Irregular Migration by Sea: A Critical Analysis of EU and EU Member State Extraterritorial Practice in the Light of International Law by Koka, Enkelejda
Kent Academic Repository
Full text document (pdf)
Copyright & reuse
Content in the Kent Academic Repository is made available for research purposes. Unless otherwise stated all
content is protected by copyright and in the absence of an open licence (eg Creative Commons), permissions 
for further reuse of content should be sought from the publisher, author or other copyright holder. 
Versions of research
The version in the Kent Academic Repository may differ from the final published version. 
Users are advised to check http://kar.kent.ac.uk for the status of the paper. Users should always cite the 
published version of record.
Enquiries
For any further enquiries regarding the licence status of this document, please contact: 
researchsupport@kent.ac.uk
If you believe this document infringes copyright then please contact the KAR admin team with the take-down 
information provided at http://kar.kent.ac.uk/contact.html
Citation for published version
Koka, Enkelejda  (2018) Irregular Migration by Sea: A Critical Analysis of EU and EU Member
State Extraterritorial Practice in the Light of International Law.   Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)
thesis, University of Kent,.
DOI




Irregular Migration by Sea: A Critical Analysis of EU and EU Member State 






A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
 
Kent Law School 
University of Kent 
 
 
Supervisors: Professor Nick Grief 











Since 2011, the arrival of more than one million migrants via irregular means on 
overcrowded, unseaworthy vessels fleeing persecution, civil war, poverty and 
devastation, has generated contradictory policies and legal measures from the EU 
and its Member States.  On the one hand, the irregular migration crisis in the 
Mediterranean has been linked with notions of humanitarianism, focusing on 
search and rescue and the provision of aid including water, food, medical care, 
and shelter; while on the other, it has prompted increased security through 
extraterritorial border controls in order to try and tackle human smuggling and 
discourage irregular migration. This thesis examines the implications of these 
extraterritorial border control measures for the rights of irregular migrants and 
TXHVWLRQVWKHPHDVXUHV¶FRPSOLDQFHZLWKLQWHUQDWLRQDOKXPDQULJKWVODZDQGRWKHU
international obligations. In particular, it investigates the Italian and Greek 
extraterritorial practices of interception and push-backs to Libya and Turkey from 
January 2014 to June 2016. )XUWKHUPRUH WKLV UHVHDUFK LQYHVWLJDWHV WKH (8¶V
policy framework IRUWKHVH0HPEHU6WDWHV¶H[WUDWHUULWRULDOERUGHUFRQWrols at sea 
which resulted in rules for the surveillance of external sHDERUGHUVXQGHU)URQWH[¶V
coordination (the Sea Borders Regulation of 15 May 2014) and, more recently, 
the EU-Turkey statement of 18 March 2016 to facilitate the accelerated return of 
irregular migrants from Greece to Turkey. 
Based on a critical appraisal of these measures in the light of international law, 
this thesis contributes to demonstrating that the Italian and Greek extraterritorial 
practices DQG WKH (8¶V VWUDWHJ\ WKURXJK )URQWHx) of µVWRSSLQJ ERDWV¶ carrying 
irregular migrants DQG µDOWHULQJ WKHLUFRXUVH¶ WR D WKLUGFRXQWU\RURQWR WKHKLJK
seas, ostensibly in order to save lives, are in breach of their obligations under 
international law, especially the Law of the Sea and international human rights 
law and refugee law. It is argued that these extraterritorial practices have not only 
violated international human rights law and other international obligations but 
have also significantly increased the death toll among irregular migrants 
attempting to cross the Mediterranean Sea. It is also argued here that the Sea 
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Borders Regulation has not only failed to unify the rules on interception, search 
and rescue and disembarkation during Frontex joint operations at sea, but also 
seeks to leJLWLPLVH WKHVH SUDFWLFHV FRQWUDU\ WR D µJRRG IDLWK¶ interpretation and 
implementation of international human rights law and other international 
obligations. 
The thesis concludes that in light of the law of international responsibility, Greece 
and Italy bear international responsibility for every internationally wrongful act or 
omission attributable to their officials during interception operations at sea in 
violation of international human rights law or other international obligations, 
notably the right to life, the duty of search and rescue, the prohibition of inhuman 
or degrading treatment or punishment and the principle of non-refoulement. 
Moreover, it is argued that the EU in its institutional role is legally responsible for 
its own internationally wrongful acts and omissions in violation of its 
international obligations.  This thesis contributes then by rebutting the 
assumptions often held in the scholarly arena by arguing that responsibility can be 
attributed to the EU for the internationally wrongful acts committed during 
Frontex joint operations and through decisions addressed to Member States 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Research Questions and Contribution to Literature 
Since 2011, with an escalated irregular migration crisis producing unprecedented 
tragic deaths at sea, Italy and Greece with the assistance of the EU (through 
Frontex1) considered the Mediterranean Sea as a space of humanitarian 
intervention, purportedly in the name of protecting life at sea. Under the newly 
GHYHORSHG FRQFHSW LQ OLWHUDWXUH WKH µH[WUD-territorialisation of border 
PDQDJHPHQW¶the EU and its Member States perceived that they had an obligation 
WRSUHYHQWµLUUHJXODUPLJUDQWV¶2 from embarking upon a perilous sea journey.3 The 
                                                          
1
  The European Border and Coast Guard Agency established by Regulation (EU) 2016/1624 of 14 
September 2016 on the European Border and Coast Guard (EBCG Regulation) [2016] OJ L 
251/55, previously known as: the European Agency for the Management of Operational 
Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union. 
2
  ,20GHILQHVLUUHJXODUPLJUDWLRQDVµPRYHPHQWWKDWWDNHVSODFHRXWVLGHWKHUHJXODWRU\QRUPVRI
the sending, transit and receiving countries. However, there is no clear or universally accepted 
GHILQLWLRQ RI LUUHJXODU PLJUDWLRQ¶ ,20 .H\ 0LJUDWLRQ 7HUPV KWWSVZZZLRPLQWNH\-
migration-terms> accessed 26 October 2017; :KHUHDVµLOOHJDOPLJUDQWPLJUDWLRQ¶LVGHILQHGDV
the illegal crossing of borders in violation of the immigration laws of a destination country. See 
UN Protocol Against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, supplementing the UN 
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, 2000, article 3(b); Also see IOM Glossary, 
49, <http://www.corteidh.or.cr/sitios/Observaciones/11/Anexo5.pdf> accessed 18 May 2018; In 
WKH0HGLWHUUDQHDQDQG$HJHDQVHDV LUUHJXODUPLJUDWLRQ LV µPL[HG¶ ,WFRQVLVWVRISHRSOH IORZV
moving for different reasons but which share the same route7KHµERDWSHRSOH¶VKDUHWKHVDPH
vessel and cross the sea without authorisation with the aim to reach EU territory. Thus, the term 
µLUUHJXODU PLJUDQW¶ LQFOXGHV DV\OXP VHHNHUV UHIXJHHV WUDIILFNHG DQG VPXJJOHG SHUVRQV
unaccompanied children, stateless persons, economic migrants and displaced persons, see Anna 
7ULDQGDI\OOLGRX DQG $QJHOLNL 'LPLWULDGL µ0LJUDWLRQ 0DQDJHPHQW DW WKH 2XWSRVWV RI WKH
(XURSHDQ 8QLRQ¶  */5  -  -XGLWK .XPLQ µ7KH &KDOOHQJH RI 0L[HG
0LJUDWLRQE\6HD¶)MR 45, 49; Nathalie Bernardie-Tahir and Camille Schmoll, Islands 
and Undesirables: Introduction to the Special Issue on Irregular Migration in Southern European 
Islands (2014) JIRS 12(2), 87-102, 88-89. 
3
  9LUJLQLH*XLUDXGRQµ%HIRUHWKH(8%RUGHU5HPRWH&RQWURORIWKH³+XGGOHG0DVVHV´¶LQ.HHV
Groenendijk, Elspeth Guild and PaulMinderhoud (eds), ,Q6HDUFKRI(XURSH¶V%RUGHUV(Kluwer 
Law International 2003) 191; Elspeth Guild and Didier Bigo, µ7KH Transformation of European 
Border &RQWUROV¶ in Bernard Ryan and Valsamis Mitsilegas (eds), Extraterritorial Immigration 
Control: Legal Challenges (Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff, 2010) 258; Maribel Casas-Cortes and 
6HEDVWLDQ &REDUUXELDV µ6WUHWFKLQJ %RUGHUV %H\RQG 6RYHUHLJQ 7HUULWRULHV" 0DSSLQJ (8 DQG
6SDLQ¶V %RUGHU ([WHUQDOL]DWLRQ 3ROLFLHV¶  Geopolítica(s) 2(1) 71-90, 80; Luisa Marin, 
µ3ROLFLQJ(8¶V([WHUQDO%RUGHUV$&KDOOHQJHIRUWKH5XOHRI/DZDQG)XQGDPHQWDO5LJKWVLQ
the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice? An analysis of Frontex Joint Operations at the 
SRXWKHUQ0DULWLPH%RUGHU¶-&(5-487, 486; Triandafyllidou and Dimitriadi (n 
27L]LDQD7RUUHVLµ$Q(PHUJLQJ5HJXODWRU\)UDPHZRUNIRU0LJUDWLRQ¶*/5
648-665, 656; Maribel Casas-Cortes, Sebastian Cobarrubias and John Pickles, µ5LGLQJ5RXWHV
DQG ,WLQHUDQW %RUGHUV $XWRQRP\ RI 0LJUDWLRQ DQG %RUGHU ([WHUQDOL]DWLRQ¶  $QWLSRGH
47(4) 894-914, 895; emphasis added. 
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most adequate response seemed to be that of further security and the 
militarisation4 of migration as an expansion of State sovereignty.5 As irregular 
migrants continue to arrive in mass, the EU border management strategy remains 
a key policy priority on the EU agenda.6  Thus, as a policy area in development, 
the literature assessing the human rights violations and the consequent 
international responsibility of the various actors involved in extraterritorial 
practices has been limited. On this basis, the thesis focuses on the following 
developments: actual violations of international obligations resulting from Italian 
and Greek extraterritorial practice, a critical assessment of the EU Regulation 
establishing rules for the surveillance of external sea borders (Sea Borders 
Regulation)7 under Frontex coordination for compliance with international 
obligations and the responsibility of Italy, Greece and that of the EU in its 
collective role for breaches of international obligations under the law of 
international responsibility.8 
This research raises the following questions and sub-questions:  1. Whether the 
Italian and Greek extraterritorial practices are consistent with international human 
rights law, refugee law and the Law of the Sea? Do these extraterritorial measures 
violate international law obligations such as non-refoulement, and the right to 
OHDYHRQH¶VRZQFRXQWU\FRPELQHGZLWKWKHULJKWWRDV\OXP" 2. Whether the Sea 
                                                          
4
 3HWHU.UDVNDµ0LOLWDUL]DWLRQDQG3ROLFLQJ± Its Relevance to 21st &HQWXU\3ROLFH¶3ROLFLQJ
1-  µIt is the process of arming, organizing, planning, training for, threatening, and 
VRPHWLPHV LPSOHPHQWLQJ YLROHQW FRQIOLFW¶; 5HHFH -RQHV DQG &RUH\ -RKQVRQ µ%RUGHU
Militarisation and the Re-DUWLFXODWLRQRI6RYHUHLJQW\¶7,%*-200, 188.  
5
  Jones and Johnson (n 4) 188; Peter 5REHUWV µ7KH0LOLWDULVDWLRQRI0LJUDWLRQ)URP7ULWRQ WR
6RILD$VVHVVLQJWKH&UHGLELOLW\RIWKH(8¶V1DYDO,QWHUYHQWLRQVDJDLQVW0LJUDQW6PXJJOLQJLQ
WKH 0HGLWHUUDQHDQ¶ LQ 7XHVGD\ 5HLWDQR 6DVKD -HVSHUVRQ /XFLD 5XL]-Benitez de Lugo (eds), 
Militarised Responses to Transnational Organised Crime (Palgrave, 2017) 217-233. 
6
  European Commission, Communication on the Delivery of the European Agenda on Migration 
COM (2017) 55 final, 2. 
7
  Regulation (EU) No 656/2014 establishing rules for the surveillance of the external sea borders 
in the context of operational cooperation coordinated by the European Agency for the 
Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the 
European Union (Sea Borders Regulation) OJ L189/93 [2014] based on TFEU, article 77(2)(d). 
8
  ILC, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, November  
2001, Supplement No 10 (A/56/10), chp.IV.E. (ASR); ILC, Draft Articles on Responsibility of 




Borders Regulation is compatible with international human rights law, refugee 
law and the Law of the Sea? Has the Sea Borders Regulation created a new 
immigration regime for Member State interception, search and rescue as well as 
disembarkation practices when conducted under Frontex coordination?  3.   
Whether the EU is attributed with responsibility for the internationally wrongful 
acts committed during Frontex joint operations and/or when adopting decisions 
and authorizations obliging its Member States to commit an act that would be 
internationally wrongful in light of the law of international responsibility? Is the 
EU using the Frontex regulatory framework to avoid its responsibility as the 
responsible entity in control of Frontex seconded-border guards? Have the Sea 
Borders Regulation and the EU-Turkey statement been designed to circumvent 
WKH(8¶V UHVSRQVLELOLW\ IRUYLRODWLRQVRI its international obligations such as the 
non-refoulement principle?  
 Hence, this research contribution critically analyses: 1) the Greek extraterritorial 
practices through interception and push-backs to Turkey from January 2014 to 
June 2016, and the Italian indirect push-backs with Libya through the EU Border 
Assistance Mission as of 22 May 2013 (EUBAM Libya)9 - Turkey and Libya 
being third countries with poor human rights records, )URQWH[¶VLQYROYHPHQWLQ
violations of human rights and other international obligations through activities 
including interception, push-back, disembarkation and 3) the legal responsibility 
of Italy, Greece, and the EU for violations of international obligations.  
 
It is argued that these extraterritorial measures in the form of interception and 
push-EDFNV YLRODWH WKH LQWHUQDWLRQDO REOLJDWLRQV RI *UHHFH ,WDO\ DQG WKH (8¶V
Furthermore, the thesis argues that these extraterritorial border controls have had 
the adverse effect of adopting two parallel asylum and immigration legal 
frameworks differentiating between irregular migrants who arrive by sea and 
those who arrive by land; hence, offering fewer legal safeguards to those irregular 
                                                          
9
  Council Decision 2013/233/CFSP On 22 May 2013 on the European Union Integrated Border 
Management Assistance Mission in Libya (EUBAM Libya) [2013] OJ L138/15. 
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entrants by sea. However, it is concluded that international refugee and human 
rights law, although its extraterritorial application conflicts with national and 
supranational public security interests, protects persons in need of international 
protection regardless of whether they enter by regular or irregular means. Through 
its original contribution, this thesis has compared the economic cost figures for 
Italy and Greece on the irregular migration crisis to the costs of pecuniary, non-
pecuniary damages, costs and expenses awarded by the ECtHR for breaches of 
human rights and other international obligations and has found that violations of 
international refugee and human rights law have not transpired because of lack of 
knowleGJH RQ WKHVH FRQYHQWLRQV¶ H[WUDWHUULWRULDO DSSOLFDWLRQ EXW EHFDXVH WKH
economic costs for non-compliance are definitely lower than the costs of 
compliance.10  
 
It is argued that these extraterritorial measures have as their main objective the 
transformation of the Mediterranean and Aegean seas into a migration 
containment belt to block flows of irregular migrants to EU territory as to avoid 
international responsibility for any violations of international obligations 
committed during these extraterritorial border controls. Confronted with the 
complexities of the national and international judiciary systems, once returned to 
country of departure, victims of illicit border control practices encounter 
difficulties from seeking redress against the participating Member States in 
Frontex joint operations.  The assumption created in existing literature and the 
underdeveloped principles of shared responsibility is that multi-party attributions 
of the same internationally wrongful acts are difficult to prove and thus are 
capable of diluting international responsibility. Hence, these extraterritorial 
measures have been arguably designed to create and exploit gaps in the rule of 
ODZ DQG LQ WKH OHJDO UHJLPH RI 6WDWH DQG LQWHUQDWLRQDO RUJDQLVDWLRQV¶ OHJDO
responsibility. 
 
                                                          
10
 See Chapter 4, section 4.6. 
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This academic research aims to provide an original contribution to current 
literature regarding the application of the law of international responsibility in 
terms of Italian and Greek push-back practices and Frontex joint operations. This 
thesis originally contributes to literature by rebutting the assumption RIWKH(8¶V
non-responsibility created by the underdeveloped principles of international 
responsibility as a result of jurisdictional limitations and the lack of scholarly 
literature making reference to situations or consequences of responsibility for the 
EU when it takes advantage of its regulatory framework in light of Articles 4, 7 
and 17 ARIO. It draws on data from NGOs and civil society on illicit 
extraterritorial practices on the ground and the existing set of legal literature on 
the extraterritorial application of international human rights, refugee law and the 
law on international responsibility. This research further contributes to literature 
by identifying the legal gaps in international protection created by the Sea Borders 
Regulation in which is argued to discriminate and undermine the rights of 
irregular migrants that arrive by sea compared to those arriving by land.  
 16 
 
1.2 Literature Review  
This thesis differs from the existing literature in that it does not analyse irregular 
migration solely from a security and State sovereignty perspective but examines 
the effects that security has on irregular migration by sea, focusing on the 
violation of human rights and other international obligations caused by Italian and 
Greek extraterritorial border control practices with EU assistance through 
Frontex. Established literature in irregular migration and border control studies 
has focused on issues of security and the militarisation of border controls. 
Divergent lines of argument have been put forward between legal scholars on 
prioritising QDWLRQDO VRYHUHLJQW\ WR FRQWURO RQH¶V ERUGHUV RYHU FRPSOLDQFH ZLWK
international human rights law. Ilse van Liempt and Stephanie Sersli argue that 
the on-going battle between Member States and organised criminal networks 
(described as the dark side of globalisation) challenge not only fundamental 
principles of international law but also State sovereignty.11 With the help of 
KXPDQVPXJJOHUVWKH\DUJXHWKDWDQDWLRQ¶VVRYHUHLJQ power comes under threat 
E\ WKH µXQVDQFWLRQHG PRYHPHQW¶ DOORZLQJ XQZDQWHG PLJUDQWV WR UHDFK 0HPEHU
State territory, in revelation of a failed border regime.12  
 
Van Liempt and Sersli argue that by re-imagining the enemy from being a State to 
D µWUDQVQDWLRQDO QHWZRUN RI SULYDWH DFWRUV LH RUJDQL]HG FULPH¶ DOO WKH ERUGHU
guard needs to focus the inquiry on is how the person crossed the border and with 
whom, instead of whether that person is escaping from a despotic regime.13 This 
perspective would allow Member States to consider human smuggling as a threat 
                                                          
11
 ,OVHYDQ/LHPSWDQG6WHSKDQLH6HUVOLµ6WDWH5HVSRQVHVDQG0LJUDQW([SHULHQFHVZLWK+XPDQ
6PXJJOLQJ $ 5HDOLW\ &KHFN¶  $QWLSRGH  -1046, 1029; Also see John Salt, 
µ7UDIILFNLQJDQG+XPDQ6PXJJOLQJD(XURSHDQ3HUVSHFWLYH¶,06SHFLDO,VVXH
2000/1, 31-56, 32 <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1468-2435.00114/pdf> accessed 
21 January 2017. 
12
 Ilse van Liempt and Jeroen Doomernik, µMigrant's Agency in the Smuggling Process: The 
perspectives of Smuggled Migrants in the 1HWKHUODQGV¶ (2006) IM 44(4) 165±190; Ilse van 
Liempt, Navigating Borders: Inside Perspectives on the Process of Human Smuggling into the 
Netherlands (Amsterdam University Press, 2007); Van Liempt and Sersli (n 11) 1029. 
13
 Van Liempt and Sersli (n 11) 1029. 
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WR WKH 6WDWH UDWKHU WKDQ DV µD UHDFWLRQ RQ UHVWULFWLRQV SRVHG E\ VWDWHV¶14 Van 
Liempt and Sersli have focused their study of irregular migration under the inter-
relationship of boat people, State sovereignty and the criminalization of human 
smuggling in the EU. Reece Jones and Corey Johnson argue that threats of 
terrorism and immigration have resulted in a shift to the militarization of borders 
which represent an expansion of State sovereigny into new spaces.15 Nora 
Markard, on the other hand, considers that the fight against irregular migration is 
not justified on grounds of national security and public order. To justify 
restrictions on grounds of national security and public order, Markard argues that 
therHPXVWEHDQDFWXDOOLQNEHWZHHQWKHLQGLYLGXDO¶VFRQGXFWDQGKLVKHUWKUHDWWR
national security which must be genuine and present.16  
 
Didier Bigo, incorporating the above arguments, argues that a genuine link 
between national security and the threat of irregular migration cannot be 
established because these security measures are not adopted to protect public 
RUGHU EXW DUH SDUW RI D µERUGHU JDPH¶17 On the basis of empirical research 
conducted from 2006-2013, Bigo concluded that military operations used for 
border control under Frontex or under bilateral agreements were not purely a 
VHFXULW\PHDVXUHEXWDGRSWHGDVSDUWRID µERUGHUJDPH¶ WRNHHS WKHµXQZDQWHG¶
away from EU territory.18 $FFRUGLQJWR%LJR¶VµERUGHUJDPH¶VPXJJOHUVRUJDQLVH
themselves into developing new routes not caught by State surveillance, whereas 
Member States through pre-emptive interception stop irregular migrants from 
                                                          
14
 Van Liempt and Sersli (n 11) 1029; also see David Kyle and Christina Siracusa, µSeeing the 
State Like a Migrant: Why So Many Non-criminals Break Immigration Laws¶ LQ Willem van 
Schendel and Itty Abraham (eds), Illicit Flows and Criminal Things States, Borders, and the 
Other Side of Globalization (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2005) 153-176. 
15
 Jones and Johnson (n 4) 187. 
16
 Stamose v Bulgaria Application no 29713/05 (27 November 2012) paragraph 35; 
Nora 0DUNDUGµ7Ke Right to Leave by Sea: Legal Limits on EU Migration Control by Third 
&RXQWULHV¶(2016) EJIL 27(3) 591-616, 609. 
17
 'LGLHU %LJR µ7KH ,QVHFXULWL]DWLRQ 3UDFWLFHV RI WKH 7KUHH 8QLYHUVHV RI (8 %RUGHU &RQWURO
Military/Navy-border Guards/Police ± Database AnDO\VWV¶  6$*(  -225, 212 
<http://sdi.sagepub.com/content/45/3/209.full.pdf+html> accessed 26 October 2017. 
18
 Bigo (n 17) 212; empirical research from 2006-2013 under the FP6 Challenge research 
programme financed by the European Commission; Also see Peter Andréas, Border Games, 
Policing the US-Mexico Divide (Cornell University Press, 2000). 
 18 
 
reaching EU territory and through the practice of push-back ensure their 
immediate return to the country of departure. Hence, through interception 
measures and EUROSUR19 (an EU electronic system of surveillance) they 
established an electronic wall to separate Europe from North Africa and the 
Middle East.20  
 
This thesis argues that a genuine link between irregular migration and 
extraterritorial border control measures purportedly justified in the name of 
terrorism and State security cannot be established. There is no evidence that 
irregular migration leads to increased terrorist activity.21 The report published by 
the UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism, Ben Emmerson, stated that the 
overly-restrictive migration policies could not be justified on grounds of State 
security.22 On the contrary, the more restrictive migration policies that criminalise 
irregular migration and which engage in push-back operations increase the covert 
movements of people by smugglers which as a consequence may increase terrorist 
activities.23 It is therefore argued that the measures undertaken under the Protocol 
on migrant smuggling are not proportionate to their aim and do not meet the tests 
of legality and necessity.24  
 
%LJRIXUWKHUDUJXHGWKDWWKLVµERUGHUJDPH¶SURGXFHGXQGHVLUDEOHHIIHFWVWXUQLQJ
smugglers routes into something more organised, avoiding the need to play hide 
                                                          
19
 Regulation (EU) No 1052/2013 establishing the European Border Surveillance System 
(EUROSUR Regulation) (OJ L 295/11, 6.11.2013). 
20
 Bigo (n 17) 212. 
21
 UN, µ3URPRWLRQDQG3URWHFWLRQRI+XPDQ5LJKWVDQG)XQGDPHQWDO)UHHGRPV:KLOH&RXQWHULQJ
7HUURULVP¶ %HQ (PPHUVRQ  6HSWHPEHU  $ -5, particularly paragraph 8; 
2+&+5 µ5HIXJHHV DQG 7HUURULVP ³1R (YLGHQFH RI 5LVN´ ± New Report by UN Expert on 
Counter-7HUURULVP¶
<http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=20734&LangID=E
accessed> 17 October  2017. 
22
 81µ3URPRWLRQDQG3URWHFWLRQRI+XPDQ5LJKWVQ21) paragraph 11.  
23
 81µ3URPRWLRQDQG3URWHFWLRQRI+XPDQ5LJKWVQ21) paragraph 11. 
24
 UN General Assembly, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 16 
December 1966, United Nations, Treaty Series, Volume 999, 171 (entry into force 23 March 
1976) article 12(3). 
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DQG VHHN 3LQQLQJ WKHLU KRSHV XSRQ 0HPEHU 6WDWHV¶ FRPSOLDQFH ZLWK WKHLU
refugee, human rights and search and rescue obligations towards overcrowded 
boats of irregular migrants in distress, all the smugglers had to do was to place 
irregular migrants on cheap, unsophisticated vessels often with defective engines 
controlled by the migrants themselves and broadcast a distress call once on the 
high seas.25 In response, Member States were determined to combat the human 
smugglers. Bigo argued that they intentionally misinterpreted their international 
obligations on search and rescue and disembarkation in order to avoid 
responsibility for the individuals who unwittingly assist the growing industry of 
organised crime.26 As a consequence, however, Member States began avoidance 
behaviour which has had a direct contribution to migrant deaths at sea.27  
 
Thomas Spijkerboer furthers the argument that extraterritorial border control 
policies contribute to border deaths. Unable to conduct extensive empirical 
UHVHDUFK WR FRQILUPKLVSUHVXPSWLRQ6SLMNHUERHU DUJXHV WKDW WKH µDYDLODEOHGDWD
PDNH LW SODXVLEOH¶ WR KROG WKDW D UHODWLRQVKLS H[LVWV %DVHG RQ WKH GDWD PDGH
available by NGOs such as United against Racism, Fortress Europe, and other 
ORFDO DQG VKRUW WHUP VWXGLHV 6SLMNHUERHU FRQFOXGHG µWKH LQWHQVLILFDWLRQ RI
European border control policies has not reduced the number of migrants; the 
intensification of European border control policies has led to the shifting of 
undocumented migration to ever more dangerous routes; and the number of 
UHJLVWHUHGERUGHUGHDWKVKDVLQFUHDVHGFRQVLGHUDEO\RYHUWKH\HDUV¶28  Hence, on 
these grounds Spijkerboer argues that lack of legal channels and intensified 
ERUGHU FRQWUROV KDYH µOHG WR Pore dangerous travel routes, with increasing 
                                                          
25
 Van Liempt and Sersli (n 11) 1038. 
26
 Bigo (n 17) 212. 
27
 Bigo (n 17) 211. 
28
 7KRPDV6SLMNHUERHU µ7KH+XPDQ&RVWVRI%RUGHU&RQWURO¶ (-0/-139; Jorgen 
&DUOLQJµ0LJUDWLRQ&RQWURODQG0LJUDQW)DWDOLWLHVDWWKH6SDQLVK-$IULFDQ%RUGHUV¶,05
41(2), 316-343; Dirk Godenau and Manuel Zapata HerQDQGH]µ7KH&DVHRIWKH&DQDU\,VODQGV
6SDLQ$5HJLRQRI7UDQVLW%HWZHHQ$IULFDDQG(XURSH¶LQ*HPPD3LQ\ROHG Immigration 
)ORZV DQG WKH 0DQDJHPHQW RI WKH (8¶V 6RXWKHUQ 0DULWLPH %RUGHUV (Documentos CIDOB 
Migraciones 17, 2008) 13-43; Thomas Spijkerboer, Are European States Accountable for 




IDWDOLWLHV DV DSUHGLFWDEOH FRQVHTXHQFH¶29 Thus, upon knowledge of such effect, 
he argues that Member States have a positive obligation to adapt their policies so 
as to minimize the undesirable side-effect of deaths at sea. He further argues that 
border deaths give rise to three positive obligations: 1) to carry out an 
investigation into fatalities at EU borders, 2) to minimize the number of fatalities 
by assessing border control policies, and 3) to identify victims and inform 
relatives.30 Spijkerboer merely touches upon the topic of EU collective 
responsibility holding that these positive obligations belong not only to 
Mediterranean States but to all European States under a collective responsibility; 




DIRUPRIµVWUXFWXUDOYLROHQFH¶XVHGDVDGHWHUUHQW WRRO LQ WKHFUXHOOHVW LQKXPDQ
way.32 To avoiG(852685¶VGHWHFWLRQKXPDQVPXJJOHUVKDYHSODFHGDVPDQ\
irregular migrants as possible on cheap, unsophisticated vessels often with 
defective engines controlled by the migrants themselves. Greek coastguards on 
the other hand, have been alleged to have intentionally endangered the lives of 
irregular migrants through seizing their boat engine and leaving them stranded at 
sea. Each Member State has a positive obligation to safeguard the lives of 
individuals within its jurisdiction.33 In addition, they must take preventative 
                                                          
29
 Spijkerboer, Are European States Accountable (n 28) 66; The EU manages the entry of non-EU 
FLWL]HQV XQGHU WKH YLVD UHJLPH  $Q (8 µEODFN-OLVW¶ KDV EHHQ FUHDWHG OLVWLQJ  WKLUG 6WDWHV
whose nationals are required to obtain a visa in order to enter Member State territory. Not 
surprisingly, the countries VLWXDWHGLQWKH0HGLWHUUDQHDQUHJLRQDUHLQFOXGHGLQWKLVµEODFN-OLVW¶
See Regulation (EC) No 810/2009 establishing a Community Code on Visas (Visa Code) [2009] 
OJ L243; Regulation (EC) No 851/2005 of 2 June 2005 amending Regulation (EC) No 
539/2001 listing the third countries whose nationals must be in possession of visas when 
crossing the external borders and those whose nationals are exempt from that requirement as 
regards the reciprocity mechanism, [2005] OJ L 141/3; Israel and Turkey are not included 
ZLWKLQWKHµEODFN-OLVW¶ 
30
 Spijkerboer, Are European States Accountable (n 28) 72. 
31
 Spijkerboer, Are European States Accountable (n 28) 73. 
32
 Leanne Weber and Sharon Pickering, Globalization and Borders: Death at the Global Frontier  
(London, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011) 93-118. 
33
 UN General Assembly, Convention on the High Seas 1958, 29 April 1958, United Nations,  
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measures to assist these boats and avoid any illicit practices leading to the 
capsizing of boats resulting in deaths.34 A positive duty is imposed on Greece by 
the ECHR to commence investigations to identify those dying at sea and punish 
those responsible for causing these deaths.35 Failure to commence investigations 
into alleged human rights violations constitutes an internationally wrongful act 
imputing Greece with international responsibility. It is argued that WKH (8¶V
sophisticated surveillance combined with the illicit Greek push-back practices 
have turned the Mediterranean Sea into a graveyard. The probability of dying in 
the Mediterranean Sea in 2005-2014 has been increased from 20.5% to at least 
45% in the first four months of 2015.36 In 2016, the probability of dying on the 
Libya to Italy route was ten times higher than the crossing from Turkey to 
Greece.37 7KXV WKHVH H[WUDWHUULWRULDO WRROV KDYH HQGDQJHUHG LUUHJXODU PLJUDQWV¶
lives contrary to the µright of life¶.38  
 
Furthermore, these extraterritorial border control measures have given rise to 
various legal issues with serious consequences for international provisions on 
search and rescue and the Law of the Sea. Anja Klug has analysed irregular 
PDULWLPHPRYHPHQWVDUJXLQJWKDWWKH\µSRVe multi-faceted challenges relating to 
                                                                                                                                                              
Treaty Series, Volume 450, 11 (entered into force on 30 September 1962) article 12; 
International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974 (SOLAS) 1184 UNTS 3, article 33; 
International Maritime Organization, International Convention on Salvage, 28 April 1989, UNT 
33479 (entry into force 14 July 1996), article 7; UN General Assembly, Convention on the Law 
of the Sea (UNCLOS) UNTS 31363 (adopted 10 December 1982, entered into force in 1994) 
article 98; Osman v United Kingdom Application no 23452/94 (1998) ECHR 101, paragraph 
115; Van Dijk and others, Theory and Practice of the European Convention on Human Rights 
(4th edn Antwerp, Intersentia 2006) 355.  
34
 Öneryildiz v Turkey Application no 48939/99 [2004] ECHR 657, paragraphs 62-65; Osman (n  
33) paragraph 93. 
35
 Council of Europe, European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental  
Freedoms, as amended by Protocols Nos. 11 and 14, 4 November 1950, ETS 5 (entry into force 
4 November 1950) (ECHR), article 2(2) read in conjunction with article 1; McCann and Others 
v the United Kingdom Application no 18984/91 (1995) Series A no 324, paragraph 161; Kelly 
and Others v the United Kingdom Application no 69076/01 (4 May 2001) paragraph 94. 
36
 Philippe Fargues and Anna Di Bartolomeo, Drowned Europe 2015, European University 
Institute, Migration Policy Centre, 3.  
37
 5HIXJHHVDQG0LJUDQWVµ815HIXJHH$JHQF\LV'HDGOLHVW<HDUIRURefugees Crossing to 
(XURSH YLD &HQWUDO 0HGLWHUUDQHDQ¶  6HSWHPEHU  KWWSVUHIXJHHVPLJUDQWVXQRUJXQ-
refugee-agency-2016-deadliest-year-refugees-crossing-europe-central-mediterranean> accessed 
24 October 2017. 
38
 See Chapter 4, section 4.3 on push-EDFNVHQGDQJHULQJPLJUDQWV¶OLYHV 
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refugee protection, border control and security, as well as inter-6WDWHUHODWLRQV¶39 
Klug argues that as irregular migrants travel in unseaworthy and overcrowded 
vessels giving rise to distress situations, a duty to rescue is imposed on 
LQWHUFHSWLQJ 6WDWHV WR GLVHPEDUN WKHP DW D µSODFH RI VDIHW\¶40 However, in the 
absence of an effective burden-sharing mechanism in the EU for irregular 
migratory flows, disembarkation rules have become problematic because of the 
Member 6WDWHV¶UHOXFWDQFHWRDFFHSW WKHUHVSRQVLELOLW\WRKRVW LUUHJXODUPLJUDQWV
whom they rescue. Clearly, the obligations arising out of search and rescue 
RSHUDWLRQV FRQIOLFW ZLWK 0HPEHU 6WDWHV¶ LQWHUHVWV LQ PDQDJLQJ PLJUDWLRQ DQG
ensuring their security. However, these interests cannot justify or legitimise 
avoidance behaviour towards rescue activities in the Mediterranean Sea which 
amount to a violation of the international search and rescue obligations. In 
accordance with the Common European Asylum system (CEAS)41 and the Dublin 
Regulation,42 those Member States rescuing or hosting the irregular migrants have 
to bear the burden of reception and ensure that they provide adequate legal 
safeguards. Consequently, as Violeta Moreno-Lax and Tugba Basaran put it, 
Member States such as Italy and Greece are discouraged from participating in 
rescue operations.43 Moreover, these States have adopted inconsistent 
interpretations and applications of WHUPVVXFKDVµGLVWUHVV¶µGLVHPEDUNDWLRQ¶DQG
                                                          
39
 $QMD.OXJµ6WUHQJWKHQLQJWKH3URWHFWLRQRI0LJUDQWVDQG5HIXJHHVLQ'LVWUHVVDW6HDWKURXJK
International Cooperation and Burden-6KDULQJ¶,-5/-64. 
40
 International Maritime Organization (IMO), International Convention on Maritime Search and  
Rescue, (SAR Convention) 27 April 1979, 1403 UNTS (entry into force: 22 June 1985), Annex 
3, Chapter I, 1.3.2. 
41
 The Common European Asylum system (CEAS) harmonises procedural and substantive law on 
Asylum, based on TFEU, article 78(1). 
42
 Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the 
Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in 
one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person (recast), OJ L 180/31, 
29.6.2013 (Dublin Regulation) based on TFEU, article 78(2)(e), and articles 3, 5, and 18; 
Directive 2008/115/EC on common standards and procedures in Member States for returning 
illegally staying third-country nationals (Return Directive), [2008] OJ L 348/98, article 1, and 
articles 6 -14; legal basis ex TEC, article 63(3)(b). 
43
 7XJED%DVDUDQµ7KH6DYHGDQGWKH'URZQHG*RYHUQLQJ,QGLIIHUHQFHLQWKH1DPHRI6HFXULW\¶
(2015) SD 46(3) 205-220, 206; Violeta Moreno-/D[ ³6HHNLQJ $V\OXP LQ WKH0HGLWHUUDQHDQ
$JDLQVW D )UDJPHQWDU\ 5HDGLQJ RI (8 0HPEHU 6WDWHV¶ 2EOLJDWLRQV $FFUXLQJ DW 6HD´ 
IJRL 23(2) 174-220, 175 <https://academic-oup-com.chain.kent.ac.uk/ijrl/article-
lookup/doi/10.1093/ijrl/eer005> accessed 24 October 2017. 
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µSODFHRIVDIHW\¶LQWKHUHOHYDnt international Conventions, giving rise to different 
national approaches to the irregular migration crisis.44  
 
+RZHYHUDQ\LQFRQVLVWHQWLQWHUSUHWDWLRQRIµGLVWUHVV¶DQGµSODFHRIVDIHW\¶LVIDWDO
to the most fundamental principle, the µULJKW WR OLIH¶45 and inconsistency in 
UHODWLRQWRµGLVHPEDUNDWLRQ¶OHDGVWRYLRODWLRQVRIWKHSULQFLSOHRInon-refoulement 
and the prohibition of collective expulsions.46 Klug argues that a solution to 
Member State avoidance behaviour on search and rescue would be to establish 
agreements to respond to irregular maritime movements through a broader 
µ5HJLRQDO&RRSHUDWLRQ)UDPHZRUN¶ZKLFKFRXOGDGHTXDWHO\UHVSRQGWRPDULWLPH
distress incidents and rescue at sea, saving the lives of many vulnerable 
individuals.47 However, it is argued that this framework would not provide a 
durable solution to the question on the responsible State as set out by the Dublin 
Regulation.  
 
Furthermore, this thesis argues that although the SAR Convention and the Sea 
Borders Regulation have set out clear rules on when to initiate search and rescue, 
they have not addressed the issue of responsibility for and the consequences of 
failed rescue scenarios by inactive SAR States; thereby creating a gap in the legal 
framework on State responsibility for negligent or intentional failed rescues.  It is 
argued here that one possible solution to this legal vacuum would be to impose de 
jure responsibility on the State in which the distress call is made within its SAR 
zone to actively respond to that call. Seline Trevisanut and Amy Moen argue that 
people in distress place their lives in the hands of the State receiving the call, 
imposing an obligation on States not only to perform the SAR service but to 
SURYLGH LW ZLWK µGXH GLOLJHQFH¶ ZKHQ DVVXPLQJ UHVSRQVLELOLW\ IRU Wheir SAR 
                                                          
44
 Violeta Moreno-Lax, The Interdiction of Asylum Seekers at Sea: Law and (Mal)practice in 
Europe and Australia (Policy Brief 4, 2017) 7-8. 
45
 ECHR, article 2; Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 26 October 
2012, 2012/C 326/02 (EU Charter) article 2; ICCPR, article 6; see Chapter 5 for more detail. 
46
 Basaran, µ7KH6DYHGDQGWKH'URZQHG¶ (n 43) 206-207. 
47
 Klug (n 39) 60. 
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zone.48 Therefore, at the moment D GLVWUHVV FDOO LV PDGH DQ µH[FOXVLYH ORQJ
distance de facto FRQWURO¶ LV FUHDWHG FUHDWLQJ µD UHODWLRQVKLS¶ sufficient to make 
the ECHR applicable.49 This de facto control becomes de jure at the moment that 
the distress call comes within the SAR zone. This thesis argues that coastal States 
have a positive obligation to take preventative measures to counter immediate 
risks to persons in distress who come under their responsibility ± leading to 
UHFRJQLWLRQRIDµULJKWWREHUHVFXHG¶  
 
The EU attempted to offer a solution to these inconsistent national interpretations, 
through the adoption of the Sea Borders Regulation,50 where Member States 
agreed on a uniform interpretation of principles such as rescue, disembarkation 
and distress combining border control and search and rescue within one 
5HJXODWLRQ RSHUDWLRQDO XQGHU )URQWH[¶V FRRUGLQDWLRQ 'HVSLWH KXPDQ ULJKWV
safeguards expressly set out within the Regulation, Den Heijer and Basaran argue 
that in practice the rules do not effectively assist in a uniform interpretation on the 
WHUPV µGLVWUHVV¶ µGLVHPEDUNDWLRQ¶ DQG µSODFH RI VDIHW\¶51 By way of original 
contribution, it is argued in this thesis that Greece, the host Member States to 
Poseidon operation,52 and Italy host Member State to Operation Triton,53 do not 
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 $P\ 0RHQ µ)RU 7KRVH LQ 3HULO RQ WKH 6HD 6HDUFK DQG 5HVFXH XQGHU WKH /DZ RI WKH 6HD
&RQYHQWLRQ¶ 2<B 377- µ$UWLFOH UHSUHVHQWV WKH LPSRVLWLRQRID
positive duty, with no clear understanding of its minimum threshold or its outer limit, and no 
FOHDULQGLFDWLRQRIWKHUHODWLRQVKLSWKDWJLYHVULVHWRVXFKDQREOLJDWLRQ«6HDUFKDQGUHVcue 
under Article 98(2) then cannot be the mere promotion of a service, but the promotion of a 
certain level of VHUYLFH¶ 6HOLQH 7UHYLVDQXW ³,V 7KHUH D 5LJKW WR EH 5HVFXHG DW 6HD" $
&RQVWUXFWLYH 9LHZ´  KWWSZZZTLO-qdi.org/is-there-a-right-to-be-rescued-at-sea-a-
constructive-view/> accessed 23 October 2017; see Furdík v Slovakia Application no 42994/05 




 Sea Borders Regulation (n 7) see articles 6-10. 
51
 Basaran, µ7KH 6DYHG DQd the Drowned¶ Q   0DDUWHQ GHQ +HLMHU µ)URQWH[ DQG WKH
6KLIWLQJ $SSURDFKHV WR %RDW 0LJUDWLRQ LQ WKH (XURSHDQ 8QLRQ $ /HJDO $QDO\VLV¶ LQ 5XEHQ
Zaiotti (ed), Externalizing Migration Management: Europe, North America and the Spread of 
µ5HPRWH &RQWURO¶ 3UDFWLFHV (Routledge Research in Place, Space and Politics, 2016) 54; See 
Chapter 2, section 2.8. 
52
 Frontex, Poseidon Sea, since 2014 <http://frontex.europa.eu/operations/archive-of- 
operations/Lq8P8c> accessed 27 October 2017; replaced by Poseidon Rapid Intervention from 
28 December 2016, )URQWH[ ³)URQWH[ DQG *UHHFH $JUHH RQ 2SHUDWLRQDO 3ODQ IRU Poseidon 
5DSLG ,QWHUYHQWLRQ´  'HFHPEHU  KWWSIURQWH[HXURSDHXQHZVIURQWH[-and-greece-
agree-on-operational-plan-for-poseidon-rapid-intervention-yiSxga> accessed 27 October 2017. 
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IXOILO WKH µVDIH FRXQWU\¶ FULWHULD JRYHUQLQJ GLVHPEDUNDWLRQ54 The Sea Border 
Regulation does not offer an alternative course of action in circumstances when 
the host/coastal Member State do not guarantee an effective functional asylum 
system. It is argued therefore that the provisions on interception and 
disembarkation under the Sea Borders Regulation violate EU and international 
obligations. 
 
Guy Goodwin-Gill, Maarten Den Heijer, Daniel Bethlehem and Elihu 
Lauterpracht are among the leading scholars analysing the effects of 
extraterritorial border control on asylum, the non-refoulement principle and the 
prohibition of collective expulsions.55 Despite the claims of Member States that 
international refugee and human rights laws apply only territorially, Den Heijer, 
Goodwin-Gill and Kim Seunghwan argue that the application of the non-
refoulement obligation extends beyond State territory.56 Thus, any conduct 
applied extraterritorially that violates refugee and other international human right 
laws and obligations such as non-refoulement makes States internationally 
responsible for those acts just as they would be if the same conduct had been 
DSSOLHGZLWKLQ WKHLU WHUULWRU\'HQ+HLMHU¶V DUJXPHQW VXSSRUWHGE\(&W+5FDVH
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law,57 concludes that overarching norms such as the prohibition of refoulement 
are equally applicable to irregular migrants subjected to pre-border control 
measures.58 
 
From an international human rights law perspective, Lauterpacht and Bethlehem 
argue that the prohibition of refoulement LV D µIXQGDPHQWDO FRPSRQHQW RI WKH
customary prohibition of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
SXQLVKPHQW¶59 The principle of non-refoulement applies regardless of the status 
or conduct of the individual at risk.60 They further argue that what is material is 
not the form of return by the State, but rather the effect of the measure which 
would put the individual at risk if returned to a place where s/he would be 
H[SRVHG WR µWKH GDQJHU RI WRUWXUH RU FUXHO LQKXPDQ RU Gegrading treatment or 
punishment upon return to another country by way of extradition, expulsion or 
refoulement¶61 In terms of its application, the principle of non-refoulement would 
apply as long as the individual comes under the effective control of the State, 
ZKHWKHUWKLVRFFXUVZLWKLQD6WDWH¶VWHUULWRU\RUHOVHZKHUH62 
 
%RUHOOLDQG6WDQIRUGFRQILUPWKDWGHVSLWHWKH(&W+5¶VUXOLQJLQHirsi in February 
2012,63 Member States with the assistance of Frontex are conducting interception 
and indiscriminate returQ SUDFWLFHV DJDLQVW LUUHJXODU PLJUDQWV¶ YHVVHOV DV
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demonstrations of austerity, nationalism and xenophobic feelings.64 Mariagiulia 
Giuffré and Seline Trevisanut have argued that Italy and Greece have exercised 
coercive push-back practices directing vessels out of the contiguous zone, onto 
the high seas, in the belief that no responsibility rests on States beyond the 
territorial sea.65 Other scholars such as Silvia Borelli and Ben Stanford have 
DGGUHVVHG WKH SUDFWLFH RI µSXVK-EDFNV¶ XQGHU WKH DXVSLFHV RI )URQWex.66 They 
argue that forced returns to the country of departure raise serious issues from the 
perspective of international human rights law, supporting the extraterritorial 
applicability of the prohibition of refoulement.67 According to Den Heijer, the 
main objective of extraterritorial border control is to shift the geographical 
borders of the EU to other countries, so that would-EHDV\OXPVHHNHUVµH[SHULHQFH
DIRUHLJQERUGHUZKLOHVWLOOZLWKLQWKHLUFRXQWU\RIRULJLQ¶68  
 
This thesis contributes to literatXUH E\ DUJXLQJ WKDW WKLV µIRUHLJQ ERUGHU¶
constitutes a form of a pull-back which is in effect an indirect push-back practice 
in disguise, condemned by the ECtHR in Hirsi.69 Preventing would-be asylum 
VHHNHUV IURPOHDYLQJD6WDWH¶V WHUULWRULDOZDWHUV SXOO-back) is incompatible with 
the bona fide principle, as Member States are obliged to provide international 
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protection against persecution or other forms of ill-treatment in the State of 
departure.70 Assisting the State of departure to prevent would-be asylum seekers 
IURP OHDYLQJ LWV WHUULWRULDOZDWHUV LV DYLRODWLRQRI WKH µULJKW WR OHDYHRQH¶VRZQ
FRXQWU\¶DQGWKHµULJKWWRVHHNDV\OXP¶71 Through EUBAM, it is argued that Italy 
with EU assistance is conducting indirect push-back practices, forcing would-be 
as\OXPVHHNHUVWRVWD\WRWKHµIURQWLHUVRIWHUULWRULHV¶ZKHUHWKH\PD\EHVXEMHFWHG
to ill-treatment. By way of an original contribution to literature it is argued in this 
thesis that the Refugee Convention and the ECHR provisions are inadequate and 
unable to offer protection to persons in need of international protection against 
extraterritorial State practice in the field of international cooperation in migration 
control within the framework of transnational organized crime.72 It is argued that 
through EUBAM Libya, the EU and Italy conduct indirect push-back practices 
contrary to the non-refoulement principle. EUBAM Libya is argued to constitute 
an EU and Italian strategy to evade international responsibility for would-be 
asylum seekers.  
 
This research has identified the regulatory shortcomings created by the provisions 
of Article 33 of the Refugee Convention and Article 3 ECHR which are argued 
not to offer sufficient international protection against State and international 
RUJDQL]DWLRQV¶LQWHUQDWLRQDOFRRSHration practices.73 For Article Article 33 of the 
Refugee Convention and Article 3 ECHR to apply, to be recognised as a refugee 
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of his/her country of nationality or habituaO UHVLGHQFH¶74 RU IDOO ZLWKLQ D 6WDWH¶V
extraterritorial jurisdiction. However, to hold Italy and the EU accountable for 
their assistance to Libya through EUBAM in violation RIWKHµULJKWWRDV\OXP¶DQG
the non-refoulement principle, a causal link must be established between the 
conduct of Italy and the EU and that of the refugees being forced to stay within 
Libyan territory.75 Training programs and financial assistance offered to Libyan 
authorities for the purpose of intercepting and pulling-back would-be asylum 
VHHNHUV DUH LQVXIILFLHQW WR VDWLVI\ WKH WHVW RI µHIIHFWLYH FRQWURO¶ RYHU /LE\DQ
territory or over persons as provided by the ECtHR in its case law.76 Thus, these 
two conventions become non-applicable in cases of indirect breaches by States or 
internatiRQDO RUJDQL]DWLRQV WR WKH µULJKW WR DV\OXP¶ DQG WKH non-refoulement 
principle. 
 
It is argued in this thesis that the essence of international law does not allow a 
State to avoid its international responsibilities by assisting third countries to 
breach their international obligations in the context of cooperation in migration 
control. The law of international responsibility provides for Italy or the EU to 
acquire a derived responsibility if it is found that through their financial and 
know-how assistance to Libya, they are in effect conducting indirect push-back 
practices, as prohibited by the ECtHR in Hirsi in violation to the non-refoulement 
principle.77 These indirect push-back practices constitute internationally wrongful 
acts which raise the legal responsibility of Italy and the EU for violations of 
international obligations in light of Article 16 ASR and Article 14 ARIO 
respectively. 
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In relation to Frontex, scholars such as Luisa Marin, Barbara Miltner, Sergio 
Carrera, Leonhard den Hertog and Joanna Parkin have focused on the inadequacy 
RI )URQWH[¶V PDQGDWH WR DGGUHVV KXPDQ ULJKWV YLRODWLRQV RFFXUULQJ LQ LWV
RSHUDWLRQDODUHDIRUMRLQWRSHUDWLRQVDWVHDDQGLWV LQFRPSDWLELOLW\ZLWKWKH(8¶V
international obligations.78 Katja Franko Aas and Helene Gundhus have criticized 
)URQWH[¶V PDQGDWH IRU DGRSWLQJ D µSHFXOLDU FR-existence of the securitization of 
the border and the growing presence and prominence of human rights and 
KXPDQLWDULDQLGHDOVLQERUGHUSROLFLQJSUDFWLFHV¶FRQVLGHULQJSDUDGR[LFDOWKHVHOI-
representation of EU humanitarianism and solidarity through Frontex in border 
management.79 Aas and Gundhus question how Frontex, signifying the 
militarisation of EU borders, represents humanitarian ideals and safeguards 
fundamental rights, especially the µright to life¶, µright to an effective remedy¶ and 
protection against return to a place of ill-treatment, persecution and torture (the 
principle of non-refoulement).80 Similarly, Polly Pallister-Wilkins argues that 
)URQWH[¶V ODQJXDJH RI KXPDQLWDULDQLVP LV PHUHO\ a disguise for the EU and 
0HPEHU 6WDWHV¶ WUXH LQWHQWLRQ WR PLOLWDULVH H[WHUQDO ERUGHUV LQ WKH QDPH RI
µKXPDQLWDULDQLVP ERUGHUODQG¶ DQ LQFRKHUHQFH EHWZHHQ ERUGHU SROLFLQJ
(restricting rights per se) and respect for irregular migrantV¶ rights.81 Melanie 
Fink RQH RI WKH IHZ UHVHDUFKHUV H[DPLQLQJ WKH µOHJDO DFFRXQWDELOLW\ IRU KXPDQ
ULJKWV LQ WKH PDQDJHPHQW RI H[WHUQDO ERUGHUV LQ (XURSH¶ KDV DSSURDFKHG
)URQWH[¶V H[WUDWHUULWRULDO SUDFWLFHV IURP WKH SHUVSHFWLYH RI FRRSHUDWLRQ 6KH
argues that the involvement of multi-actors dilutes responsibility amongst those 
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LQYROYHGDOORZLQJ WKHPDLQDFWRU µWRDFWDV VLQJOHFRJV LQ WKHZKROHRSHUDWLRQ¶
whilst others bear responsibility.82  
 
This thesis further contributes to literature by arguing that Frontex deployment in 
the Mediterranean and Aegean seas is not just a tool to assist Italy and Greece in 
managing their external borders but a strategic tool to circumvent the international 
responsibility of Member States and the EU. In joint operations, it becomes 
difficult to pinpoint a specific actor, thus the buck of responsibility may be shifted 
from one actor to another. The host Member State considers Frontex to have the 
control of the operation and the responsible entity for wrongful conduct occurring 
within the operational area.83 Whereas Frontex, rejects any responsibility arguing 
that its de jure mandate does not give it competence to take the leading role in 
joint operations. The aim of these actors is not to create an internal conflict on 
who actually has effective control over the operational area, but to devise a 
strategy to create a gap in attribution of accountability in which the Member 
States and the EU may circumvent their international responsibilities although in 
violation of international obligations. Roberta Mungianu has navigated through 
the structure of Frontex and its working methods to address the theoretical and 
practical questions on whether EU responsibility could be triggered by violations 
RFFXUULQJ LQ )URQWH[¶V MRLQW RSHUDWLRQV84  In her examination of WKH (8¶V
responsibility under the scrutiny of EU and international law, focusing mainly on 
the principle of non-refoulement 0XQJLDQX¶V DQDO\VLV GRHV QRW HVWDEOLVK
responsibility to the EU for the conduct of seconded border guards participating in 
joint operations.85 In her assessment of the rules of attribution under Article 4 and 
 $5,2 WKH KRVW 0HPEHU 6WDWH QRW )URQWH[ KDV µHIIHFWLYH FRQWURO¶ RYHU WKH
conduct of the border guards. Thus, Mungianu argues that the conduct of the 
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seconded border guards is attributed to the host Member State.  This thesis rejects 
0XQJLDQX¶V DUJXPHQW WKDW )URQWH[ GRHV QRW KDYH µHIIHFWLYH FRQWURO¶ RYHU WKH
conduct of seconded border guards. The Frontex Executive Director draws up and 
dictates the conditions of cooperation between Frontex and the participating 
Member States, and sets out through its operational plan the provisions on 
command and team compositions which Greece must agree and implement.86 On 
the ground, Greece has the obligation to issue instructions to the seconded border 
guards upon a reproduction of a decision taken at EU level. Thus, Frontex is 
argued to be the de facto controller in command of Frontex joint operations. By 
way of an original contribution, the wrongful conduct of border guards placed 
XQGHU)URQWH[¶s disposal is attributed to the EU in the light of Articles 4 and 7 
ARIO.  
 
This thesis differs from existing literatures which have assessed the international 
legal responsibility of international organisations such as the EU in light of ARIO 
mainly because they have been focused on the shared responsibility of the EU and 
its Member States in the context of WKH (8¶V &ULVLV 0DQDJHPHQW 0LVVLRQV
involving Member State military.87 6FDUOHW 0F$UGOH¶V WKHVLV LV EDVHG XSRQ D
critique of ARIO to accommodate the complex nature of the EU arguing that 
WKHVHDUWLFOHVOHDYHWKH(8¶VDFWLRQVRXWVLGHWKHODZRIUHVSRQVLELOLW\88 McArdle 
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further argues that the international law system of responsibility is ill equipped to 
address the supranational character of the EU despite its international identity.89 
McArdle, Andre Nollkaemper, Dov Jacobs, and Roberta Mungianu identified the 
limitations of ASR and ARIO to have originated because of the establishment of 
responsibility as a singular principle requiring blame to be allocated to a specific 
responsible actor.90 These legal scholars have found this approach to be out-dated 
and no longer reflecting the changes of international action in the field of 
multilateral cooperation. In light of the changing nature of international action 
involving a complex and high degree of interdependence in collective action, 
Andre Nollkaemper and Dov Jacobs have addressed the possibility of shared 
responsibility in international law.91 They argue that the principles of international 
law as they now stand do not provide clear guidance as to whether the increased 
situations of multiple actors involved in the same wrongful act may give rise to 
situations of shared responsibility.92 The above mentioned legal scholars have 
attempted to identify gaps in the international legal framework to cases of shared 
responsibility and have provided a new perspective to allocating shared 
international responsibility in cases involving multi actors.  
 
7RGDWHWKH(8¶VVKDUHGUHVSRQVLELOLW\KDVEHHQDGGUHVVHGE\ZD\RIH[DPSOe of 
the EU¶V FULVLVPDQDJHPHQWPLVVLRQVZKHQ LPSOHPHQWLQJ816HFXULW\&RXQFLO
Resolutions in which Member States had to second personnel. Ramses Wessel 
and Aurel Sari have studied the division of international responsibility between 
the EU and its Member States in the area of foreign, security and defence policy 
(CFSP and CSDP).93 Although Wessel and Sari touch upon the possible 
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international responsibility of the EU in relation to the area of CFSP and CSDF in 
light of the ARIO, the main focus of their investigation was the unclear division 
of who acts under the CFSP and CSDF and who then maintains international 
responsibility.94 However, confronted with the unitary system of fault allocation, 
these new conceptual frameworks on shared responsibility still require a better 
formulation to receive assertion by judicial or arbitral decisions that responsibility 
can be shared.95 As a solution to finding the EU internationally responsible for the 
acts of its institutions, agencies or Member States existing literature have focused 
on developing the concept on shared responsibility. However, jurisdictional 
limitations and the lack of scholarly literature making reference to situations or 
consequences of shared responsibility have kept the law on shared responsibility 
undeveloped. At the same time, they have created assumptions that the 
complexity of the EU legal framework prevents international courts from finding 
the EU internationally responsible for the acts of its institutions, agency or 
Member States in light of Article 4 and 7 ARIO. This thesis contributes to 
literature by rebutting these assumptions.  
 
The present research has based its argument on the ILC commentaries and on the 
UHVHDUFKRI)UDQFHVFR0HVVLQHR¶VRQ$UWLFOH$5,296 Messineo has questioned 
whether international law allowed within its scope the possibility to have multiple 
attributions, i.e. the internationally wrongful act would be attributed to more than 
one actor at once or whether it accommodated only one possibility, that of 
exclusive attribution where only one actor may be found responsible at a time. 
Messineo argues that ASR and ARIO do recognise the possibility of multiple 
attribution of conduct and there is no reason why one or more States or 
international organizations cannot be attributed a given conduct at the same time. 
He argues that in such cases of international cooperation multiple attributions are 
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the default position. However, Messineo argues that Article 7 ARIO is an 
exception to the principle of multiple attributions.97 The ILC commentaries have 
clearly emphasised that in those circumstances when an organ of a State is placed 
at the disposal of another State, there must still be a determination on who 
maintains responsibility for the wrong occurred.98 Hence, the possibility of a 
shared responsibility is excluded. Thus, in relation to Frontex joint operations, this 
WKHVLVKDV DVVHVVHG WKH(8¶V LQWHUQDWLRQDO UHVSRQVLELOLW\ IURP WKHSHUVSHFWLYHRI
an exclusive attribution derived from the conduct of Frontex, as opposed to a 
shared responsibility perspective as addressed by the above mentioned scholars.  
 
It is argued in existing literature that the complexity of the EU legal framework 
prevents the EU from an attribution of international responsibility for its 
extraterritorial policies and actions. By way of an original contribution, this thesis 
will argue that an allocation of the EU¶V responsibility is possible under Article 17 
ARIO, designed to cover precisely situations where the EU takes advantage of its 
legal framework and the separate personality of its Member States to circumvent 
its international obligations. This thesis is believed to be among the first to 
analyse Article 17 ARIO in light of Frontex joint operations, let alone assess its 
application in terms of the EU-Turkey statement (concluded on 18 March 2016 
and entered into force on 20 March 2016) and the Sea Borders Regulation.99 To 
date, scholars have addressed their research on the EU-Turkey statement in the 
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 ibid, 44.  
98
 Commentary to Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations, Yearbook of  
the International Law Commission 2011 (ARIO Commentary) Volume II, Part Two, see 
&KDSWHU ,, µ$WWULEXWLRQ RI FRQGXFW WR DQ LQWHUQDWLRQDO RUJDQL]DWLRQ¶ $UWLFOHV RQ WKH
Responsibility of International Organizations, article 7, paragraph 4; Also see Third Report on 
State Responsibility by Roberto Ago, Special Rapporteur (UN Doc A/CN.4/246 and Add.1-3 




accessed 25 October 2017; Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Turkey 
on the re-admission of persons residing without authorization (EU-Turkey re-admission 




form of blogs,100 forums,101 magazine articles102 and working papers.103 NGOs 
have been the fiercest critics of the EU-Turkey statement, claiming that Turkey 
FDQQRW EH FRQVLGHUHG D µVDIH WKLUG FRXQWU\¶104 Furthermore, the Sea Borders 
Regulation has been criticised by scholars such as Maarten den Heijer and Luisa 
Marin not to conform to general principles of EU and international law.105 
However, this research is amongst the first that assesses the EU-Turkey statement, 
and the Sea Borders Regulation in light of Article 17 ARIO, argued to have been 
adopted as tools of circumvention for EU responsibility under international law 
by compelling the Member States to commit an act that would be internationally 
wrongful if committed by the EU.106  
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 Jean-%DSWLVWH )DUF\ ³(8-Turkey Agreement: Solving the EU Asylum Crisis or Creating a 
1HZ &DODLV LQ %RGUXP"´  'HFHPEHU  (0/% KWWSZZZJGU-elsj.eu/wp-
content/uploads/2016/03/EU-Immigration-and-Asylum-Law-and-Polic...eating-a-new-Calais-in-
Bodrum-%C2%BB-Print.pdf> accessed 25 October 2017. 
101
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(2016) CESifo Forum 17(2) 21. 
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 6HYGD7XQDER\OXDQG-LOO$OSHVµ7KH(8-Turkey Deal: What Happens to People Who Return 
WR7XUNH\"¶)05 
103
 Ilke Toygür and Bianca Benvenuti, One Year on: An Assessment of the EU-Turkey Statement 
on Refugees (2017) IA Working Papers 17. 
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1RW D µ6DIH &RXQWU\¶´ 6WDWHZDWFK $QDO\VLV 1R  )HEUXDU\ 
<http://www.statewatch.org/analyses/no-283-why-turkey-is-not-a-safe-country.pdf> accessed 
25 October .HQQHWK5RWK6DOLO6KHWW\DQG&DWKHULQH:RROODUG³6D\1RWR a Bad Deal 
ZLWK 7XUNH\´ +5:  0DUFK  KWWSVZZZKUZRUJQRGH! DFFHVVHG 
2FWREHU  %LOO )UHOLFN ³,V 7XUNH\ 6DIH IRU 5HIXJHHV´ 3ROLF\ 5HYLHZ 0DUFK 
<https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/03/22/turkey-safe-refugees> accessed 25 October 2017; 
2UoXQ 8OXVR\ ³7XUNH\ DV D 6DIH 7KLUG &RXQWU\"´ %RUGHU &ULPLQRORJLHV  0DUFK 
<https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/research-subject-groups/centre-criminology/centreborder-
criminologies/blog/2016/03/turkey-safe-third> accessed 25 October 2017; 81+&5 ³/egal 
Considerations on the Return of Asylum-Seekers and Refugees from Greece to Turkey As Part 
of the EU-Turkey Cooperation in Tackling the Migration Crisis Under the Safe Third Country 
DQG )LUVW &RXQWU\ RI $V\OXP &RQFHSW´  0DUFK  
<http://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/47237> accessed 25 October 2017; Amnesty 
,QWHUQDWLRQDO ³7XUNH\ 1R 6DIH 5HIXJH $V\OXP-seekers and Refugees Denied Effective 
3URWHFWLRQ LQ 7XUNH\´  -XQH   KWWSVZZZ
amnesty.org/en/documents/eur44/3825/2016/en> accessed 25 October 2017; $KPHW øoGX\JX
and Evin Millet, Syrian Refugees in Turkey: Insecure Lives in an Environment of Pseudo-
Integration Global Turkey in Europe Working Papers, No 13, August 2016, 5-6 
<http://www.iai.it/en/node/6690> accessed 27 October 2017.  
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 Luisa Marin, µ3ROLFLQJWKH(8¶V([WHUQDO%RUGHUV$&KDOOHQJHIRUWKH5XOHRI/DZDQG 
Fundamental Rights in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice? An Analysis of Frontex 
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In addition, this thesis will be amongst the first to challenge the legal nature of the 
EU-Turkey statement in the light of recent Cases T-192/16, T-193/16 and T-
257/16 NF, NG and NM v European Council, in which the General Court of the 
European Union (GCEU) concluded that the statement was not an act of an 
LQVWLWXWLRQRI WKH(8KHQFHH[FOXGLQJWKH&RXUW¶s jurisdiction under Article 263 
TFEU.107 The statement is argued in this thesis to constitute in effect an 
international agreement not with the Members of the EU Council but between 
Turkey and the EU. The actual objective of the EU-Turkey statement is argued to 
have been a strategy by the EU and its Member States to bind its partner third 
countries to comply with their political obligations under the auspices of existing 
obligations with the EU and in the same time avoid any responsibility for the EU 
for vioODWLRQVRILQWHUQDWLRQDOREOLJDWLRQVFRPPLWWHGDVDUHVXOWRIWKHVWDWHPHQW¶V
implementation.108 However, in light of Article 17 ARIO, this thesis argues that 
the EU institutions may not use the EU legal framework to avoid international 
responsibility for violations conducted by the Member States under EU decisions 
and authorizations.  
 
1.3 Methodology and Ethical Issues  
This study is based on doctrinal legal research through a law in context analysis 
referring to primary legal sources such as the 1951 Refugee Convention (Refugee 
Convention), the Convention against Torture (CAT Convention), the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea 1982 (UNCLOS 1982), the International Convention for the 
Safety of Life at Sea 1974 (SOLAS Convention), the International Convention on 
Maritime Search and Rescue 1979 (SAR Convention), the International 
Convention on Salvage 1989, the UN Convention against Transnational 
Organized Crime 2000, the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), the 
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 (28 February 2017) ECLI:EU:T:2017:128. 
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Treaty of the EU (TEU) and the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU),109 
the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (EU Charter). It also draws on 
international agreements concluded by the EU and Turkey such as the EU-Turkey 
readmission agreement, the EU-Turkey statement and the bilateral readmission 
agreements concluded by Italy with Libya and Sudan and Greece with Turkey. 
The following EU secondary legislations are addressed: the Dublin Regulation, 
the revised Eurodac Regulation, the recast Asylum Procedures Directive, the 
recast Reception Conditions Directive, the revised Qualification Directive and the 
Return Directive. In terms of IHRL, although the CAT and the ICCPR are 
discussed briefly in various places, the primary focus of this thesis is on the 
ECHR. 
 
In addition, the thesis draws upon decisions of international and regional courts 
such as the International Court of Justice (ICJ), International Tribunal of the Law 
of the Sea (ITLOS), the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), the Court of 
Justice of the European Union (CJEU) and national courts of Italy and Greece, 
referring when relevant to other Member State court decisions. In relation to 
statistical data, the thesis draws upon the data provided by Eurostat, Frontex and 
the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA). The reports of 
international monitoring bodies of the UN, Council of Europe and the EU are 
drawn on, such as the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (OHCHR), the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and 
the Commissioner for Human Rights, the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion 
and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms While Countering 
Terrorism, FRA reports, and the Commissions progress reports and press release 
on state of play. In relation to secondary sources the thesis has examined scholarly 
literature, notably journal articles and monographs as well as reports from 
international and regional NGOs.  
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Due to the nature of the irregular migration crisis, aVVHVVLQJ0HPEHU6WDWHV¶DQG
)URQWH[¶V FRPSOLDQFH ZLWK IXQGDPHQWDO ULJKWV GXULQJ MRLQW RSHUDWLRQV DW VHD
becomes difficult especially as there is no official Member State or EU statistics 
as to compliance of international obligations on the ground. Member States claim 
to be fully compliant with applicable EU and international legal frameworks. 
Therefore, the slightest infringement reported by non-legal sources such as NGO 
reports, activist accounts, and the news on the media signal violations of 
international obligations. Thus, LQWKHDEVHQFHRIRIILFLDO0HPEHU6WDWHV¶GDWDDQG
statistics, to demonstrate push-back practices in interception and search and 
rescue operations this thesis bases its analysis on reports published by NGOs such 
as Pro Asyl,110 HRW,111 Amnesty International,112 Migreurop113 and Watch the 
Med114 which have confirmed through testimonies of irregular migrants. These 
reports have gained authority by the fact that the ECtHR relied on similar reports 
in MSS, Hirsi, Sharifi, and recently in Khlaifia when it held that Greece and Italy 
were in violation of Article 3 ECHR.115 Furthermore, the ECtHR held in its 
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July 2014, 29 
<https://www.frontexit.org/en/docs/49-frontexbetween-greece-and-turkey-the-border-of-
denial/file> accessed 25 October 2017. 
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 Watch the Med, Alarm Phone Press Release (5th of August 2015) 
<http://www.watchthemed.net/index.php/page/index/18>accessed 25 October 2017. 
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 MSS v Belgium and Greece Application no 30696/09 ECHR 2011, paragraphs 348-349; Hirsi 
(n 57) paragraphs 35-36, 37-39, 40-41, 125; Sharifi v Italy and Greece Application no 
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recently decided case of Sakir that the Greek authorities were at fault for failing to 
consider the reports of various NGOs and other Greek institutions as relevant to 
the investigation.116 The same sources are now relied upon here to demonstrate 
that push-backs are systematically occurring on the Eastern Mediterranean route 
(Greece to Turkey). Apart from NGO reports, Frontex reports are used as 
confirmation that Greece is allegedly involved in collective expulsions from 
Greek territorial waters and/or on the high seas to Turkey.117 In 2013, Frontex 
confirmed that it had received eighteen reports by Frontex officers alleging 
informal forced returns in the form of push-backs in groups.118  
 
In this thesis it is argued that at the time the Mediterranean Sea has been subject 
to closest surveillance, the highest number of people have been reported dead or 
disappeared at sea.119 Although it is recognised that some of these deaths were a 
direct result of the inherent dangers of the seas and the un-seaworthiness of 
vessels, others have been due to the determination of the EU and its Member 
States to seal their external borders.120 Conducting legal research on the cause and 
magnitude of deaths and disappearances in the context of irregular migration by 
sea has its difficulties. The first difficulties arise with accurately counting and 
registering the number of deaths resulting during border crossings. The irregular 
migration crisis in itself occurs in hiding, unattended, away from the public eye, 
                                                                                                                                                              
treatment or Punishment (CPT) visit on Italy from 27 to 31 July 2009, 28 April 2010, CPT/Inf 
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following irregular paths and happening at any time.121 In addition, there is no 
official record of the actual number of irregular migrants who have lost their lives 
in attempting to cross over to EU territory. Nor do the Member States have a 
unique system of registration for the number of deaths occurring at their land or 
sea borders. For this reason, the only official statistics on the number of deaths are 
those recorded by the Member States or third countries from the recovered dead 
bodies, not the number of persons reported missing by family members or NGOs 
whose bodies are not recovered. Furthermore, any fatalities occurring via land and 
sea borders are not always brought to the attention of the relevant authorities. 
7KXVHYHQWKH0HPEHU6WDWHV¶RUWKLUGFRXQWULHV¶RIILFLDOUHFRUGVDUHQRWDFFXUDWH
or complete.  
 
The next best data on migrant deaths is that established by the OHCHR and 
International Organisation for Migration (IOM), recording the number of refugee 
deaths in an irregular situation.122 For the years 2011 to 2016 there were 
approximately 15,000 registered deaths.123 In addition to these international 
organisations, there are various institutions and civil society groups that have 
attempted to keep a more complete record of those migrants dying in irregular 
situations. There have been various attempts by civil society to gather statistics 
through indirect sources. Fortress Europe, a webpage maintained by civil society, 
gathers information on the incidents reported on the news, eyewitnesses, reports 
from family members, official records and so on. For example, Fortress Europe 
revealed that 4,273 people died in 2015 compared to IOM statistics of 3,771.124 It 
must be emphasised that although Fortress Europe has the most comprehensive 
estimates of the number of migrants missing or dead, the website is not always up 
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<http://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/mediterranean> accessed 25 October 2017. 
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  ,20³0LVVLQJ0LJUDQWV3URMHFW´Q122). 
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 Fortress Europe <http://fortresseurope.blogspot.al/> accessed 25 October 2017. 
 42 
 
to date (last updated 16 February 2016) and these figures still do not reflect the 
reality of the crisis. The press does not cover all the incidents occurring at sea or 
YLD ODQG DV WKH\ KDYH EHFRPH VR FRPPRQ WKDW WKH\ DUH QR ORQJHU µQHZV¶
7KHUHIRUHWKHSUHFLVHQXPEHURILUUHJXODUPLJUDQWV¶FURVVLQJRYHU(8ERUGHUVLV
unknown and impossible to keep track of.  
Furthermore, in the light of the University's Code of Ethical Practice for 
Research, since this research does not involve human participants it does not raise 
any ethical issues. 
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1.4 Thesis Structure and Chapter Summary 
The thesis is structured in three parts. Part One which includes Chapters Two, 
Three and Four analyse the extraterritorial measures adopted in response to the 
irregular migration crisis and the international obligations violated as a result.  
Part Two consisting of Chapter Five addresses Frontex involvement in violations 
of international obligations during interception, search and rescue and 
disembarkation. Part Three includes Chapter Six and Seven the Conclusion 
critiques the involvement of Frontex and the imposition of EU decisions and 
authorisations as a tool to circumvent and possibly dilute Member State and EU 
international responsibility for violations of international obligations committed 
whilst addressing the irregular migration crisis. 
From a doctrinal perspective, Chapter Two examines the complex legal issues 
arising in interception and Search and Rescue (SAR). It covers the applicable 
legal regimes: the Law of the Sea, international criminal law,125 international 
KXPDQ ULJKWV ODZ DQG LQWHUQDWLRQDO UHIXJHH ODZ $OWKRXJK D 6WDWH¶V ULJKW WR
conduct interception operations is justified on the basis of its legitimate interest in 
controlling irregular migration, it must also ensure the safety of maritime 
transportation and endeavour to rescue persons on unseaworthy vessels.126 
However, it is argued that the primary objective of Member State interceptions is 
to detect boats carrying irregular migrants, stop them from reaching Member State 
territory and to persuade them to return to their country of departure. The border 
game is explained in light of the Law of the Sea, international human rights and 
refugee law which obliges Member States to respect and protect the rights of 
irregular migrants who come within their jurisdiction. Upon a detailed 
explanation of the Law of the Sea and the ways a Member State exercises its 
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jurisdiction, it is concluded that any form of coercion to prevent the vessel 
entering their territorial waters falls under Member State jurisdiction and the act is 
in violation of their international obligations such as the right to seek asylum, the 
non-refoulement principle and the prohibition of collective expulsions.127  
 
Furthermore, it is argued that although international law at times comes to the 
advantage of irregular migrants, it has also been used to their disadvantage 
causing serious consequences to their µright to life¶. As irregular migrants travel 
in overcrowded and unseaworthy ships, this Chapter provides an analysis of the 
complex legal issues on situations of distress, disembarkation and place of safety. 
It argues that these concepts, despite clear guidelines on their interpretation, have 
been misinterpreted and misapplied by Member States due to their reluctance to 
accept the responsibility to host irregular migrants whom they rescue. 
Furthermore, it is argued that immigration preoccupations combined with the 
inadequacy of the SAR regime to deal with massive inflows of irregular migrants 
on unseaworthy boats and due to overlapping search and rescue zones, between 
Italy, Malta and Libya have proved fatal to migrant lives.128 This Chapter argues 
that in the absence of specific provisions by the SAR Convention to address a 
failure to act scenario by reluctant SAR States or provide for agreed criteria on the 
µVDIHVWSODFH¶IRUGLVHPEDUNDWLRQ, a legal gap of accountability is created as long 
as States do not DJUHHRQKRZWKH6$5&RQYHQWLRQ¶VGHILQLWLRQRIGLVWUHVVVKRXOG
be interpreted and applied.129 Despite International Maritime Organisation (IMO) 
SURYLGLQJ IXUWKHU FODULILFDWLRQ LQ  RI ZKDW µSODFH RI VDIHW\¶ PHDQV130 the 
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(8¶VDWWempt to create to create uniform rules on interception, search and rescue 
and disembarkation during Frontex joint operations through the Sea Borders 
Regulation, and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 
and IMO proposals to establish a cooperation model framework on concerted 
procedures and protection response teams following the disembarkation of 
rescued persons,131 disparities in interpretation have continued. States have an 
obligation not only to ensure a safe place of disembarkation for rescued irregular 
migrants but also to ensure that the receiving country provides the necessary legal 
guarantees against indirect refoulement,132 very much dependent on the 
GLVHPEDUNLQJ FRXQWU\¶V IXQFWLRQDO DV\OXP V\VWHP133 Chapters Three, Four and 
Five of this thesis will argue that the main third countries of departure or transit 
(Libya and Turkey), and the two frontline Member States (Italy and Greece) no 
ORQJHU IXOILO WKH µVDIH FRXQWU\¶ FULWHULD JRYHUQLQJ GLVHPEDUNDWLRQ134 Thus, 
disembarking irregular migrants to these States effectively violates international 
obligations. 
                                                                                                                                                              
also a place where the survLYRUV¶VDIHW\RI OLIH LVQR ORQJHU WKUHDWHQHGDQGZKHUH WKHLUEDVLF
human needs (such as food, shelter and medical needs) can be met. Further, it is a place from 
ZKLFK WUDQVSRUWDWLRQ DUUDQJHPHQWV FDQ EH PDGH IRU WKH VXUYLYRUV¶ QH[W RU ILQDO GHVWLQDWLRQ¶ 
<http://www.refworld.org/docid/432acb464.html> accessed 26 October 2017; also see Annex 
3 on the adoption of amendments to the SAR Convention, Resolution MSC. 70(69), (adopted 
on 18 May 1998) paragraph 1.3.2 "Rescue" - An operation to retrieve persons in distress, 
provide for their initial medical or other needs, and deliver them to a place of safety  
<http://www.imo.org/blast/blastDataHelper.asp?data_id=15436&filename=70(69).pdf> 
accessed 26 October 2017. 
131
  UNHCR, Refugees and Asylum-Seekers in Distress at Sea ± how best to respond? Expert  
meeting in Djibouti, 8-10 November 2011, Summary Conclusions 
<http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/4ede0d392.pdf> accessed 25 October 2017. 
132
 Wouters and den Heijer (n 57) 7; Parliamentary Assembly, The interception and rescue at sea 
of asylum seekers, refugees and irregular migrants, Resolution 1821 (2011) Rapporteur Mr 
Arcadio Diaz Tejera, 1 June 2011, Doc 12628, point 5.2; 0DWWHR 7RQGLQL µ7KH /HJDOLW\ RI
Intercepting Boat People under Search and Rescue and Border Control Operations, with 
Reference to Recent Italian Interventions in the Mediterranean Sea and the ECtHR Decision in 
the Hirsi &DVH¶   -,0/ -74, 59; see Chapter 4 for further detail on indirect 
refoulement. 
133
 C-411/10 and C-493/10 NS v Secretary of State for the Home Department and ME v Refugee 
Applications Commissioner, Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2011] paragraph 
94; MSS (n 115) paragraph 358; Susan Kneebone, The Legal and Ethical Implications of 
Extraterritorial Processing of Asylum Seekers: The ``Safe Third Country'' Concept' in Jane 
McAdam (ed), Forced Migration, Human Rights and Security (Hart Publishing Oxford and 
Portland OR 2008) 129 and 54; Agnes Hurwitz, The Collective Responsibility of States to 
Protect Refugees (Oxford University Press New York 2009) 46. 
134
  See Chapters 3-5. 
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In Chapter Three the thesis moves on to consider the reaction of Italy, Greece and 
the EU to the irregular migration situation in terms of security in the form of 
individual and collective preventative extraterritorial State control, a measure 
purportedly against smugglers. From a legal perspective, these extraterritorial 
measures taken by the EU, Italy and Greece in response to the irregular migration 
crisis are scrutinised under a pre-emptive three stage strategy, acting as ad hoc 
fences. 7KHILUVWVWDJHLQYROYHVWKH(8¶VGHWHUPLQDWLRQIRUWKLUGFRXQWULHVVXFKDV
Libya and Turkey to comply with their obligations under the Palermo protocols, 
VFUXWLQLVLQJWKHLUDGRSWHGSURYLVLRQVWRµFULPLQDOLVHWKHVPXJJOLQJRIPLJUDQWV¶135 
Although international criminal law allows States to impose administrative 
measures on smuggled migrants this Chapter argues that they pose a great threat 
RQ WKH VPXJJOHG PLJUDQWV¶ ULJKWV GXH WR WKH OLPLWHG LQYROYHPHQW Rf the courts. 
They also violate Article 5 of the Migrant Smuggling Protocol as they have 
similar characteristics to a criminal sanction involving a forced deprivation of 
liberty and personal autonomy which both entail coercive treatment.136  
 
The second stage scrutinises the Italian and EU assistance to Libya to pull-back 
irregular migrants and returns from Greece in accordance the EU-Turkey 
statement. It is argued that the Italian and EU assistance to Libya for the 
SUHYHQWLRQRILUUHJXODUPLJUDQWV¶ERDWVIURm leaving territorial waters is a form of 
pull-EDFN ZKLFK FRQVWLWXWHV DQ LQWHUIHUHQFH ZLWK WKH ULJKW WR OHDYH RQH¶V RZQ
FRXQWU\ DQG UHVWULFWV WKH µULJKW WR VHHN DV\OXP¶ LQ D VDIH FRXQWU\137 hence it is 
incompatible with the non-refoulement principle and refugee law obligations. In 
addition, in assisting third countries to pull-back would-be asylum seekers in 
effect constitutes an indirect push-back practice in which Italy and the EU act 
                                                          
135
 UN General Assembly, Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, 
Supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime, United 
Nations, (Resolution 55/25 of 15 November 2000) United Nations, Treaty Series, Volume 
2241, 507 (Migrant Smuggling Protocol) article 6. 
136
  0DWKHZ*URYHVµ,PPLJUDWLRQ'HWHQWLRQYV,PSULVRQPHQW¶$/--230. 
137
  Refugee Convention, article 1; EU Charter, article 18; UN General Assembly, Universal  
Declaration of Human Rights, 10 December 1948, 217 A (III) (UDHR) article 14; Goodwin-
Gill and McAdam, The Refugee in International Law (n 71) 370. 
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contrary to the bona fide principle to provide international protection against 
persecution or other forms of ill treatment in the State of departure.138 In relation 
to the Greek returns to Turkey, it is argued that despite the presumption created 
by the EU-7XUNH\ VWDWHPHQW WKDW 7XUNH\ LV FRQVLGHUHG D µVDIH WKLUG FRXQWU\¶
Greece has an obligation under international human rights and refugee law to 
nonetheless assess the efficiency of the Turkish asylum and immigration system 
and the particular treatment the individual will be subjected before return.139 
 
The third stage examines the EU surveillance system, EUROSUR, and its 
unsubstantiated contribution to the European refugee crisis as a humanitarian tool 
for distress situations at the Mediterranean Sea. Instead, its hidden objective is 
DUJXHGWRFRQVWUXFWDµFRQWUROOHGVSDFH¶140 in the Mediterranean Sea to deploy the 
military as a tool to assist Turkish and Libyan authorities in pull-back operations, 
intercept and push-back migrants purportedly viewed as a threat to national 
security. With such sophisticated intelligence surveillance in place, State 
authorities would easily detect irregular migrant boats over third country 
territorial waters making it impossible for them to reach international waters. The 
µSUH-IURQWLHU¶PHFKDQLVPLQSDUWQHUWKLUGFRXQWULHV LVQRW WKHUHWRDVVLVWZLWKWhe 
issue of distress as argued in Chapter Two, but is a disguised form of push-back, 
QHJDWLYHO\LQWHUIHULQJZLWKWKHµULJKWWROHDYHRQHV¶RZQFRXQWU\¶DQGWKHµULJKWWR
DV\OXP¶141 Chapter Four then argues that the illicit push-back operations and the 
adoptLRQRI(852685KDYHHQGDQJHUHGLUUHJXODUPLJUDQWV¶OLYHVFRQWUDU\WRWKH
right of life.142 
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  81+&5¶VDPLFXVFXULDHEULHIQ70) 427. 
139
 MSS (n 115) paragraphs 293 and 321. 
140
 RocFR%HOODQRYDDQG'HQLV'XH] µ7KH0DNLQJ 6HQVHRI(852685+RZ WR&RQWURO WKH
6HD %RUGHUV"¶ LQ 5DSKDHO %RVVRQJ DQG +HOHQD &DUUDSNR HGV EU Borders and Shifting 
Internal Security (Springer 2016) 26. 
141
  Ben Hayes and Mathias Vermeulen, Borderline, EU Border Surveillance Initiatives, An  
assessment of the Costs and Its Impact on Fundamental Rights (Heinrich Boll Stiftung, May 
2012) 11. 
142
  See Chapter 4, section 4.3 on push-EDFNVHQGDQJHULQJPLJUDQWV¶OLYHV 
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Chapter Four provides a detailed analysis of Greek indiscriminate push-back 
practices during interception operations from 2013 to June 2016. Whereas, in 
relation to Italy the Chapter does not address the Italian push-back practice 
FRQGXFWHGIURP0D\WR)HEUXDU\6LQFHIROORZLQJWKH(&W+5¶V
decision in Hirsi condemning push-back practices to Libya, no incidents have 
been reported.143 It is argued in this Chapter that immigration preoccupations have 
FUHDWHGKLJKULVNVIRUPLJUDQW¶VULJKWVJHQHUDOO\UHVXOWLQJLQQRQ-rescue episodes 
causing loss of life, route diversion, push-back practices, and disputes over 
refugee responsibility upon disembarkation.144 This Chapter scrutinises the 
incidents occurring in Greek territorial waters on 20 January 2014, 25 October 
2014 and 14 August 2015. On 25 October 2014, Greek coastguards boarded a 
YHVVHO UHPRYHG WKH HQJLQH¶V IXHO WDQN SXQFWXUHG WKH YHVVHO DQG VXEVHTXHQWO\
pushed the boat to Cesme, Turkey.145 On 5 August 2015, Watch the Med Alarm 
Phone reported four separate incidents of push-back practices (involving 
violence) from 26 July to 1 August 2015. Furthermore, on 14 August 2015, 
Turkish fishermen claimed that a boat carrying fifty people was intentionally sunk 
by Greek authorities.146 These incidents question the legal safeguards afforded by 
LQWHUQDWLRQDOKXPDQULJKWVIUDPHZRUNVRQWKHµULJKWWROLIH¶µGXW\WRUHVFXH¶WKH
SURKLELWLRQRIµWRUWXUHRULQKXPDQRUGHJUDGLQJ WUHDWPHQWRUSXQLVKPHQW¶DQGWKH
principle of non-refoulement.147 It is argued that these illicit practices have caused 
                                                          
143
  Hirsi (n 57) paragraph 137; Fulvio Vassallo PDOHRORJR³7KH(FOLSVHRI(XURSH,WDO\/LE\D 
DQG WKH6XUYHLOODQFHRI%RUGHUV´ (-International Relations, 30 March 2014) <http://www.e-
ir.info/2014/03/30/the-eclipse-of-europe-italy-libya-and-the-surveillance-of-borders/>accessed 
26 October 2017; Mattia Toaldo, Migrations Through and From Libya: A Mediterranean 
Challenge (IAI Working Papers 15, 14 May 2015) 7. 
144
  Moreno-/D[µ6HHNLQJ$V\OXPLQWKH0HGLWHUUDQHDQ¶Q43) 174. 
145
  :DWFKWKH0HG³7KH\:DQWWR6HH8V'URZQ´$ODUP3KRQH,QYestigation 25/26 October  
2014) <http://watchthemed.net/reports/view/84> accessed 26 October 2017. 
146
  (XURQHZV³7XUNLVK)LVKHUPDQ&ODLPV*UHHN2IILFLDOV,QWHQWLRQDOO\6DQN0LJUDQW%RDW´ 
August 2015) <http://www.euronews.com/2015/08/14/turkish-fisherman-claims-greek-
officials-intentionally-sank-migrant-boat> accessed 26 October 2017. 
147
  UNCLOS, article 98(1); SOLAS, Chapter V, Regulation 33.1; SAR Convention, Chapter  
2.1.10; CAT, article 3 and article 16; ECHR, article 3; CoE, Protocol No 4 to the Convention 
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, securing certain rights and 
freedoms other than those already included in the Convention and in the first Protocol thereto, 
as amended by Protocol No.11, ETS no 46, 16.IX.1963 (Protocol No 4 to the ECHR) article 4; 
EU Charter, article 19. 
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µDUHDODQGLPPHGLDWHULVNWRWKHOLIHRIDQLQGLYLGXDO¶148 in which Greece has a 
positive obligation to safeguard within its jurisdiction.149 These push-back 
practices will be argued to constitute internationally wrongful acts and trigger 
*UHHFH¶VLQWHUQDWLRQDOUHVSRQVLELOLW\IRUEUHDFKHVRILQWHUQDWLRQDOREOLJDWLRQV150  
 
Furthermore, it is argued that the returns under the EU-Turkey statement violate 
the non-refoulement principle prohibited under the EU Charter and the ECHR.151 
From mid-January 2016 to 1 April 2016, recent reports from NGOs indicate that 
Turkey expelled groups of 100 individuals to Syria on a daily basis.152 These 
returns to Syria, at a time when that country continues to be in serious turmoil, 
impute Greek authorities with knowledge that Turkey does not respect the 
principle of non-refoulement in practice.153 On this basis, Greece has the duty to 
investigate the human rights protection mechanism offered by Turkey on the 
ground and offer an effective remedy in return; otherwise these individuals would 
be subjected to an increased risk of arbitrary refoulement. 
 
Chapter Five scrutinizes the Sea Borders Regulation154 as a means of harmonising 
Member State interception, search and rescue as well as disembarkation practices 
during Frontex joint operations at sea. The Chapter questions the legality of the 
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  SAR Convention, Annex, Chapter 1, point 11. 
149
 UNCLOS, article 98; Convention on the High Seas, article 12; International Convention on 
Salvage 1989, article 7; SOLAS, article 33; Osman (n 33) paragraph 115. 
150
 ASR, article 1 and 2; ECHR, article 2(2) read in conjunction with article 1; Kelly (n 35) 
paragraph 94. 
151




illegal-mass-returns-of-syrian-refugees-expose-fatal-flaws-in-eu-turkey-deal/> accessed 25 
October 2017. 
153
 International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH) µ/LE\D WKH +RXQGLQJ RI 0LJUDQWV 0XVW
6WRS¶  'HFHPber 2012, 48 <https://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/libyemignantsuk-ld.pdf> 
DFFHVVHG2FWREHU+5:³7XUNH\6\ULDQV3XVKHG%DFNDWWKH%RUGHU&ORVXUHV)RUFH
'DQJHURXV &URVVLQJV ZLWK 6PXJJOHUV´  1RYHPEHU 
<https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/11/23/turkey-syrians-pushed-back-border> accessed 25 
2FWREHU  $PQHVW\ ,QWHUQDWLRQDO ³(XURSH¶V *DWHNHHSHU 8QODZIXO 'HWHQWLRQ DQG
'HSRUDWLRQ RI 5HIXJHHV IURP 7XUNH\´  'HFHPEHU  -2 
<https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/eur44/3022/2015/en/> accessed 25 October 2017. 
154
  Sea Borders Regulation (n 7) recital 1 and 2. 
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permissive measures conducted in the territorial sea of the host Member State 
(Article 6(2)(b)) or on the high seas (Article 7(2)(b)) and concludes that they are 
likely to constitute a push-back practice and a collective expulsion measure in 
violation of the Refugee Convention, the EU Charter, the recast Asylum 
Procedures Directive and the principle of non-refoulement, as well as of the Sea 
Borders Regulation itself.155 Furthermore, the Sea Borders Regulation as also 
argued in Chapters Three and Four of this thesis to have increased the risk of 
LUUHJXODUPLJUDQW¶VORVVRIOLIHRQWKHKLJKVHDVby permitting the alteration of the 
LUUHJXODUPLJUDQWV¶ERDWFRXUVHRQWKHKLJKVHDV OHDYLQJWKHPVWUDQGHGDWVHD in 
violation of the µright to life¶156 and the µduty to rescue¶ at sea.157 
 
The purpose of the Sea Borders Regulation is not to improve legal safeguards for 
irregular migrants, but to create a new immigration regime differentiating 
irregular migrants travelling by sea from the protection usually offered under EU 
and international asylum laws. The Regulation does not expressly address the 
possibility for irregular migrants intercepted in Member State territorial waters to 
claim asylum, a situation incompatible with the recast Asylum Procedures 
Directive and the Schengen Borders Code.158 Hence, asylum and immigration 
legal frameworks seem to be disconnected and to be non-applicable to irregular 
migrants arriving by sea, raising a presumption that such individuals are to be 
treated differently from other irregular migrants travelling by land. It is argued 
that this new immigration regime is likely to contUDYHQHWKH(&W+5¶VUHDVRQLQJ
                                                          
155
  Refugee Convention, article 33(1); Protocol No 4 to the ECHR, article 4; Sea Borders  
Regulation (n 7) article 4; Hirsi (n 57) paragraphs 134.  
156
  ICCPR, article 6; ECHR, article 2; EU Charter, article 2; UDHR, article 3; Aas and Gundhus 
(n 79) 14. 
157
 UNCLOS, article 98(1); SOLAS, Chapter V, Regulation 33.1; SAR, Chapter 2.1.10 ; also 
contrary WR WKH6HD%RUGHUV5HJXODWLRQ¶VREMHFWLYH µto ensure the efficient monitoring of the 
crossing of external borders including through border surveillance, while contributing to 
HQVXULQJWKHSURWHFWLRQDQGVDYLQJRIOLYHV¶VHH(n 7) recital 1 and article 3. 
158
 Directive 2013/32/EU on common procedures for granting and withdrawing international 
protection (recast) OJ [2013] L180/60 (Asylum Procedures Directive) article 3; Regulation 
(EC) No 562/2006 establishing a Community Code on the rules governing the movement of 
persons across borders OJ L105/1, Chapter II as amended by Regulation (EU) 2016/399 on a 
Union Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders - Schengen 
Borders Code (SBC) [2016] OJ L77/1. 
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on the guarantees protected by the ECHR, as articulated in the case of 
Medvedyev159 and more recently in Hirsi holding that the irregular migration 
crisis falls under the ambit of the ECHR.160 
 
In addition, by not taking into consideration the local reception conditions or the 
effectiveness of the asylum and immigration laws of Italy or Greece, the Sea 
Borders Regulation violates EU and international search and rescue legal 
frameworks on the grounds of prohibition of the non-refoulement principle and 
collective expulsions. Furthermore, it is argued that by disembarking irregular 
migrants to Italy and Greece, Frontex violates its international obligations. In 
addition, this Chapter argues that the practice of using coercive measures as 
proposed by the EU against irregular migrants who refuse to provide their 
fingerprints constitute acts of inhuman treatment contrary to Article 16 CAT, 
Article 3 ECHR and Article 4 of the EU Charter. In Chapter Six it is argued that 
not only is Italy responsible for committing acts of inhuman treatment which 
constitute international wrongful acts, but the EU also acquires international 
responsibility through compelling Italian authorities to commit these wrongful 
acts.  
 
Chapter Six argues that the actual purpose behind Frontex deployment in the 
Mediterranean Sea is not only to assist Member States in managing their external 
borders but to constitute a crucial strategic tool to circumvent the international 
responsibility of Member States and the EU. It is argued that Frontex deployment 
has the following dual purpose 1) that the EU may use the EU legal framework on 
shared competence as a shield against international responsibility for violations of 
international obligations exercised by Member States when conducted under 
Frontex coordination, and 2) to bind and dictate its participating Member States 
through the regulatory character of Frontex in accordance with EU policies which 
                                                          
159
 Medvedyev and Others v France Application no 3394/03 ECHR 2010, paragraph 81. 
160
 Hirsi (n 57) paragraphs 177 and 178 ± where the ECtHR recognised that article 4 of Protocol  
No 4 may have extraterritorial application. 
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gives the EU an opportunity to circumvent the challenges brought by the Lisbon 
Treaty to the transparency, accountability and quality of the EU decision making 
process.161 Member States and the EU have created assumptions that international 
responsibility can be diluted if confusion is created as to whether Frontex is the 
only responsible entity in joint operations. Therefore, the Chapter provides a 
detailed analysis of ARIO determinations of attributed exclusive responsibility. A 
rebuttal to the EU and Member State assumption is provided arguing that 
international responsibility between the Member States and Frontex cannot be 
GLOXWHG 7KH &KDSWHU DVVHVVHV WKH (8¶V WKURXJK )URQWH[ LQWHUQDWLRQDO
responsibility for the wrongful conduct exercised within the Frontex operational 
area in light of Articles 4 and 7 ARIO. In addition, it is argued that the Sea 
Borders Regulation, the EU-Turkey statement and the EU-Turkey readmission 
agreement constitute circumvention tools from international responsibility under 
the auspices of the EU legal order to the transparency, accountability and quality 
of the EU decision making process. It is argued however that upon an assessment 
of Article 17 ARIO, international responsibility cannot be shifted nor 
circumvented by the EU and its Member States only because they have chosen to 
cooperate with EU agencies or partner third countries to strengthen security at its 
external borders.  
 
Chapter Seven concludes by summarising the main arguments of the thesis, as 
well as, identifies legal issues for future research. Although it is acknowledged 
that human smuggling and organised crime raise national and supranational 
security concerns, responding to such a threat however, should not entail the 
criminalisation of irregular migrants so as to undermine their human rights. That 
is why this thesis points out the need to focus future research on the implications 
of opening legal migration channels as to the most adequate solution to prevent 
irregular migration. If irregular migration is tackled through an economic and 
                                                          
161
  Frontex Regulation, article 3a ± as repealed by EBCG Regulation (n 1) article 15(3) emphasis  




fundamental rights approach, Europe could actually benefit from the long term 
benefits of migration to address its eminent problems of the ageing population and 
labour shortages. Thus, changes of mind-set by political leadership to focus on 
migration governance would most certainly secure legal pathways for migrants 




Chapter 2: The International Legal Framework of Interception and Search 
and Rescue 
2.1 Introduction 
For more than a decade Europe has received a high number of irregular migrant 
flows. Since 2011, due to the Syrian civLO ZDU /LE\D¶V LQVWLWXWLRQDO EUHDNGRZQ
and EritUHD¶VSROLWLFDO XQUHVW record high numbers162 of irregular migrants have 
EHHQ DUULYLQJ DW WKH (8¶V VRXWK-HDVWHUQ H[WHUQDO ERUGHUV SXEOLFO\ DV µ(XURSH¶V
UHIXJHH FULVLV¶163 The most pressurised borders have been those of Greece and 
Italy.164 The control and management of external borders has become a top 
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 141,051 in 2011, 72,437 in 2012, 107,365 in 2013, 283,532 in 2014, 1,015,078 in 2015 and 
363,348 in 2016:  FRAN  Annual Risk Analysis 2014, 14, 
<http://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Publications/Risk_Analysis/Annual_Risk_Analysis_2014.pdf> 
accessed 26 October 2016; IOM Monitors Latest Migrant Arrivals, Deaths in Mediterranean, 
<https://www.iom.int/news/irregular-migrant-refugee-arrivals-europe-top-one-million-2015-
iom> accessed 26 October ,20µ0HGLWHUUDQHDQ0LJUDQW$UULYDOV7RSLQ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DeaWKVDW6HD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of People who ArrLYHGLQ,WDO\IURP1RUWK$IULFD¶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-360, 342; Florian 
7UDXQHUµ$V\OXP3ROLF\WKH(8¶V³FULVHV´DQGWKHORRPLQJSROLF\UHJLPHIDLOXUH¶-(,
38(3) 311-325, 311. 
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  From 2010 to 2016, the Arab Spring led to a rise in irregular migrants by: 35% in 2011, with  
64,000 detections in the Central Mediterranean area and 55,000 in the Eastern Mediterranean; 
48% in 2013, with approximately 107,000 detections of which 40,304 were detected in the 
Central Mediterranean area and 24,800 in the Eastern Mediterranean; 162% in 2014, with 
280,000 detections by sea, including 170,000 in the Central Mediterranean and 50,800 in the 
Eastern Mediterranean. In 2015, unprecedented numbers of detections were reported by 
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72% decrease in 2016, with 511,371 detections, of which 182,277 arrived by the Eastern 
Mediterranean route and 181,459 by the Central Mediterranean route.; From 104,000 in 2010 
to 141,000 in 2011; Frontex, Annual Risk Analysis 2012, 4 
<http://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Publications/Risk_Analysis/Annual_Risk_Analysis_2012.pdf> 
accessed 26 October 2017;  A total of 107,000 irregular entries; Frontex Annual Risk Analysis 
2014, 7-8 
<http://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Publications/Risk_Analysis/Annual_Risk_Analysis_2014.pdf> 
accessed 26 October 2017; Frontex Annual Risk Analysis 2015, 5 
<http://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Publications/Risk_Analysis/Annual_Risk_Analysis_2015.pdf> 
accessed 26 October 2017; Frontex Risk Analysis 2016, 6 
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accessed 26 October 2017; Frontex Risk Analysis 2017, 18 
<http://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Publications/Risk_Analysis/Annual_Risk_Analysis_2017> 
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June 2016) <http://frontex.europa.eu/news/frontex-and-nato-to-cooperate-in-the-aegean-sea-
nZMSYr> accessed 26 October 1$72³$VVLVWDQFHIRUWKH5HIXJHHDQG0LJUDQW&ULVLV
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priority for the EU and its Member States, translated into concrete measures 
linking irregular migration with issues on security and criminalisation.165  
 
Italy and Greece have taken drastic measures to reduce and prevent arrivals in 
their territories through increased policing at external borders and by 
strengthening their surveillance capacities. They aimed to facilitate returns via 
interception operations at sea and land borders, conducting formal expulsions 
through readmission agreements and informal expulsions in the form of push-
EDFNVRWKHUZLVHNQRZQDV µH[WHUQDOLVDWLRQ¶PHDVXUHVRIERUGHUFRQWURO'HVSLWH
EU and Member State policies on preventing and sanctioning irregular 
migration,166 the number of irregular migrants reaching EU shores is increasing, 
over-burdening Member State asylum and immigration capacities.167 In 
consequence, the lack of legal channels and stringent entry controls has 
contributed to creating a multibillion business of organised migrant smuggling 
and trafficking networks.168  
  
Irregular migrants cross the Mediterranean Sea with the help of centralised and 
sophisticated criminal cartels.169 These integrated criminal cartels operate in the 
region with some knowledge of European and international law on asylum and 
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search and rescue.170 In accordance with ECtHR case law, government vessels 
patrolling the Mediterranean Sea are obliged following interception or search and 
rescue operations not to return irregular migrants back to their country of 
departure without conducting an independent assessment of their individual 
circumstances.171 Furthermore, Member State authorities have a further 
investigative duty not to return an individual if they know or ought to know that 
WKH FRXQWU\ RI GHSDUWXUH¶V DV\OXP DQG LPPLJUDWLRQ V\VWHP LV GHILFLHQW RU
systematically violates human rights obligations.172 As a result, criminal cartels 
KDYH GHYHORSHG DQ µRUJDQLVHG UHIXJHH¶ VWUDWHJ\ PRYLQJ DZD\ IURP XQSODQQHG
irregular movements, to well-planned organised routes.173  Knowing that the boats 
will not turn back, the recent practice of human smugglers has been to place as 
many irregular migrants as possible on cheap, unsophisticated vessels often with 
defective engines controlled by the migrants themselves.174 The migrants are 
instructed to: 1) broadcast a distress call or a call for assistance as soon as they 
KDYHOHIWWKH6WDWHRIGHSDUWXUH¶VWHUULWRULDOZDWHUVDQGFRQFRFWWKHµEHVWVWRU\¶
they can to tell the Member State authorities (supported with forged 
documents).175 6XFKDSUDFWLFHNQRZQDVµDERUGHUJDPH¶LVFUHDWLQJGLIILFXOWLHVLQ
distinguishing genuine asylum seekers from other types of migrants.176 The 
migrant smugglers, facets of transnational organised crime, are the protagonists in 
the declared legal and policy battle with European governments.  
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7KH KXPDQ VPXJJOHU¶V µRUJDQLVHG UHIXJHH¶ VWUDWHJ\ KDV LGHQWLILHG YDULRXV OHJDO
issues resulting from the application of parallel legal frameworks both at regional 
and at international level. 7KH0HPEHU6WDWHV¶SROLF\-making response to human 
smuggling has created loopholes through conflicting interpretations of the 
international legal framework on search and rescue and the inconsistent 
application of human rights law. These policies, in the form of extraterritorial 
measures, are supposed to be a solution; however, in this thesis it will be argued 
that they have become the problem. Although human smuggling must be 
sanctioned, it is argued that this battle is happening at the expense of persons in 
need of international protection and thus in violation of international refugee and 
human rights law. This thesis argues that the EU and its Member States have the 
obligation to protect the victims of crime and especially those entitled to special 
protection such as refugees and other vulnerable groups in accordance with 
international obligations.177 The positive extraterritorial measures effectively 
activate the EU and its Member State collective responsibility. 
 
The issue of the irregular migration phenomenon involves enforcement measures 
consisting of pre-border, border and post-border controls. This chapter explores 
from a legal (doctrinal) perspective, border enforcement and human rights issues 
in response to the smuggling of migrants. It examines the international legal 
framework of the Law of the Sea, addressing the complex legal issues arising in 
interception and SAR. It covers the applicable legal regimes: the Law of the Sea, 
transnational criminal law, international human rights and international refugee 
law. It will first address the rules on law enforcement at sea, with particular 
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emphasis on interception. As migrants often travel in unseaworthy boats, this 
chapter also examines the obligation upon the masters of ships to render 
assistance to a person in distress at sea regardless of immigration status. Due to 
overlapping search and rescue zones, there are legal issues as to which State is 
responsible for disembarking persons rescued or interdicted at sea, arising from 
the international obligation not to return any person to a country where there is a 
real risk that they would face ill-treatment. The chapter will also provide an 
analysis of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and 
International Maritime Organisation (IMO) proposals to establish a cooperation 
model framework on concerted procedures and protection response teams 
following the disembarkation of rescued persons.178 Furthermore, an analysis of 
the EU External Borders Sea Regulation on interception, search and rescue and 
disembarkation is provided. 
 
2.2 The International Law of the Sea and Interception 
Any counter response to migrant smuggling by sea is challenged by the complex 
legal landscape of cumulative rules and international obligations under refugee 
and human rights laws, the Law of the Sea and transnational criminal law. 
Confronted with this challenge, Member States are reacting to the high number of 
irregular migrants coming to their territory by externalising border controls.179 
Interception operations DUH MXVWLILHGRQ WKHEDVLV WKDW WKH6WDWHKDV D µOHJLWLPDWH
interest in controlling irregular migration as well as ensuring the safety and 
security of air and maritime transportation, and a right to do so through various 
PHDVXUHV¶180 They also act as a multipurpose endeavour to rescue persons on 
unseaworthy vessels and to prevent human trafficking and people smuggling.181  
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At the international level, these interception measures are exercised on the basis 
of the Protocols to the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime 
 KHQFHIRUWK WKH µ3DOHUPR 3URWRFROV¶182 1) The Protocol to Prevent, 
Suppress, and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children 
2000,183 ZKLFK GHILQHV µWUDIILFNLQJ LQ SHUVRQV¶ DQG SURWHFWV WKH YLFWLPV RI
trafficking; 2) The Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and 
Air 2000,184 which deals with the smuggling of migrants by organised criminal 
JURXSV GHILQHV µVPXJJOLQJ RI PLJUDQWV¶ DQG SURWHFWV WKH ULJKWV RI VPXJJOHG
migrants;185 and 3) The Protocol against the illicit Manufacturing and Trafficking 
in Firearms, their parts and Components and Ammunition 2001,186 the purpose of 
ZKLFKLVWRIDFLOLWDWHFRRSHUDWLRQEHWZHHQWKH6WDWHV3DUWLHVLQRUGHUWRµSUHYHQW
combat and eradicate the illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms, their 
SDUWV DQG FRPSRQHQWV DQG DPPXQLWLRQ¶ $UWLFOH  These Protocols aim to 
HVWDEOLVK DQ µLQWHUQDWLRQDO FR-RSHUDWLYH IUDPHZRUN¶ LQ WKH ILHOG RI FURVV-border 
crime, the smuggling of migrants by land, sea and air, and the protection of 
victims of human trafficking.187 They act as a mechanism for States to respond to 
criminal networks via bilateral agreements allowing a State other than the flag 
State to intercept vessels involved in criminal operations.  
 
In anticipation of difficulties in interpretation of parallel legal frameworks 
applicable at sea, the EU, through the Schengen Borders Code (SBC) handbook, 
has laid down certain principles and procedures to be followed by border officials 
upon intercepting irregular migrants. The SBC handbook provides that border 
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officials must: a) allow any person in need of international protection access to 
legal safeguards, b) identify those persons that express fear of ill-treatment or 
harm upon being returned to country of origin or transit, c) consult with relevant 
QDWLRQDODXWKRULWLHVDVWRZKHWKHUDSHUVRQ¶VGHFODUDWLRQVKRXOGEHFRQVWUXHGDVD
wish to apply for asylum or any other form of international protection, and d) 
inform potential applicants of procedural legal guarantees such as access to 
interpreters when appropriate, and give adequate information to intercepted 
persons about what will happen to them.188 Most importantly, border guards 
FDQQRW WDNH DQ\GHFLVLRQ WR UHWXUQDSHUVRQ µZLWKRXWSULRU FRQVXOWDWLRQZLWK WKH
competent national DXWKRULW\ RU DXWKRULWLHV¶189 Despite the existence of clear 
guidance, however, this chapter argues that illicit extra-territorial border control 
practices are being conducted by the Italian and Greek authorities in violation of 
human rights law and other international obligations.190 
 
In the circumstances where a migrant smuggling vessel attempts to enter State 
territory without authorisation, the State has the right to enforce its coercive or 
punitive measures in the form of interception subject to its national laws on 
immigration and crime and subject to its international obligations.191 International 
ODZ KDV QRW HVWDEOLVKHG D XQLIRUP GHILQLWLRQ RI ZKDW µLQWHUFHSWLRQ¶ PHDQV192 
According to academic literature and the UNHCR, it means to: µi) prevent 
embarkation of persons on an international journey without the required 
documentation; (ii) prevent further onward international travel by persons who 
have commenced their journey either by land, air or sea; or (iii) assert control of 
vessels where there are reasonable grounds to believe the vessel is transporting 
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SHUVRQV FRQWUDU\ WR LQWHUQDWLRQDO RU QDWLRQDO PDULWLPH ODZ¶193 The primary 
objective of interception is to detect boats carrying irregular migrants and stop 
them reaching Member State territory, and to persuade them to return to their 
country of departure. Although it is recognised that every State has the right to 
use various measures in border management, they must do so in conformity with 
international law.194 This chapter will focus on interception at sea where legal 
safeguards are most challenged on grounds of jurisdiction. Operations at sea are 
governed by the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea µ81&/26¶195 The 
international Law of the Sea is addressed later in this chapter. 
 
2.3 State Jurisdiction in Interception Operations at Sea 
2.3.1 Territorial Jurisdiction 
Human smugglers no longer need to find new migratory routes to cross borders 
LUUHJXODUO\7KHLULQQRYDWLYHµRUJDQLVHGUHIXJHH¶VWUDWHJ\VHHNVWREHQHILWIURPWKH
international and EU legal framework, as well as from case law developments on 
international human rights law and the search and rescue regime. With knowledge 
of international law,196 human smugglers seem to be aware that State 
sovereignty197 is limited in its right to regulate immigration on matters concerning 
asylum and refugee law,198 as well as by the principle of international law 
prohibiting the return of individuals to a country where s/he might face a real risk 
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of being subjected to ill treatment.199 At the international and regional level, 
States must further ensure that human rights200 guarantees and safeguards are 
afforded to every person within their jurisdiction.201 As distinct jurisdictional 
rules apply to specific maritime zones as recognised by the Law of the Sea, 
directly affecting a 6WDWH¶VULJKW WR LQWHUFHSWDIRUHLJQYHVVHO202 the border game 
consists of irregular migrant boats coming as close as possible to the outer limit of 
Member State territorial sea jurisdiction, up to 12 nautical miles from the 
baseline.203 Within their territorial sea, States are sovereign and have the power to 
stop, board, and arrest individuals who violate their immigration laws and 
regulations.204 It is precisely at this zone that human smugglers count upon the 
coastal State to intercept and stop the vessel. Once the vessel reaches the coastal 
6WDWH¶VWHUULWRULDOZDWHUVWKHODWWHUEHFRPHVUHVSRQVLEOHIRUWKHUHFHSWLRQRIWKHVH
individuals in accordance with the Dublin Regulation,205 and international refugee 
law,206 and cannot return the vessel to its country of departure or any third State 
ZLWKRXWILUVWDVVHVVLQJHDFKSDVVHQJHU¶VLQGLYLGXDOFLUFXPVWDQFHV  
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Human smugglers seem to be aware that beyond the 12-mile limit and extending 
up to 24 nautical miles from the baseline is WKH µFRQWLJXRXV ]RQH¶207 where, as 
regards incoming vessels, WKHFRDVWDO6WDWHLVOLPLWHGLQLWVH[HUFLVHRIµFRQWURO¶WR
µLQVSHFWLRQV DQG ZDUQLQJV¶ LH LW FDQ RQO\ µVWRS ERDUG DQG VHDUFK WKH YHVVHO¶
with a view to preventing it from entering the territorial sea and there infringing 
the coastDO6WDWH¶VODZVDQGUHJXODWLRQV208 7KHFRDVWDO6WDWH¶VH[HUFLVHRIFRQWURO
depends upon WKHH[LVWHQFHRIDµUHOHYDQWFRQQHFWLRQZLWKWHUULWRULDODUHDV¶209 i.e. 
the migrant smuggling vessel intends to disembark its passengers in the territory 
of the intercepting State.210  But how would the coastal State know whether the 
migrant smuggling vessel intended to disembark its passengers in its territory? To 
confirm its suspicions, the coastal State may send a small boat alongside the 
vessel so that its officers can board the latter and inspect its documents, thus 
exercising control short of arrest.211 +RZHYHU RQFH WKH YHVVHO¶V GRFXPHQWV DUH
inspected and if unauthorised entry into the territorial sea is confirmed, the coastal 
State is permitted to punish in the contiguous zone infringement of its laws and 
regulations committed within its territorial sea.212 This course of action would 
require that upon inspection the coastal State arrests the vessel and assumes 
responsibility under domestic and international law. To avoid international 
responsibility, Italy and Greece have exercised push-back practices in the form of 
coercion to prevent the vessel entering their territorial waters.213 Such coercion 
involves directing the vessel out of the contiguous zone, onto the high seas, in the 
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belief that no responsibility rests on States on the high seas.214 This thesis argues 
that such a practice is illegal and constitutes a breach of international obligations 
including human rights law.215 
 
With regard to the two States that form the focus of this analysis, it should be 
noted that in accordance with UNCLOS, Italy has made the following maritime 
claims: their territorial waters extend to 12 nautical miles216 and have declared a 
contiguous zone of 24 nautical miles.217 Due to its geographical location,218 
Greece has encountered obstacles in claiming the maximum territorial sea breadth 
of 12 nautical miles in accordance with UNCLOS. This situation has led to a 
breakdown of relations between Greece and Turkey since the 1970s, extending 
beyond maritime zone issues to airspace, over-flight and the militarisation of 
islands in the Aegean Sea.219 Following negotiations, however, Greece and 
Turkey have agreed to have a territorial sea of 6 nautical miles220 and to refrain 
from unilaterally claiming an extension of this limit.221 This arrangement allows 
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the rest of the Aegean to be used by Turkey, Greece or any third country as high 
seas. Even under these circumstances, there is already geographical overlap to 
some extent.222  
 
2.3.2 Extraterritorial Jurisdiction 
Human smugglers instruct irregular migrants to use unmanned rubber Zodiac 
boats, to avoid detection upon leaving the Libyan or Turkish coasts, and upon 
reaching the territorial sea of the Member State to request assistance in the form 
of a distress call.223 In response, coastal States use extraterritorial measures in the 
form of interception beyond the territorial sea with the aim of returning the 
PLJUDQWV¶ ERDWV WR WKH FRXQWU\ RI GHSDUWXUH +RZHYHU DOWKRXJK WKLV SUDFWLFH LV
beneficial to Member States in preventing high numbers of irregular migrant 
flows to their territories, it violates their international obligations. 
 
To try and legitimise such a practice, Member States regard acts on vessels and on 
the high seas as not constituting an exercise of jurisdiction by them.224 However, 
the International Court of Justice (ICJ),225 the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR)226 and supervisory bodies have indicated that such an interpretation is 
wrong, KROGLQJDFWVGRQHRQWKHPFDQEHZLWKLQD6WDWH¶VMXULVGLFWLRQDVDUHsult 
of the principle of exclusive flag State jurisdiction over vessels on the high seas. 
At first, the concept of jurisdiction in human rights treaties was interpreted 
similarly to the concept under customary international law, being primarily 
territorial.227 However, due to a series of human rights violations taking place 
                                                          
222
  Deniz Bölükbasi, Turkey and Greece: The Aegean Disputes (Cavendish Publishing, 2012) 422. 
223
  Reitano and Tinti (n 196) 12. 
224
  Medvedyev (n 159) paragraphs 49-50; Kumin (n 2) 49. 
225
  Wall (n 201) paragraph 109. 
226
  Drozd and Janousek v France and Spain Application no 12747/87 Series A no 240, paragraph  
91; Cyprus v Turkey Application no 25781/94 ECHR 2001-IV; Medvedyev (n 159) paragraph 
67. 
227
  Bankovic (n 76) paragraph 61 and 67; Al-Adsani v United Kingdom Application no 35763/97  
ECHR 2001-XI, SDUDJUDSK$OH[DQGHU2UDNKHODVKYLOLµ5HVWULFWLYH,QWHUSUHWDWLRQRI+XPDQ
Rights Treaties in thH5HFHQW-XULVSUXGHQFHRI WKH(XURSHDQ&RXUWRI+XPDQ5LJKWV¶ 
EJIL 14(3) 529-568, 530. 
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RXWVLGHD6WDWH¶VWHUULWRU\228 it was considered unconscionable to allow a State to 
SHUSHWUDWH KXPDQ ULJKWV YLRODWLRQV RQ DQRWKHU 6WDWH¶V WHUULWRU\ ZKLFK ZRXOG EH
condemned if perpetrated within its own territory.229 Thus, international courts 
have recognised that the exercise of jurisdiction beyond State territory can take 
place in exceptional circumstances with special justification.230  
 
An authoritative interpretation of the scope of extraterritorial jurisdiction over 
ships beyond the 12-mile limit was established in the recent case of Hirsi.231 On 6 
May 2009, around two hundred individuals departing from Libya were 
intercepted by Italian Coastguards on the high seas within the Maltese Search and 
Rescue Region. Upon interception, Italian coastguards transferred these 
individuals into the Italian warship and took them back to Tripoli without 
H[DPLQLQJ WKH SDVVHQJHUV¶ LQGLYLGXDO FLUFXPVWDQFHV RU LQIRUPLQJ WKHP RI WKH
place of disembarkation. The (&W+5 DFFHSWHG WKDW µVKLSV RI WKH ,WDOLDQ DUPHG
IRUFHV¶ FRPSRVHG RI ,WDOLDQ PLOLWDU\ SHUVRQQHO IHOO XQGHU ,WDOLDQ MXULVGLFWLRQ IRU
the purposes of the Convention, even though the acts were performed on the high 
seas.232 Applying the principle of exclusive flag State jurisdiction, the applicants 
ZHUHXQGHU WKHµH[FOXVLYHde jure and de facto FRQWURORI WKH ,WDOLDQDXWKRULWLHV¶
GXULQJ WKH SHULRG µEHWZHHQ ERDUGLQJ WKH VKLSV DQG EHLQJ KDQGHG RYHU WR WKH
/LE\DQDXWKRULWLHV¶233 With this ruling, the Court challenged the traditional stance 
that jurisdiction is mainly territorial.234  
 
                                                          
228
  Al-Skeini and Others v the United Kingdom Application no 55721/07 (7 July 2011) paragraph  
150; Drozd (n 226) paragraph 91; Wall (n 201) paragraph 109. 
229
  Celiberti de Casariego v Uruguay 29 July 1981(U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/13/D/56/1979) paragraph  
10.3; Michael 'HQQLV µ$SSOLFDWLRQ RI +XPDQ 5LJKWV 7UHDWLHV ([WUDWHUULWRULDOO\ LQ 7LPHV RI
$UPHG&RQIOLFWDQG0LOLWDU\2FFXSDWLRQ¶AJIL 99(1) 119-141, 124-125. 
230
  Bankovic (n 76) paragraphs 59-61; Wall (n 201) paragraph 109; Marko Milanovic,  
Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties: Law, Principles, and Policy (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2011) 7-9. 
231
  See (n 57). 
232
  Hirsi (n 57) paragraph 81. 
233
  Hirsi (n 57) paragraphs 77, 81 
234
  Giuffréµ:DWHUHG-'RZQ5LJKWVRQWKH+LJK6HDV¶Q65) 730. 
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The Italian government had argued that the Italian vessels were on a rescue 
mission rather than an interception operation at the time, hence the Law of the Sea 
on search and rescue prevailed.235 The ECtHR rejected that argument, holding 
that Convention rights are not diminished on the ground that multiple 
international law regimes apply to a given situation.236 In relation to the 
µMXULVGLFWLRQ¶ LVVXH WKH&RXUWFRQFOXGHG WKDW LWGLGQRWPDWWHU why the migrants 
were on board the Italian vessels. What mattered was whether they were under the 
µFRQWURO¶RI WKH ,WDOLDQDXWKRULWLHV237 However, no guidance was given as to the 
intensity of control required to engage jurisdiction. It is also not clear whether a 
6WDWHYHVVHO¶VIDLOXUHWRFRPHWRWKHUHVFXHRIDVKLSLQGLVWUHVVZRXOGHQJDJHWKDW
6WDWH¶VMXULVGLFWLRQXQGHUWKH&RQYHQWLRQDQGVRSURYLGHWKHEDVLVIRUDSRVVLEOH
violation of the ECHR.  
 
In relation to migration at sea, Hirsi confirmed that irregular entry did not 
preclude asylum seekers from the application of the non-refoulement principle at 
the frontier as guaranteed by the 1951 Refugee Convention238 and re-iterated by 
the UNHCR Executive Committee.239 Hirsi implied a positive obligation on the 
intervening State not to return the vessel to its country of origin or to re-direct it 
to an unsafe third country without first assessing the individual circumstances of 
the people on board.240 ,WKHOGWKDWD6WDWH¶VREOLJDWLRQXQGHU$UWLFOH(&+5LV
not exempted if the applicants do not ask for asylum.241 Rather, whether or not a 
request for asylum is made, there is a positive duty to analyse how the authorities 
of the receiving State are fulfilling their international obligations in relation to the 
                                                          
235
  Hirsi (n 57) paragraphs 79-80. 
236
  Hirsi (n 57) paragraphs 79-80. 
237
  Hirsi (n 57) paragraphs 79-81. 
238
  Article 31(1). 
239
  UNHCR, Conclusions adopted by the Executive Committee on the International Protection of  
Refugees No 15 (XXX) 1979, A/34/12/Add.1, paragraph (c): States have an obligation to admit 
asylum seekers on a temporary basis if not on a durable basis due to large-scale influx 
situations. 
240
  Trevisanut, µ7KH3ULQFLSOHRINon-Refoulement¶Q65) 674; emphasis added. 
241
  ECHR, article 3 prohibits torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. 
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protection of refugees.242 The effect of the Hirsi case was to avoid binding the 
non-refoulement principle to the traditional concept of territory, avoiding 
duplicity of regimes. If the Court had decided the case differently, it would have 
made international protectioQFRQGLWLRQDOXSRQDQLQGLYLGXDO¶VFDSDFLW\WRVXEYHUW
border control migration policies by crossing borders undetected.243 
 
Thus, intercepting States cannot be insulated from accountability only because 
they exercise extraterritorial border control measures. On the contrary, de-
territorialisation comes with the guarantee of the non-refoulement principle. In 
effect, the Hirsi MXGJPHQWHVWDEOLVKHGDEHDFRQ IRUPLJUDQWV¶ ULJKWVDW VHDZKHQ
confronted with State interception measures.244  On the other hand, by focusing its 
reasoning in applying Article 3 ECHR mainly on asylum seekers and refugees,  
the Court avoided making a general statement that the non-refoulement principle 
applies to all intercepted migrants, thus XQGHUPLQLQJWKHµDEVROXWHFKDUDFWHURIWKH
righWVVHFXUHGE\$UWLFOH¶245 
 
2.4 The International Legal Framework on Search and Rescue 
7KH VPXJJOHUV¶ QH[W LQQRYDWLYH VWUDWHJ\ LQ UHVSRQVH WR WKH (&W+5¶V
extraterritorial application of human rights and the Mare Nostrum Operation246 
performed by Italian authorities is to first cross the territorial sea of Libya and 
WKHQ OHDYH LUUHJXODU PLJUDQWV¶ ERDWV VWUDQGHG DW VHD ZDLWLQJ WR EH UHVFXHG E\
Member States patrol boats.247 Upon crossing over onto the high seas, irregular 
migrants are instructed to sabotage their own vessels (self-induced distress) to 
oblige State authorities to rescue them.248 This brings a very high risk of death 
                                                          
242
  Hirsi (n 57SDUDJUDSK*LXIIUpµ:DWHUHG-'RZQ5LJKWVRQWKH+LJK6HDV¶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243
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  Italian response to immigration to Europe from 18 October 2013 to 31 October 2014 operating 
close to Libyan coast; superseded by Frontex Triton Operation; see Chapter 5 and 6.  
247
  Reitano and Tinti (n 196) 12. 
248
  Patricia Mallia, Migrant Smuggling by Sea: Combating a Current Threat to Maritime Security  
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through starvation, dehydration, suffocation and violence from human 
smugglers.249 This strategy has resulted in overburdening the search and rescue 
services of coastal States, making them ineffective to save lives. From 1988 to 
June 2016, over 27,000 people were documented as having drowned in an attempt 
to cross the Mediterranean Sea,250 identified as one of the most deadly seas in 
Europe.251 Situations of distress at sea often resulting in fatalities have become a 
regular feature of the Mediterranean Sea. Human rights challenges are raised in 
the context of search and rescue, disembarkation, and post-disembarkation 
processing for States, the shipping industry and international organisations.252 The 
main challenges include the safety of lives at sea, the identification of a safe place 
of disembarkation in a timely manner and access to asylum procedures. In 
identifying solutions to these challenges, States must consider the different 
regimes of the Law of the Sea, international refugee law, international human 
rights law, international humanitarian law and criminal law. 
 
The duty to assist persons in distress at sea, part of the jus gentium,253 has its 
origins in customary international law.254 This duty has been codified in various 
international conventions, namely: the International Convention for the Safety of 
                                                          
249
  $PQHVW\,QWHUQDWLRQDO³/LE\DLV)XOORI&UXHOW\6WRULHVRI$EGXFWLRQSexual Violence and  
Abuse From 0LJUDQWV DQG 5HIXJHHV´  0D\   
<https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/mde19/1578/2015/en/> accessed 28 October 2017. 
250
  $PQHVW\,QWHUQDWLRQDOµ6HDUFKDQG5HVFXH2SHUDWLRQVLQWKH&HQWUDO0Hditerranean: Facts and 
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  UNHCR, Rescue at Sea, Stowaways and Maritime Interception (2nd edition, 2011) 4. 
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  Grant Gilmore and Charles Black, Salvage (1957)The Law of Admiralty (8-1 law of nations). 
254
  Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law Respecting Assistance and Salvage at  
Sea (212 CTS 187) 23 September 1910, article 11; Geneva Convention on the High Seas 1958, 
DUWLFOH  DOVR QRWH WKDW WKH SUHDPEOH UHJDUGHG WKH &RQYHQWLRQ DV µJHQHUDOO\ GHFODUDWRU\ RI
established principles of iQWHUQDWLRQDO ODZ¶81&/26DUWLFOH ,/& Commentary on draft 
article 12 of the United Nations Convention on the High Seas (1956) UN Doc. A/3179; David 
Joseph Attard, Malgosia Fitzmaurice, Norman Martinez Gutierrez (eds), The IMLI Manual on 
International Maritime Law: Volume I: the Law of the Sea (Oxford University Press, 2014) 43. 
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Life at Sea 1974 (SOLAS Convention),255 the International Convention on 
Maritime Search and Rescue 1979 (SAR Convention);256 the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982 (UNCLOS),257 and the International 
Convention on Salvage 1989.258 This duty applies to any master of a navigating 
vessel, be it a governmental or private fishing vessel.259 States are responsible for 
establishing consecutive search and rescue zones without any overlap in the 
Mediterranean Sea,260 through the conclusion of SAR agreements with 
neighbouring States.261 The SAR Convention 1979 provides for the adoption of a 
µFRRUGLQDWLRQ V\VWHP RI VHDUFK DQG UHVFXH RSHUDWLRQV¶262 at the international 
level.263 Italy, Malta and Libya have unilaterally declared264 their SAR regions 
which partially overlap, creating problems of coordination in SAR operations. 
0DOWD¶V6$5UHJLRQFRYHUVDQDUHDRI50,000 km2, 750 times bigger than Malta 
itself.265 It extends to Tunisian territorial waters, the Greek island of Crete and the 
territorial waters of Lampedusa, Lampione and Linosa.266 Since the 1970s, Greece 
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and Turkey have been in conflict over their sovereign rights in the Aegean Sea.267 
In the 1950s, Greece unilaterally designated its maritime search and rescue 
area,268 followed by a unilateral declaration by Turkey in 1988, overlapping with 
the Greek region.269 These unilateral demarcations are in contravention of the 
Hamburg Convention, which requires the demarcation of SAR areas to be based 
on bilateral agreements.270 Equally, claiming overlapping SAR areas violates 
international standards as set out by IMO,271 ICAO272 Recommendations and the 
International Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue Manual (IAMSAR 
Manual).273 
 
The long-running Aegean dispute and the overlapping SAR areas between Italy, 
Malta and Libya have caused long delays in responding to rescue calls and have 
sometimes been used as an excuse for in-action, proving fatal to migrant lives. On 
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Convention"), 7 December 1944, (1994) 15 U.N.T.S. 295, Annex 12, 
<http://www.icao.int/safety/airnavigation/NationalityMarks/annexes_booklet_en.pdf> 
accessed 28 October 2017; on fXUWKHUGLVFXVVLRQVHH ,VDYHOOD9DVLORJHRUJL µ'HOLPLWDWLRQRI




11 October 2013, a boat carrying over 400 people sank 111 km from Lampedusa 
DQGNPIURP0DOWDZLWKLQ0DOWD¶V6$5]RQH274 The island of Lampedusa 
forms part of Maltese and Italian SRR. More than 200 people died as a 
consequence of the Maltese and Italian Regional Coordination Centre (RCC) 
passing rescue calls to one another in an attempt to evade responsibility for 
disembarking rescued persons in their territories.275 Italy and Malta were guilty of 
similar failures in 2011, when 63 migrants died as a result of distress calls being 
ignored by the Italian and Maltese RCC.276 These incidents are not a result of a 
lack of capacity, but of fear from consequences of rescue. Coastal States fear the 
heavy burden upon their immigration and security systems and private vessels 
fear investigation and possible detention.277  
 
2.5 Conditions of Distress 
Rescue interventions are duty based, not conditional on the nationality of the 
vessel in distress or of the individuals found on board.278 It is for the State, the 
master of the ship or the commander of an aircraft to assess a specific case as a 
distress situation and whether it requires assistance. It does not matter whether the 
persons in need of assistance are irregular migrants, as long as they are found to 
be in distress.279 The rescue of irregular migrant boats in distress has given rise to 
various legal issues with serious consequences. µDistress¶ PHDQV D µVLWXDWLRQ
wherein there is a reasonable certainty that a person, a vessel or other craft is 
threatened by grave and imminent danger and requires immediate assisWDQFH¶280 
But VWDWHV FDQQRW DJUHH RQ KRZ WKH 6$5 &RQYHQWLRQ¶V GHILQLWLRQ RI GLVWUHVV
should be interpreted and applied. For some States, the vessel must be on the 
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Malta for example knowing that irregular migrants wish to be rescued by Italian 
armed forces, will initiate a rescue operation if the boat is in distress, ie is sinking 
and in imminent danger of loss of lives.282 If the boat people actively resist rescue 
attempts, the interception is not considered to fall under the SAR legal regime.283 
However, this inWHUSUHWDWLRQ LV FRQWUDU\ WR WKH 6$5 &RQYHQWLRQ¶V GHILQLWLRQ RI
µGLVWUHVV SKDVH¶ DV µD situation wherein there is a reasonable certainty that a 
vessel or a person is threatened by grave and imminent danger and requires 
LPPHGLDWHDVVLVWDQFH¶284 The Convention places an obligation on the shipmaster 
responding to a distress call to decide whether the vessel needs immediate 
assistance. Logically, coastal States cannot know that a vessel is in distress if they 
do not receive a distress call from the vessel itself. However, once the distress call 
is received, the coastal State cannot ignore it or refuse to provide assistance if the 
individuals on board prefer to be rescued by an Italian vessel instead of by a 
Maltese or Greek vessel. The SAR Convention does not offer a solution to failed 
rescue scenarios by inactive SAR states. It is argued that the created legal vacuum 
requires specific provisions to address a failure to act scenario by reluctant SAR 
States and possible penalization measures for those who fail to exercise their 
responsibility to act. 
 
It is argued that the confusion of responsibility in overlapping SAR zones or non-
responsibility for a SAR zone does not relieve another State from responsibility 
under the SAR Convention if it is the recipient of a distress call. Trevisanut 
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State and those individuals in distress at the moment that a distress call is made, 
FUHDWLQJ µD UHODWLRQVKLS¶ sufficient to make the ECHR applicable.285 A de facto 
control nexus exists when distress calls are made from the high seas, deriving 
from the argument that people in distress place their lives in the hands of the State 
receiving the call.286 This control becomes de jure at the moment that the distress 
call comes from within the SAR zone, the State in question having the additional 
REOLJDWLRQ WR µpromote the establishment, operation and maintenance of an 
DGHTXDWHDQGHIIHFWLYHVHDUFKDQGUHVFXHVHUYLFH¶287 It is argued that the coastal 
State does not have an obligation merely to perform the SAR service, but to 
SURYLGH ZLWK µGXH GLOLJHQFH¶ D FHUWDLQ OHYHO RI VHUYLFH ZKHQ DVVXPLQJ
responsibility for its SAR zone.288 Thus, coastal States have a positive obligation 
to take preventative measures to counter immediate risks to persons in distress 
under their responsibility ± OHDGLQJ WR UHFRJQLWLRQ RI D µULJKW WR EH UHVFXHG¶ 
)XUWKHUPRUH WKH LQFRQVLVWHQW LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ RI µGLVWUHVV¶ LV IDWDO WR Whe most 
fundamental principle, the µULJKW WR OLIH¶289 With any rescue intervention, the 
GHFLVLRQDVWRWKHYHVVHO¶VVHDZRUWKLQHVVUHVWVZLWKDQLQGLYLGXDOVKLSPDVWHU290  If 
the wrong decision is made and people drown as a result, the above inconsistency 
would not exonerate the shipmaster from liability.   
 
2.6 The µ'LVHPEDUNDWLRQ¶&RPSOLFDWLRQ 
Once a private or governmental vessel rescues irregular migrants, it becomes 
UHVSRQVLEOHWRSURYLGHµLQLWLDOPHGLFDORURWKHUQHHGVDQGGHOLYHUWKHPWRDSODFH
RI VDIHW\¶ LQ DFFRUGDQFH ZLWK WKH LQWHUQDWLRQDO OHJDO IUDPHZRUN RQ VHDUFh and 
                                                          
285
  6HOLQH7UHYLVDQXW³,V7KHUHD5LJKWWREH5HVFXHGDW6HD"´Q48). 
286
  6HOLQH7UHYLVDQXW³,V7KHUHD5LJKWWREH5HVFXHGDW6HD"´Q48). 
287
  UNCLOS, article 98(2). 
288
 Moen (n 48µ$UWLFOHUHSUHVHQWVWKHLPSRVLWLRQRIDSRVLWLve duty, with no clear  
understanding of its minimum threshold or its outer limit, and no clear indication of the 
UHODWLRQVKLS WKDW JLYHV ULVH WR VXFKDQREOLJDWLRQ «6HDUFKDQG UHVFXHXQGHU$UWLFOH 
then cannot be the mere promotion of a service, EXWWKHSURPRWLRQRIDFHUWDLQOHYHORIVHUYLFH¶ 
289
  ECHR, article 2; EU Charter, article 2; ICCPR, article 6; see Chapter 5 for more detail. 
290
  %DVDUDQµ7KH6DYHGDQGWKH'URZQHG¶Q43) 210. 
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rescue.291 Complex legal issues arise in relation to governmental vessels rescuing 
irregular migrant vessels in distress, especially with regard to where to disembark 
the rescued individuals. Disembarkation rules have become problematic because 
of the 0HPEHU 6WDWHV¶ UHOXFWDQFH WR DFFHSW WKH UHVSRQVLELOLW\ WR KRVW LUUHJXODU
migrants whom they rescue. At EU level, the State in which the irregular migrants 
first disembark is legally responsible for their reception and screening, for 
processing asylum claims and for facilitating their return in accordance with 
CEAS292 and the Dublin Regulation.293 SAR Convention makes the State 
UHVSRQVLEOH IRU WKH VHDUFK DQG UHVFXH UHJLRQ GHFLVLRQ PDNHU RQ WKH µSODFH RI
VDIHW\¶294 In this situation, the main preoccupation of Member States is not how 
to provide assistance, but what will happen to their immigration system. As there 
is no EU burden-sharing mechanism in respect of irregular migratory flows, the 
Member State which rescues these persons bears this burden alone.295 
Consequently, Member States such as Italy and Greece are discouraged from 
participating in rescue operations. This practice is contrary to international law 
governing search and rescue which requires assistance to be rendered to any 
person regardless of their immigration status.296 It also violates the legal 
obligation to protect human life297 and the principle of non-refoulement.298 In 
short, immigration preoccupations are undermining the SAR regime.  
                                                          
291
  SAR Convention, Annex 3, Chapter I, 1.3.2. 
292
  Based on article 78(1) TFEU. 
293
 Dublin Regulation (n 42) based on article 78(2)(e) TFEU, see articles 3, 5, and 18; Return 
Directive (n 42) article 1, articles 6-14; legal basis article 63(3)(b) TEC. 
294
  Annex 5 to the amended SAR Convention, Chapter 3, paragraph 3.1.9 (MSC 78/26/Add.1, 3);  
SOLAS, Chapter V, Regulation 33.  
295
 TFEU, article 80: Any Union policies on border checks, asylum and immigraWLRQVKDOOµEH 
governed by the principle of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility, including its financial 
implicatiRQV EHWZHHQ WKH 0HPEHU 6WDWHV¶ ,Q WKH ILHOG RI LUUHJXODU PLJUDWLRQ DSDUW IURP
inadequate financial assistance), the European Council and the Commission omit to provide 
further assistance upholding the principle that this matter is a Member State obligation. 
296
  UNCLOS, article 98; SOLAS as amended, Regulation 33, 1-1; SAR Convention, as amended,  
Chapter 3.1.9; MSC Guidelines (n 130) Annex 34; IMO Principles Relating to Administrative 
Procedures for Disembarking Persons Rescued at Sea  22 January 2009 Circular FAL.3/Circ. 
194, point 2(3). 
297
  UDHR 1948, article 3; ICCPR, article 6(1); ECHR, article 2; EU Charter, article 2. 
298
  Refugee Convention, article 33; UN General Assembly, Convention Against Torture and 




Hence, they do QRWDSSO\DXQLIRUPLQWHUSUHWDWLRQRIµSODFHRIVDIHW\¶DQGZKHQD
State is deemed to have discharged its responsibilities under international law,299 
benefiting from one of the weaknesses of the SAR regime - lack of agreed criteria 
RQWKHµVDIHVWSODFH¶IRUGLVHPEDUNDWLRQ7KHRULJLQDO6$5&RQYHQWLRQGLd 
QRW GHILQH µSODFH RI VDIHW\¶ (TXDOO\ SUREOHPDWLF LV WKH µSODFH RI VDIHW\¶
interpreted as satisfied through a temporary accommodation of the rescued 
persons on board a warship, not necessarily on land.300 Disparities in 
interpretation have continued despite IMO providing further clarification in 2004 
RIZKDWµSODFHRIVDIHW\¶PHDQVQDPHO\µDORFDWLRQZKHUHUHVFXHRSHUDWLRQVDUH
FRQVLGHUHGWRWHUPLQDWH,WLVDOVRDSODFHZKHUHWKHVXUYLYRUV¶VDIHW\RIOLIHLVQR
longer threatened and where their basic human needs (such as food, shelter and 
medical needs) can be met. Further, it is a place from which transportation 
DUUDQJHPHQWVFDQEHPDGHIRUWKHVXUYLYRUV¶QH[WRUILQDOGHVWLQDWLRQ¶301  
 
The main reason for the disparity of interpretations is that Malta has not ratified 
the subsequent amendments.302 It insists that rescued migrants must be 
disembarked at the nearest safe port; distinguishing the concept of safe place in 
terms of search and rescue.303 Malta interprets this as meaning disembarkation in 
a country WKDW VDWLVILHV WKH UHVFXHG SHUVRQ¶V EDVLF QHHGV ZLWKRXW WDNLQJ LQWR
consideration the need for international protection.304 ,Q0DOWD¶VFDVHWKHQHDUHVW
                                                                                                                                                              
1984, United Nations, Treaty Series, Volume 1465, 85 (entry into force 26 June 1987), article 
3; EU Charter, article 19.  
299
  Parliamentary Assembly, Europe's Boat People: Mixed Migration Flows by Sea into Southern  
Europe Resolution 1637 (2008) paragraph 6.  
300
  MSC Guidelines (n 130) article 6.13. 
301
  MSC Guidelines (n 130) point 6.12; Resolution MSC.70(69) (n 130) Annex 3, paragraph 1.3.2  
"Rescue" - An operation to retrieve persons in distress, provide for their initial medical or other 
needs, and deliver them to a place of safety. 
302
  IMO, Report of the Facilitation Committee on its Thirty-Fifth Session, Formalities Connected  
with the Arrival, Stay and Departure of Persons (19 March 2009) FAL 35/17, point 6.57. 
303
  Jasmine CoppenVµ7KH/DPSHGXVD'LVDVWHU+RZWR3UHYHQW)XUWKHU/RVVRI/LIHDW6HD"¶ 
(2013) IJMNST 7(4) 591. 
304
  Klepp (n 282) 549. 
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safe port is in Italy.305 Italy, on the other hand, is a party to the 2004 Amendments 
and interprets the latter as requiring the State responsible for the SAR zone in 
which the rescue takes place to accept disembarkation in its own territory, which 
usually means the Maltese port of Valletta GXHWR0DOWD¶VH[WHQGHG6$5DUHD306 
These inconsistent interpretations create problems and tensions between the two 
countries, resulting in disembarkation delays.  
 
These interpretations go against the jurisprudence of ECtHR turning the concept 
RI µSODFH RI VDIHW\¶ FRXSOHG ZLWK WKH non-refoulement UXOH LQWR WKH µVDIH WKLUG
coXQWU\¶ FRQFHSW IRU GLVHPEDUNDWLRQ SXUSRVHV307 States have an obligation not 
only to ensure a safe place of disembarkation for individuals but also to ensure 
that the third country provides the necessary legal guarantees against indirect 
refoulement.308 Such a GHFLVLRQ LV GHSHQGHQW RQ WKH WKLUG FRXQWU\¶V IXQFWLRQDO
asylum system. This thesis will argue that the main third countries of departure or 
transit (Libya and Turkey), and the two frontline Member States (Italy and 
*UHHFHQRORQJHUIXOILOWKHµVDIHFRXQWU\¶FULWHULDJRYHUQLQJGLVHPEDUNDWLRQ309  
 
2.7 In Search of Adequate Disembarkation Criteria 
Due to the lack of clear disembarkation criteria, the UNHCR has developed 
JXLGHOLQHVRQGLVHPEDUNDWLRQEDVHGRQWKHFRQFHSWRIµQH[WSRUWRIFDOO¶310 These 
do not prRYLGH D FOHDU GHILQLWLRQ RI µQH[W SRUW RI FDOO¶ UDWKHU WKH\ DVVLVW E\
recognising various possibilities depending on the circumstances. In those 
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 M/V Pinar E incident, 
<http://www.doiarchived.gov.mt/EN/press_releases/2009/04/pr0640E.asp> accessed 28 October 
2017. 
306
 Patricia MalliDµ7KH096DODPLVDQGWKH6WDWHRI'LVHPEDUNDWLRQDW,QWHUQDWLRQDl Law: the  
8QGHILQDEOH*RDO¶(2014) ASIL 18(11) May 15; Annex 5 to the amended SAR Convention (n 
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 NS and ME (n 133) paragraph 94; MSS (n 115) paragraph 358; Hurwitz (n 133) 46; Kneebone 
(n 133) 129 and 54. 
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 Wouters and den Heijer (n 57) 7; Resolution 1821 (2011) (n 132) point 5.2; Tondini (n 132) 59;  
see Chapter 4 for further detail on indirect refoulement. 
309
 See Chapters 3-5. 
310
 81+&5¶V([HFXWLYH&RPPLWWHH, Problems Related to the Rescue of Asylum-Seekers in  
Distress at Sea Problems Related to the Rescue of Asylum-Seekers in Distress at Sea, EXCOM 
Conclusion No 23 (1981) No 12A (A/36/12/Add.1) paragraph 3. 
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circumstances where large numbers of irregular migrants are rescued, the next 
port of call would be the nearest port of geographic proximity. Paramount 
consideration shall be given to the safety and humanitarian needs of the rescued 
persons. Depending on the circumstances, other interpretations include: the next 
scheduled port of call if the situation allows so that the rescued vessel does not 
deviate from its route; the next port which is best equipped to receive the rescued 
person and provide access to asylum guarantees; disembarkation can take place at 
the nearest port of the State which conducts interception measures; or if the 
situation allows, in the State from which the boat left, considering its primary 
responsibility not to allow unseaworthy vessels to leave its territory.311 Although 
guidance has been provided by the responsible international agencies assigned 
with the task of overseeing and guiding States regarding the development of 
international maritime law and safety at sea,312 States have not taken these 
guidelines into consideration or acted upon them when conducting 
disembarkation practices.  
 
In 2011, WKH 81+&5 IXUWKHU SURSRVHG D µ0RGHO )UDPHZRUN IRU &RRSHUDWLRQ
IROORZLQJ 5HVFXH DW 6HD 2SHUDWLRQV LQYROYLQJ 5HIXJHHV DQG $V\OXP 6HHNHUV¶
addressing disembarkation situations by the State other than the flag State.313 This 
model framework was intended to be aGRSWHG DV µRQH HOHPHQW LQ D EURDGHU
FRPSUHKHQVLYH UHJLRQDO DSSURDFK WR DGGUHVV LUUHJXODUPL[HGPRYHPHQWV¶314 To 
address the situation where States do not have the capacity to meet the needs of 
rescued persons, the UNHCR recommended the establishment of mobile 
                                                          
311
  UNHCR and Global Consultations International Protection, Background note on the protection  
of asylum-seekers and refugees rescued at sea, 18 March 2002, paragraph 30  
<http://www.unhcr.org/3e5f35e94.html> accessed 26 October 2017. 
312
  ,0281+&5,QWHUQDWLRQDO&KDPEHURI6KLSSLQJµ81+&55HVFXHDW6HD, A Guide to  
3ULQFLSOHV DQG 3UDFWLFH DV $SSOLHG WR 0LJUDQWV DQG 5HIXJHHV¶ -DQXDU\ 
<http://www.imo.org/en/MediaCentre/HotTopics/seamigration/Documents/UNHCR-
Rescue_at_Sea-Guide-ENG-screen.pdf> accessed 27 October 2017. 
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  UNHCR, The Model Framework, Expert Meeting in Djibouti, 8-10 November 2011; UNHCR,  
µ5HIXJHH Protection and Mixed Migration: The 10-3RLQW 3ODQ LQ $FWLRQ¶ )HEUXDU\ 
UNHCR, Global Initiative on Protection at Sea, Division of International Protection, 2014 
<http://www.unhcr.org/4ec1436c9.pdf> accessed 17 October 2017. 
314
  Klug (n 39) 58. 
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protection response teams. These experts, coming from governments, 
international organisations, UNHCR and NGOs, would be on a standby basis and 
called on by States upon request.315 These teams would greatly assist States to 
comply with their international obligations and avoid the reception and detention 
of rescued people in inadequate conditions.  
 
In response to the 11 October 2013 Mediterranean shipwrecks, UNCHR adopted 
the Central Mediterranean Sea Initiative (CMSI).316 It introduced 12 steps 
designed to contribute to saving lives at sea, with steps taken at 1) EU level, 2) in 
collaboration with first countries of asylum and transit, and 3) in collaboration 
with countries of origin.317 The UNHCR considers that introducing SAR patrols 
on certain Mediterranean routes followed with the reinforcement of Frontex is the 
key to saving lives at sea. Other recommendations included the establishment of a 
compensation scheme for those masters of commercial ships assisting vessels in 
distress, and a joint EU response for establishing a predictable mechanism for 
identifying clearly and without delay the safest places of disembarkation.318  
 
7KH 81+&5¶V SURSRVDOV DQG UHFRPPHQGDWLRQV IRFXVHG PDLQO\ RQ HQKDQFLQJ
international cooperation through the facilitation of existing tools, agreements and 
instruments. It did not adopt new binding legal obligations on international 
cooperation to address the issue of inconsistent interpretations of the relevant 
provisions. It also failed to address the collective responsibility of burden sharing 
which many scholars regard as the key to the phenomenon of mixed migration.319 
The proposed mobile teams would not be a suitable solution for those States that 
experience a consistent flow of large-scale maritime arrivals, which is becoming 
                                                          
315
  UNHCR, The Model Framework (n 313) Annex B, 11; Klug (n 39) 59. 
316
  UNHCR Central Mediterranean Sea Initiative (CMSI), EU solidarity for Rescue-at-sea and  
Protection of Refugees and Migrants: CMSI Action Plan (UNHCR Bureau for Europe, 
updated March 2015). 
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  ibid, 2-3. 
318
  ibid, see steps 2 and 3. 
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  Hurwitz (n 133) 163; Goodwin-Gill and McAdam, The Refugee in International Law (n  
71) 7KHDXWKRUVDUJXHWKDWµFROOHFWLYHUHVSRQVLELOLW\IRUUHIXJHHSURWHFWLRQ¶LVHPHUJLQJ
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the norm in Italy and Greece.320 In fact, the UNHCR proposals mirror the EU 
action plan for irregular migration on re-enforcing existing instruments as the 
answer to this problem.321  
 
One wonders whether the re-enforcement of existing instruments, which have not 
proven effective so far, will be the right solution to this continuing problem. Klug 
argues that although the proposed adoption of a model framework on cooperation 
for State action after rescue at sea is to be welcomed and contributes to ensuring 
adequate SAR services, these proposals are cost-intensive and strain public 
resources.322 Requesting States to cooperate to the fullest extent possible when 
there is no such duty under customary international law is difficult.323 The IMO 
has attempted to close loopholes impairing cooperation through the adoption of 
treaties creating a duty to cooperate. However, these loopholes exist not because 
of a lack of treaty obligations, but because of an unsatisfactory degree of non-
compliance with existing rules. 
 
The IMO has also established a set of principles on disembarkation as guidelines 
for Member States on where to disembark undocumented irregular migrants if the 
third country does not willingly collaborate.324 The draft circular re-iterates that 
µLIGLVHPEDUNDWLRQIURP WKHUHVcuing ship cannot be arranged swiftly elsewhere, 
the Government responsible for the SAR area should accept the disembarkation of 
the persons rescued into a place of safety under its control in which the persons 
rescued can have timely access to post rescue VXSSRUW¶325 It is not clear whether 
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  Klug (n 39) 60. 
321
  European Commission, The Global Approach to Migration and Mobility, COM(2011) 743 
final, 2. 
322
  Klug (n 39) 57. 
323
  'HOEUFN-RVWµ7KH,QWHUQDWLRQDO2EOLJDWLRQWR&RRSHUDWH± An Empty Shell or a Hard Law  
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13Ǧ14. 
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325
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this imposes on the State responsible for the SAR zone a duty to accept the 
disembarkation of rescued persons in its own territory. There was considerable 
RSSRVLWLRQE\GHOHJDWLRQV WR WKHFKDQJH LQ WKHZRUGLQJIURPµVKDOO¶ WR µVKRXOG¶
OHDYLQJ WKH VLWXDWLRQ XQFHUWDLQ GXH WR WKH ODWWHU¶V QRQ-obligatory nature.326 
Member States feared that making disembarkation rules clear would act as a pull 
factor, increasing the number of irregular migration by sea.327 (TXDOO\ ,02¶V
attempts to adopt a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU)328 between the 
countries in the central Mediterranean to reach an agreement on concerted 
procedures for the disembarkation of rescued persons failed.329 In April 2014, it 
again failed to achieve any significant progress in reaching agreement between 
States Parties.330  
 
So far, IMO and the UNHCR have managed to prepare joint guidelines, principles 
and practices fully respecting the rights of migrants and refugees at sea.331 
Although these guidelines are a first step to assisting States to avoid inconsistent 
interpretations, they represent soft law thus are not binding on States. 
Furthermore, they do not provide a precise procedure. On the contrary, they 
contain general principles without addressing the root cause of the 
inconsistencies. It is precisely the lack of detailed guidance as to good practice in 
given situations that are causing these conflicting interpretations. Furthermore, 
these guidelines fail to address the situation where the nearest Member States 
responsibOHIRUWKHVHLQGLYLGXDOV,WDO\DQG*UHHFHGRQRWIXOILOWKHµVDIHVWSODFH¶
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  Facilitation Committee, Report of the Facilitation Committee on Its Thirty-Fifth Session, Doc.  
FAL 35/17, 19 March 2009, paragraph 6.59. 
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  Moreno-Lax (n 43) 176; comments by UK and Malta. 
328
  MoU considered an informal but legal agreement; see Maritime Delimitation and Territorial  
Questions between Qatar v Bahrain (1 July1994) ICJ Reports 1994,112, paragraph 27; Hollis 
Duncan, The Oxford Guide to Treaties (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) 46. 
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  ,0281+&5DQGWKH,QWHUQDWLRQDO&KDPEHURI6KLSSLQJµ5HVFXHDW6HD$*XLGH to  
Principles and Practice as $SSOLHG WR 0LJUDQWV DQG 5HIXJHHV¶ -DQXDU\ 
<http://www.imo.org/en/MediaCentre/HotTopics/seamigration/Documents/UNHCR-
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criteria due to the overburdening of their reception capacities.332 In need of 
concrete solidarity, the Greek and Italian governments have shown great interest 
in turning the CMSI into a concrete formalised model of cooperation on rescue 
for the Mediterranean Region.333 However, the process is moving slowly with 
discussions and proposals but so far without any concrete action at regional 
level.334 
 
In 2016, all 193 UN Member States agreed through the New York Declaration for 
Refugees and Migrants to protect those who are forced to flee.335 The UNHCR 
was given the task of building upon the Comprehensive Refugee Response 
)UDPHZRUN DQG GHYHORSLQJ D µ*OREDO &RPSDFW RQ 5HIXJHHV¶ FRQVLVWLQJ RI D 
programme of action setting out measures for States and other stakeholders to 
better cooperate and share responsibility for large-scale movements of refugees.336  
7KHIRXUNH\REMHFWLYHVRIWKH*OREDO&RPSDFWDUHWRµHDVHWKHSUHVVXUHVRQKRVW
countries; enhance refugee self-reliance; expand access to third-country solutions; 
DQGVXSSRUWFRQGLWLRQV LQFRXQWULHVRIRULJLQ IRU UHWXUQ LQVDIHW\DQGGLJQLW\¶337 
The New York Declaration also paved the way for the opening of negotiations on 
a Global Compact for safe, regular and orderly migration.  
 
Although UN action towards refugees in vulnerable situations is to be welcomed, 
the Global Compact has been criticised by legal scholars because it is not  legally 
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binding Portraying the migrants as victims presenting StDWHV ZLWK D µPRUDO DQG
KXPDQLWDULDQ¶ FKDOOHQJH QRW RQO\ VKRZV WKDW SURWHFWLRQ ZLOO ODUJHO\ GHSHQG RQ
6WDWHV¶ JHQHURVLW\ EXW DOVR XQGHUOLQHV WKH XQZLOOLQJQHVV RI 6WDWHV WR ELQG
themselves legally to respect, promote and protect migrant rights in terms of 
international human rights law.338 Hence, all that States committed themselves to 
LQ WKH 1HZ <RUN 'HFODUDWLRQ ZDV WR µFRQVLGHU GHYHORSLQJ QRQ-binding guiding 
SULQFLSOHV DQG YROXQWDU\ JXLGHOLQHV¶339 Although the Global Compact is a 
positive step in a more human rights centred direction, it is not a long term 
VROXWLRQ WR PLJUDQWV¶ YXOQHUDELOLW\ $Q\ UHVSRQVH WR ODUJH VFDOH PRYHPHQWV RI
migrants will not be resolved by adopting new laws and binding protocols as 
recommended by the zero draft but by finding solutions to ensure that States 
comply with their human rights obligations.340 What is necessary in times of large 
scale movements of migrants is to create an international mechanism of 
accountability and independent oversight of human rights violations. 
 
2.8 Regulating Interception and Search and Rescue at EU level 
Equally, the EU failed to adopt a uniform interpretation on principles such as 
rescue, disembarkation and distress. In 2014, to avoid Member States divergent 
practices for sea operations, the Commission proposed the DGRSWLRQ RI D µ6HD
%RUGHUV 5HJXODWLRQ¶341 combining border control and search and rescue within 
one Regulation, operational under Frontex342 coordination. The Sea Borders 
Regulation promotes the protection of fundamental rights and the principle of 
non-refoulement;343 prohibiting the disembarkation of intercepted or rescued 
                                                          
338
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342
  For further details on Frontex see Chapter 5. 
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persons to a third country by participating Member States if they are aware or 
ought to be aware that the third country is engaged in human rights violations.344  
 
Despite human rights safeguards expressly set out within the Sea Borders 
Regulation, it is argued however that in practice the rules do not effectively assist 
in a uniform interpretation. Unfortunately, disembarkation continues to depend 
largely on where the ship was intercepted and/or rescued. If the interception 
occurred within the territorial sea or the contiguous zone of a host or participating 
Member State, the disembarkation must be conducted within that coastal Member 
State.345 If the interception takes place on the high seas, the persons on the ship 
PXVW EH GLVHPEDUNHG DW WKH WKLUG FRXQWU\ RI WKH VKLS¶V GHSDUWXUH LQ DFFRUGDQFH
with the principle of non-refoulement and respect for fundamental rights; and if 
this is not possible, the disembarkation must take place in the host Member 
State.346 7KHUH LV QR JHRJUDSKLF UHVWULFWLRQ RQ WKH µSODFH RI VDIHW\¶ IRU
disembarkation. This allows irregular migrants to be disembarked in non-EU 
countries. Furthermore, the Sea Borders Regulation permits an intercepted ship to 
alter its course, meaning a possible diversion to international waters or a third 
country of origin, a possible risk of refoulement.347 This practice could constitute 
a form of push-back which is prohibited.348 
 
6XFKDQRXWFRPHZDVDUHVXOWRIFRQWHVWDWLRQRQ$UWLFOHRQµ6HDUFKDQG5HVFXH¶
DQG $UWLFOH  RQ µGLVHPEDUNDWLRQ¶ RI WKH  GUDIW 5HJXODWLRQ E\ WKH VL[
Member States (Italy, Malta, Greece, Cyprus, Spain and France)349 bordering the 
Mediterranean Sea. They were of the opinion that there is no need to over-
regulate tKH DUHD RI µVHDUFK DQG UHVFXH DQG GLVHPEDUNDWLRQ¶ DV LW LV DOUHDG\
                                                          
344
  Sea Borders Regulation (n 7) article 4 (1) and (2); 7KHZRUGVµIRUFHGWRHQWHU¶DQGµconducted 
WR¶ZHUHLQFOXGHGE\the EP in order to cover situations of push-backs.  
345
  Sea Borders Regulation (n 7) article 10(1)(a). 
346
  Sea Borders Regulation (n 7) article 10(1)(b). 
347
  Aas and Gundhus (n 79) 14. 
348
  Hirsi (n 57) paragraphs 134, 138; see Chapter 4 on push-backs. 
349
  Greek, Spanish, French, Italian, Cyprus and Maltese delegations, Inter-institutional file:  
2013/0103(COD) Council Doc. 14612/13 (Brussels 10 October 2013).  
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regulated by international law through UNCLOS, SAR, the SOLAS Convention, 
and the IMO guidelines in the IAMSAR Manual as they were in complete 
agreement as to their requirements. However, in August 2013, only a few months 
before their contestation, Italy and Malta were in complete disagreement as to the 
SODFH RI GLVHPEDUNDWLRQ IRU WKH  PLJUDQWV UHVFXHG E\ WKH RLO WDQNHU µ09
6DODPLV¶ LQ 6\UDFXVH ,WDO\350 The irregular migrants were saved 45 nautical 
miles from the Libyan port. On behalf of the Libyan authorities, the Rome RCC351 
ordered the oil tanker, flying the flag of Libya, to disembark the migrants at the 
nearest port in Libya, Khoms which MV Salamis refused.352 Malta then refused 
the tanker permission to enter its territorial waters with the belief that 
GLVHPEDUNDWLRQ WDNHV SODFH LQ VDIHVW SRUW LH /DPSHGXVD GHVSLWH 0DOWDV¶ 6$5
responsibility. After being stranded at sea for two days, the Italian government 
agreed that the irregular migrants could be disembarked in Italy.353  
 
Equally, these States succeeded in the current Sea Borders Regulation to fail to 
address a specific definition on distress. The 2013 draft Regulation specified that 
participating units were to take into account the following elements when 
DVVHVVLQJ ZKHWKHU D VKLS ZDV LQ GLVWUHVV µD WKH H[LVWHQFH RI D UHTXHVW IRU
assistance;  (b) the seaworthiness of the ship and the likelihood that the ship will 
not reach its final destination; (c) the number of passengers in relation to the type 
and condition of the ship; (d) the availability of necessary supplies such as fuel, 
water, food to reach a shore; (e) the presence of qualified crew and command of 
the ship; (f) the availability and capability of safety, navigation and 
communication equipment; (g) the presence of passengers in urgent need of 
                                                          
350
  1LHOV)UHQ]HQµ'HWDLOVDQG'RFXPHQW5HJDUGLQJ(80HGLWHUUDQHDQ6WDWHV2SSRVLWLRQWR 
3URSRVHG )URQWH[ 6HD %RUGHUV 5HJXODWLRQ¶ (Migrants At Sea, 16 October 2013) 
<migrantsatsea.wordpress.com/2013/10/16/details-and-document-regarding-eu-mediterranean-
states-opposition-to-proposed-frontex-sea-borders-regulation/> accessed 27 October 2017. 
351
  Rescue Coordination Centre. 
352
  CoE Parliamentary Assembly, 7KH³/HIW-to-GLHERDW´$FWLRQVDQG5HDFWLRQV Report  
Committee on Migration, Refugees and Displaced Persons, Rapporteur: Ms Tineke Strik (Doc. 
13532, 9 June 2014) 11. 
353
  %%&1HZV(XURSHµ7DQNHU0LJUDQWV5HMHFWHGE\0DOWD$UULYHLQ,WDO\¶$XJXVW 
<http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-23599696> accessed 27 October 2017. 
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medical assistance; (h) the presence of deceased passengers; (i) the presence of 
pregnant women or children; (j) the weather and sea conditions, including weather 
DQG PDULQH IRUHFDVWV¶354 As irregular migrants travel in overcrowded and 
unseaworthy ships, intercepting Member States would end up rescuing a ship full 
of refugees fulfilling points (a-j).  
 
For this reason, the six Mediterranean States amended the 2013 draft regulation 
from a duty WR FODVVLI\LQJ WKH DERYH IDFWRUV DV µVKDOO EH FRQVLGHUHG WR EH LQ D
VLWXDWLRQ RI GLVWUHVV¶355 to an obligation to transmit relevant information and 
REVHUYDWLRQVWRWKHUHVSRQVLEOH5&&WRFRQVLGHUZKHWKHUWKHYHVVHOLVLQDµSKDVH
of uncertainty, alert or diVWUHVV¶356 This amendment took away Member State 
obligation of an immediate action to render assistance or launch an operation.  
This amendment has stripped the Regulation of its aim, that of saving lives at sea 
and avoiding inconsistent interpretations by Member States. It also creates a 
dangerous environment whereby it is left to the discretion of government vessels 
WR WUDQVPLW µUHOHYDQW¶ LQIRUPDWLRQ7KHDFWXDOSUREOHP LQ WKH0HGLWHUUDQHDQKDV
DULVHQ EHFDXVH RI 0HPEHU 6WDWH XQGHUVWDQGLQJ RI WKH ZRUG µUHOHYDQW¶ LQ WKH
context of border control undermining the concepts of international regime on 
search and rescue and human rights. As a result, a dangerous discretion is 
afforded to search and rescue units in determining a distress situation on a case by 
case basis having regard to the above list of factors.  Furthermore, this Regulation 
GRHV QRW DGGUHVV FDVHV ZKHUH D VLWXDWLRQ RI µXQFHUWDLQW\¶ HYHQWXDOO\ EHFRPHV D
VLWXDWLRQ RI µGLVWUHVV¶ 7KHUH LV D EOXUUHG OLQH EHWZHHQ WKHVH VLWXDWLRQV ZKLFK
leaves irregular migrants vulnerable to the perils of the sea and the discretion of 
State authorities judging a particular situation, especially in light of border control 
objectives. Similarly, it does not address the issue of post-disembarkation 
                                                          
354
 Proposal for a Regulation establishing rules for the surveillance of the external sea borders in 
the context of operational cooperation coordinated by the European Agency for the 
Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the 
European Union COM(2013) 197 final, article 9(6). 
355
  ibid, articles 9(5) and 9(6). 
356
  Sea Borders Regulation (n 7) article 9(2)(a) and (f). 
 87 
 




The ongoing battle between Member States and organised criminal networks 
(described as the dark side of globalisation) challenges fundamental principles of 
international law. On the one hand, human smugglers pin their hopes upon 
0HPEHU 6WDWHV¶ FRPSOLDQFH ZLWK WKHLU UHIXJHH KXPDQ ULJKWV DQG VHDUFK DQG
rescue obligations towards overcrowded boats of irregular migrants in distress. 
On the other hand, Member States determined to combat human smugglers are 
intentionally misinterpreting their international obligations to avoid responsibility 
for the individuals who are unwittingly assisting the growing industry of 
organised crime. 0HPEHU6WDWHV¶UHOXFWDQFHWRUHFHLYHLUUHJXODUPLJUDQWV rescued 
at sea has directly contributed to the inconsistent application of certain terms in 
the relevant Conventions, giving rise to different national approaches to the 
irregular migration phenomenon. This is particularly true of the term µSODFH RI
safet\¶ Clearly, the obligations arising out of search and rescue operations 
FRQIOLFWZLWK0HPEHU6WDWHV¶LQWHUHVWV LQPDQDJLQJPLJUDWLRQDQGHQVXULQJWKHLU
security. Despite these extraterritorial measures, the situation has not improved 
and irregular migration flows remain high.  
 
In light of above legal issues, it is highly recommended that concerned member 
VWDWHV PD\ D UHIHU D TXHVWLRQ IRU XQLIRUP LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ RI µGLVWUHVV¶ WR WKH
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS Hamburg), or b) request the 
EU Parliament to initiate an opinion of the CJEU, or c) to the ECtHR. In addition, 
the EU Commission must take positive action against those States that refuse 
disembarkation of boats containing asylum seekers, especially, prohibit any 
disembarkation instructions to countries known as human rights violators. In 
DGGLWLRQWKHGHILQLWLRQRIµVDIHSRUW¶PXVWEHUHGHILQHGWRWDNHLQWRFRQVLGHUDWLRQ
not just their immediate physical needs but also the risk of refoulement. In 
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addition, a systematic evaluation of Frontex operations and State diversion 
practices must be conducted against the principle of non-refoulement and in 
protection of µright to life¶. 
 
&KDSWHU7KUHHZLOODVVHVVWKH0HPEHU6WDWHV¶GRXEOHFKDOOHQJHRQWKHRQHKDQG
they must comply with their border management obligations under the SBC; and 
on the other, they must comply with their obligation to provide international 
protection to those entitled to it. The tendency of EU and Member State policy 
makers is to deal with the issue of irregular migration by managing external 
ERUGHUV WKURXJK µH[WHUQDOLVDWLRQ¶ PHDVXUHV QRWDEO\ WKH H[WHUQDOLVDWLRQ RI
responsibility through returns or transfer mechanisms to third countries. The main 
challenge for the SAR Regime and for EU and Member State immigration laws is 
to prohibit the practice of illicit return to unsafe third countries and identify the 
place of safety for disembarkation, especially due to the mixed nature of these 
irregular migratory flows involving refugees and asylum seekers. As a result, the 
Italian and Greek extraterritorial measures on irregular migration with EU 





Chapter 3: (XURSH¶V6RXWK-Eastern External Border Crisis 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Migrants, arriving on overcrowded unseaworthy vessels fleeing persecution, civil 
war, poverty and devastation generated contradictory reaction from the EU and its 
Member States. Bound by its international obligations under the Refugee 
Convention and the ECHR, unable to dissociate asylum seekers from irregular 
migrants in mixed migration related matters, the EU had to present these massive 
arrivals as a humanitarian crisis.357 However, this approach came in direct conflict 
with its policies and practices considerations on border control preventing 
XQDXWKRULVHGHQWU\7KLVµ%RUGHU6SHFWDFOH¶358 has politically been addressed from 
the perspective of human smuggling and neglected significantly the refugee and 
asylum seeker perspective.359 This approach stereotypes the people as unidentified 
µDOLHQERGLHV¶SURPRWLQJDVWDWHRIH[FHSWLRQUHIOHFWLQJµLQVWLWXWLRQDOUDFLVPDQG
ELRSROLWLFV¶360 ZLWKWKHLQWHQGHGHIIHFWRIVXVSHQGLQJPLJUDQWV¶ULJKWVFRQWUDU\WR
the Refugee Convention and the ECHR.361 The chapter examines the reaction of 
the EU, Italy and Greece to the situation in terms of security in the form of 
collective preventative extraterritorial State control against smugglers. This 
chapter questions the implications of EU border control from a legal perspective.  
 
                                                          
357
 CommisVLRQ µ+XPDQLWDULDQ $LG DQG &LYLO 3URWHFWLRQ¶ KWWSHFHXURSDHXHFKRUHIXJHH-
crisis_en> accessed 28 October 2017. 
358
  Nicholas De Genova, :RUNLQJ WKH %RXQGDULHV 5DFH 6SDFH DQG µ,OOHJDOLW\¶ LQ 0H[LFDQ
Chicago (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2005); Bigo (n 17) 213. 
359
  Migrant Smuggling Protocol (n 135) DUWLFOH  DUWLFOH D ³6PXJJOLQJ RI PLJUDQWV´ µVKDOO
mean the procurement, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material 
benefit, of the illegal entry of a person into a State Party of which the person is not a national 
RU D SHUPDQHQW UHVLGHQW¶ )HGHULFD 0D]]DUD µ6SDFHV RI 9LVLELOLW\ IRU WKH 0LJUDQWV RI
/DPSHGXVD7KH&RXQWHU1DUUDWLYHRIWKH$HVWKHWLF'LVFRXUVH¶,6-464, 449.  
360
  ,DLQ &KDPEHUV µ7KH 0XVHXP RI 0LJUDWLQJ 0RGHUQLWLHV¶ LQ %HDWULFH )HUUDUD HG, Cultural 
Memories, Migrating Modernities and Museum Practices (Milan: Politecnico di Milano, 2012) 
3±32, 17. 
361




To block flows of refugees from arriving in EU territory, Italy and Greece with 
EU assistance have transformed the Mediterranean and Aegean seas into a 
migration containment belt. This invisible belt would be secured through a series 
of extraterritorial measures acting as movable walls to an invisible fortress 
Europe. These extraterritorial measures taken by the EU, Italy and Greece in 
response to the European refugee crisis are scrutinised under a pre-emptive three 
stage strategy. Under the first stage, this chapter questions the steps taken by 
/LE\D DQG 7XUNH\ WR µFULPLQDOLVH WKH VPXJJOLQJ RI PLJUDQWV¶ DQG WKHLU DGRSWHG
provisions prohibiting any person to leave the country or cross its borders in an 
irregular manner, in light of the object and purpose of the Protocol against the 
Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air.362 The second stage scrutinises the 
interception measures in the Mediterranean and Aegean seas and the EU-Turkey 
statement. The third stage consists of an assessment of EUROSUR, a surveillance 
system in the Mediterranean Sea. The chapter concludes by arguing that these 
PHDVXUHV UHIHUUHG WR DV WKH (8 µKXPDQLWDULDQ ERUGHU¶363 policy violate 
international obligations such as non-refoulement DQG WKH ULJKW WR OHDYH RQH¶V
own country combined with the right to asylum.  
 
3.2 The European Refugee Crisis and the Evolving Supranational External 
Border Regime 
,Q WKH QDPH RI µKXPDQLWDULDQLVP¶ DQG GHDWKV LQ WKH 0HGLWHUUDQHDQ 6HD364 the 
legal and political justification delivered by the EU and its Member States to 
PDQDJH WKH µ(XURSHDQ UHIXJHH FULVLV¶ LV SUH-emptive interception.365 7KH (8¶V
pre-emptive interception strategy can be summarised in the words of a European 
coast guard quoted in research conducted by Ruben Andersson: to avoid deaths at 
VHD WKH VWUDWHJ\ LV µWR SUHYHQW >PLJUDQWV@ IURP OHDYLQJ¶ WKDW LV SUHYHQW WKHP
                                                          
362
  Article 6. 
363
 :LOOLDP:DOWHUV µ)RXFDXOWDQG)URQWLHUV1RWHVRQ WKH%LUWKRI WKH+XPDQLWDULDQ%RUGHU LQ
Ulrich Bröckling, Susanne Krassman and Thomas Lemke (eds), Governmentality: Current 
Issues and Future Challenges (London and New York, NY: Routledge, 2010) 138±164. 
364
 The Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (n 321) 6. 
365
 The Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (n 321) 15-16. 
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getting on a boat which leads to danger.366 The Australian Prime Minister Tony 
$ERWWGHVFULEHGWKLVDSSURDFKDVDFRPSDVVLRQDWHSROLF\WRµVWRSWKHERDWV¶LQD
determination to save lives.367 Although the EU led into believing that its 
migration policy acted in solidarity with the refugees, this chapter argues that in 
IDFWLWLVFRQVLVWHQWZLWKDµERUGHUPDQDJHPHQWJDPH¶LQZKLFKWKH(8VHWVDQG
FKDQJHVLWVWHUPVWKHVPXJJOHULVWKHµFDXVH¶LUUHJXODUPLJUDQWVDUHµWKH YLFWLPV¶
WKH(8LVWKHµVDYLRXU¶DQGPLOLWDU\LQWHUYHQWLRQLVWKHµVROXWLRQ¶368 All these fall 
µXQGHU WKHUXEULFRIFRPSDVVLRQDWHERUGHUZRUN¶369 in which the EU purports to 
have developed measures such as interception and surveillance as lifesaving tools. 
However, in this chapter it is argued that these measures are adopted as deterrent 
tools to irregular migration having as their main objective the circumvention of 




H[WHUQDO GLPHQVLRQ RI ERUGHU PDQDJHPHQW¶370 7KH FRQFHSW RI µH[WUD-
WHUULWRULDOLVDWLRQ¶ LV GHVFULEHG E\ OHJDO VFKRODUV DV WKH µPHDQV E\ ZKLFK WKH (8
attempts to push-back the (8¶V H[WHUQDO ERUGHUV¶ EH\RQG 0HPEHU 6WDWH
territories.371 Others describe extra-WHUULWRULDOLVDWLRQDVWKHSURFHVVRIµSROLFLQJ(8
ERUGHUVDWDGLVWDQFH¶372 XQGHUµUHPRWHFRQWURO¶373 deciding who enters and who is 
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 5XEHQ $QGHUVVRQ µ(XURSH¶V)DLOHG ³)LJKW´ DJDLQVW ,UUHJXODU0LJUDWLRQ(WKQRJUDSKLF 1RWHV
on a CounterproduFWLYH ,QGXVWU\¶  -(06 9ROXPH  ,VVXH  
<http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/1369183X.2016.1139446> accessed 16 October 
2017. 
367
 5LFKDUG$FNODQG µ,I(XURSH/LVWHQV WR7RQ\$EERWW WKH)XWXUH IRU5HIXJHHV:LOOEH&UXHO¶
(The Guardian, 21 April 2015) <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/apr/21/if-
europe-listens-to-tony-abbott-the-future-for-refugees-will-be-cruel> accessed 28 October 2017. 
368
 Pallister-Wilkins (n 81) 63. 
369
 Adrian Little and Nick Vaughan-:LOOLDPVµ6WRSSLQJ%RDWV Saving Lives, Securing Subjects: 
+XPDQLWDULDQ %RUGHUV LQ (XURSH DQG $XVWUDOLD¶  (-,5 
<http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/1354066116661227> accessed 28 October 2017.  
370
  Casas-Cortes and Cobarrubias (n 3) 80. 
371
  Triandafyllidou and Dimitriadi (n 2) 601; 0DULQµ3ROLFLQJ(8¶V([WHUQDO%RUGHUV¶Q3) 486.  
372
  Guild and Bigo (n 17) 258. 
373
  Guiraudon (n 3) 191.  
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prevented from entering.374 The combination of extra-territorial and 
externalisation measures, has created a new concept of border management. 
Borders are no longer considered only fixed territories of a State, but extend 
beyond State territories through pre-emptive security checks and surveillance 
activities.375 Although extra-territorialisation measures are conveyed as necessary 
to save lives at sea, this chapter shows that their actual objective is to prevent 
third country nationals (TCNs) from entering the EU; and if they attempt to do so, 
they do not come close to reaching Member State territory.376 To achieve this 
objective, the main actors in border management had to be the third countries 
from which the irregular migrants are departing, in collaboration with the EU, its 
Member States and the relevant EU agencies.377 These various actors in the field 
would act under the auspices of the renewed Global Approach to Migration and 
Mobility (GAMM) policy,378 an EU strategy to externalise the complete agenda 
RQ PLJUDWLRQ WRZDUGV WKLUG FRXQWULHV¶ WHUULWRULHV WKURXJK WKH (8¶V H[WHUQDO
relations policy.379 
 
This chapter divides the extraterritorial measures undertaken by Italy and Greece 
in collaboration with the EU under a pre-emptive three-stage strategy, acting as 
ad hoc IHQFHV7KHILUVWVWDJHLQYROYHVWKH(8¶VGHWHrmination for third countries 
such as Libya and Turkey to comply with their obligations under the Palermo 
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  Torresi (n 3) 656; Casas-Cortes, Cobarrubias and Pickles µ5LGLQJ 5RXWHV DQG ,WLQHUDQW
%RUGHUV¶Q3) 895.  
375
  Topak (n 120) 2; KiUVWLQH 0RVH DQG 9HUD :ULHGW µ0DSSLQJ WKH &RQVWUXFWLRQ RI (8
%RUGHUVSDFHVDV1HFURSROLWLFDO=RQHVRI([FHSWLRQ¶%/5-304, 281. 
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  5RJLHU YDQ 5HHNXP µ7KH 0HGLWHUUDQHDQ 0LJUDWLRQ &RUULGRU %RUGHU 6SHFWDcle, Ethical 
/DQGVFDSH¶MP, 21(2) 336-341, 338. 
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  Commission Communication, A European Agenda on Migration 13 May 2015, COM(2015) 
240 final, 11-12; GAMM extended the concept of borders to neighbouring countries of the EU 
WRWKHµQHLJKERXUVRIQHLJKERXUV¶LHWRWKLUGFRXQWULHVRIRULJin, transit and destination; The 
Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (n 321) 2. 
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 TFEU, article 77(2)(d); Council of the European Union, Presidency Conclusions (2005) Doc  
7619/1/05; Council of the European Union, Global approach to migration: priority actions 
focusing on Africa and the Mediterranean, Doc 15744/05; Global Approach to Migration and 
Mobility (n 321) 2; Casas-Cortes, Cobarrubias DQG 3LFNOHV µ*RRG 1HLJKERXUV 0DNH *RRG
)HQFHV¶ Q 179)  $QQD 7ULDQGDI\OOLGRX µ0XOWL-levelling and Externalizing Migration and 
$V\OXP/HVVRQV)URPWKH6RXWKHUQ(XURSHDQ,VODQGV¶,6--22, 9. 
379
  The Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (n 321) 2. 
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protocols. The second stage scrutinises the readmission agreements and 
interception measures taken by Italy and Greece on the high seas. The third stage 
examines the EU surveillance system, EUROSUR and its purported contribution 
to the European refugee crisis. 
  
3.3 First Pre-emptive Security Check: Criminalisation of Migrants 
To ensure irregular migrants will not cross the high seas and arrive on EU 
territory, they had to be prevented from leaving the third country territory. The 
EU adopted pre-emptive interception measures referred to in this thesis as the 
µERUGHU JDPH¶380 7KH µERUGHU JDPH¶ FRQVLVWV RI WKH WKLUG FRXQWU\ RI GHSDUWXUH
playing an active role in the surveillance and apprehension of would-be asylum 
seekers in their own territory. If the TCN manages to reach Member State 
territorial sea, only then will the respective Member State respect and comply 
with its obligations under the Refugee Convention. It can be questioned how this 
individual can possibly receive full protection by the very State that tried to 
sabotage his/her arrival as an undesired immigrant. Although beyond their 
infrastructural capacities, the EU requires Libya and Turkey381 to manage the 
increasing number of migrants or refugees who transit their territory, and 
simultaneously provide the necessary legal guarantees within their immigration 
systems.382 To comply with these requirements, Libya and Turkey, both parties383 
to the UN Convention against Transnational Organised Crime 2000 and its 
Protocols (Palermo Protocols),384 KDYH WDNHQVWHSV WR µFULPLQDOLVH WKHVPXJJOLQJ
                                                          
380
 See Chapter 2 , section 2.1 
381
  No association agreement between EU and Libya; part of European Neighbourhood Instrument 
(ENI) regional programmes on migration and human rights 
<http://eeas.europa.eu/libya/index_en.htm> accessed 25 October 2017; Regulation (EU) No 
232/2014 Establishing a European Neighbourhood Instrument (OJ L77/27 15.3.2014); EU-
Turkey re-admission Agreement (n 99). 
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  +5: ³(XURSH¶V 5HIXJHH &ULVLV $Q $JHQGD IRU $FWLRQ´  1RYHPEHU 
<https://www.hrw.org/report/2015/11/16/europes-refugee-crisis/agenda-action> accessed 25 
October 2017. 
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  Parties: 187, Signatories: 147; 
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12&chapter=18&clang=_en> accessed 26 October 2017. 
384
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RI PLJUDQWV¶ DQG KDYH DGRSWHG SURYLVLRQV SURKLELWLQJ DQ\ SHUVRQ WR OHDYH WKH
country or cross its borders in an irregular manner.385 In accordance with Libyan 
legislation, any non-national apprehended crossing Libyan borders irregularly 
may be imprisoned and/or subject to a minimum fine of 2,000 Libyan dinars 
(equivalent to EUR 1,326).386 Turkey imposes an administrative fine of 1,000 to 
3,000 Turkish Lira (equivalent to EUR 260 to 780) on its nationals or non-
nationals who are apprehended crossing or attempting to cross Turkish borders 
irregularly.387  
 
Although Turkey and Libya justify these measures on the basis of meeting the 
overall object and purpose of the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by 
Land, Sea and Air, they are risking to violate Article 5, which prohibits the 
µFULPLQDOLVDWLRQ¶ RI PLJUDQWV specifying that smuggled migrants should not be 
subject to criminal prosecution if they are the object of conduct related to migrant 
smuggling as set forth in Article 6 of that Protocol.388 The legislative guide for the 
implementation of the Protocol expressly provides that sanctions should not apply 
WRPLJUDQWVµHYHQLQFDses where it involves entry or residence that is illegal under 
WKH ODZV RI WKH 6WDWH FRQFHUQHG¶389 It has been acknowledged since 1949, that 
people fleeing from persecution and other forms of hardship do not usually have 
the required travel documents, as they often have no choice but to cross 
international borders irregularly.390 In consequence, States cannot legitimately 
                                                          
385
 Article 6. 
386
  Libyan Law No 6 of 20 June 1987, Concerning the Regulation of Aliens Entry, Residence and 
Exit in Libya, Issued on 24/Shawwal/1396 FDP, Corresponding to 20/06/1987, as amended by 
Law No 2 in 2004, article 19 <http://security-legislation.ly/sites/default/files/files/lois/1214-
Law%20No.%20(6)%20of%201987_EN.pdf> accessed 25 October 2017; Exchange rate as of 
06.01.2017 <http://lyd.fxexchangerate.com/eur/2000-currency-rates.html> accessed 6 January 
2017. 
387
 Turkey: Law No 5682 of 1950, Passport Law, 24 July 1950 (as amended in April 2011 by 
articles 7±9 of Law No 6217) article 33; Exchange rate as of 06.01.2017 
<http://www.currencyconverterx.com/1000-TRY-to-EUR> accessed 6 January 2017. 
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  An obligation similar to article 31 of the Refugee Convention. 
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  812'& µ/HJLVODWLYH *XLGHV IRU WKH ,PSOHPHQWDWLRQ RI WKH 81 &RQYHQWLRQ DJDLQVW
Transnational Organized Crime and the ProWRFROV7KHUHWR¶81 
390
  81(FRQRPLFDQG6RFLDO&RXQFLOµ6WXG\RQ6WDWHOHVVQHVV¶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 
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prosecute migrants who use fraudulent documents to leave their country.391 These 
measures disregard the mixed migration pattern in the Central and Eastern 
Mediterranean routes which consist of refugees and economic migrants.392  
 
The Protocol not only protects refugees but also covers the contemporary reality 
of the broad category of migrant smuggling. As Andreas Schloenhardt and Hadley 
Hickson have argued, the immunity granted by Article 5 of the said Protocol must 
extend to any administrative measure punishing smuggled migrants. Holding 
RWKHUZLVH ZRXOG UHVXOW LQ 6WDWHV EHLQJ DOORZHG WR LPSRVH µSXQLWLYH PHDVXUHV
under the guise of administrative iPPLJUDWLRQ SURFHVVHV¶ HYHQ WKRXJK WKH\ DUH
precluded from imposing criminal sanctions.393 This view is supported by the 
travaux préparatoires which confirm that Article 6(1)(b) applies even when an 
individual knowingly possesses fraudulent documents for the purpose of migrant 
smuggling within the meaning of Article 6(1)(a).394 
 
Administrative measures such as detention and fines pose a greater threat to 
VPXJJOHGPLJUDQWV¶ULJKWVGXHWRWKHOLPLWHGLQYROYHPHQWRIWKHFRXUWV,QHIIHFW
detention measures are similar to a criminal sanction prohibited under Article 5. 
They have similar characteristics such as forced deprivation of liberty and 
personal autonomy, and both entail coercive treatment.395 Detainees are often held 
in criminal prisons or prison-like settings.396 Detention measures have proved to 





  Anna Triandafyllidou, Disentangling the Migration and Asylum Knot, Dealing with Crisis 
Situations and Avoiding Detention (RSCAS PP 2013/19 Policy Papers, 2013) 1. 
393
  $QGUpDV 6FKORHQKDUGW DQG +DGOH\ +LFNVRQ µ1RQ-Criminalization of Smuggled Migrants: 
Rights, Obligations, and Australian Practice under Article 5 of the Protocol against the 
6PXJJOLQJRI0LJUDQWVE\/DQG6HDDQG$LU¶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-64, 47. 
394
  UN GAOR, Report of the Ad Hoc Committee, Elaboration of a Convention Against 
Transnational Organized Crime on the Work of its First to Eleventh Sessions, 55th Session, 
$GGHQGXP µ,QWHUSUHWDWLYH 1RWHV IRU WKH 2IILFLDO 5HFRUGV¶ 7UDYDX[ 3UHSDUDWRLUHV RI WKH
Negotiation of the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime and the 
Protocols Thereto (Travaux Préparatoires) (UN Doc. A/55/383/ Add.1, 14, paragraph 93. 
395
 Groves (n 136) 228-230. 
396




be ineffective as deterrence tools to irregular migration.397 There are other less 
intrusive instruments which the EU and its partners can use to achieve the desired 
outcome in preventing irregular migration.398 States may include in their legal and 
policy frameworks alternatives to detention, such as: community placement, 
shelters, fundraising opportunities and reporting conditions.399 These punitive 
GRPHVWLF PHDVXUHV FRQIOLFW ZLWK WKH SULQFLSOH RI µJRRG IDLWK SHUIRUPDQFH¶400 
6WDWHVSDUWLHVWRDWUHDW\PXVWHQVXUHWKDWWKHWUHDW\LVµinterpreted in good faith in 
DFFRUGDQFHZLWKWKHRUGLQDU\PHDQLQJWREHJLYHQWRWKHWHUPVµ«LQWKHLUFRQWH[W 
DQG LQ WKH OLJKW RI LWV REMHFW DQG SXUSRVH¶401 and must not act arbitrarily or 
capriciously.402 Although States have a sovereign right to impose administrative 
measures on smuggled migrants, in effect they are sanctioning them contrary to 
Article 5 and the good faith principle,403 rendering this obligation ineffective.404  
 
The restrictive measures are taken in response to requests by the strongest and 
economically independent States to weaker States such as Libya, Turkey and 
(J\SW WR FXUWDLO WKH µULJKW WR OHDYH¶ LQFOXGLQJ SODFH RI FLWL]HQVKLS RU FXUUHQW
                                                          
397
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April 2015, 
<https://www.detentionwatchnetwork.org/sites/default/files/reports/DWN%20Detention%20as
%20a%20Deterrance%20Policy%20Brief.pdf> accessed 25 October 2017; Frontex Annual 
Risk Analysis 2015, Massive influxes of irregular migrants have reached European soil in 2014 
(280,000) 5 
<http://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Publications/Risk_Analysis/Annual_Risk_Analysis_2015.pdf> 
accessed 25 October 2017; For 2015 (557,899 as of October 6 2015) see 
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accessed 25 October 2017. 
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  Harvey and Barnidge (n 391) 14. 
399
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the Detention of Asylum-VHHNHUV DQG 5HIXJHHV¶ 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<http://www.unhcr.org/53aa929f6.pdf> accessed 25 October 2017. 
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  United Nations, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, United Nations,  
Treaty Series, Volume 1155, 331 (VC/7DUWLFOHµ(YHU\WUHDW\LQIRUFHLVELQGLQJXSRQWKH
SDUWLHVWRLWDQGPXVWEHSHUIRUPHGE\WKHPLQJRRGIDLWK¶ 
401
  VCLT, article 31(1); article 31 reflects customary international law; see Kasikilil /Sedudu 
Island (Botswana v Namibia) Judgment, ICJ Reports 1999, 1045, paragraph 18. 
402
 Gabcíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v Slovakia) [1997] ICJ Reports 142; Gerald 
Fitzmaurice, The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice: General Principles 
and Sources of Law (Volume 1, Grotius Publishers, 1986) 12±13. 
403
 Free Zones (Switzerland v France)(Merits) [1930] PCIJ (ser A/B) No 46.  
404
  Schloenhardt and Hickson (n 393) 49-50. 
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presence.405 ,W DOVR UHVWULFWV WKH µULJKW WR VHHN DV\OXP¶ LQ D VDIH FRXQWU\406 A 
WHQVLRQLVFUHDWHGEHWZHHQWKHULJKWWRHPLJUDWHIURPRQH¶VRZQFRXQWU\DQGWKH
right to enter another country, which the latter is considered a matter of national 
sovereignty.407 There exists a right to leave as long as the destination State 
permits entry.408 Departing States have a dual duty: 1) not to impede departure; 
and 2) to issue relevant documents for departure.409 In the courts, this positive 
duty is usually linked with passport issuance.410 Today, however, in the context of 
ERUGHUFRQWUROWKHQHJDWLYHGXW\RI6WDWHVLQYROYHVWKHLUXQGHUWDNLQJRIµUHVSHFW¶
that is, not to impede any person from leaving. The right to leave a country does 
not differentiate between a national and a foreigner.411  
 
Although the right to leave oQH¶V RZQ FRXQWU\ LV D QRQ-derogable right,412 
universally accepted as a norm of customary international law,413 it has not been 
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  8'+5 DUWLFOH 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 ,&&35 DUWLFOH 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406
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and McAdam, The Refugee in International Law (n 71) 370. 
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 Üner v the Netherlands Application no 46410/99 ECHR 2006-XII, paragraph 54; Saadi v Italy  
Application no 37201/06 (2008) ECHR 179, paragraph 124; Koffi Anan, International 
Migration and Development: report of the Secretary General 18 May 2006, A/60/871, 
paragraph 76; Richard Ball, The Legitimacy of the European Union Through Legal Rationality: 
Free Movement of Third Country Nationals (Routledge Research in EU Law) 219. 
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 Peltonen v Finland, Communication No 492/1992 (UN Doc CCPR/C/51/D/492/1992 (1994) 
paragraph 31; Juss (n 394) 294. 
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  Kochenov (n 405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LQOLQHZLWK,&&35DUWLFOHµWRUHVSHFW¶DQGµWRHQVXUH¶ 
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 Peltonen (n 408); Baumann v France Application no 33592/96 ECHR 2001-V, paragraphs 61± 
63; also see Vincent Chetail and Celine Bauloz, Research Handbook on International Law and 
Migration (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2014) 12. 
411
  Human Rights Committee, General Comment No 27: Article 12 on Freedom of Movement 
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/AGG  1RYHPEHU  SDUDJUDSK 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 ICCPR, article 4(2); ECHR, article 15(2) applicable under Protocol No 4 to the ECHR, article 
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  Vincent Chetail, The Transnational Movement of Persons Under General International Law - 
Mapping the Customary Law Foundations of International Migration Law (Research 
Handbook on International Law and Migration Edward Elgar Publishing, 2014) 10; Colin 
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respected by those States unwilling to grant it. According to Goodwin-Gill, 
although States have agreed two declarations about this norm,414 in practice it 
remains weak415 despite attempts by experts416 and the Human Rights 
Committee417 to enforce respect for this right on the ground. To render any 
UHVWULFWLRQ RI LUUHJXODU PLJUDQWV¶ ULJKWV OHJLWLPDWH LUUHJXODU PLJUDWLRQ KDV EHHQ
linked with issues of security and criminalisation.418 Italy, Greece, and the EU 
collectively, take advantage of the limitations accompanying the right to leave: it 
µVKDOOQRWEHVXEMHFW WRDQ\UHVWULFWLRQVH[FHSW WKRVHZKLFKDUHSURYLGHGE\ODZ
are necessary to protect national security, public order, public health or morals or 
the rights and freedoms of others, and are consistent with the other rights 
UHFRJQLVHG LQ WKHSUHVHQW&RYHQDQW¶419 Turkey and Libya claim that restrictions 
on the enjoyment of this right are in accordance with their national law and 
consistent with the Palermo Protocols. Irregular migrant boats depart from non-
official ports and to protect public order, these States must prevent human 
trafficking and smuggling and undocumented immigration. However, a State 
cannot invoke provisions of its national law to justify its failure to carry out the 
terms of a treaty.420 Nor do the Palermo Protocols permit border controls to 
interfere with the free movement of people whilst discovering trafficking and 
smuggling.421 Articles 14 of the Trafficking Protocol and Article 19 of the 
                                                          
414
 Uppsala Colloquium, Sweden, June 21 1972, The Right to Leave and the Right to Return 
(reprinted in 7 International Migration Review, 1973) 62; the Strasbourg Declaration on the 
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  VCLT, article 27. 
421
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Smuggling Protocol expressly state that the measures taken under these protocols 
must not affect human rights and refugee law obligations.422 Nor have the CJEU 
and ECtHR accepted the justification that the right to leave can be curtailed to 
protect the immigration laws of another State.423 7KH ULJKW WR OHDYH RQH¶V RZQ
country must not be undermined through the use of blanket prohibitions.424 
Instead, it must be construed in light of the ordinary meaning of the provision and 
ZLWKRXWXQGHUPLQLQJWKHWUHDW\¶VSXUSRVHDQGREMHFW425 
 
In its guidance, the UN Human Rights Committee has stated that any restrictions 
on the right to leave should be narrowly interpreted so as not to impair the essence 
of the right, to avoid an unfettered discretion on those executing such 
restrictions.426 For a restriction to be proportionate,427 a set of precise criteria 
should be used in compliance with the principles of equality and non-
discrimination.428 To justify the restriction on grounds of security and public order 
WKHUHPXVWEHDJHQXLQHOLQNEHWZHHQWKHLQGLYLGXDO¶VFRQGXFWDQGKLVKHUWKUHDW
to national security which must be genuine and present.429 In its recent report 
published by the Special Rapporteur on counter-terrorism and human rights, Ben 
Emmerson QC, there was no evidence that irregular migration lead to increased 
terrorist activity.430 Furthermore, the report criticized the overly-restrictive 
migration policies not to be justified on grounds of State security.431 On the 
contrary, the more restrictive migration policies that criminalise irregular 
                                                                                                                                                              
Barnidge (n 391) 14: States can control departure of migrants within the limits of the ICCPR, 
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422
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  ibid, paragraph 15. 
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  ICCPR, article 12(1) and (2); UN General Assembly, International Convention on the  
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 21 December 1965, United Nations, Treaty 
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  Stamose (n 16) paragraph 35; Markard (n 16) 609. 
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  81µ3URPRWLRQDQG3URWHFWLRQRI+XPDQ5LJKWVQ21) paragraph 11. 
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migration and which engage in push-back operations increase the covert 
movements of people by smugglers which as a consequence may increase terrorist 
activities.432 It is therefore argued that the measures undertaken under the Protocol 
on migrant smuggling are not proportionate to the aim of tackling human 
smuggling and do not meet the tests of legality and necessity.433  
 
3.4 Second Pre-emptive Security Check: Interception at Sea 
For those irregular migrants who manage to depart without being detected by 
third country officers, detection and interception at sea act as a second wall 
barrier. As the Central and Eastern Mediterranean route is the busiest and most 
dangerous bringing about thousands of deaths,434 the burden of detecting, 
intercepting, disembarking and receiving irregular migrants falls to Italy and 
Greece.435 To keep irregular migrants away from EU territorial waters, these 
Member States in collaboration with the EU have devised bilateral strategies in 
the form of readmission agreements with third countries.436 A readmission 
DJUHHPHQWLVDELODWHUDODJUHHPHQWIRUWKHDFFHSWDQFHRIµSHUVRQVZKRGRQRWRU
who no longer, fulfil the conditions in force for entry or residence on the territory 
of the requesting Contracting Party provided that it is proved or may be validly 
DVVXPHGWKDW WKH\SRVVHVV WKHQDWLRQDOLW\RI WKH UHTXHVWHG&RQWUDFWLQJ3DUW\¶437 
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By entering into a readmission agreement, the particular State undertakes to re-
admit any person who is a national of that country, or resides in it, or has crossed 
its borders illegally as a means of transit. These agreements allow Member States 
to return without any formalities unauthorised individuals intercepted at sea or 
apprehended in their territory to third countries of origin or transit. This chapter 
will now focus on readmission for those individuals intercepted before entering 
Member State territorial waters. 
 
3.4.1 Italian Interception and Push-back Policy 
In May 2008, in response to the high number of irregular migrant crossings, Italy 
commenced an indiscriminate push-back policy to the country of departure. From 
May 2008 to February 2012, the Italian strategy was to return unauthorised 
individuals apprehended on the high seas to North African countries such as 
Libya, Tunisia and Algeria.438 These individuals were transferred onto Italian 
boats and were compelled to disembark in third country ports without a prior 
examination of their individual circumstances.439 Italy argued that its push-back 
operations were consistent with the Italy-Libya bilateral agreements.440 However, 
these interception operations were conducted without transparency and in the 
absence of monitoring mechanisms by international organisations, NGOs and the 
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media.441 The Italian push-back policy, was strongly contested by the UNHCR,442 
academics,443 NGOs such as HRW444 and Amnesty International,445 as well as by 
the Council of Europe (CoE),446 the EU447 and ultimately by the ECtHR.448 
According to the ECtHR, in all cases of removal where an individual shows 
VXEVWDQWLDOJURXQGVRIIDFLQJµDUHDOULVNRIEHLQJVXEMHFWHGWRWUHDWPHQWFRQWUDU\
WR $UWLFOH ¶449 prior to taking a decision to return migrants, a State must first 
examine whether 1) the receiving country complies with its human rights 
obligations and respects them in practice and 2) the individual will be subjected to 
any form of ill-treatment.450 Although Member States may refuse entry to TCNs 
who do not fulfil their entry requirements,451 they must always act in accordance 
with the EU Charter and general principles of Union Law, the Refugee 
Convention and the principle of non-refoulement.452 As a result of their immediate 
return, these individuals are denied the right to have their case heard by an 
independent administrative body, and the opportunity to challenge their 
expulsion.453 Furthermore, upon return these individuals have been fined for 
breaching immigration rules and/or detained in detention centres, sometimes for 
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prolonged periods.454 The indiscriminate return of migrants through the practice 
of interception without any form of screening is incompatible with the minimal 
procedural guarantees and international human rights law. The ECtHR has held 
that any push-back practices performed without adequate assessment of individual 
circumstances is in contravention of Article 3 ECHR, Article 4 of Protocol No 4 
to the ECHR (prohibition of collective expulsions) and the principle of non-
refoulement.455 These push-back practices are not only in violation of the Refugee 
Convention,456 the ECHR but also of EU law such as the EU Charter and 
CEAS.457  
 
)ROORZLQJ WKH (&W+5¶V GHFLVLRQ LQ Hirsi, Italy formally stopped its push-back 
practices to Libya.458 No other formal agreements have been concluded by Libya 
to date either with the EU collectively, or with IWDO\ 7KLV LV GXH WR /LE\D¶V
continuing political instability and the fact that it is not a party to the Refugee 
Convention. However, as Libya is a party to the UN Convention against 
Transnational Organized Crime and the UN Trafficking Protocol,459 the two 
countries have co-operated in the field of migration and defence. Since 2012, 
Italian and Libyan cooperation has been reinforced through EU funding on 
matters involving human rights460 and migration,461 to improve Libyan border 
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 Tiffany Butler et al, Human Rights in the Middle East and North Africa, Task Force 2015 
(University of Washington, Jackson School of International Studies 2016) 46-55, 56-65, 66-77, 
110-118, 119-135. 
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 Hirsi (n 57) paragraphs 137, 158, paragraphs 184-186; for article 3 ECHR, see paragraphs 137-
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 See Chapter 4 for more detailed analysis. 
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 Refugee Convention, article 1 and 33; ECHR, article 3; Return Directive (n 42); Asylum 
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 Hirsi (n 57) paragraph 137; Paleologo (n 143); Toaldo (n 143) 7. 
459
 UNTS 12, Vol. 2225, 209 (adopted by resolution A/RES/55/25 of 15 November 2000, New 





<http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-14-228_en.htm> accessed 28 October 2017. 
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 /LE\DUHFHLYHVIXQGLQJXQGHUWKH(XURSHDQ1HLJKERXUKRRG,QVWUXPHQW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<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2015/572797/EPRS_BRI(2015)572797
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control.462 Italy has reinforced the implementation of an integrated border 
PDQDJHPHQW V\VWHP LQRUGHU WRXQGHUWDNHVXUYHLOODQFHRI/LE\D¶VYDVWGHVHUW WR
prevent irregular migrants from leaving Libyan territory.463  
 
3.4.1.1 EUBAM ± An Italian and EU Indirect Push-back Practice 
It is argued that the EU and Italy continue to act in contravention of their 
international obligations by indirectly contributing to the financing of Libyan 
border security for the purposes of returning irregular migrants. On 22 May 2013, 
the Council of the EU supporteG/LE\D¶VUH-construction process by improving its 
border security.464 The mission, known as EUBAM Libya (EU Border Assistance 
Mission),465 had an initial mandate of two years, extended for a year and six 
months until 21 August 2017.466 Italy and the EU have undertaken to build and 
upgrade detention camps for migrants and to provide training programmes for 
Libyan police to control maritime and terrestrial borders and for identification 
processes.467 This collaboration places a strong focus on Libyan authorities to 
exercise interception practices in their territories and territorial waters to prevent 
irregular migrants and would-be asylum seekers from reaching Europe, 
constituting a pull-back practice.468 By assisting Libyan authorities to improve its 
border security to perform pull-back practices, Italy in collaboration with the EU 
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 From May 2013, EU Border Assistance Mission in Libya (EUBAM Libya), contributing in 
enhancing Libyan security at land, sea and air borders <http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-
and-operations/eubam-libya/index_en.htm> accessed 27 October 2017. 
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 $QQXDO EXGJHW IRU  ZDV ¼
million <http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/csdp/missions-and-operations/eubam-
libya/pdf/factsheet_eubam_libya_en.pdf> accessed 15 October 2017. 
467
  EUBAM Libya (n 9) article 3; also see FIDH (n 153) 36. 
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in effect conduct indirect forms of push-back in violation of the right to seek 
asylum and the non-refoulement principle.469 
 
Through EUBAM, Italy with the assistance of the EU is forcing would-be asylum 
seekers to stay on Libyan territory where their life and freedom are under threat. 
Italy has a positive obligation to provide international protection against 
persecution or other forms of ill treatment in the State of departure.470 Any form 
of assistance to Libyan authorities by Italy and the EU constitutes an exploitation 
RIUHIXJHHODZDQGDYLRODWLRQRI$UWLFOH9&/7VWDWLQJWKDWµDWUHDW\VKDOOEH
interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to 
the terms RIWKHWUHDW\LQWKHLUFRQWH[WDQGLQWKHOLJKWRILWVREMHFWDQGSXUSRVH¶
In accordance with Article 1A(2) of the Refugee Convention, to be recognised as 
a refugee the person must be outside the territory of his/her country of nationality 
or habitual residence.471 One observes that through EUBAM, Italy with EU 
assistance seem to interpret Article 1A(2) of the Refugee Convention that as long 
as the would-be asylum seeker does not leave the country of origin or transit the 
Refugee Convention is non-applicable. However, Italy does not only have the 
obligation to provide international protection once the person leaves his/her 
territory but to also ensure that it does not sabotage their departure from the State 
where s/he flees from political or other forms of persecution. Italy has an 
obligation in accordance with Article 31(1) VCLT to interpret Article 1A(2) of 
WKH5HIXJHH&RQYHQWLRQLQWKHOLJKWRILWVREMHFWDQGSXUSRVHLHµWKHemphasis of 
this definition is on the protection of persons from political or other forms of 
SHUVHFXWLRQ¶472 Libya has been reported to systematically violate international 
human rights and refugee law. Thus, any assistance to Libyan authorities to pull-
                                                          
469
  Markard (n 16) 616; For an analysis on Greek push-backs see Chapter 4. 
470
  81+&5¶VDPLFXVFXULDHEULHIQ70) 427. 
471
 European Roma Rights Centre and Others (n 74) paragraph 31; Also see UNHCR Handbook  
(n 74) paragraph 88. 
472
 UNHCR, Convention and Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, 3, 
<http://www.unhcr.org/3b66c2aa10.pdf> accessed 28 October 2017. 
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back irregular migrants is in effect an illicit indirect push-back to Libya, as 
condemned by the ECtHR in Hirsi.473 
 
EUBAM however, reveals another legal gap created by the provisions of Article 
33 of the Refugee Convention, Article 3 ECHR and Article 19(2) EU Charter 
which provide safeguards against the expulsions of refugees.474 Article 33 of the 
Refugee Convention and Article 3 ECHR do not contain any geographical 
limitation to its protection. Article 33 of the Refugee Convention provides that 
µQR&RQWUDFWLQJ6WDWHVKDOOH[SHORU UHWXUQ³refouler´D UHIXJHH LQDQ\PDQQHU
whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be 
threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular 
VRFLDO JURXS RU SROLWLFDO RSLQLRQ¶475 ,W LV DUJXHG KHUH WKDW WKH WHUPV µH[SHO¶
µUHWXUQ¶DQGµrefouler¶ZKHQFRPELQHGZLWKWKHWH[WµLQDQ\PDQQHUZKDWVRHYHU¶
connote both a territorial and extraterritorial application of Article 33 of the 
Refugee Convention.476 Any other interpretation would deny refugees protection 
from refoulement as long as they have not entered WKH &RQWUDFWLQJ SDUW\¶V
territory. The extraterritorial application of Article 33 of the Refugee Convention 
is established when the State exercises its jurisdiction similar to the protection 
offered by Article 1 ECHR.477  
 
The ECtHR has already confirmed that refoulement may occur within the territory 
of a State, at its borders, or outside its territory.478 Thus to trigger the application 
of the non-refoulement principle, the would-be asylum seeker must cross the 
                                                          
473
 Hirsi (n 57) paragraph 137. 
474
 (8&KDUWHUDUWLFOH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 Kate Elliott (ed), International legal standards for the Protection from Refoulement (Instituut  
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the International Protection of Refugees No 85 (XLIX) 1998, A/53/12/Add.1, paragraph (q) ± 
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  See Chapter 2, section 2.3.2; also see ICCPR, article 2(1) ± µZLWKLQLWVWHUULWRU\DQGVXEMHFWWR 
LWVMXULVGLFWLRQ¶&$7DUWLFOHµLQDQ\WHUULWRU\XQGHULWVMXULVGLFWLRQ¶ 
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 Amuur v France Application no 19776/92 EHRR 1996-III, paragraph 52. 
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territorial sea of the third country of departure and either reach the territory of the 
country of asylum or fall under its jurisdiction.479 To establish the exercise of a 
6WDWH¶VMXULVGLFWLRQEH\RQGWKH6WDWH¶VERUGHULWLVQHFHVVDU\WRSURYHWKHHOHPHQW
RIDµIDFWXDOHIIHFWLYHFRQWURO¶LQZKLFKWKH6WDte has over territory or persons.480 
7KXVMXULVGLFWLRQLVXQGHUVWRRGDVµFRQWURORYHUWHUULWRU\E\PLOLWDU\RFFXSDWLRQRU
the exercise of public powers by virtue of the consent of the government of the 
WHUULWRU\¶481 RU µZKHQD6WDWH¶VDFWV WDNHSODFHRQ-board vessels registered in or 
IO\LQJWKHIODJRIWKH6WDWH¶DQGµZKHQWKHUHLVWKHFRQVHQWRIWKHJRYHUQPHQWRI
WKH IRUHLJQ WHUULWRU\¶482 Thus, not all State conduct falls within the scope of 
Article 33 of the Refugee Convention and Article 3 ECHR.   
 
To hold Italy accountable for its assistance provided to Libya through EUBAM, 
the key element to establish is whether the refugee is forced to go or stay to the 
µIURQWLHUVRIWHUULWRULHV¶IDFLQJLOO-WUHDWPHQWDVDFRQVHTXHQFHRI,WDO\¶VFRQGXFW483 
A causal link must exist between the conduct of Italy and that of the refugee being 
IRUFHGWRJRRUVWD\µWRWKHIURQWLHUVRI WHUULWRULHV¶ZKHUHKLV OLIHRUIUHHGRPDUH
XQGHU WKUHDW LUUHVSHFWLYH ZKHWKHU WKH FRQGXFW RFFXUV LQ RU RXWVLGH WKH 6WDWH¶V
territory.484 However, the HOHPHQWRIDQµHIIHFWLYHFRQWURO¶RYHU/LE\DQWHUULWRU\
an exercise of public powers by virtue of the consent of the government of the 
territory or actual control over persons cannot be established. The financial 
assistance and training program do not satLVI\ WKH UHTXLUHPHQW RI µHIIHFWLYH
FRQWURO¶ RYHU WKH /LE\DQ WHUULWRU\ RU RYHU SHUVRQV485 On this basis, it is argued 
that EUBAM, an EU policy on third country financial support, constitutes in 
effect a strategy to avoid international responsibility under EU and international 
                                                          
479
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law, despite the fact that Libya uses this financial assistance to commit human 
rights breaches.486  
 
It is argued however that assisting Libyan authorities to prevent boats of irregular 
migrants from leaving territorial waters and build and upgrade detention camps 
with Italian and EU finances is a form of pull-back which constitutes an 
LQWHUIHUHQFHZLWK WKH ULJKW WR OHDYHRQH¶VRZQFRXQWU\ DQG LV LQFRPSDWLEOHZLWK
the non-refoulement principle and refugee law obligations. The right to leave 
RQH¶VRZQFRXQWU\FRPSOHPHQWVWKHnon-refoulement principle creating the basis 
of refugee protection.487 As it was considered unconscionable by the international 
courts WR DOORZ D 6WDWH WR SHUSHWUDWH KXPDQ ULJKWV YLRODWLRQV RQ DQRWKHU 6WDWH¶V
territory, which would be condemned if perpetrated within its own territory,488 
equally unconscionable would be to allow a State to avoid its international 
responsibilities by engaging and assisting third countries to breach their 
international obligations in the context of cooperation in migration control.  
 
3.4.1.2 Italy and the EU Become Derivatively Responsible for Aid or 
Assistance Given to Libya 
The EU collectively and Italy in particular, assist Libyan authorities in 
intensifying border controls to detect and detain unauthorised migrants attempting 
to cross its borders and provide financial assistance to up-grade detention camps 
despite prior knowledge that Libya has been regularly reported by NGOs and 
&RXQFLO RI WKH (8¶V FRQFOXVLRQV to have a poor human rights record.489 In 
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accordance with Article 16 ASR and Article 14 ARIO Italy and the EU become 
derivatively responsible for aid or assistance given to Libya for the commission of 
DQLQWHUQDWLRQDOO\ZURQJIXODFWLILWGRHVVRZLWKµNQRZOHGJHRIWKHFLUFXPVWDQFHV
of the LQWHUQDWLRQDOO\ZURQJIXODFW¶DQGµWKHDFWZRXOGEHLQWHUQDWLRQDOO\ZURQJIXO
LI FRPPLWWHG E\ WKDW 6WDWH¶ ,WDO\ DQG WKH (8 PXVW  EH DZDUH490 of the 
circumstances that its aid and assistance facilitates Libya to conduct international 
wrongful acts, 2) the aid and assistance must actually facilitate the commission of 
the act and 3) the act would have been wrongful if committed by Italy and the EU 
itself.  
 
Italy and the EU cannot argue that they had no knowledge of the situation in 
Libya as UNHCR and NGOs have reported Libya to be a gross human rights 
violator.491 Once returned to Libya, irregular migrants face torture and other ill-
treatment, and abuses such as sexual violence, abductions for ransom, and foreign 
nationals face detention for migration related offences.492 Furthermore, in the 
absence of stable State institutions, upon interception and arrest irregular migrants 
claim to have been subjected to prolonged beatings by Libyan coastguards.493 
Amnesty International reports that lawlessness and chaos prevail in Libya creating 
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xenophobic feelings especially against Christian foreign nationals, resulting in 
their exploitation in unpaid work, physical assault, abductions, torture, unlawful 
killings, and other forms of ill-treatment.494 Libyan legal framework allows for 
the indefinite detention of irregular entry, stay or exit.495 For many years, NGOs 
have criticised the Libyan detention policy as a disproportionate measure and 
condemns it for not distinguishing general migrants from refugees, or those in 
need of international protection.496 Moreover, migrant women detainees are 
vulnerable to sexual violence due to the lack of female guards in Libyan detention 
centres. Libyan detention centres lack adequate ventilation, have no hygienic 
facilities, are overcrowded and have a shortage of basic necessities including 
medicine and food.497 HRW,498 Amnesty International,499 the Jesuit Refugee 
Service500 and Médecins sans Frontières501 have all documented that once 
irregular migrants are intercepted and returned to Libya, the Libyan authorities 
detain these individuals in overcrowded detention facilities, with poor sanitation 
and nutrition, and without access to an interpreter, a lawyer or to judicial review 
in order to challenge their detention. Libya is directly violating its international 
obligations and human rights law by violating international conventions such as 
Convention against Torture 1989 (CAT), Convention on the Elimination of All 
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Forms of Discrimination against Women 1989 (CEDAW) and the Protocol on 
Migrant Smuggling and Trafficking.502 
 
In addition, Libya fails to offer adequate asylum safeguards. Although it is not a 
signatory to the Refugee Convention, it is bound to the Organization of African 
Unity Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa 
(1969) sharing similar principles.503 Libya does not adopt domestic asylum 
legislation in line with its international obligations nor does it provide the 
necessary legal safeguards such as national asylum institutions and processes.504 
The only organisation dealing with asylum related issues in Libya is UNHCR and 
its partners. Due to no cooperation agreement existing between UNHCR and the 
Libyan government, decisions on asylum applications by UNHCR are given un-
systematically, on an ad hoc basis. For the above reasons, Libya is not considered 
a safe country as is evidenced by the EUBAM offices operating in Tunisia instead 
of in Libya since August 2014.505 Despite various calls by NGOs and civil society 
groups to stop the collaboration with Libya, the EU and its Member States are 
more concerned to externalise border controls. The economic and security 
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concerns of the EU as a whole seem to take precedence over concerns over 
PLJUDQWV¶ULJKWVSURWHFWLRQ506  
 
However, to incur international responsibility for aiding or assisting Libya, a link 
must exist between the assistance provided and the wrongful act.507 In accordance 
ZLWK WKH ,/& FRPPHQWDULHV WKH DVVLVWDQFH µPXVW EH JLYHQ ZLWK D YLHZ WR
IDFLOLWDWLQJ WKH FRPPLVVLRQ RI DQ LQWHUQDWLRQDOO\ ZURQJIXO DFW¶ DQG SURRI LV
required RI DQ LPSOLFLW µLQWHQWLRQ¶ E\ WKH (8 DQG ,WDO\ WKDW LWV PDQSRZHU
assistance and financial aid facilitates the commission of the wrongful act.508  At 
ILUVW WKH ,/& FRPPHQWDULHV VXJJHVW WKH µLQWHQW¶ FULWHULRQ WR FRQVLVW RI D
µVXEMHFWLYH HOHPHQW¶ DV D GHFLVLYe factor for international responsibility.509 It is 
argued however that such an approach makes the standard of proof inherently 
difficult in practice for two obvious reasons: 1) the EU and Italy are not expected 
to openly express their illegal purpose and 2) they will not officially declare the 
actual purpose of their assistance. Thus, the requirement of intent makes 
international responsibility obscure and very difficult to prove in practice. Hence, 
WR DLG RU DVVLVW ZLWK D YLHZ WR IDFLOLWDWH PXVW EH µGHOLEHUDWH LQ FKDUDFWHU¶ QRW
WRZDUGV WKH µXOWLPDWH SXUSRVH RI WKH DFW¶ WKDW LW LV µDVVLVWLQJ¶510 The ILC has 
H[SODLQHG WKDW LW LV QRW QHFHVVDU\ IRU WKH DLGRU DVVLVWDQFH WRPDNHDQ µHVVHQWLDO
FRQWULEXWLRQ¶WRWKHSHUIRUPDQFHRIWKHZURQJIXODFWEXWWKDWLWVLPSO\µFRQWULEXWHV
VLJQLILFDQWO\¶511 For the attribution of responsibility to arise all the EU and Italy 
need to know are the circumstances of the wrongdoings. 
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  Emanuela Paoletti, Migration Agreements between Italy and North Africa: Domestic 
Imperatives versus International Norms (Middle East Institute, 2012) 4. 
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 James Crawford, Second Report on State Responsibility (Addendum, A/CN.4/498/Add.1)  
SDUDJUDSK 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 ARIO Commentary (n 98) article 14, paragraph 4; ASR Commentary (n 489) article 16,  
paragraph 5. 
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  ibid. 
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  Vladislav Lanovoy, Complicity in an Internationally Wrongful Act SHARES Paper 38(2014)  
152. 
511
 See ASR Commentary (n 489) article 16, paragraph 5; James Crawford, The International Law 
&RPPLVVLRQ¶V$UWLFOHVRQ6WDWH5HVSRQVLELOLW\ (Cambridge University Press, 2002) 50. 
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Hence, to become effective, the decisive element proving international 
responsibility must be based obMHFWLYHO\ RQ HYDOXDWLQJ ,WDO\¶V DQG (8¶V
knowledge that human rights violations are conducted with its assistance.512  
Special Rapporteurs Crawford and Ago support this argument, asserting the 
HOHPHQW RI LQWHQW WR µGHPRQVWUDWH SURRI RI UHQGHULQJ DLG RU DVVLVtance with 
NQRZOHGJH RI WKH FLUFXPVWDQFHV¶513 The element of intent considered from a 
knowledge-based focus imputes responsibility in consideration for rendering 
assistance to the wrongful act, providing a distinction between standard forms of 
cooperation and assistance rendered for the commission of a wrongful act.514 
Thus, the impact of the assistance rendered coupled with the knowledge of the 
LQWHUQDWLRQDO ZURQJIXO DFW LV WKH GHFLVLYH HOHPHQW WULJJHULQJ (8¶V DQG ,WDO\¶V
international responsibility. That explains why international law imposes on a 
State or international organisation the obligation to withdraw assistance upon 
gaining knowledge of human rights violations.515 Once it is established that the 
aid or assistance has been rendered by the EU and Italy for the commission of an 
LQWHUQDWLRQDO ZURQJIXO DFW WKHQ WKH µDLG RU DVVLVWDQFH¶ LQ LWVHOI FRQVWLWXWHV DQ
international wrongful act.516 Hence, the EU and Italy bear international 
responsibility independently for their own conduct, i.e. the aid or assistance which 
has become internationally wrongful. 
 
This chapter argues that through the conduct of Frontex, the EU derives 
international responsibility for aiding and assisting the Libyan authorities to 
improve /LE\D¶V border security, providing training programmes for Libyan 
police to control maritime and terrestrial borders to best conduct pull-back 
practices in their territories and territorial waters, and providing financial aid to 
build and upgrade detention camps for migrants unlawfully and arbitrarily 
                                                          
512
 ARIO Commentary (n 98) DUWLFOHSDUDJUDSK)LQNµ$³%OLQGVSRW´¶Q486) 13. 
513
 Crawford, Second Report on State Responsibility (n 507) paragraph 186; Roberto Ago, Seventh  
Report on State Responsibility (1978) YILC, I(1) 58, paragraph 72. 
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 ARIO, article 14 and 30; Wall (n 201) paragraph 146. 
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depriving them of their liberty.517 Without EU and Italian financial assistance, 
Libyan authorities would not have had the capacity or the infrastructure to pull-
back irregular migrant boats and hold them in substandard detention facilities 
offering degrading treatment.518 The EU and Italy have continued to provide 
financial assistance to Libya GHVSLWH WKH 1*2V DQG &RXQFLO RI WKH (8¶V
FRQFOXVLRQV WKDW µRQ-going violence, human rights abuses, and violations of 
LQWHUQDWLRQDOKXPDQLWDULDQODZ¶WDNHSODFHDFURVVWKHFRuntry.519 For many years 
now Libya has been reported by the UNHCR and NGOs to be a gross human 
rights violator.520 Hence, the EU and Italy acquire international responsibility for 
aiding and assisting Libya with knowledge that it conducts internationally 
wrongful acts.521  
 
In relation to the third element, through the Italian/EU aid and assistance, Libyan 
authorities apprehend and detain in inhuman and degrading conditions would-be 
DV\OXPVHHNHUVLQYLRODWLRQRIWKHULJKWWROHDYHRQH¶VRZQFRXQWU\522 the right to 
seek asylum,523 and contrary to the prohibition of inhuman and degrading 
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  EUBAM Libya, article 3; See Chapter 3, section 3.4.1.1; FIDH (n 153) 36. 
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treatment;524 international obligations which Italy and the EU are bound.525 The 
EU and Italy have an obligation not to continue to support Libya financially or 
provide logistics, services, manpower which is used to conduct human right 
violations and to cease any form of cooperation i.e. EUBAM in Libya.526 
International responsibility may be imputed to the EU and Italy even in those 
circumstances where they have not issued specific instructions to execute an 
action resulting in violation, but could have prevented the wrongful conduct from 
occurring.527 Italy and the EU respectively acquire international responsibility as 
complicit to the wrongful act if they fail to withdraw assistance rendered when 
used to commit human rights violations.528 This is based on the assumption that 
,WDO\ DQG WKH (8 KDYH D SRVLWLYH REOLJDWLRQ WR DFW ZLWK µGXH GLOLJHQFH¶ WR VWRS
furnishing aid and assistance to Libya.529   
 
3.4.2 Greek Returns to Turkey under the EU/Turkey Statement 
Greece responded to the sharp increase in irregular migrants by building a 10.5km 
fence costing millions of Euros and deploying 1800 border guards along the 
Greek/Turkish border.530 This fence, although built without EU support, 
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effectively reduced the number of irregular migrants crossing the border from 
Turkey to Greece,531 but in the same time produced the side effect of displacing 
PLJUDQWV¶ URXWHV WR PRUH GDQJHURXV VHD URXWHV532 To stop sea arrivals, Greece 
subsequently exercised forced returns in the form of push-backs to Turkey.533 
NGOs have reported Greek coastguards intercepting irregular migrants in their 
dinghies, taking them on board a Greek vessel where some have been µVODSSHG
EHDWHQ DQG PDQKDQGOHG¶, towing them back to Turkish waters, damaging their 
boats and subsequently abandoning them in Turkish waters for the Turkish 
coastguard to rescue them.534 These allegations are addressed in more detail in 
Chapter 4 of this thesis. 
 
To support Greece, and in response to the migration crisis and allegations of push-
backs, the EU intensified its cooperation with Turkey to improve the management 
of migration flows from Turkey to Greece and subsequently Bulgaria. On 1 June 
2016, the EU-Turkey readmission agreement succeeded the Greek/Turkish 
readmission agreement.535 In return for EU incentives on visa liberalisation and 
possible EU membership, Turkey agreed to admit its own nationals, transiting 
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TCNs, and stateless persons coming to the EU.536 On 18 March 2016, members of 
the European Council and their Turkish counterpart decided to step up their 
commitments to the implementation of their joint action plan as agreed on 29 
November 2015, as well as, end irregular migration from Turkey to the EU by 
breaking the business model of the smugglers.537 Through this statement, it was 
decided as of 20 March 2016, TCNs who did not apply for asylum or whose 
DSSOLFDWLRQZDVGHWHUPLQHGDVµLQDGPLVVLEOH¶RUXQIRXQGHGZRXOGEHUHWXUQHGWR
Turkey.538 According to the Recast Asylum Procedures Directive, a Member State 
may reject an DSSOLFDWLRQDVµLQDGPLVVLEOH¶ZLWKRXWH[DPLQLQJLWVVXEVWDQFHZKHQ
1) the individual should have requested asylum in the first country of arrival 
guaranteeing effective access of protection (safe third country),539 or the applicant 
has been recognised as a refugee in another country (first country of asylum).540 
Both these concepts have been deemed applicable to Turkey.541  
 
7XUNH\KRZHYHUFDQQRWEHFRQVLGHUHGDµVDIHWKLUGFRXQWU\¶DVLWGRHVQRWIXOILO
the safeguards under Article 38 of the Recast Asylum Procedures Directive, nor 
does it offer protection under the Refugee Convention and respect for the 
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principle of non-refoulement.542 Turkey a party to the Refugee Convention,543 
only recently reformed its asylum and immigration system, passing its first law on 
international protection. In retaining the geographic limitation, Turkey offers legal 
guarantees only to those individuals who come from a country that is a member of 
CoE.544 Its asylum system does not ensure that the returned irregular migrants of 
Syrian, Egyptian, Libyan, and Afghan nationality have access to international 
protection as ensured by the Refugee Convention. Any individual coming from a 
non-CoE country receives national protection status on a temporary basis until the 
individual is resettled.545 Turkish law does not grant the right to apply for 
international protection nor does it set a maximum time period for the temporary 
protection, contrary to the UNHCR Guidelines on Temporary Protection.546 It 
only provides subsidiary protection status for those individuals who have fled 
from generalised violence and other forms of human rights violations.547 
Consequently, these individuals cannot integrate with the population in Turkey. 
They do not have permission to work or access the social services, resulting in 
them having fewer social rights than Turkish nationals contrary to the Refugee 
Convention.548 This particular excluded group of people are the ones most in need 
of international protection as most come from war-torn countries such as Syria, 
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 Roman, Baird, and Radcliffe (n 104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Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq and Somalia.549 On 17 May 2016, the Greek Appeal 
Committees undermined the legal and practical basis of the EU-Turkey statement 
by overturning deportation orders holding that the temporary protection offered 
by Turkey to a Syrian citizen do not offer rights equivalent to those required by 
the Refugee Convention.550 By 22 December 2016, the number of refugees 
registered in Turkey was 2.8 million, constituting a significant number of people 
likely not to receive adequate legal safeguards.551 
  
In Hirsi, the ECtHR held that a State cannot justify practices incompatible with its 
obligations under the Convention because of its problems with migratory flows 
management.552 Nor can it justify practices contrary to the Convention based on 
the existence of a statement or readmission agreement concluded with Turkey 
which purports to guarantee respect for fundamental rights. In itself the agreement 
is not sufficient to guarantee adequate protection in accordance with international 
human rights and refugee law.553 By analogy with the Dublin case law, it can be 
argued that despite the presumption provided under the EU-Turkey readmission 
agreement and the EU-7XUNH\VWDWHPHQWKROGLQJ7XUNH\WRFRQVWLWXWHDµVDIHWKLUG
FRXQWU\¶ QRQHWKHOHVV *UHHFH KDV WKH REOLJDWLRQ WR DVVHVV WKe efficiency of the 
Turkish asylum and immigration system and must provide access to its asylum 
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process or other immigration remedies before returning individuals to Turkey.554 
Greece cannot liberate itself from its obligations stemming from the ECHR only 
because the EU and the members of the Council of Europe have entered into a 
commitment with Turkey.555 Thus, Greece must first examine whether it is 
lawfully discharging its own obligations under the ECHR on a case by case basis 
irrespective of whether Turkey is also a party to the Convention.556 Returns under 
the EU-Turkey statement and the international responsibility of Greece are 
addressed in more detail in Chapter 4 of this thesis. 
 
3.5 Third Pre-emptive Security Check: Intensifying Surveillance 
To carry out further surveillance for the southern maritime EU external borders, 
the European Surveillance System (EUROSUR)557 was adopted to work as 
information data exchange system and at the same time contribute towards search 
and rescue in the Mediterranean Sea.558 ThLV FKDSWHU DUJXHV WKDW (852685¶V
objective is not to act as a strategic lifesaving tool as purported by the 
&RPPLVVLRQ EXW WR FRQVWUXFW D µFRQWUROOHG VSDFH¶559 in the Mediterranean Sea 
functioning as an early detection system in which Member States with Frontex 
coordination and partner third countries may detect and intercept irregular 
PLJUDQWV¶ERDWVRQGHSDUWXUHRUEHIRUHWKH\UHDFKWKHKLJKVHDV(852685¶VDLP
is to exchange information containing data on: unauthorised border crossings of 
migrants and whether their lives seem to be at risk; cross-border crime; and data 
on any vehicles or vessels which seem suspicious to the authorities at or in the 
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YLFLQLW\ RI WKH 0HPEHU 6WDWH¶V H[WHUQDO ERUGHUV560 These data are subsequently 
used to adopt a situational picture at national and European levels,561 and a 
simultaneous pre-frontier situation in partner third countries.562 Through the pre-
frontier intelligence picture, Frontex is authorised to conduct surveillance in the 
territorial waters of third States as well as on the high seas. National coordination 
FHQWUHV PD\ UHTXHVW )URQWH[ WR PRQLWRU WKLUG FRXQWU\ SRUWV LGHQWLILHG DV µEHLQJ
embarkation or transit points for vessels or other craft used for illegal immigration 
or cross-ERUGHU FULPH¶ WKH WUDFNLQJ RI YHVVHOV VXVpected of carrying irregular 
migrants on the high seas; designated pre-frontier areas; and other areas in order 
to detect or track vessels suspected of carrying irregular migrants.563 7KH µSUH-
IURQWLHUVLWXDWLRQLQSDUWQHUWKLUGFRXQWULHV¶LVMXVWLILHGE\WKe Commission as the 
means to better assist boats in distress found in third country territorial waters.564 
+RZHYHU LQ UHDOLW\ WKH µSUH-IURQWLHU¶ PHFKDQLVP LV D GLVJXLVHG IRUP RI SXVK-
EDFNQHJDWLYHO\ LQWHUIHULQJZLWK WKH µULJKW WR OHDYHRQH¶VRZQ FRXQWU\¶ Dnd the 
µULJKW WR DV\OXP¶565 With such sophisticated intelligence surveillance in place, 
would-be asylum seekers will be prevented from departing the third country, 
making it impossible for them to reach international waters let alone the territorial 
waters of Member States. The pre-frontier mechanism in partner third countries is 
WKH (8¶V H[WHUQDOLVDWLRQ WRRO SURYLGLQJ LWV DVVLVWDQFH WR WKLUG FRXQWULHV VXFK DV
Turkey and Libya to conduct pull-back operations.566 
 
                                                          
560
 EUROSUR Regulation (n 19) article 1 and article 9(3): µMember States and the Agency shall 
comply with fundamental rights, in particular the principles of non-refoulement and respect for 
human dignity and data protection requirements, when applying this Regulation. They shall 
give priority to the special needs of children, unaccompanied minors, victims of human 
trafficking, persons in need of urgent medical assistance, persons in need of international 
protection, persons in distress at sea and other persons in a particularly vulnerable situation¶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 EUROSUR Regulation (n 19) article 10. 
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 EUROSUR Regulation (n 19) article 11: pre-frontier means the geographical area beyond the 
external borders ± see article 3 (g). 
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 EUROSUR Regulation (n 19) article 12(2). 
564
 European &RPPLVVLRQµ(852685.LFNVRII¶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The EU is making every effort to commit the main third countries producing the 
highest number of irregular migrant departures to participate in regional 
surveillance systems.567 Turkey is already a participant to EUROSUR through its 
membership in the Baltic Sea Region Border Control Cooperation.568 To get 
Libya, Algeria, Tunisia and Egypt on board, WKH&RPPLVVLRQ¶VSODQV WRFRQQHFW
EUROSUR to the Seahorse Mediterranean network.569 +RZHYHUGXH WR/LE\D¶V
unstable political environment it has not been possible to install a National 
Contact Point in Libya.570 Similarly, despite Spanish efforts to commit Algeria, 
Tunisia and Egypt to the Seahorse Mediterranean project, these States have not 
yet confirmed their participation due to lack of political will.571 A lack of 
commitment continues despite EU funding of EUR 200 million to Libya, Tunisia, 
Egypt and Algeria to strengthen their border surveillance systems.572 
 
Moreover, once these third countries connect to EUROSUR they will be able to 
exchange information.573 As a purported legal safeguard, the EUROSUR 
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 EUROSUR is linked to Seahorse Atlantic network (Participating third countries: Mauritania, 
Morocco, Senegal, the Gambia, Guinea Bissau and Cap Verde) and the Black Sea Littoral 
States Forum (BSCF); on BSCF see (XURSHDQ 061 3ODWIRUP µ%ODFN 6HD¶ KWWSPVS-
platform.eu/sea-basins/black-sea-0> accessed 18 October 2017; Bulgaria and Spanish NCC 
linked to BSCF and Seahorse Atlantic network. 
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 Commission, Communication on the Work of the Task Force Mediterranean COM(2013) 869 
ILQDO  (3 µ3DUOLDPHQWDU\ TXHVWLRQV¶ 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<www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getAllAnswers.do?reference=E-2014-000331&language=EN> 
accessed 18 October 2017; Linked to Italian NCC from 2015; Libya may join the network, 
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Avramopoulos, 23 October 2015) 
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IP-17-1882, 4 July 2017) <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-1882_en.htm> accessed 
18 October 2017. 
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Regulation prohibits the exchange of information to a third country if it would be 
XVHG WR µLGHQWLI\ SHUVRQV RU JURXSV RI SHUVRQV ZKRVH UHTXHVW IRU DFFHVV WR
international protection is under examination or who are under a serious risk of 
being subjected to torture, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment or any 
RWKHUYLRODWLRQRIIXQGDPHQWDOULJKWV¶574 However, (852685¶VUROHLVengaged 
from the moment these irregular migrants are detected and intercepted at sea, 
where no individual examination of international protection has taken place. 
There is not enough information at this stage to determine whether these 
individuals are at serious risk of being subjected to any form of ill-treatment. 
Once the competent national authorities intercept these vessels, EUROSUR no 
loQJHU SOD\V D UROH LQ µRSHUDWLRQDO SURFHGXUDO DQG OHJDO PHDVXUHV WDNHQ DIWHU
LQWHUFHSWLRQ¶575  
 
Thus, Libya, Tunisia, Algeria and Egypt (expected to join), third countries known 
for their poor human rights records, must be denied access to the system. Without 
a safety procedural facet to the system, how can it be expected that the EU, 
contributing millions of Euros to convince Libya, Tunisia, Egypt and Algeria to 
strengthen their border surveillance to proclaim these countries not to be 
trustworthy for a mutual sharing of information through EUROSUR? Although 
the EUROSUR Regulation contains legal safeguards against human rights 
violations, it has not provided monitoring mechanisms for oversight by 
independent and objective institutions. Access to all information concerning 
IXQGDPHQWDOULJKWVLQ)URQWH[¶VDFWLYLWLHVFRQGXFWHGZLWKLQ(852685LVJLYHQWR
the Fundamental Rights Officer (FRO) reporting to the Consultative Forum (CF), 
the Frontex Management Board and the Executive Director of Frontex.576 The 
FRO and CF evaluations are limited to recommendations; they do not have the 
authority to oblige the legislator or Frontex itself to take a particular course of 
                                                          
574
 EUROSUR Regulation (n 19) article 20(5). 
575
 EUROSUR Regulation (n 19) article 2(3). 
576
 EUROSUR Regulation (n 19) article 26a and see recital 12 of preamble. 
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action.577 Deficiencies in the monitoring system still exist mainly contributed by 
the high degree of opacity in Frontex operations.578 
 
,W LV DSSDUHQW WKDW WKH &RPPLVVLRQ¶V GHFODUDWLRQV RQ VHDUFK DQG UHVFXH DUH
pretexts, and that the real purpose of Europe is not to develop genuine life-saving 
WRROV ZKLFK DFW DV µSXOO IDFWRUV¶ HQFRXUDJLQJ IXUWKHU GHSDUWXUHV IURP the 
Mediterranean Sea,579 but to intercept migrant boats before or on departure, a 
pull-EDFN SUDFWLFH 7KH &RPPLVVLRQ¶V H[SHFWDWLRQ IRU (852685 WR FRQWULEXWH
towards search and rescue in the Mediterranean Sea and work as a surveillance 
system monitoring vessels in distress is seriously questioned especially when 
considering the fact that VHDUFK DQG UHVFXH LV H[FOXGHG IURP (852685¶V
scope.580 Once it locates vessels in distress, it does not have the authority to oblige 
Member States or Frontex to initiate SAR operations.581 To EUROSUR, the 
LUUHJXODU PLJUDQWV FRPSULVLQJ UHIXJHHV DQG DV\OXP VHHNHUV DUH VHHQ DV µPHUH
UDGDU EOLSV LQIUDUHG EOREV DQG DQRQ\PRXV QXPEHUV¶582 The casualty figures in 
the Mediterranean Sea speak for themselves. Since EUROSUR became 
operational there were 3,279 registered deaths in 2014,583 over 3,772 in 2015,584 
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 Yves Pascouau and Pascal Schumacher, Frontex and the Respect of Fundamental Rights: from 
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578
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François Crépeau, Regional Study: Management of the External Borders of the European Union 
and its Impact on the Human Rights of Migrants 8 May 2015, A/HRC/23/46, 12; Özgün (n 18) 
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  ,20³0LVVLQJ0LJUDQWV3URMHFW´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and 5,079 in 2016.585 Before the implementation of extraterritorial measures, 
according to statistics the probability of dying in the Mediterranean Sea from 
2005-2014 was 20.5% and in the first four months of 2015 it has increased by at 
least 45%.586 In 2016, the chances for irregular migrants dying on the Libya to 
Italy route was ten times higher than the crossing in the Eastern Mediterranean 
route from Turkey to Greece.587 That explains why the number of detections 
decreased by 72% in 2016 to a total of 511,371 detections compared to 1.8 
million detections in 2015.588 These extraterritorial measures have become a form 
RIµVWUXFWXUDOYLROHQFH¶XVHGDVDGHWHUUHQWWRROLQWKHPRVWLQKXPDQZD\589 The 
more Member States try to close their doors, the more people die attempting to 
enter. The Mediterranean Sea, identified as the most deadly sea in Europe, has 
WXUQHG LQWR D JUDYH\DUG GHVSLWH WKH (8¶V VRSKLVWLFDWHG VXUYHLOODQFH DQG WKH
deployment of military vessels.590 EUROSUR, an EU externalisation tool, is 




Since 2011, the high numbers of irregular migrants arriving to Europe have 
proved that the entire immigration containment belt has produced continuous 
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displacement of migration routes turning them to being even more dangerous. 
These individuals are fleeing from repressive regimes, terrorism and extreme 
poverty. Their best opportunity is to reach Europe. Europe, on the other hand, 
through the implementation of extraterritorial measures and surveillance 
technology attempts to discourage irregular border crossing to avoid acquiring 
international responsibility for individuals in need of international protection 
contrary to its international obligations under international human rights and 
refugee law. 
 
To justify these extraterritorial preventative measures, the EU presents smugglers 
as the cause of the crisis and irregular migrants as victims. To fight smugglers, the 
EU in collaboration with third countries perceives an obligation to target victims 
in order to stop growing levels of criminal activity. However, the fight against 
smugglers cannot justify D6WDWH¶VYLRODWLRQRI LWVREOLJDWLRQVXQGHULQWHUQDWLRQDO
law. Knowingly that Libya and Turkey lack a well-functioning asylum system or 
the infrastructure to effectively manage the mass influxes of migrants, the EU and 
its Member States did not hesitate to assist these third countries to perform their 
obligations on border control. In preventing would-be asylum seekers from 
leaving their own territory, the third country and its partners (Italy and the EU in 
its collective role) become jointly liable for breaches of international law. Nor can 
Greece justify the return of irregular migrants to Turkey only because the 
existence of an EU-Turkey statement. Nonetheless, to lawfully discharge its 
obligations under the ECHR, Greece must examine on a case by case basis 
whether Turkey is indeed considered a safe third country for the person concerned 
before return.  
 
Chapter Four provides a detailed analysis of Greek indiscriminate push-back 
practices during interception operations. It argues that these indiscriminate push-
back practices are illegal since they violate international human rights law and 
other obligations. Through the illicit practice of push-back and its commitment 
 127 
 
under the EU-Turkey statement, Greece is argued to acquire international 
responsibility for breaches of international obligations, such as the µright to life¶, 
prohibition of ill-treatment and the non-refoulement principle.  
 128 
 
Chapter 4: Illicit Return Practices on the Eastern Mediterranean Route 
4.1 Introduction 
Irregular migration throughout Europe exposes the regulatory shortcomings of the 
Refugee Convention and CAT to protect against refoulement.592 Although these 
two Conventions determine the criteria for international protection, they do not 
provide specifically for rules in case of mass migration; concurrently, non-
applicability of these Conventions in such cases cannot be assumed as it would 
leave migrants without protection under international law ± which is not in line 
ZLWK WKH &RQYHQWLRQV¶ DLPV +RZHYHU WKLV OHJDO XQFHUWDLQW\ FRQWLQXHV to be 
exploited by Member States to legitimise returns of irregular migrants on the basis 
of bilateral readmission agreements, despite the threat of persecution and torture 
in the respective countries. As there are many of such agreements in place, rulings 
of the ECtHR are providing relevant guidelines on treatment in individual cases.  
 
7KLV FKDSWHU ZLOO SURYLGH DQ DQDO\VLV RI WKH (8¶V µFRPSDVVLRQDWH ERUGHU ZRUN¶
policy,593 a practice known as push-back. It is argued that these push-back 
practices violate international obligations, notably the µright to life¶, the µduty to 
search and rescue¶, the prohibition of inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment and the principle of non-refoulement. These aspects will be exposed 
in the context of the EU-Turkey statement the legality of which is questioned in 
light of EU and international law, focusing mainly on the Asylum Procedures 
Directive, the EU Charter, the ECHR and the Refugee Convention. In this chapter 
LW LVDUJXHG WKDW7XUNH\GRHVQRWPHHW WKHµVDIH WKLUGFRXQWU\¶ UHTXLUHPHQWVDQG
that the returns under the EU-Turkey statement violate the non-refoulement 
principle.594 This chapter addresses the illicit push-back practices conducted by 
Greece with EU support but it will not consider Italy, as since 2014 no incidents 
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 CAT, article 3; Refugee Convention, article 33. 
593
 Little and Vaughan-Williams (n 369); see Chapter 3, section 3.2.   
594
 Refugee Convention, article 33; ECHR, article 3; EU Charter, article 19(2). 
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of illicit push-back practices to Libya have been reported.595 Italy formally 




Since 2011, irregular migrants have been victimised not only by the 
FLUFXPVWDQFHV RFFXUULQJ LQ WKHLU FRXQWULHV RI RULJLQ EXW DOVR E\ WKH (8¶V
µFRPSDVVLRQDWHERUGHUZRUN¶SROLF\DGRSWHGWRPDQDJHWKHLQIOX[,QWKHLUILJKW
against smugglers, organised crime and terrorism, the EU and its Member States 
seek to persuade the rest of the world that their extraterritorial measures are not 
GLUHFWHG DJDLQVW LUUHJXODU PLJUDQWV ZKRP WKH\ SXUSRUWHGO\ VHH DV µYLFWLPV¶ EXW
DJDLQVW VPXJJOHUV ZKRP WKH\ FRQVLGHU WR EH WKH µFDXVH¶ RI WKH PLJUDWLRQ
outreach.597 Irregular migrants are indeed the victims of the declared war between 
the Member States and smugglers, but in their effort to fight smugglers, the EU 
DQGLWV0HPEHU6WDWHVKDYHWXUQHGWKHVHµYLFWLPV¶LQWRµWDUJHWV¶,WLVDUJXHGWKDW
the fight against smugglers by no means justifies a policy resulting in violation of 
human rights law and other international obligations.598 
 
Smugglers perceive the refugee crisis as a business opportunity; to them, the 
H[WUDWHUULWRULDOPHDVXUHVDUHSDUWRIDµERUGHUJDPH¶599 All smugglers have to do 
is to ensure that the irregular migrants cross the territorial sea onto the high seas 
and then call the Greek Rescue Coordination Centre for assistance, taking 
DGYDQWDJHRI WKHVHDUFKDQG UHVFXH OHJDO IUDPHZRUN ,Q UHVSRQVH WR WKLVµERUGHU
gDPH¶*UHHFHKDVDGRSWHGLWVRZQVWUDWHJ\WKDWRILQIRUPDOIRUFHGUHWXUQVNQRZQ
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as push-EDFNV8SRQLQWHUFHSWLRQ WKHERDW LQµGLVWUHVV¶ LVQRWRIIHUHGLPPHGLDWH
assistance in accordance with international obligations under the search and 
rescue legal framework,600 instead, coastguards take steps to ensure the immediate 
return of these individuals to their country of departure without examining their 
individual circumstances.601 The Greek extraterritorial measures on irregular 
migration have thereby exposed refugees to vulnerabilities along their way.602 The 
race between smugglers and border authorities have forced smugglers to be 
inventive, for each unauthorised point of entry that is closed by border authorities, 
two more unauthorised points of entry are found by smugglers.603 This has created 
high risks for migrants generally resulting in non-rescue episodes, route diversion, 
push-back practices, and disputes over refugee responsibility upon 
disembarkation.604  
 
Through identifying the extraterritorial practices as necessary measures in the 
fight against smugglers, Greece risks adverse effects in the form of violations of 
international obligations and human rights law as unfortunate collateral 
damage.605 $VH[SODLQHGLQ&KDSWHU7KUHHLQDFFRUGDQFHZLWKLWVµFRPSDVVLRnate 
border-ZRUN¶SROLF\*UHHFH LQWHUDFWV LQ UHODWLRQ WR7XUNH\RXWRI µFRPSDVVLRQ¶
that is, in order to prevent irregular migrants from departing on unseaworthy 
boats. However, even if these individuals manage to depart, Greek coastguards 
                                                          
600
 See Chapter 2, section 2.3. 
601
 Allegations of push-backs from November 2013 to 11 June 2016; see 3UR$V\O³3XVKHG-EDFN´
(n 110) 14-$PQHVW\,QWHUQDWLRQDO³*UHHFH)URQWLHURI+RSHDQG)HDU´Q112) 15; Watch 
WKH0HG³$ODUP3KRQH3UHVV5HOHDVH´ Q 114 ,QIRPRELOH µ,QIRUPDWLRQZLWKDERXWDQG IRU
5HIXJHHV LQ*UHHFH¶ -XO\KWWSLQIRPRELOHZHXQHWPLQRUV-separated-
from-their-family-in-moria-greek-coast-guard-punctures-refugee-boat-under-the-eyes-of-
IURQWH[!DFFHVVHG  2FWREHU  :DWFK WKH 0HG $ODUP 3KRQH ³,OOHJDO 3XVK-Back 
2SHUDWLRQ ZLWK )URQWH[ 3UHVHQW´  -XQH 
<https://alarmphone.org/en/2016/06/15/watchthemed-alarm-phone-denounces-illegal-push-
back-operation-with-frontex-present/> accessed 13 October 2017. 
602
 Maija Mustaniemi-Laakso et al, The Protection of Vulnerable Individuals in the Context of EU 
Policies on Border Checks, Asylum and Immigration (FRAME, 31 May 2016) 33. 
603
 Gammeltoft-Hansen and Hathaway (n 518) 237. 
604
 Moreno-/D[µ6HHNLQJ$V\OXPLQWKH0HGLWHUUDQHDQ¶Q43) 174. 
605




ensure their push-back.606 During push-backs, irregular migrants claim that their 
lives have been endangered intentionally by Greek coastguards who have seized 
the boat engine, or have pierced holes in boats and subsequently abandoned them 
in Turkish territorial waters; these practices have contributed to irregular 
PLJUDQWV¶ ERDWV FDSVL]LQJ DQG UHVXOWLQJ LQ ORVV RI OLIH607 In addition, irregular 
migrants claim that violence has been used against them during push-backs.608 
The Greek push-back practices appear to be similar to the strategy of smugglers in 
/LE\DWKDWRIµVHOI-LQGXFHGGLVWUHVV¶609 Smugglers in Libya left irregular migrant 
boats stranded at sea without a boat engine and in unseaworthy conditions.610 It 
cannot be precluded that the Greek authorities are exercising similar practices 
DJDLQVW LUUHJXODU PLJUDQWV¶ ERDWV LQWHUFHSWHG RQ WKH KLJK VHDV RU LQ *UHHN
territorial waters to avoid acquiring international responsibility in accordance with 
international human rights and refugee law. 
 
When conducting field operations, Greece claims to have fully respected 
applicable EU and international legal frameworks.611 Nevertheless, the illegal 
practices conducted by Greek and Turkish coastguards have been confirmed by 
the testimonies of irregular migrants during various studies conducted by Pro 
Asyl,612 HRW,613 Amnesty International,614 Migreurop615 and Watch the Med.616 
The ECtHR relied on similar reports produced by HRW and Amnesty 
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International when it held that Greece were in violation of Article 3 ECHR.617 The 
same form of documentation is now relied upon to prove that systematic push-
backs are occurring on the Eastern Mediterranean route (Greece to Turkey). For 
many years, NGOs have reported that Greece systematically pushes intercepted 
irregular migrants back from its territorial waters and/or on the high seas to 
Turkey.618 The pushed-back migrants were of Syrian, Somali, Afghan, or Eritrean 
nationality, identified by the UNHCR as persons in need of international 
protection.619 These individuals were given no opportunity to request international 
protection or challenge their forced return.620  
 
NGOs and even Frontex have confirmed practices of informal forced returns 
taking place from Greek territorial waters and/or on the high seas to Turkey.621 In 
2013, Frontex confirmed that it had received eighteen reports alleging informal 
forced returns in the form of push-backs in groups.622 The Greek authorities 
categorically denied such allegations, arguing they were isolated incidents.623 It 
ZDVWKH&R(¶V&RPPLVVLRQHUIRU+XPDQ5LJKWVZKRUHDFWHGWRWKHFDOOVRI NGOs 
in requesting an effective investigation addressing recorded incidents of unlawful 
                                                          
617
 Hirsi (n 57) paragraphs 35-36, 37-39, 40-41, 125; Sharifi (n 115) paragraph 102; see Report of 
WKH&RXQFLO RI(XURSH¶V&RPPLWWHH IRU WKH3UHYHQWLRQRI 7RUWXUH DQG ,QKXPDQRU'HJUDGLQJ
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ference_English.pdf> accessed 24 October 2017. 
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 Andric v Sweden Application no 45917/99 (23 February 1999) paragraph 1; Henning Becker v 
Denmark Application no 7011/75 (3 October 1975); Hirsi (n 57) paragraphs 184-185; also see 
SBC handbook in Chapter 2, section 2. 
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 $PQHVW\,QWHUQDWLRQDOµ7KH+XPDQ&RVWRI)RUWUHVV(XURSH¶Q112) 9. 
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 $PQHVW\,QWHUQDWLRQDOµ7KH+XPDQ&RVWRI)RUWUHVV(XURSH¶Q112) 5. 
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practices in the form of push-backs.624 In response to this investigation, the Greek 
government denied that there was a Greek policy of push-back in the Aegean Sea 
and confirmed their commitment to respect human rights. They stated that any 
allegations would be investigated, but that no such allegations had been 
received.625 However, between November 2014 and August 2015, NGOs reported 
eleven incidents of push-back practices at Greek-Turkish land and sea borders,626 
in which irregular migrants claimed violence was used against them.627 In 
addition, WKHVHSUDFWLFHVKDYHFRQWULEXWHGWRLUUHJXODUPLJUDQWV¶ORVVRIOLIH It was 
only in October 2015 that the Prosecutor of the Thessaloniki Appeals Court 
ordered the Internal Affairs Directorate of the Police to commence a criminal 
investigation based on the reports of NGOs that push-backs were taking place in 
the Evros region.628 However, no push-backs were found to have taken place.629 
 
4.3 Push-EDFNV(QGDQJHULQJ0LJUDQWV¶/LYHV 
During push-back practices, the most contentious incidents in violation of the 
µright to life¶ were those occurring in Greek territorial waters on 20 January 2014, 
25 October 2014 and 14 August 2015. On 20 January 2014, a boat carrying 28 
people sank 100m from the Greek island of Farmakonisi during a search and 
rescue operation conducted by the Greek authorities.630 A total of eleven people 
drowned.631 Survivors told the UNHCR that immediately upon interception Greek 
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 Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights letter to Greek Ministry of Public Order 
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 Amnesty International Report 2015/2016 (n 625) 168. 
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coastguards towed the boat to Turkey. The coastguard vessel sped across the sea, 
IORRGLQJ WKH LUUHJXODUPLJUDQWV¶ERDWDQGFDXVLQJ LW WRFDSVL]H632 Survivors also 
claimed that once in the water, they tried to climb on board the Greek coastguard 
vessel but were beaten badly by the coastguards.633 The migrants who managed to 
get on board were held at gunpoint.634 The Greek coastguards categorically denied 
these allegations. They claimed that the boat capsized when being towed towards 
Greek territory and that weather conditions had not allowed the irregular migrants 
to board the Greek vessel.635  
 
Immediate reactions came from the EU and the CoE. The EU Commissioner for 
Home Affairs requested independent investigations.636 7KH&R(¶V&RPPLVVLRQHU
for Human Rights commented that WKH LQFLGHQWDSSHDUHG WREH µDFDVHRI IDLOHG
FROOHFWLYH H[SXOVLRQ¶637 The Greek Minister of Shipping, Maritime Affairs and 
the Aegean638 was obliged to commence an investigation.639 In August 2015, with 
WKHDSSURYDORI WKH$WKHQV¶&RXUWRI5HYLHZ WKH3URVHFXWRURI3LUDHXV¶0DULQH
&RXUWGURSSHGWKHLQYHVWLJDWLRQKROGLQJWKHVXUYLYRUV¶ testimonies unfounded.640 
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The investigation was argued by NGOs to have been conducted inadequately, not 
taking into consideration serious discrepancies in the evidence provided by the 
coastguard.641 The termination of any investigation against Greek coastguards 
comes as no surprise when one considers the insistence of the Greek Foreign 
Minister that WKHUHKDGEHHQQRµLOOHJDOUHSHOOLQJ WR7XUNH\¶642  
 
On 25 October 2014, Greek coastguaUGVERDUGHGDYHVVHOUHPRYHGWKHHQJLQH¶V
fuel tank, punctured the vessel and subsequently pushed the boat to Cesme, 
Turkey.643 The boat was carrying migrants of Syrian nationality, including 
children and pregnant women.644 On 5 August 2015, Watch the Med Alarm Phone 
reported four separate incidents of push-back practices (involving violence) from 
 -XO\ WR $XJXVW  ,W UHSRUWHG WKDW µPDVNHG VSHFLDOXQLWVRI FRDVWJXDUG¶
had attacked boats of refugees between the Greek-Turkish islands.645 According 
to the AODUP3KRQH WKHERDWVZHUHLQGLVWUHVVDVDUHVXOWRI*UHHNFRDVWJXDUGV¶
attacks, and were left drifting at sea until they were rescued by Turkish 
coastguards. These allegations were confirmed by the Alarm Phone which was in 
direct contact with the irregular migrants straight after the attacks occurred. 
Furthermore, on 14 August 2015, Turkish fishermen claimed that a boat carrying 
fifty people was intentionally sunk by Greek authorities.646 These fishermen 
supported their claim with a video.647 On 15 June 2016, a further allegation of a 
push-back practice occurred between Chios, Greece and Cesme, Turkey.648 On 22 
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August 2016, TheIntercept.com reports on the allegations of a female passenger 
to have been shot by the Greek patrol within the Frontex operational area.649 
)URQWH[GRFXPHQWVWKHXVHRIILUHDUPVDJDLQVWLUUHJXODUPLJUDQW¶VERDWVWDUJHWLQJ
two shots to the outboard engine on the same date the allegation was made (24 
November 2015).650 To date, no investigation has been undertaken by Greece to 
confirm or disprove these allegations.  
 
These incidents question the legal safeguards afforded by international human 
ULJKWV IUDPHZRUNV RQ WKH µULJKW WR OLIH¶ DQG µGXW\ WR UHVFXH¶. It is universally 
DFFHSWHGWKDWµQRRQHVKDOOEHDUELWUDULO\GHSULYHGRIKLVOLIH¶651 The µright to life¶ 
is codified in maritime law through the duty to render assistance to persons in 
distress at sea and through the search and rescue obligations.652 Article 2 ECHR 
ranks the µright to life¶ as the most fundamental653 right within the ECHR and the 
Convention expressly provides that no derogation from it is permitted.654 Any 
deprivation of life has to be justified. Article 2(2) ECHR describes the 
FLUFXPVWDQFHV µZKHUH LW LV SHUPLWWHG WR XVH IRUFH ZKLFK PD\ UHVXOW DV DQ
unintended outcome in the deprivation RIOLIH¶655 Such use of force must not be 
µPRUH WKDQ DEVROXWHO\ QHFHVVDU\¶656 in achieving its intended purpose in 
accordance with sub-paragraphs (a)-(c) of Article 2(2) ECHR. Furthermore, the 
ECtHR and the Human Rights Committee have emphasised the positive 
obligation of States to take measures657 ZLWKLQ WKHLU µOHJDO DQG DGPLQLVWUDWLYH
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IUDPHZRUN¶658 to ensure that the lives of those persons within their jurisdiction659 
are not lost. The Greek authorities have a positive obligation to refrain from 
intentionally taking life. States also have a positive obligation under the Palermo 
3URWRFROV WR WDNHµDOODSSURSULDWHPHDVXUHV LQFOXGLQJ OHJLVODWLRQ LIQHFHVVDU\ WR
preserve and protect the rights of persons who have been the object of smuggling 
as accorded under applicable international law, in particular the ³ULJKWWROLIH´¶.660  
 
As Greece is part of Operation Poseidon at sea in collaboration with Frontex, it is 
bound to follow the Frontex sea borders rules.661 Irregular migrants are arriving 
on Greek shores in overcrowded, unseaworthy vessels controlled by 
unprofessional seamen. The deaths in the Mediterranean Sea and the arrivals on 
*UHHNVKRUHVLQRYHUFURZGHGXQVHDZRUWK\ZRRGHQERDWVKDYHHYLGHQFHGµDUHDO
DQG LPPHGLDWH ULVN WR WKH OLIH RI DQ LQGLYLGXDO¶662 For these reasons, upon 
LQWHUFHSWLRQ*UHHNDXWKRULWLHVPXVWFRQVLGHUWKHLUUHJXODUPLJUDQWV¶ERDWVWREHLQ
D µGLVWUHVV SKDVH¶663 Based on its positive obligations under the Sea Borders 
Regulation and the ECHR, Greece is obliged to take preventative measures to 
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assist these boats and avoid any illicit practices leading to the capsizing of boats 
resulting in deaths.664 ,W LV WKHGXW\ RI WKH *UHHNFRDVWJXDUG¶V FDSWDLQ WR UHVFXH
these persons in distress, not to be the cause of their drowning.665 
 
Greece has a positive obligation to safeguard the lives of individuals within its 
jurisdiction666 and prevent loss of life.667 $µFDXVDOUHODWLRQVKLS¶LVHVWDEOLVKHGDW
the moment Greek authorities take persons on board and/or tows the boat to a 
particular destination. It is precisely at this moment that they exercise direct 
control over the boat, thus placing the passengers under Greek jurisdiction.668 As 
long as border guards exercise their control during interception there is no need to 
SURYH µHIIHFWLYH FRQWURO RYHU LWV JHRJUDSKLFDO VXUURXQGLQJV¶669 Apart from 
establishing de jure and de facto control,670 to hold Greece accountable for the 
incidents of 20 January 2014, 25 October 2014 and 14 August 2015 it must also 
EH SURYHG WKDW *UHHFH µNQHZ RU RXJKW WR KDYH NQRZQ RI DQ\ XQODZIXO DFW
perSHWUDWHG WKHUHLQ RU WR KDYH NQRZQ WKH DXWKRUV¶671 The Greek State has full 
command of its coastguards.672 In addition, the reports produced by NGOs 
alleging push-back practices impute Greece with knowledge of unlawful acts 
perpetrated by its officials.673 On the high seas, individuals have died as a direct 
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UHVXOW RI *UHHN FRDVWJXDUGV¶ H[HUFLVH RI DXWKRULW\ RYHU LUUHJXODU PLJUDQWV¶
boats.674 In causing intentional damage to migrant boats and leaving them 
stranded at sea it is argued that Greek officials are committing internationally 
wrongful acts.675 These wrongful acts, in the form of push-back practices trigger 
international responsibility for Greece.676  
 
In the Aegean Sea, the risk of death has materialised but no action has been taken 
by Greece to adequately respond to such risk in accordance with its obligations 
under Article 2 ECHR.677 Furthermore, in failing to conduct an effective 
investigation in respect of the 14 August 2015 and 15 June 2016 incidents, Greece 
is in breach of its procedural obligations under Articles 2 and 3 ECHR.678 Greece 
has a positive duty imposed by the ECHR to commence investigations to identify 
those dying at sea and punish those responsible for causing these deaths.679 
Failure to commence investigations into alleged human rights violations 
constitutes an internationally wrongful act imputing Greece with international 
responsibility.680  
 
4.4 Irregular Migrants Subjected to Ill-Treatment 
Not only do Greek authorities have a positive duty to protect life at sea in the 
form of rescue but they also need to respect individuals and treat them humanely. 
During push-backs, irregular migrants have alleged receiving ill-treatment of a 
severity which may amount to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. 
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Irregular migrants interviewed by Pro Asyl alleged WKDW WKH\KDGEHHQ µVODSSHG
beaten with batons, punched and kicked on their body, on their head and on their 
IDFH¶ E\ *UHHN RIILFHUV GXULQJ WKHLU DSSUHKHQVLRQ DQG SXVK-back.681  Others 
alleged that Greek coastguards had forced them to come on board the Greek 
&RDVWJXDUG YHVVHO ZKHUH WKH\ ZHUH WKUHDWHQHG ZLWK JXQV DQG PDGH WR µNQHHO
GRZQDQGNHHSWKHLUKDQGVEHKLQGWKHLUQHFN¶ZKLOVWERGLO\VHDUFKHGRWKHUVVDLG
they were forced to take their clothes off.682 There were allegations of theft of 
personal belongings, as well as the removal of identification documents.683 NGOs 
have also reported that Greek border guards assaulted a pregnant woman.684  
 
If these allegations are true, it is argued that Greek authorities are committing acts 
of inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.685 The prohibition of ill-
treatment is non-derogable under the ECHR and CAT.686 Thus, all States Parties 
DUHREOLJHGWRµHOLPLQDWHDQ\OHJDORURWKHUobstacles that impede the eradication 
of torture and ill-WUHDWPHQW¶ DQG PXVW WDNH HIIHFWLYH PHasures to ensure such 
conduct does not re-occur.687 To distinguish torture from the other forms of ill-
treatment, both the jurisprudence of the Committee against Torture and the 
(&W+5KDYHPRYHGWRZDUGVWKHHVWDEOLVKPHQWRIDVSHFLDOVWLJPDIRUµGHOLEHUDWH
iQKXPDQWUHDWPHQWFDXVLQJYHU\VHULRXVDQGFUXHOVXIIHULQJ¶688 DQGWKHµGLIIHUHQFH
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 3UR$V\O³3XVKHG-EDFN´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 ECHR, article 3; CAT, article 16; EU Charter, article 4; Note the difference in terminology 
between the CAT and the ECHR/EU Charter: unlike article 3 ECHR and article 4 EU Charter, 
DUWLFOH  &$7 UHIHUV µWR WRUWXUH or cruel, inhuman RU GHJUDGLQJ WUHDWPHQW RU SXQLVKPHQW¶
ICCPR, article 7; UDHR, article 5. 
686
 ECHR, article 15; also see CAT, article 2: The Committee Against Torture has expressly 
FRPPHQWHG WKDW WKH µREOLJDWLRQV WR SUHYHQW torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment (hereinafter "ill-treatment") under article 16, paragraph 1 are 
interdependent, indivisible DQG LQWHUUHODWHG¶ VHH Committee Against Torture, General 
Comment 2, Implementation of Article 2 by States Parties (U.N. Doc. CAT/C/GC/2/CRP. 
1/Rev.4 (2007)) paragraph 3. 
687
  ibid, also see Committee Against Torture, General Comment 2, paragraph 4. 
688
 Dikme v Turkey Application no 20869/92 (11 July 2000) paragraph 93; Aksoy v Turkey 
Application nos. 28635/95, 30171/96, 34535/97 ECHR 1996-VI, paragraph 64. 
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LQ WKH LQWHQVLW\ RI WKH VXIIHULQJ LQIOLFWHG¶689 The minimum level of severity 
depends on the circumstances of the case such as treatment duration, physical and 
mental effects, sex, age and state of health of the victim.690 Any ill-treatment of 
not a sufficient intensity or purpose to that required for torture is classified as 
inhuman or degrading.691 
 
It is argued that the acts conducted by Greek authorities such as slapping, beating 
ZLWKEDWRQVDQGSXQFKLQJDQGNLFNLQJDQLUUHJXODUPLJUDQW¶VERG\KHDGDQGIDFH
amount to inhuman treatment.692 These particular acts caused a deliberate actual 
bodily injury on the migrants concerned.693 Similarly, the infliction of severe pain 
to a pregnant woman, and a series of intense blows to the entire body, is 
considered a heinous and violent intentional act, punishable by law.694 The 
severity of the pain to the woman taken in conjunction with the consequences of 
such pain to the unborn child arguably amounts to torture. As the ECtHR has 
consistently held and as Article 2(2) of the CAT makes clear, the prohibition of 
torture is absolute.695 No exceptional circumstances whatsoever can be invoked 
                                                          
689
 CAT, H.K. v Switzerland (2013) Communication no 432/2010, paragraph 7.4; CAT, Fatou 
Sonko v Spain (2012) Communication no 368/2008, paragraph 10.4; The Greek case (1969) 
ECHR no 12, 186; Ireland v United Kingdom (1978) ECHR Series A no 25, paragraph 167 
µOHYHORIVHYHULW\¶ Keenan v the United Kingdom Application no 27229/95 [2001] ECHR 239, 
paragraph 20; Jalloh v Germany Application no 54810/00 ECHR 2006-IX, paragraph 68; 
Fernando Menéndez, µRecent Jurisprudence of the United Nations Committee against Torture 
DQGWKH,QWHUQDWLRQDO3URWHFWLRQRI5HIXJHHV¶56434 (1) 61-78 <https://academic-oup-
com.chain.kent.ac.uk/rsq/article-lookup/doi/10.1093/rsq/hdu019> accessed 17 October 2017. 
690
 Tekin v Turkey Application no 22496/93 ECHR 1998-IV, paragraph 52; Selmouni v France 
Application no 25803/94 ECHR 1999-V, paragraph 96; Keenan (n 689) paragraph 20; 
9DODãinas v Lithuania Application no 44558/98 (24 July 2001) paragraph 120; and specifically 
to torture see Labita v Italy Application no 26772/95 ECHR 2000-IV, paragraph 120; The 
Committee Against Torture has already established that the physical and mental suffering, 
aggravated by the vulnerability of the individual as a migrant, exceed the threshold of cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment - see CAT, Fatou Sonko (n 689) paragraph 
10.7. 
691
 Tekin (n 690) paragraph 52. 
692
 ECHR, article 3. 
693
 Jalloh (n 689) paragraph 68; Labita (n 690) paragraph 120. 
694
 Selmouni (n 690) paragraph 103. 
695
 Chahal (n 59) paragraph 79; Saadi v Italy (n 407) paragraph 127. 
 142 
 
by way of justification.696 There can be no derogation from the prohibition, even 
in the event of a public emergency threatening the life of the nation.697  
 
As to the acts of bodily search and forced removal of clothes on-board the vessel 
LQ IURQW RI FRDVWJXDUGV DQG RWKHUV WKH\ LQWHUIHUH ZLWK WKH LUUHJXODU PLJUDQWV¶
digQLW\ DFWLQJ DV D IRUP RI µJURVV KXPLOLDWLRQ¶ DQG WKXV FRQVWLWXWLQJ GHJUDGLQJ
treatment.698 Although the bodily search and forced removal was exercised for 
security reasons, the ECtHR has reiterated that the Convention prohibits in 
absolute terms torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment even in 
circumstances such as organised crime, security and terrorism.699 The effect of 
these acts on irregular migrants crossing the sea on overcrowded unseaworthy 
vessels fleeing persecution and civil war was sXFKDVWRDURXVHWKHLUµIHHOLQJVRI
fear, anguish and inferiority capable of humiliating and debasing them and 
SRVVLEO\EUHDNLQJWKHLUSK\VLFDORUPRUDOUHVLVWDQFH¶700  
 
For many years, NGOs and civil society groups have reported the Greek 
FRDVWJXDUGV¶ SUDFtice of inflicting physical and mental violence causing severe 
pain and suffering to irregular migrants, however, the solidity of these allegations 
must be proved in court beyond reasonable doubt.701 For Greece, the law on the 
burden and standard of proof in Article 3 ECHR cases is opportune. These 
irregular migrants are immediately returned to the country of departure, mainly 
Turkey. Upon return they face difficulties in obtaining supporting evidence of ill-
                                                          
696
 The Greek case (n 689) 186. 
697
 M/V Saiga (No 2) (n 209) paragraphs 155-156. 
698
 Tyrer v UK [1978] 2 EHRR 1, paragraphs 32 and 35. 
699
 Tomasi v France Application no 12850/87 Series A no 241-A, paragraph 115; on CAT see 
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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700
 Hurtado v Switzerland Application no 17549/90, Series A no 280, paragraph 67 - the absence 
of a specific purpose having as its object to humiliate and debase the person concerned, does 
not conclusively rule out a finding of a violation of article 3 ECHR; see Peers v Greece 
Application no 28524/95, ECHR 2001-III, paragraph 68 and 74. 
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 Pruneanu v Moldova Application no 6888/03 ECHR 2004-IV, paragraph 45; Ireland (n 689) 
SDUDJUDSK µWRDVVHVs the evidence, proof may follow from the coexistent of sufficiently 
strong, clear and concordant inferences or of similar un-UHEXWWHGSUHVXPSWLRQVRIIDFW¶ 
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treatment considering that Turkey faces massive inflows of irregular migrants;702 
they do not receive adequate legal services such as interpreters and legal aid.703 
Without legal advice, the victims of ill-treatment are not aware on the evidence 
they need to obtain in order to support a case of ill-treatment in court.  
 
Mindful of such difficulties, to avoid a situation where State authorities act with 
virtual impunity, the ECtHR has imposed upon States an obligation, similar to 
WKDW LQ UHVSHFW RI WKH µULJKW WR OLIH¶ WR FDUU\ RXW DQ HIIHFWLYH LQYHVWLJDWLRQ LQWo 
allegations of ill-treatment on the basis of prima facie evidence provided by the 
victims.704 In those situations when a person alleges injury under the control of 
State authorities, such as the police or coastguards, a strong presumption arises 
that the person concerned was subjected to ill-treatment.705 Upon allegations of 
ill-treatment conducted under its jurisdiction,706 Greece has the burden of 
explaining the circumstances under a thorough investigation to determine the 
nature and circumstances of the event in which these irregular migrants were 
intercepted, treated and returned to country of departure.707  
 
NGOs and UNHCR have brought to the attention of the Greek government the 
fact that practices of torture and ill-treatment have taken place during push-backs, 
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 Labita (n 690) paragraph 125, difficulties obtaining medical report. 
703
 :RPHQ¶V5HIXJHH&RPPLVVLRQµ(8-7XUNH\$JUHHPHQW)DLOLQJ5HIXJHH:RPHQDQG*LUOV¶ 
(August 2016) 20, <https://www.womensrefugeecommission.org/images/zdocs/EU-Turkey-
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 Assenov v Bulgaria Application no 24760/94, EHRR 1998-VIII, paragraph 102; Kaya v Turkey 
Application no 22535/93, 28 EHRR 1, paragraph 86; McCann (n 35) paragraph 161.  
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 Pruneanu (n 701) paragraph 44; Bursuc v Romania Application no 42066/98 (12 October 
2004) paragraph 80. 
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 (&+5DUWLFOH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LQ«WKH&RQYHQWLRQ¶DOVRVHH&KDSWHUVHFWLRQ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VMXULVGLFWLRQLQFOXGHVDQ\
territory where the State party exercises, directly or indirectly, in whole or in part, de jure or de 
facto effective control, in accordance with international law. 
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 Tomasi (n 699) paragraphs 108-111; Ribitsch v Austria Application no 18896/91 Series A no 
336, paragraph 34; Aksoy (n 688) paragraph 61; Pruneanu (n 701) paragraph 47; CAT, Fatou 
Sonko (n 689) paragraph 10.4; Juliet Chevalier-:DWWVµ(IIHFWLYH,QYHVWLJDWLRQVXQGHU$UWLFOH
of the European Convention on Human Rights: Securing the Right to Life or an Onerous 
%XUGHQRQD6WDWH"¶(-,/ (2010) 21 (3) 701-721, 705. 
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i.e. within its jurisdiction.708 In its recently decided case Sakir v Greece, the 
ECtHR held that the Greek authorities were at fault for failing to consider the 
reports of various NGOs and other Greek institutions as relevant to the 
investigation.709 Referring to alleged push-backs, the Greek Government has not 
commenced any investigations to secure evidence concerning the incidents.710 
Greece has an obligation to identify and punish the wrongdoers.711 Such failure is 
likely to send a message of tolerance to the perpetrators of Article 3 ECHR and 
Article 16 CAT violations which is undesirable from EU perspective as it furthers 
incompliance with EU laws, values, and human rights. From Greek perspective, 
confronted with massive influxes of irregular migrants, the possibility of a case 
taken to the ECtHR is seen as permissible collateral damage when compared to 
the positive results produced by the illicit push-back practices acting as strategic 
deterrence tools.712 Nonetheless, Greece obtains responsibility for the wrongful 
actions committed by its coastguards during push-back practices and must 
commence adequate investigations to determine their nature and take appropriate 
measures against its perpetrators.713 7KH*UHHNDXWKRULWLHV¶ IDLOXUH WRFRPPHQFH
investigations against cogent allegations of ill-treatments violates Article 3 ECHR 
procedural aspect to conduct an effective official investigation.   
 
4.5 The EU-Turkey Statement as a violation of the Non-refoulement Principle  
To avoid international responsibility for individuals in need of protection, it is 
argued that Greece is intentionally ignoring its obligations under the non-
refoulement principle. An example of such infringement is the EU-Turkey 
statement. Since 20 March 2016, Greece has returned irregular migrants, 
including asylum seekers, to Turkey on the basis of the EU-Turkey statement 
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 Sakir (n 116) paragraphs 70-72. 
710
 Pruneanu (n 701) paragraph 47, such as eyewitness testimony and forensic evidence; 7DQUÕNXOX
v Turkey Application no 23763/94 ECHR 1999-IV, paragraph 104. 
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 CAT, article 12; CAT, Fatou Sonko (n 689) paragraph 10.7; Tomasi (n 699) paragraphs 108-
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712
 See section 4.6. 
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FRQVLGHULQJ 7XUNH\ WR EH D µVDIH WKLUG FRXQWU\¶714 Despite the existence of a 
statement determining Turkey as safe, to be relieved of its obligations under the 
ECHR and the Refugee Convention, Greek authorities may return a potential 
asylum seeker to Turkey if it can ensure that Turkey will admit and consider the 
LQGLYLGXDOV¶ UHTXHVW E\ SURYLGLQJ KLPKHU ZLWK HIIHFWLYH SURWHFWLRQ715 The 
assessment must take into consideration whether Turkey realistically offers the 
IROORZLQJOHJDOJXDUDQWHHVµWKDWWKHSHUVRQZLOOEHDGPLWWHGWRWKDWFRXQWU\ZLOO
enjoy effective protection against refoulement; will have the possibility to seek 
and (if necessary) enjoy asylum; and will be treated in accordance with accepted 
LQWHUQDWLRQDOVWDQGDUGV¶716  
 
If there are substantial grounds for believing that the individual would be 
subjected to a real risk of ill-treatment, Greece has a positive duty to observe all 
OHJDO VDIHJXDUGV QRW WR UHWXUQ µrefouler¶ WKH LQGLYLGXDO WR D 6WDWH ZKHUH WKHUH
H[LVWV µD FRQVLVWHQW SDWWHUQ RI JURVV IODJUDQW RU PDVV YLRODWLRQV RI KXPDQ
ULJKWV¶717 7KHULJKWVSURYLGHGE\$UWLFOH(&+5DUHRIDQµDEVROXWHFKDUDFWHU¶
and may not be derogated from even in times of public emergency.718 The non-
refoulement principle applies equally to those individuals who are displaced, 
victims of trafficking, and economic migrants.719 In addition, the EU has adopted 
WKHµVXEVLGLDU\SURWHFWLRQ¶IUDPHZRUNWRRIIHUSURWHFWLRQWRGLVSODFHGSHUVRQVDQd 
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 Valeria Ilareva, Undocumented Immigrants and Their Access to Fundamental Human Rights 
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not return them to a place where they will face harm.720 These provisions are an 
extension of the non-refoulement principle in the Refugee Convention to those 
persons who do not qualify for refugee status but nonetheless need protection. 
Thus, the non-refoulement principle is an absolute, non-derogable721 peremptory 
norm722 of international law (jus cogens) and the cornerstone of international 
refugee protection law.723 Therefore, the principle of non-refoulement must be 
observed even by those States that are not parties to the 1951 Refugee 
Convention.724  
 
It is argued that these legal safeguards are not fulfilled by Turkey which is an 
unsafe third country in the light of the non-refoulement principle. Although the 
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principle of non-refoulement has been incorporated in Turkish legislation,725 
NGOs are sceptical as to its implementation.726 From mid-January 2016 to 1 April 
2016, recent reports from NGOs indicate that Turkey expelled groups of 100 
individuals to Syria on a daily basis.727 These returns to Syria, at a time when that 
country continues to be in serious turmoil, impute Greek authorities with 
knowledge that Turkey does not respect the principle of non-refoulement in 
practice.728 Greece should take into account the reports of NGOs and the UNHCR 
on Turkey,729 especially ZKHQ FRQVLGHULQJ 7XUNH\¶V UHFRUG RI YLRODWLRQV WR WKH
ECtHR receiving the highest judgments against it when compared to received 
MXGJPHQWV¶IURPDOORWKHU6WDWHSDUWLHVWRWKH(&+5730  
 
The return of irregular migrants from Greece to Turkey on the basis of the EU-
Turkey statement becomes more worrying in the light of the four readmission 
agreements signed by Turkey with Kyrgyzstan, Romania, Ukraine, Belarus, and 
7XUNH\¶VSURSRVHGUHDGPLVVLRQDJUHHPHQWVZLWK731 third countries.732 Equally 
worrying is the fact that Turkey has commenced negotiations with these unsafe 
third countries based on its obligations under the EU-Turkish visa free regime 
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 Algeria, Bulgaria, Bangladesh, China, Egypt, Ethiopia, Georgia, India, Iraq, Iran, Israel, 
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Sudan, Tunisia, Uzbekistan. 
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incentives, as expressly requested by the EU.733 There is no transparency during 
the negotiations with these third countries, nor are these readmission agreements 
disclosed for public scrutiny. These readmission agreements will have the effect 
of subjecting irregular migrants to arbitrary detention or any other form of ill-
treatment and an increased risk of refoulement to third countries which do not 
offer adequate legal safeguards in accordance with International Refugee law.  
*UHHFHKDV WKHREOLJDWLRQQRW WR µKDQGRYHU WKRVH FRQFHUQHG WR WKHFRQWURORI D
state where they would be at risk of persecution (direct refoulement),734 or from 
which they would be returned to another country where such a risk exists (indirect 
refoulement¶735 On this basis, Greece has the duty to investigate the human 
rights protection mechanism offered by Turkey on the ground and offer an 
effective remedy in return; otherwise these individuals would be subjected to an 
increased risk of arbitrary refoulement.736 +HQFH WKHµIRUHVHHDEOHFRQVHTXHQFHV¶
RI DQ\ UHPRYDO PXVW EH WDNHQ LQWR FRQVLGHUDWLRQ LQ WKH OLJKW RI WKH SHUVRQ¶V
individual circumstances.737 In consequence, the return of irregular migrants to 
Turkey under the EU-Turkey statement without prior examination of individual 
circumstances may result in arbitrary repatriation in violation of the principle of 
non-refoulement. 
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Equally worrying is the CommisVLRQ¶V SURSRVDO WR UHSOLFDWH WKH (8-Turkey 
statement to more than 16 countries in Africa and Middle East.738 Amongst these 
countries are Somalia, Sudan, Afghanistan and Eritrea listed as top ten countries 
generating refugees.739 7KH (8¶V KLJK UHSUHVHQWDWLYH IRr foreign affairs and 
security policy, Federica Mogherini, together with Matteo Renzi, the Italian Prime 
Minister, also wish to replicate the EU-Turkey statement model with Libya.740 
Libyan coast guard capacity would be enhanced through the EUNAVFOR MED 
µ2SHration Sophia¶DFFHVVLQJ/LE\DQ WHUULWRULDOZDWHUV3UHSDUDWLRQV WR UHSOLFDWH
this model are already being put to place. EUBAM has started training Libyan 
coast guards in Tripoli.741 Furthermore, on 11 February 2016, NATO Defence 
Ministers announced the depOR\PHQWRI1$72¶V6WDQGLQJ0DULWLPH*URXS742 
to the Aegean, to carry out surveillance on irregular crossings. NATO Secretary-
General Stoltenberg stated that any rescued persons intercepted at sea would be 
immediately returned to Turkey.743 It is argued that in effect the EU-Turkey 
statement has achieved a legitimisation of push-backs.744  
 
                                                          
738
 Commission, Communication on Establishing a New Partnership Framework with Third 
Countries under the European Agenda on Migration COM(2016) 385 final, 8. 
739
 81+&5³5HIXJHHV0LJUDQWV5HVSRQVH-0HGLWHUUDQHDQ´
<http://data.unhcr.org/mediterranean/regional.php> accessed 25 October 2017. 
740
 ,WDOLDQ0LJUDWLRQ&RPSDFW³&RQWULEXWLRQWRDQ(86WUDWHJ\IRU([WHUQDO$FWLRQRQ0LJUDWLRQ´
<http://www.governo.it/sites/governo.it/files/immigrazione_0.pdf> accessed 16 October 2017; 
*OHQGD *DUHOOL DQG 0DUWLQD 7D]]LROL µ:DUIDUH RQ WKH /RJLVWLFs of Migrant Movements: EU 
DQG 1$72 0LOLWDU\ 2SHUDWLRQV LQ WKH 0HGLWHUUDQHDQ¶ 2SHQ 'HPRFUDF\  -XQH 
<https://www.opendemocracy.net/mediterranean-journeys-in-hope/glenda-garelli-martina-





1$72¶V 0LJUDQW 0LVVLRQ¶ 3ROLWLFR  )HEUXDU\  KWWSZZZSROLWLFo.eu/article/72-
hours-to-launch-natos-migrant-mission-refugees-asylum-greece-turkey/> accessed 16 October 
2017. 
743
 $QGUpZ 5HWWPDQ µ1$72 WR 7DNH 0LJUDQWV %DFN WR 7XUNH\ LI 5HVFXHG¶ (8 2EVHUYHU 
February 2016) <https://euobserver.com/foreign/132418> accessed 16 October 2017; NATO, 
µ1$72'HIHQFH0LQLVWHUV$JUHHRQ1$726XSSRUWWR$VVLVWZLWKWKH5HIXJHHDQG0LJUDQW
&ULVLV¶ KWWSVWDWHZDWFKRUJQHZVIHEUHIXJHHV-NATO-mil-force-med-prel.pdf> 
accessed 16 October 2017. 
744
 (&5(µ(&5(6WURQJO\2SSRVHV/Hgitimizing Push-EDFNVE\'HFODULQJ7XUNH\D³6DIH7KLUG
&RXQWU\´¶ %UXVVHOV  -DQXDU\  KWWSZZZHFUHRUJHFUH-strongly-opposes-
legitimising-push-backs-by-declaring-turkey-a-safe-third-country/> accessed 16 October 2017; 
see Chapter 4 on further analysis. 
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4.6 State Practice of Push-backs and the Non-refoulement Principle  
Hathaway contests the customary character of the non-refoulement principle.745 
He notes that throughout the world, there has been a long standing practice of 
refoulement and refusal to allow access to State territory for refugees through 
push-back policies.746 In 2009, the World Refugee Survey reported that fifty-two 
countries had committed acts of refoulement showing consistent State practice. 
According to Hathaway, these results undermine the claim of a universally 
accepted norm of customary international law.747 He further argues that this 
SULQFLSOHGRHVQRWDSSO\WRDEHQHILFLDU\FODVVRUWRDµSDUWLFXODUFODVV of persons 
RU W\SHRI ULVN¶748 In his view this duty resembles an injunction giving relief to 
individuals in certain circumstances, instead of being customary international law 
on non-refoulement.749 However, other scholars such as Lauterpacht and 
Bethlehem argue that the consistent declaration by States, together with the 
UNHCR declarations of respect for non-refoulement, constitute a norm.750 The 
requirement to justify acts of refoulement as exceptions to the norm supports the 
argument that non-refoulement is a peremptory norm of customary international 
law.751 Thus, the principle of non-refoulement has become an integral facet of the 
absolute prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment.752  
 
                                                          
745
 -DPHV+DWKDZD\µ/HYHUDJLQJ$V\OXP¶,/--536, 510. 
746
 United States Committee for Refugees and Immigrants, World Refugee Survey 2009 - Canada 
17 June 2009, 279-286 <http://www.refworld.org/docid/4a40d2a2c.html> accessed 17 October 
2017. 
747
 +DWKDZD\µ/HYHUDJLQJ$V\OXP¶Q745) 510 
748
 +DWKDZD\µ/HYHUDJLQJ$V\OXP¶Q745) 510. 
749
 +DWKDZD\µ/HYHUDJLQJ$V\OXP¶Q745) 510; emphasis added. 
750
 Lauterpacht and Bethlehem (n 55) paragraphs 196-253; see other scholars Goodwin-Gill and 
McAdam, The Refugee in International Law (n 71) 345-1LOV&ROHPDQµNon-refoulement 
Revisited: Renewed Review of the Status of the Principle of Non-refoulement as Customary 
,QWHUQDWLRQDO/DZ¶(-0/-68. 
751
 Lauterpacht and Bethlehem (n 55) paragraphs 196-253; Case Concerning the Military and 
Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua Case) (Merits), ICJ reports 27 
June 1986, paragraph 186; also see Declaration of States parties to the 1951 Convention (n 
722). 
752
 ICCPR, article 7; ECHR, article 3; CAT, article 3; Goodwin-*LOOµ7KH5LJKWWR6HHN$V\OXP¶
(n 487) 444. 
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This chapter supports the view that the non-refoulement principle is a peremptory 
norm of customary international law. However, confronted with the European 
refugee crisis, States seem have chosen to violate the non-refoulement principle 
because the economic costs for non-compliance are definitely lower than the costs 
of compliance. In accordance with the Reception Conditions Directive, Member 
States must ensure that asylum seekers have access to shelter being entitled to 
food and extra money to buy it, medical attention, schooling and access to lawyer 
and interpreter.753 Since 2015, 1.03 million people have entered Greece. Before 
18 March 2016, Greece exercised a policy of free movement for asylum seekers 
who were not subjected to detention. Against this background, the economic cost 
per beneficiary has been estimated to be $780/per year.754 After 18 March 2016, 
upon the conclusion of the EU-Turkey statement, every person including asylum 
seekers were held into automatic detention, thus, raising the costs per beneficiary 
to approximately $14,000/per year.755 Since 2015, over EUR 1 billion in EU 
funding has been allocated to Greece to manage the irregular migration crisis, 
more than EUR 500 million in emergency assistance, and up to EUR 200 million 
under the EU Emergency Support Instrument for projects.756 By way of example, 
Italy gives EUR 1125/month per asylum seeker to centres to provide meals and 
shelters.757 Between 2011 and 2016, Italy received 630,000 irregular migrants.758  
                                                          
753
 Directive 2013/33 laying down standards for the reception of applicants for international 











information/eu_turkey_statement_17032017_en.pdf> accessed 24 October 2017; European 




_update_en.pdf> accessed 24 October 2017; An additional EUR 35.1 million is given to 
Greece for the implementation of the Relocation and Resettlement mechanisms. 
757
 See costs figures for EU countries, taking as example Germany- per asylum seeker (free meals 
plus EUR 143/month cash to maximum EUR 216/month and EUR 92/per child depending on 
age, compared to Italy EUR 35/day which goes to centres for meals and shelter and EUR 2.50 
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In 2016, a total of 181,436 irregular sea arrivals entered Italy.759 This means that 
on a monthly average, Italy has financed the accommodation of at least 15,119 
persons constituting a figure of EUR 17 million. To date, Italy has received EUR 
560 million from 2014-2020 to facilitate reception, returns and relocation and 
EUR 19 million in emergency funding.760 These figures reflect only the costs of 
free meals and accommodation; it does not cover the costs of legal aid and other 
services which Italy and Greece are obliged to provide access to.  
 
When one compares the economic cost figures for Italy and Greece on the 
irregular migration crisis to the costs of pecuniary, non-pecuniary damages, costs 
and expenses awarded by the ECtHR for breach of human rights law and other 
international obligations, it is noted that it is in the economic interest of Italy and 
Greece to push-back and return these individuals before they are disembarked in 
their territories. Since the beginning of 2011, ECtHR decisions against Greece 
and Italy based on asylum and immigration matters violating ECHR rights have 
been very few. As of July 2017, the ECtHR has given judgment against Greece on 
only three cases involving applicants who had entered Greece through irregular 
means in light of Articles 3, 5 and 13 ECHR respectively.761 Since 2016, 
following the EU-Turkey statement, the ECtHR has communicated two cases 
FRQFHUQLQJWKHDSSOLFDQW¶VGHWHQWLRQLQ9,$/DQG6RXGDKRWVSRWVLQ&KLRVXQGHU
                                                                                                                                                              
SRFNHW PRQH\ VHH 5HXWHUV ³)DFWER[ %HQHILWV RIIHUHG WR $V\OXP 6HHNHUs in European 
&RXQWULHV´ KWWSZZZUHXWHUVFRPDUWLFOHXV-europe-migrants-benefits-factbox/factbox-
benefits-offered-to-asylum-seekers-in-european-countries-idUSKCN0RG1MJ20150916> 
accessed 24 October 2017. 
758
 7KH (XURSHDQ 3ROLWLFDO 6WUDWHJ\ &HQWUH ³,UUHJXlar Migration via the Central Mediterranean: 
)URP (PHUJHQF\ 5HVSRQVHV WR 6\VWHPLF 6ROXWLRQV´
<https://ec.europa.eu/epsc/publications/strategic-notes/irregular-migration-central-






agenda-migration/background-information/docs/italy_state_of_play_report_en.pdf> accessed 24 
September 2017. 
761
 MSS concerning Dublin transfers on conditions of detention under article 3 and 13 ECHR;  
Sharifi (n 115); Rahimi v Greece Application no 8687/08 (5 April 2011) conditions in 
detention centres under Article 3, 5 and 13 ECHR 
<http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/CP_Greece_eng.pdf> accessed 28 October 2017. 
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Articles 3 and 5 ECHR respectively.762 Similarly, since 2011, the ECtHR has 
considered only four cases from applicants entering Italy irregularly under 
Articles 3, 5 and 13 ECHR, respectively.763 On average, the highest amount the 
ECtHR has ordered against Italy has been EUR 17,000 per applicant.764 The 
amount of damages against Greece has varied from EUR 4,500 ± 5,000, including 
non-pecuniary damages, costs and expenses. Thus, for Italy and Greece, the 
economic costs for compliance with the non-refoulement principle are definitely 
higher than the costs for non-compliance, especially when considering the low 
number of applications before the ECtHR by individuals whose rights have been 
violated by EU and Member State extraterritorial measures. 
 
 
                                                          
762
 see ECtHR communicated case of Raoufi and Others v Greece Application no 22696/16  
(Communicated by ECtHR on 26 May 2016) concerning their detention in VIAL hotspots in 
Chios after entry into force of EU-Turkey statement under article 3 and 5 ECHR; also see 
communicated case of Allaa Kaak and others v Greece Application no 34215/16 
(Communicated by ECtHR on 7 September 2017) article 3 (conditions of Vial and Souda in 
Chios hotspots and article 5 ECHR (detention in the hotspots). 
763
 Hirsi (n 57) pushed-back at sea, held: violations under Article 3 ECHR, Article 4 of Protocol 
No 4 (prohibition of collective expulsions) and Article 13 ECHR for being exposed to risk of 
ill-treatment in Libya and repatriation to Somalia and Eritrea; Khlaifia (n 115) concerning the 
holding in the reception centre on the island of Lampedusa and on ships in Palermo harbor in 
Sicily, violations of Article 5(1), (2) and (4) ECHR and article 13 ECHR, but no violation of 
Article 3 ECHR and Article 4 of Protocol No 4 to the ECHR; Mohammed Hussein v the 
Netherlands and Italy Application no 27725/10 ECHR 2013 concerned Dublin transfer to Italy 
of a Somali asylum seeker, application was found manifestly ill-founded and declared 
inadmissible; Sharifi (n 115), concerned immediate returns to Greece from Italy, Held: Greece 
violated article 13 ECHR combined with article 3 ECHR, for lack of access to asylum 
procedure and risk of deportation to Afghanistan. A violation by Italy of article 4 of Protocol 
No 4 and article 3 ECHR by returning these applicants to Greece exposed them to the 
shortcomings of the Greek asylum procedure, and a violation of Article 13 ECHR combined 
with Article 3 ECHR and Article 4 of Protocol No 4 to the ECHR of the lack of access to 
asylum procedure in the port of Ancona. 
764
 Hirsi (n 57) paragraphs 215-218, non-pecuniary damage: EUR 15,000 for each applicant (24  
applicants), costs and expenses: EUR 1,575.74; Sharifi (n 115) paragraphs 251-252 and 256,  
non-pecuniary damage: with regards to Italy and Greece - applicants did not submit their claim 
for just satisfaction within time-limit, no amount was granted, costs and expenses: EUR 5,000 
(granted jointly to the applicants); Khlaifia (n 115) paragraphs 285 and 288, non-pecuniary 
damage: EUR 2,500 for each applicant (3 applicants), costs and expenses: EUR 15,000 to 
applicants jointly; MSS (n 115) paragraphs 406, 411, 414, and 420: non-pecuniary damage: 
against Greece - EUR 1,000, against Belgium ± EUR 24,900 costs and expenses: EUR 3,450 
and EUR 6,075 respectively. 
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4.7 Legal Redress before the ECtHR 
These extraterritorial border controls become even more dangerous when viewed 
in the context of the complexities of the judiciary system. Victims of illicit border 
control practices may seek redress in an international court only if they do not 
receive sufficient redress in domestic courts.765 The majority of irregular migrants 
disembark in Italy, Greece or Turkey. However, these countries do not have 
adequate asylum and immigration systems and lack effective redress 
mechanisms.766 Furthermore, in the context of individual applications to the 
ECtHR, only those individuals or non-governmental organisations that suffer 
detriment as a result of a particular violation of the Convention may petition the 
Court for redress.767  There is no right of petition for those individuals or NGOs to 
complain about a law through an actio popularis because they believe it to 
contravene the Convention.768 In addition, the Convention does not enable the 
VFUXWLQ\ RI ODZV µLQ DEVWUDFWR¶.769 Applicants must prove that the violation has 
affected them personally.770  
 
7KHSUREOHPHQFRXQWHUHGLQWKHFRQWH[WRIERUGHUFRQWUROLVWKDWWKHµULJKWWROLIH¶
has been violated, but the victims are no longer alive. Third party standing before 
the ECtHR is based on the right violated. In exceptional circumstances, the 
(&W+5DGPLWVDSSOLFDWLRQVE\WKHYLFWLPV¶FORVHUHODWLYHV771 In cases concerning 
deaths or disappearances, the ECtHR has accepted indirect victim status, but in 
UHODWLRQWR$UWLFOH(&+5WKH&RXUWKDVKHOGWKDWWKLVULJKWLVµVWULFWO\SHUVRQDO¶
                                                          
765
 Tanase v Moldova Application no 7/08 (27 April 2010) paragraph 112. 
766
 See Chapter 3 on Turkey and Chapter 5 for Italy and Greece. 
767
 ECHR, article 34. 
768
 ECHR, article 34; Klass and Others v Germany Application no 5029/71 (1979) 2 EHRR 214, 
[1978] ECHR 4, paragraph 33; Burden v UK Application no 13378/05 (2008 ECHR 357) 
paragraph 33. 
769
 7KH&KULVWLDQ)HGHUDWLRQRI-HKRYD¶V:LWQHVVHVLQ)UDQFH v France (unreported 6 November 
2001) <http://swarb.co.uk/the-christian-federation-of-jehovahs-witnesses-of-france-v-france-
echr-6-nov-2001/> accessed 128 October 2017. 
770
 Tanase (n 765) paragraph 108. 
771




and cannot be transferred to a third party.772 These strict legal standards of 
admissibility make applications to the ECtHR E\ LUUHJXODU PLJUDQWV¶ YLUWXDOO\
impossible. In cases of expulsions at sea, in the context of Article 3 ECHR, to 
lodge a complaint before the Court there must be a binding decision against the 
person who has exhausted all effective domestic remedies.773 In push-backs at sea 
no expulsion order is given to irregular migrants, the result being no opportunity 
to exhaust domestic remedies; a situation leading to the ECtHR rejecting the 
claim for want of victim status within the meaning of Article 34 ECHR.774 
 
To remedy gaps in accountability, it has been argued that the ECtHR should adopt 
DSUDFWLFHZKHUHLQ1*2VKDYHOHJDOVWDQGLQJWRUHSUHVHQWWKHYLFWLPV¶LQWHUHVWV775 
This would ensure more effective protection of Convention rights.776 Although 
NGO involvement within the ECtHR is advantageous to the victims and their 
families, this practice might open a floodgate,777 overburdening the ECtHR 
considering that most of NGOs have the financial means to make claims even 
though they might fail on admissibility grounds.778 In drawing a balance between 
1*2DFFRXQWDELOLW\DQGWKHSURWHFWLRQRIDYLFWLPV¶LQWHUHVW LW LVVXJJHVWHGWKDW
the ECtHR should relax the victim status requirement and allow an actio 
popularis for specific cases which are of interest to a broader group or class, 
                                                          
772
 Kaburov v Bulgaria Application no 9035/06 ECHR 2003-IX, paragraph 52. 
773
 ECHR, article 34; Hirsi (n 57) paragraph 57. 
774Scordino v Italy (no.1) Application no 36813/97 (29 March 2006), 45 EHRR 7, paragraphs 179-
180; Albayrak v Turkey Application no 38406/97 (7 July 2008), ECHR 104, paragraph 32. 
775
 ASR, article 33; Lloyd Mayer, NGO Standing and Influence in Regional Human Rights Courts 
and Commissions (Scholarly Works, 2011, Paper 54) 911; Emanuele Rebasti and Luisa 
9LHUXFFL³$/HJDO6WDWXVIRU1*2VLQ&RQWHPSRUDU\,QWHUQDWLRQDO/DZ"´(6,/, November 
2002, 12 <http://www.esil-sedi.eu/sites/default/files/VierucciRebasti.PDF> accessed 17 
October 2017. 
776
 By analogy see Scozzari and Giuntay v Italy Application No 39221/98 (13 July 2000) 
paragraph 138; Spijkerboer, Are European States Accountable (n 28) 73. 
777
 Protocol No 14, which entered into force on 1 June 2010, was designed to address the floodgate 
issue by introducing a new admissibility criterion and changing the way in which repetitive and 
clearly inadmissible cases are treated. See CoE, Protocol No 14 to the Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, amending the control system of the 
Convention, Strasbourg, 13.V.2004, CoE Treaty Series No. 194, article 12. 
778
 Rebasti and Vierucci (n 775) 12.  
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similar to the practice of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and 
WKH$IULFDQ&RPPLVVLRQRQ+XPDQDQG3HRSOHV¶5LJKWV.779 
 
4.8 The International Responsibility of Greece for Breach of International 
Obligations  
Greece incurs international responsibility for every internationally wrongful act 
ZKLFK PD\ µFRQVLVW LQ RQH RU PRUH DFWLRQV RU RPLVVLRQV RU D FRPELQDWLRQ RI
ERWK¶780 To determine the existence of an internationally wrongful act, there must 
exist first an international obligation which is said to have been breached and such 
the act is attributed to Greece as a subject of international law.781  The notion of a 
breach of an international obligation was described by the ICJ as an act or 
RPLVVLRQ ZKLFK DFWV µFRQWUDU\ WR¶ RU µLQFRQVLVWHQW ZLWK¶ D UXOe,782 RU µIDLOXUH WR
FRPSO\ZLWKLWVWUHDW\REOLJDWLRQV¶783 $UWLFOH$65VWDWHVWKDWµWKHUHLVDEUHDFK
of an international obligation by a State when an act of that State is not in 
conformity with what is required of it by that obligation, regardless of its origin or 
FKDUDFWHU¶784 7KH SKUDVH µUHJDUGOHVV RI LWV RULJLQ¶ PHDQV WKDW WKH $65 DUWLFOHV
apply to all international obligations of States, i.e. those established by a treaty, 
general principles within the international legal order or by a customary rule of 
international law.785  
 
                                                          
779
 Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights, "Pact of San Jose",  
Costa Rica, 22 November 1969 (American Convention on Human Rights) article 44; Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Approved by the 
Court during its LXXXV Regular Period of Sessions, held from   November 16 to 28, 2009 
(entry into force 1 August 2013) article 23; 155/96 Social and Economic Rights Action Center 
(SERAC) and Center for Economic and Social Rights (CESR) v Nigeria (27 October 2001, 30th 
2UGLQDU\6HVVLRQ3HWHU.RRLMPDQVµ7KH5ROHRI1RQ-State Actors and International Dispute 
6HWWOHPHQW¶LQ:\ER+HHUHFrom Government to Governance: The Growing Impact of Non-
State Actors on the International and European Legal System (TMC Asser Press 2004) 23. 
780
 ASR, article 1; ASR commentary, paragraph 1. 
781
 ASR, article 2; United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, Judgment, I.C.J. 
Reports 1980, 3, paragraph 56 and paragraph 90; Nicaragua case (n 751) paragraph 226. 
782
 Nicaragua case (n 751) paragraphs 115 and 186. 
783
 *DEþtNRYR-Nagymaros Project (n 402) paragraph 57. 
784
 Emphasis added. 
785
 ASR commentary, article 12, paragraph 3; also see Nicaragua case (n 751) paragraph 177; 
North Sea Continental Shelf (n 723) paragraph 63. 
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Greek coastguards as officers in authority represent their government, thus as an 
organ of Greece, their conduct is considered an act of Greece under international 
law.786 5HJDUGOHVV RI ZKHWKHU WKHVH RIILFHUV DUH FODVVLILHG RI D µVXSHULRU¶ RU
µVXERUGLQDWH¶ FDWHJRU\ ZKDW PDWWHUV LV WKDW WKH\ DUH DFWLQJ LQ WKHLU RIILFLDO
capacity, thus their conduct is attributable to Greece for the purposes of Article 4 
ASR.787 It is argued in this chapter that the intentional damage to migrant boats 
leaving them stranded at sea by Greek officials during push-back practices are not 
LQFRQIRUPLW\ZLWK*UHHFH¶VWUHDW\REOLJDWLRQVRQWKHµright to life¶788 and µGXW\WR
UHVFXH¶.789 In addition, Greece has a positive procedural obligation under Articles 
2 and 3 ECHR to conduct an effective investigation in respect of allegations of 
push-back practices, particularly on the 14 August 2015 and 15 June 2016 
incidents.790 Furthermore, it is argued that the acts of inhuman and degrading 
treatment conducted during these push-back practices constitute internationally 
ZURQJIXO DFWV FRQWUDU\ WR *UHHFH¶V LQWHUQDWLRQDO REOLJDWLRQV GHULYLQJ XQGHU WKH
ECHR and CAT.791 Moreover, the continued failure of Greek authorities to 
commence investigation against cogent allegations on the µright to life¶, µduty to 
rescue¶ and ill-treatment violate the procedural aspects of Articles 2 and 3 ECHR, 
thus constituting internationally wrongful acts.792  
 
                                                          
786
 ASR, article 4(1); ASR commentary, article 4, paragraph 3; Difference Relating to Immunity 
from Legal Process of a  Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, Advisory 
Opinion, ICJ Reports 1999, 62, paragraph 62, referring to the draft articles on State 
responsibility, article 6, now embodied in article 4. 
787
 ASR commentary, article 4, paragraph 7; Currie case Decision No 21, Volume XIV 21 (13 
March 1954) 24. 
788
 Also contrary to ICCPR, article 6; ECHR, article 2; EU Charter, article 2; UDHR, article 3. 
789
 UNCLOS, article 98(1); SOLAS, Chapter V, Regulation 33.1; SAR Convention, Chapter  
2.1.10. 
790
 Jaloud (n 669). 
791
 ECHR, article 3; CAT, article 16; EU Charter, article 4; Note the difference in terminology 
between the CAT and the ECHR/EU Charter: unlike article 3 ECHR and article 4 EU Charter, 
artLFOH  &$7 UHIHUV µWR WRUWXUH or cruel, inhuman RU GHJUDGLQJ WUHDWPHQW RU SXQLVKPHQW¶
ICCPR, article 7; UDHR, article 5. 
792
 Jaloud (n 669); also see ECHR, article 15; also see CAT, article 2: The Committee Against 
Torture has expressly commented that the µREOLJDWLRQV WR SUHYHQW torture and other cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment under article 16, paragraph 1 are 
LQWHUGHSHQGHQW LQGLYLVLEOH DQG LQWHUUHODWHG¶ VHH Committee Against Torture, General 
Comment 2 (n 686) paragraph 3. 
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It is also argued that Article 54 of Greek Law 4375/2016 adopted as a result of 
*UHHN¶V FRPPLWPHQW under the EU-Turkey statement constitutes an 
internationally wrongful act.793 Article 54 states that individuals whose 
DSSOLFDWLRQZDVGHWHUPLQHGDVµXQIRXQGHG¶RUµLQDGPLVVLEOH¶ZRXOGEHUHWXUQHGWR
Turkey.794 Despite its bilateral commitments under the EU-Turkey statement, 
Greece has a positive duty not to return an individual to a third country without 
first assessing the human rights situation in the receiving country and the 
treatment the individual would be subjected on return.795 In accordance with 
Article 12(1) ASR, for the purposes of attribution of responsibility the Greek 
parliament is considered an organ of the State.796 Hence, the internationally 
wrongful act via the passage of legislation entails the international responsibility 
of Greece as an enacting State.797 
 
Necessarily, a violation by Greece of its international obligations gives rise to its 
responsibility as well as a consequent duty of reparation.798 The regime of State 
responsibility for breach of an international obligation is general in scope and 
character, thus it can involve minor infringements and serious breaches of 
obligations, such as peremptory norms of customary international law.799 Due to 
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 ASR commentary, article 12, paragraph 2; Applicability of the Obligation to Arbitrate under 
Section 21 of the United Nations Headquarters Agreement of 26 June 1947, 30, paragraph 42; 
a mere passing of legislation may breach international obligations; also see Chapter 3, section 
3.4.2 on an analysis of Article 54 of Greek Law 4375/2016 and the safe third country criteria. 
794
 See Chapter 3, VHFWLRQRQµXQIRXQGHG¶DQGµLQDGPLVVLEOH¶GHWHUPLQDWLRQV 
795
 Hirsi (n 57) paragraphs 133. 
796
 ASR, article 4(1); see ASR commentary, article 4, paragraph 1: µ7KH UHIHUHQFH WR D ³6WDWH
RUJDQ´ FRYHUV DOO WKH LQGLYLGXDO RU FROOHFWLYH HQWLWLHV ZKLFK PDNHXS WKHRUJDQL]DWLRQRI WKH
State and act on its behalf. It includes an organ of any territorial governmental entity within the 
State RQWKHVDPHEDVLVDVWKHFHQWUDOJRYHUQPHQWDORUJDQVRIWKDW6WDWH¶ 
797
 ASR, article 4(1); ASR commentary, article 4, paragraph 1; Norris v Ireland Application no  
10581/83 [1988] ECHR 22, paragraph 31; Johnston and Others v Ireland Application no 
9697/82 [1986] ECHR 11, paragraph 42; Modinos v Cyprus Application no 7/1992/352/426 
[1993] ECHR 259, paragraph 24. 
798
 ASR commentary, article 12, paragraph 4; ASR, article 34 on forms of reparation; Rainbow  
Warrior (New Zealand v France) Arbitration Tribunal, 82 I.L.R. 500 (1990) paragraph 75; See 




 ASR commentary, article 12, pDUDJUDSK9&/7DUWLFOH µDSHUHPSWRU\QRUPRIJHQHUDO
international law is a norm accepted and recognized by the international community of States 
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its character, peremptory norms affect the interests of the international community 
as a whole necessarily involving a stricter regime of responsibility.800  The µright 
to life¶ and the prohibition of refoulement to a country where the individual will 
be subjected to ill-treatment are considered peremptory norms of general 
international law (jus cogens).801 Since 2011, Greece has systematically failed to 
fulfil its obligations on the µright to life¶ and the prohibition of refoulement.802 As 
a general principle of international law, Greece must compensate the individuals 
for the loss caused.803 These individuals should be allowed to receive remedy 
under civil and criminal law. Apart from receiving monetary compensation of 
interest to irregular migrants would be the demand that Greece ceases the 
wrongful acts.804  
 
The obligations in question are owed by Greece to the international community as 
a whole.805 They are obligations erga omnes,806 meaning that all States have a 
legal interest in their protection and compliance.807 Therefore, these obligations 
invoke the responsibility of the EU, its Member States and other States to exercise 
                                                                                                                                                              
as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only 
by a subsequeQWQRUPRIJHQHUDOLQWHUQDWLRQDOODZKDYLQJWKHVDPHFKDUDFWHU¶ 
800
 ASR commentary, article 12, paragraph 7; ASR, article 33. 
801
 $65 DUWLFOH  $65 FRPPHQWDU\ DUWLFOH  SDUDJUDSK  µ7KH REOLJDWLRQV UHIHUUHG WR LQ
article 40 arise from those substantive rules of conduct that prohibit what has come to be seen 
as intolerable because of the threat it presents to the survival of States and their peoples and the 
PRVWEDVLFKXPDQYDOXHV¶. See (n 722) on the jus cogens character of non-refoulement.  
802
 See Chapter 4. 
803
 ASR, article 36; James Crawford, %URZQOLH¶V3ULQFLSOHVRI3XEOLF,QWHUQDWLRQDO/DZ (8th edn,  
Oxford University Press, 2012) 434. 
804
 ASR, article 41(3); ASR commentary, article 41, paragraph 13; Factory at Chorzów (Merits, 
Judgment No13, 1928, P.C.I.J., Series A, No 17) 47. 
805
 ASR commentary, article 12, paragraph 6; Barcelona Traction (n 798) paragraph 34; Case 
Concerning East Timor (Portugal v Australia) ICJ 30 June 1995; Legality of the Threat or Use 
of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1996, 226; Application of the Convention 
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Preliminary Objections (Croatia 
v Serbia) ICJ 1 September 2002. 
806
 VCLT, article 53; Barcelona Traction (n 798) paragraphs 33-34: µ6XFKREOLJDWLRQVGHULYH for 
example, in contemporary international law, from the outlawing of acts of aggression, and of 
genocide, as also from the principles and rules concerning the basic rights of the human person, 
LQFOXGLQJSURWHFWLRQIURPVODYHU\DQGUDFLDOGLVFULPLQDWLRQ¶ Wall (n 201) paragraphs 88, 155, 
156; Prosecutor v Anto Furundzija, ICTY IT-95-17/1-T (Decision of December 1998) 
paragraph 151. 
807
 ASR, article 33 and article 48. 
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their positive duty to cooperate and assist in the cessation of the serious breaches 
of peremptory norms by Greece.808 Given an EU conflict of interest with Greece, 
it is recommended that States fulfil their positive duty to bring an end to serious 
breaches of international law through using the United Nations framework.809 It is 
suggested to those States that have a common interest to invoke their 
responsibility to request Greece to conduct a preliminary inquiry into allegations 
RI WKH µULJKW WR OLIH¶ YLRODWLRQV µULJKW WR DV\OXP¶ DQG SXVK-backs amounting to 
prohibition of non-refoulement. Furthermore, they may claim that the EU, in its 
GXW\ RI DEVWHQWLRQ KDV WKH REOLJDWLRQ QRW WR  µUHFRJQLVH DV ODZIXO VLWXDWLRQV
FUHDWHGE\ VHULRXVEUHDFKHV¶ LH returns under the EU-Turkey statement and 2) 
µQRWWRUHQGHUDLGRUDVVLVWDQFHLQPDLQWDLQLQJWKDWVLWXDWLRQ¶810 Moreover, request 
that the EU and Turkey suspend their obligations under the EU-Turkey 
readmission agreement and EU-Turkey statement until the political and legal 
situation in Turkey improves. In addition, the United Nations monitoring 
mechanisms such as the OHCHR currently, Filippo Grandi, and the European 
Committee for the Prevention of Torture and the Commissioner for Human 
Rights, currently NilV 0XLåQLHNV who may request Greece to desist from 




Prioritisation of border control has led Greece to exercise systemic push-back of 
persons in need of international protection in a desperate attempt to avoid its 
obligations under EU and international law. It is concluded that in exercising 
push-back practices Greece has violated its obligations under the ECHR, CAT, 
                                                          
808
 ASR, article 41(1); Wall (n 201) paragraphs 88, 155, 156. 
809
 ASR commentary, article 14, paragraph 2. 
810
 $5,2DUWLFOHµDLGDQGDVVLVWDQFH¶PXVWEHUHDGLQFRQMXQFWLRQZLWKDUWLFOHVHHDQDORJ
articles on ASR, Serious Breaches of Obligations under Peremptory Norms of General 
International Law, 267. 
811
 ASR, Chapter II, articles 34-40; Crawford, %URQZOLH¶V Principles of Public International Law 
2012 (n 803) 567; see section 4.4 on ill-treatment. 
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the Refugee Convention and the EU Charter. Infringement proceedings should be 
commenced against Greece by the Commission812 for the systematic push-back of 
irregular migrants at the Greek-Turkish borders without a prior assessment of 
their individual circumstances. Greece and the EU have a positive obligation to 
stop these extraterritorial measures leading to undesired side effects, that is, 
migrant deaths. At the same time, Greece has an obligation to respond to 
PDWHULDOLVHGULVNVWRWKHµULJKWWROLIH¶E\LQVWLWXWLQJDQRIILFLDOLQYHVWLJDWLRQ 
 
Chapter Five analyses the effects of Frontex disembarkation practices in the 
Central and Eastern Mediterranean Route in accordance with the Sea Border 
Regulation.813 It argues that the measures undertaken under the Sea Borders 
Regulation purported to be established for the purpose of avoiding divergent 
practices for joint operations at sea and to adopt a uniform interpretation on 
principles such as rescue; disembarkation and distress in effect constitute a 
legitimisation of Member State illicit push-back practices under Frontex 
coordination. Furthermore, the two host Member States to Frontex joint 
operations, Italy and Greece are argued to no longer fulfil the safe country criteria 
for disembarkation purposes. In disembarking intercepted/rescued irregular 
migrants to Greece or Italy, Frontex violates EU and international human rights 
law and other international obligations. 
  
                                                          
812
 TFEU, article 258. 
813
 Sea Borders Regulation (n 7). 
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Chapter 5: Frontex and Irregular Migration by Sea 
 
5.1 The Sea Borders Regulation ± a Legitimisation of Push-back Practices? 
The Sea Borders Regulation was adopted with the logic that the EU and its 
Member States consider external border controls to be essential deterrence tools 
but, concurrently, that they contribute to the protection and saving of lives at 
sea.814 Therefore, the Sea Borders Regulation aims to avoid inconsistent practices 
for joint operations at sea and to promote a uniform interpretation of the 
principles of rescue, disembarkation and distress.815 Although uniform rules 
consolidating inconsistent practices of rescue, disembarkation and distress are to 
be welcomed, the Sea Borders Regulation has not achieved its objective.816 
Justified by the need to consolidate rules on interception, search and rescue and 
disembarkation, the impact of the Sea Borders Regulation is perceived as a formal 
legitimisation of Member State push-EDFN SUDFWLFHV XQGHU )URQWH[¶V
coordination.817 This chapter analyses the most controversial provisions of the Sea 
Borders Regulation from a human rights perspective, particularly with regard to 
interception, search, rescue and disembarkation.818 
 
This chapter questions the Sea Borders Regulation as a means of harmonising 
Member State interception, search and rescue as well as disembarkation practices 
during Frontex joint operations at sea. Although the Sea Borders Regulation 
attempts to protect irregular migrant rights on interception, search and rescue, it is 
flawed, predominantly in failing to resolve rather inconsistent search and rescue 
practices as well as with regard to the sharing of the irregular migrant burden on 
disembarkation.819 This chapter argues that the objective of the EU is not to 
provide a sustainable solution to the inconsistency of interception, search and 
                                                          
814
 Sea Borders Regulation (n 7) recital 1. 
815
 See Chapter 2, section 2.8; also see Sea Borders Regulation (n 7) recital 1. 
816
 Marin, µ3ROLFLQJ(8¶V([WHUQDO%RUGHUV¶ (n 3) 485. 
817
 'HQ+HLMHUµ)URQWH[DQGWKH6KLIWLQJ$SSURDFKHV¶Q51) 54. 
818
 Sea Borders Regulation (n 7) articles 6, 7, 9 and 10. 
819
 'HQ+HLMHUµ)URQWH[DQGWKH6KLIWLQJ$SSURDFKHV¶Q51) 53. 
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rescue and disembarkation practices, but to purport to legitimise them under the 
auspices of the fight against human smugglers and the prevention of irregular 
migration.820 Thus, the chapter concludes by arguing that the Sea Borders 
Regulation was not adopted for the purpose of providing improved legal 
safeguards for irregular migrants, but to create a new immigration regime 
differentiating irregular migrants travelling by sea from the protection usually 
offered under EU and international asylum laws. In addition, by not taking into 
consideration the local reception conditions or the effectiveness of the asylum and 
immigration laws of Italy or Greece, the Sea Borders Regulation violates EU and 
international search and rescue legal frameworks on the grounds of prohibition of 
the non-refoulement principle and collective expulsions.  
 
5.2 Interception at Sea 
Once a vessel is intercepted in Greek territorial waters, and upon confirmation 
that its passengers intend to circumvent checks at border crossing points, 
participating units may take one or more of the following measures:  
a) seizing the vessel and apprehending persons on board; b) 
ordering the vessel to alter its course outside of or towards a 
destination other than the territorial sea or the contiguous zone, 
including escorting the vessel or steaming nearby until it is 
confirmed that the vessel is keeping to that given course, and/or 
conducting the vessel or persons on board to the coastal Member 
State in accordance with the operation plan.821 
7KXV WKH *UHHN FRDVWJXDUG µVKDOO LQVWUXFW WKH SDUWLFLSDWLQJ XQLW DSSURSULDWHO\
through the International CoordinatioQ&HQWUH¶822 DQGWKHPHDVXUHVWDNHQµVKDOOEH
proportionate and shall not exceed what is necessary to achieve the objectives of 
                                                          
820
 See Chapter 2, section 2.8. 
821
 Sea Borders Regulation (n 7) article 6(2)(a-b). 
822
 Sea Borders Regulation (n 7) article 6(4). 
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WKLV$UWLFOH¶823 A similar approach applies in the case of vessels intercepted on 
the high seas.824 As irregular migrant vessels are often flagless, travelling in 
dinghies or rubber boats,825 units participating in Frontex joint operations may 
WDNHWKHIROORZLQJPHDVXUHVµDVHL]LQJWKHYHVVHODQGDSSUHKHQGLQJSHUVRQVRQ
board; and (b) warning and ordering the vessel not to enter the territorial sea or 
the contiguous zone, and, where necessary, requesting the vessel to alter its course 
WRZDUGVDGHVWLQDWLRQRWKHUWKDQWKHWHUULWRULDOVHDRUWKHFRQWLJXRXV]RQH¶826 The 
Sea Borders Regulation permits, then, the participating units to alter the 
LQWHUFHSWHG LUUHJXODU PLJUDQWV¶ YHVVHO FRXUVH WR D GHVWLQDWLRQ RWKHU WKDQ WKH
territorial sea or contiguous zone of the host Member State, leading to a possible 
diversion to international waters or a third country.  
 
In the territorial sea, Member States participating in Frontex joint interception 
operations must exercise their sovereignty not only having due regard to domestic 
and EU laws, but subject to UNCLOS and other rules of international law, such as 
applicable treaties and customary international law including the law of 
international responsibility.827 In the irregular maritime migration context, before 
H[HUFLVLQJWKHLUVRYHUHLJQULJKWVRYHULPPLJUDWLRQUXOHVVXFKDVDOWHULQJDYHVVHO¶V
course away from its territorial sea onto the high seas or to a third country or 
towing the vessel onto the high seas, participating Member States in cooperation 
ZLWK)URQWH[KDYHWKHFRUUHVSRQGLQJGXW\WRFRQVLGHULQµJRRGIDLWK¶RWKHUUXOHV
                                                          
823
 Sea Borders Regulation (n 7) article 6(3). 
824
 Sea Borders Regulation (n 7) article 7(2)(a-d). 
825
 See Chapter 2, section 2.3.1; Parliamentary Assembly, The Interception and Rescue at Sea of 
Asylum Seekers (n 132) paragraph 2. 
826
 Sea Borders Regulation (n 7) article 7 (2)(a-b) and article 7(11). 
827
 UNCLOS, article 2(3); Chagos Marine Protected Area Arbitration (Mauritius v UK) (The 
Hague, Case No 2011/03, 18 March 2015) paragraphs 502-7XOOLR7UHYHVµ+XPDQ5LJKWV
DQGWKH/DZRIWKH6HD¶%-,/,ULQD3DSDQLFRORSXOXµ,QWHUQDWLRQDO-XGJHVDQG
WKH3URWHFWLRQRI+XPDQ5LJKWVDW6HD¶LQ1HULQD%RVFKLHURHWDOHGV International Courts 
and the Development of International Law (Springer, 2013) 536. 
 165 
 
of international law,828 especially the principle of non-refoulement and 
international refugee law.829 
 
From 1992 to 2012, before the ECtHR judgment in Hirsi, State interception 
practices on the high seas were based on the reasoning of the Federal Court of 
Australia in Ruddock v Vadarlis (known as the Tampa case)830 and the US 
Supreme Court in Sale v Haitian Centers Council.831 In the Tampa case, 
Australian authorities refused entry despite calls that the ship was in distress and 
carrying rescuers who were alleged to be asylum seekers. In refusing entry, the 
Australian government not only violated the Law of the Sea customary norms but 
also the Search and Rescue Convention, the Convention for the Safety of Life at 
Sea and Article 33 of the Refugee Convention preventing non-refoulement.832 The 
Australian government argued that it was not returning the ship to the State of 
origin but mainly altered its course to the high seas, which it said it was entitled to 
do in accordance with its prerogative powers. At no time did the Australian 
government conduct a prior investigation into the individuals¶ SHUVRQDO
circumstances or whether they would be granted protection norms at the port of 
disembarkation. Similarly, in the case of Sale the US coastguards immediately 
returned interdicted Haitians to Haiti without a determination of their individual 
circumstances, based on a bilateral agreement with Haiti833 and in accordance 
with US Executive Order no 12,324. 
 
In Sale, the US Supreme Court interpreted Article 33 of the Refugee Convention 
as not placing any limitations on WKH 3UHVLGHQW¶V Executive Order to return all 
                                                          
828
 Nuclear Tests Case (Australia v France) (Merits) [1974] ICJ Rep 253; Crawford, %URZQOLH¶V
Principles of Public International Law 2012 (n 803  0LOWQHU µ7KH 0HGLWHUUDQHDn 
0LJUDWLRQ¶Q78) 230. 
829
 UNCLOS, article 2(3). 
830
 Ruddock (n 69). 
831





 Executive Order no 12,807, 57 Fed Reg 23,133 (1992). 
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unauthorised migrants intercepted on the high seas.834 Similarly, in 2001 the 
Federal Court of Australia found in the Tampa case that the government had a 
prerogative power to prevent non-citizens from entering Australian territory. In 
both cases, the US and Australian governments were held to have sovereign rights 
over State territory. As long as vessels did not enter the State¶V territorial sea, 
coastguards were authorised to stop them and return any unauthorised migrants 
who were not refugees to the high seas or back to their country of departure 
without any obligation to undertake a prior assessment of their individual 
circumstances. In Hirsi in 2012, however, the ECtHR had the opportunity to 
assess the compatibility of State extraterritorial interception practices with the 
ECHR and condemned the return of any individuals to their country of departure 
or the alteration of their course onto the high seas without a prior assessment of 
their individual circumstances.  
 
On this basis, this Chapter argues that the measures taken in accordance with the 
Sea Borders Regulation raise two key legal issues: 1) the legality of the 
permissive measure conducted in the territorial sea of the host Member State 
(Article 6(2)(b)) or on the high seas (Article 7 (2)(b)); and 2) the effectiveness of 
the Sea Borders Regulation to ensure the protection of fundamental rights and the 
principle of non-refoulement.  
1. In relation to the first legal issue, it is argued in this section that Articles 
6(2)(b) and 7(2)(b) are likely to constitute a push-back practice and a 
collective expulsion measure.835 At the same time, it is likely that this 
constitutes a violation of the Refugee Convention, the EU Charter, the 
recast Asylum Procedures Directive and the principle of non-refoulement, 
as well as the Sea Borders Regulation itself.836 In 2012, in Hirsi the 
                                                          
834
 Sale (n 69) 2559; Thomas Jones, Sale v Haitian Centers Council, Inc, AJIL Vol 88, No 1 
(January 1994) 114-126, 119. 
835
 Protocol No 4 to the ECHR, article 4; Hirsi (n 57) paragraphs 134, 138; see Chapter 4 on push- 
backs. 
836
 Refugee Convention, article 33(1); EU Charter, articles 18 and 19, non-refoulement enshrined  
in EU law see TFEU, article 78(1); Sea Borders Regulation (n 7) article 4. 
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ECtHR prohibited the practice of push-back, holding that returns to the 
country of origin without an adequate assessment of individual 
circumstances exposed these individuals to the risk of ill-treatment 
contrary to the ECHR and the Refugee Convention.837 Contrary to this 
ECtHR ruling, Article 6(2)(b) and 7(2)(b) appear to permit the collective 
return of irregular migrants to their respective country of origin or 
departure without an assessment of individual circumstances. The push-
back of irregular migrants to a third country, in the context of 
interceptions on the high seas, involves an exercise of jurisdiction under 
Article 1 ECHR engaging the responsibility of the participating States 
under Article 4 of Protocol No 4.838 The prohibition of collective 
expulsion applies to all individuals, irrespective of whether their 
residences are lawful within the territory of the State, or in the event of 
interception on the high seas.839 As it is unlawful for participating units to 
request the vessel to return to a third country of departure, without first 
examining the individual circumstances of those found on-board and 
enabling them to challenge their expulsion by the relevant authority,840 
such a practice would effectively constitute a push-back amounting to a 
                                                          
837
 Hirsi (n 57) paragraphs 125 and 185. 
838
 Hirsi (n 57) paragraph 180; participating States in JO EPN Poseidon Sea ± Poseidon Rapid 
Intervention (as of 28 December 2015): Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, 
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operations/7UtaOZ> accessed 7 October 2017; Protocol No 4 to the ECHR does not apply to 
Greece and United Kingdom which are not parties, see 
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providing more extensive proteFWLRQ¶ DOVR VHH Explanations relating to the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights, OJ C 303/17, 14.12.2007 on article 19.  
839
 Georgia v Russia Application no 13255/07 (3 July 2014) paragraph 170; Hirsi (n 57) paragraph  
180. 
840
 Hirsi (n 57) paragraph 177; Sharifi (n 115) paragraph 210.   
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collective expulsion.841 Hence, Article 6(2)(b) and Article 7(2)(b) can be 
said to contravene the non-refoulement principle and the prohibition of 
collective expulsion.842 
 
Since 2006, Frontex has been criticised by NGOs, civil society groups and legal 
VFKRODUV IRU RIWHQ DOWHULQJ WKH FRXUVH RI LUUHJXODU PLJUDQWV¶ ERDWV DZD\ IURP
Member State territorial waters and, thus participating in push-back operations in 
the Aegean and Mediterranean seas.843 Establishing violations of human rights 
laws in Frontex joint operations remains challenging, however. There is no 
official documentation stating that Frontex is or has been involved in push-back 
practices, nor has it been confirmed that Frontex co-financed vessels have been 
used by Greek or Italian authorities during push-backs. Hence, any allegations of 
human rights violations by Frontex are analysed through observations and reports 
conducted by NGOs and activist networks based on eyewitness accounts, as well 
as with reference to reported events in the media.  
 
Recently, activist networks have alleged that Greek push-back practices with 
Frontex involvement have taken place between 5 August 2015 and 11 June 
                                                          
841
 Protocol No 4 to the ECHR, article 4; Hirsi (n 57) paragraph 180 and 185. 
842
 Protocol No 4 to the (&+5DUWLFOHµ&ROOHFWLYHH[SXOVLRQRIDOLHQVLVSURKLELWHG¶6WDWHV 
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ICCPR, article 13; Human Rights Committee, General Comment 15/27, The Position of Aliens 
under the Covenant UN.DOC.HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1, 22 July 1986, paragraph 10. 
843
 Mainly in Spain, Italy, Greece and France; Borelli and Stanford (n 64+5:µ3XVKHG%DFN 
3XVKHG $URXQG¶ Q 115) 98; Karl Stago-1DYDUUD ³+DQGRYHU RI 0LJUDQWV WR ,WDO\ 5HVXOWV LQ
)RUFHG 5HSDWULDWLRQ´ 0DOWD 7RGD\  -XQH 
<http://archive.maltatoday.com.mt/2009/06/21/t8.html> accessed 19 October 2017; HRW, 
µ7KH(8¶V'LUW\+DQGV)URQWH[,Qvolvement in Ill-WUHDWPHQWRI0LJUDQW'HWDLQHHVRQ*UHHFH¶
21 September 2011, 39 <https://www.hrw.org/report/2011/09/21/eus-dirty-hands/frontex-
involvement-ill-treatment-migrant-detainees-greece> accessed 26 October 2017; Amnesty 
,QWHUQDWLRQDO ³7KH +XPDQ &RVW RI )RUWUHVV (XURSH´ Q 112  0DULQ µ3ROLFLQJ WKH (8¶V
([WHUQDO%RUGHUV¶Q105) 482; Pallister-Wilkins (n 81) 58. 
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2016.844 On 5 August 2015, upon interception, irregular migrants alleged that 
Greek coastguards hit a boat driver with a long metal stick, punctured the boat 
and subsequently altered its course back to Turkey.845 The FRDVWJXDUGV¶ERDWZDV
reported to be large and white, similar to that of the Norwegian Frontex vessel.846 
That day the Greek coastguard in cooperation with the Norwegian Frontex vessel 
was reported to have arrested 79 persons near the Greek coast.847 On 11 June 
2016, the Alarm Phone documented a push-back operation between Chios and 
Cesme:848 irregular migrants had reached Greek territorial waters when they were 
intercepted by Greek coastguards in the presence of two Frontex vessels 
(Portuguese and Romanian).849 These individuals were immediately returned to 
7XUNH\$FFRUGLQJWRLUUHJXODUPLJUDQWV¶WHVWLPRQLHVWhe Greek coastguard took 
migrants onto their boats and subsequently handed them over to Turkey, forcing 
those who refused to leave the Greek vessel with guns held above their heads.850 
At the time of these alleged attacks, Frontex was on a mission near the islands of 
Lesvos, Samos and Chios.851 If these allegations are true, then Frontex in 
collaboration with the Greek coastguard violated the non-refoulement principle 
and the prohibition of collective expulsions.  
 
Furthermore, when altering the course of the iUUHJXODUPLJUDQWV¶ERDWRQWKHKLJK
seas the irregular migrants are left stranded at sea, a practice that places their lives 
at risk, in infringement of the µright to life¶852 and the µduty to rescue¶ at sea.853 As 
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WR %XU\ 5HSRUW RQ 7XUNH\ 0LJUDQW 5HWXUQV¶ 'LULWWLHIURQWLHUH  -XQH 
<http://dirittiefrontiere.blogspot.de/2016/06/illegal-push-back-operation-in-aegean.html> 










irregular migrants often travel in hazardous weather and sea conditions with 
women and children on board,854 while on unseaworthy and overcrowded boats, 
with a limited supply of fuel, water and food, and in the absence of anyone 
properly qualified to be in command of the vessel, 855 it is reasonable to suggest 
WKDWWKHVHFRQGLWLRQVJLYHULVHWRIDFWRUVGHWHUPLQLQJµXQFHUWDLQW\DOHUWRUGLVWUHVV¶
within the meaning of the Sea Borders Regulation.856 Upon interception, 
participating units must not take any course of action against an irregular 
PLJUDQW¶VERDW until they receive instructions from the RCC on how to react in 
the particular circumstances.857 Until then, participating units must ensure the 
SHUVRQV¶ VDIHW\858 7R FRPSO\ ZLWK WKLV REOLJDWLRQ GXH WR WKH YHVVHO¶V XQ-
seaworthiness, participating units may be obliged to take irregular migrants on 
ERDUG 7KLV DFWLRQ WULJJHUV WKH KRVW 0HPEHU 6WDWH¶V MXULVGLFWLRQ LPSRVLQJ RQ
them the burden of examining the individual circumstances of these irregular 
migrants and ascertaining whether they are in need of international protection.859 
Hence, participating units are left with no choice but to disembark these 
individuals within the territory of the host Member State.860 As a result of Articles 
7(2) and 13(1) of the Dublin Regulation, the host Member State becomes 
responsible for these individuals.861 On the other hand, if they supervise the boat 
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 UNCLOS, article 98(1); SOLAS, Chapter V, Regulation 33.1; SAR, Chapter 2.1.10 ; also 
contrary WR WKH6HD%RUGHUV5HJXODWLRQ¶VREMHFWLYH µto ensure the efficient monitoring of the 
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accessed 11 October 2017. 
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 Sea Borders Regulation (n 7) article Article 9(2)(c-f) 9(2)(f); See Chapter 4, section 4.3. 
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 See Chapter 2, section 2.3.1. 
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 Sea Borders Regulation (n 7) article 10(1)(c). 
861
 Dublin Regulation (n 42) article 1 and 13. 
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from a distance and take no action until it is at the point of sinking and irregular 
migrants happen to die, their responsibility for the loss of life may be engaged.862  
 
It is therefore reasonably assumed that the fear of having responsibility for 
irregular migrants under EU and international asylum laws has generated 
avoidance behaviour towards rescue activities in the Mediterranean Sea 
amounting to a violation of the international search and rescue obligations.863 In 
March 2012, the CoE Committee on Migration, Refugees and Displaced Persons 
had already condemned failed search and rescue operations when intercepting 
overcrowded unseaworthy irregular migrant boats.864 In the well-NQRZQ µleft to 
GLH ERDW¶ FDVH GHVSLWH WKH H[LVWHQFH RI D GLVWUHVV FDOO WKH ,WDOLDQ DQG 0DOWHVH
Maritime RCC, NATO, and military helicopters collectively failed to rescue the 
lives of 63 people. 865 Although no one disputed their positive duty to rescue 
people at sea, discrepancies existed between the rhetoric and the practice as to the 
initiation of rescue.866 The Sea Borders Regulation was purportedly adopted 
specifically in order to avoid such discrepancies, by aiming to put a stop to 
Member State avoidance behaviour on rescue. This chapter, however, argues that, 
in effect, Article 6(2)(b) and Article 7(2)(b) do not put a stop to Member State 
avoidance behaviour on rescue, but instead purport to legitimise the participating 
XQLWV¶SUDFWLFHRIDOWHULQJWKHFRXUVHRI LUUHJXODUPLJUDQWV¶ERDWVDQGOHDYLQJWKH
individuals stranded at sea without giving due consideration to the un-
seaworthiness of the vessels. 
 
2. In relation to the second legal issue, this chapter argues that the Sea 
Borders Regulation does not effectively ensure protection of fundamental 
rights and the principle of non-refoulement for irregular migrants arriving 
                                                          
862
 UNCLOS, article 98(1); SOLAS, Chapter V, Regulation 33.1; SAR, Chapter 2.1.10.  
863
 See Chapter 2, section 2.3.1 
864
 Rapporteur Ms Tineke Strik, Lives Lost in the Mediterranean Sea (n 251) 1, out of 72 irregular  
migrants, only 9 survived. 
865
 ibid, 20. 
866
 ibid, 13. 
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by sea. The Regulation does not expressly address the possibility for 
irregular migrants intercepted in Member State territorial waters to claim 
asylum, making no reference to the EU asylum and immigration rules or 
to the ordinary border controls in accordance with the SBC.867 This 
situation is incompatible with the recast Recast Asylum Procedures 
Directive which considers as falling within its scope asylum applications 
made in the territorial waters of the coastal Member State.868 Asylum and 
immigration legal frameworks seem to be disconnected and to be non-
applicable to irregular migrants arriving by sea, raising a presumption that 
such individuals are to be treated differently from other irregular migrants 
travelling by land. The Sea Borders Regulation seems to, in fact, leave 
irregular migrants arriving by sea outside the applicable legislative 
guarantees.869 
 
This chapter argues, therefore, that the Sea Borders Regulation purports to 
establish a new legal framework applicable to irregular migrants arriving by sea. 
As Maarten den Heijer puts it, a special immigration regime is created to legally 
VHSDUDWHLUUHJXODUPLJUDQWVEDVHGRQµZKHWKHUWKHLUIHHWDUHGU\RUZHW¶870 Those 
LUUHJXODUPLJUDQWVZKRVHµIHHWDUHZHW¶GRQRWEHQHILW IURPWKH OHJDOVDIHJXDUGV
offered by EU and international legal frameworks on asylum. Instead, they are 
susceptible to purportedly legitimised coercive measures, in particular expedient 
and summary returns, when conducted under Frontex joint operations. This new 
OHJDOIUDPHZRUNLVDUJXDEO\GLVFULPLQDWRU\DQGWRXQGHUPLQHLUUHJXODUPLJUDQWV¶
rights only because they have attempted to cross borders irregularly by sea instead 
of over land.871 In addition, this new legal framework is likely to contravene the 
(&W+5¶VUHDVRQLQJRQWKHJXDUDQWHHVSURWHFWHGE\WKH(&+5DVDUWLFXODWHGLQWKH
                                                          
867
 Asylum Procedures Directive (n 158) Chapter II; SBC (n 158) Chapter II. 
868
 Asylum Procedures Directive (n 158) article 3. 
869
 'HQ+HLMHUµ)URQWH[DQGWKH6KLIWLQJ$SSURDFKHV¶Q51) 57. 
870
 'HQ+HLMHUµ)URQWH[DQGWKH6KLIWLQJ$SSURDFKHV¶Q51) 67. 
871
 'HQ+HLMHUµ)URQWH[DQGWKH6KLIWLQJ$SSURDFKHV¶Q51) 67.  
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case of Medvedyev,872 and more recently in Hirsi. In Medvedyev the ECtHR held 
WKDWWKHµVSHFLDOQDWXUHRf the maritime environment cannot justify an area outside 
the law where individuals are covered by no legal system capable of affording 
them enjoyment of the rights and guarantees protected by the Convention which 
the States have undertaken to secure to evHU\RQH ZLWKLQ WKHLU MXULVGLFWLRQ¶873 
Similarly, in Hirsi LW UHIXVHG WR DFFHSW WKDW µD VLJQLILFDQW FRPSRQHQW RI
FRQWHPSRUDU\ PLJUDWRU\ SDWWHUQV¶ GLG QRW IDOO XQGHU WKH DPELW RI WKH (&+5874 
Accordingly, Member States may neither justify nor legitimise unlawful unilateral 
or joint interception practices which are incompatible with their obligations under 
the ECHR on the basis that massive irregular migration flows are overburdening 
their asylum and immigration systems.875 
 
5.3 Disembarkation 
Participating units are required to disembark rescued individuals at a place of 
safety.876 For disembarkation purposes, ECtHR jurisprudence has turned the 
FRQFHSWRI µSODFHRI VDIHW\¶ FRXSOHGZLWK WKHnon-refoulement principle into the 
µVDIHFRXQWU\¶FRQFHSW877 Thus, States have an obligation not only to ensure a safe 
SODFHRIGLVHPEDUNDWLRQWRµSK\VLFDOO\¶SURWHFWWKHLUUHJXODUPLJUDQW878 but also to 
µUHVSHFW WKHLU IXQGDPHQWDO ULJKWV¶ DQGPXVW WDNH LQWRFRQVLGHUDWLRQ WKHSRVVLEOH
need for international protection and the risk of refoulement.879 Such a decision is 
GHSHQGHQWRQWKHGLVHPEDUNLQJ6WDWH¶VIXQFWLRQDODV\OXPV\VWHP880 
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 Hirsi (n 57) paragraphs 177 and 178 ± where the ECtHR recognised that article 4 of Protocol 
No 4 may have extraterritorial application. 
875
 Hirsi (n 57) paragraph 179. 
876
 Sea Borders Regulation (n 7) article 10; See Chapter 2, section 2.4; MSC Guidelines (n 130)  
point 6.12. 
877
 NS and ME (n 133) paragraph 94; MSS (n 115) paragraph 358; Hurwitz (n 133) 46; Kneebone 
(n 133) 129 and 54; Hirsi (n 57) paragraphs 127-128, 156. 
878
 Parliamentary Assembly, Rapporteur Mr Arcadio Diaz Tejera (n 132) point 5.2. 
879
 Tondini (n 132) 59; IMO Guidelines on the Treatment of Persons Rescued at Sea (n 130): µ7KH
need to avoid disembarkation in territories where the lives and freedoms of those alleging a 
well-founded fear of persecution would be threatened is a consideration in the case of asylum-




The Sea Borders Regulation provides clear rules on the place of disembarkation 
for Frontex joint operations, but does not address the possibility for an alternative 
course of action if the level of safety in the coastal or host Member State is 
questionable. It provides that if the interception occurs within the territorial sea or 
the contiguous zone of a host or participating Member State, the disembarkation 
must be conducted within that coastal Member State.881 Where the interception 
takes place on the high seas, the persons must be disembarked at the third country 
RI WKHVKLS¶VGHSDUWXUH LQDFFRUGDQFHZLWK WKHSULQFLSOHRInon-refoulement and 
respect for fundamental rights; if this is not feasible, disembarkation must take 
place in the host Member State.882 The host Member States in Poseidon and 
Triton operations are Greece and Italy, respectively. This chapter argues that these 
two host Member States do not fulfiO WKH µVDIH FRXQWU\¶ FULWHULD JRYHUQLQJ
disembarkation.883 Hence, by not offering an alternative course of action in 
circumstances when the host/coastal Member State does not guarantee an 
effective functional asylum system, the provisions under the Sea Borders 
Regulation violate EU and international obligations and human rights laws and 
the established international search and rescue framework. 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
Assembly, Rapporteur Mr Arcadio Diaz Tejera (n 132) point 5.2; see Chapter 4 for further 
detail on indirect refoulement. 
880
 See by analogy the CJEU in NS and ME (n 133) which has held that Member States must not 
transfer DQDV\OXPVHHNHUWRWKHWHUULWRU\RIDQRWKHU6WDWHLIµWKHUHDUHsubstantial grounds for 
believing that there are systemic flaws in the asylum procedure and reception conditions for 
asylum applicants in the Member State responsible, resulting in inhuman or degrading 
WUHDWPHQWZLWKLQWKHPHDQLQJRI$UWLFOHRIWKH&KDUWHU¶SDUDJUDSK; EU Charter, article 4 
uses the same wording and has the same meaning and scope as the ECHR, article 3; see EU 
Charter, article 52(3). 
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 Sea Borders Regulation (n 7) article 10(1)(a). 
882
 Sea Borders Regulation (n 7) article 10(1)(b). 
883
 Sea Borders Regulation (n 7) article 4 (1) Under no circumstances shall participating Member  
States in joint operation Triton µGLVHPEDUNLQIRUFHGWRHQWHUFRQGXFWHGWRRWKHUZLVHKDQGHG
ovHU¶DSHUVRQWRµWKHDXWKRULWLHVRIDFRXQWU\ZKHUHLQWHUDOLDWKHUHLVDVHULRXVULVNWKDWKHRU
she would be subjected to the death penalty, torture, persecution or other inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment, or where his or her life or freedom would be threatened on 
account of his or her race, religion, nationality, sexual orientation, membership of a particular 
social group or political opinion, or from which there is a serious risk of an expulsion, removal 





This section argues that Greece does not guarantee to those rescued at sea basic 
human needs such as food, shelter and medical provisions. Upon disembarkation, 
apprehended irregular migrants are accommodated at First Reception Centres 
where they are to be registered and identified.884 In response to the irregular 
migration crisis, refugee hotspots were set up on Greek islands under Frontex 
coordination, mainly in Lesvos (reception capacity: 1,500), Chios (1,100) Samos 
(850), Leros (1,000) and Kos (1,000).885 It should be noted that Greece 
experienced 885,709 irregular border crossings in 2015, of which 876,777 were 
people arriving from Turkey and disembarking in Greek islands,886 and 176,906 
arrivals by sea in 2016.887 The total number of reception facilities in Greece is 
34,419, with 17,906 open reception places on the Greek mainland and 9,933 
places in the Eastern Aegean islands.888 With a very limited reception 
infrastructure, these flows of irregular migrants on such a scale have put immense 
pressure on Greek reception facilities, resulting in new arrivals being offered 
inadequate reception conditions.889  
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 Greek Law No 3907 of 2011 on the establishment of an Asylum Service and a First Reception  
Service, transposition into Greek legislation of Directive 2008/115/EC "on common standards 
and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third country nationals" and 
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article 8. 
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_greece_state_of_play_report_20160304_en.pdf > accessed 11 October 2017. 
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<http://data.unhcr.org/mediterranean/country.php?id=83> accessed 23 October 2017; IOM, 
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<http://migration.iom.int/docs/2016_Flows_to_Europe_Overview.pdf> accessed 25 October 
2017.  
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 ibid; The total number of special facilities for asylum seekers and unaccompanied minors are  
1,221 places on the mainland and islands and 5,359 places in pre-removal centres. 
889
 ECRE and AIDA, µ:URQJ&RXQWV and Closing Doors ± The Reception of Asylum Seekers in 
Europe March 2016, 25-26 
<http://www.asylumineurope.org/sites/default/files/shadowreports/aida_wrong_counts_and_cl




In the course of inspections on Samos, Lesbos and Chios from 9 May to 15 May 
+5:UHSRUWHG WKH IDFLOLWLHV WREH µseverely overcrowded, with significant 
shortages of basic shelter along with filthy, unhygienic conditions. Long lines for 
poor quality food, mismanagement, and lack of information contribute to the 
FKDRWLFDQGYRODWLOHDWPRVSKHUHLQWKHWKUHHKRWVSRWV¶890 In the emergency Moria 
refugee camp on 9 May, with a 700-bed capacity was accommodating 4,000 
people; Vathi with a 250 bed capacity accommodated 945 people and the VIAL 
camp accommodated 1,400 people with a 1,150 bed capacity.891 Disembarked 
LUUHJXODUPLJUDQWVZHUHIRUFHGWRVOHHSµRQWKHJURXQGLQVPDOOWHQWVRUPDNHVKLIW
shelters constructed of blankets, plastic sheeting, and scraps of fencing, 
FDUGERDUG DQG RWKHU EXLOGLQJ PDWHULDOV¶892 Furthermore, in the Moria camp 
irregular migrants were left without food for days because of fights occurring in 
the queues for food.893 HRW reported the inability of the Greek police to stop the 
fights and guarantee the safety of the accommodated irregular migrants.894 
Furthermore, the food was reported to be rotten and expired.895 Those 
accommodated in VIAL camp after disembarkation were confronted with 
shortages of soap, hot water and only three toilets (with no bathrooms) for women 
who have to queue up for hours to use the facilities. In the Vathi, VIAL and Moria 
FDPSV WKH PHQ¶V WRLOHWV ZHUH XQVDQLWDU\ RIWHQ UHVXOWLQJ LQ VHZDJH IURP WKH
latrine flowing into the living area.896 
 
In addition, rescued individuals were confronted with inadequate healthcare in all 
hotspots. Those in need of medical attention were given hospital appointments in 
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DSSUR[LPDWHO\ WZR PRQWKV¶ WLPH897 whereas basic medical needs were/are 
provided by NGOs or the military.898 To offer their services these NGOs 
depended on funding from the Commission or the Greek government. As a protest 
against the arbitrary detention of asylum seekers, Médecins sans Frontières, a 
persistent campaigner against the deterrence policies of the EU and its Member 
States, has exposed the refusal of any funds from the EU and/or its Member 
States.899 It maintains that these deterrence policies have made the irregular 
PLJUDQWV¶MRXUQH\HYHQPRUHGDQJHURXVFRQWULEXWHGWRIXUWKHUVXIIHULQJ900 Other 
NGOs became part of the protest and refused to offer their services.901 These 
SURWHVWVGLGQRWDIIHFWWKH(8OHDGHUV¶GHWHUPLQDWLRQWRYLHZWKHVHDUULYDOVDVDQ
immense burden on Member State asylum and immigration systems, rather than 
as individuals in urgent need of international protection and humanitarian 
assistance. 
 
Furthermore, upon disembarkation in Farmakonisi, a remote location and one of 
the busiest disembarkation islands in Greece, with a non-existing first reception 
facility,902 activist networks reported that most of the time migrants do not receive 
food or water for several hours. After disembarkation in Farmakonisi, these 
individuals are to be transferred to Leros, a process that sometimes does not occur 
for days. In addition, rescued individuals alleged that they had waited for blankets 
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0LFKDORSRXORV µ1*2V $EDQGRQ*UHHFH2SSRVH(8-7XUNH\5HIXJHH3ODQ¶ 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March 2016) <http://www.euractiv.com/section/global-europe/news/ngos-abandon-greece-
oppose-eu-turkey-refugee-plan/> accessed 17 October 2017. 
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farmakonisi-alarm-phone-demands-immediate-transfer-of-all-refugees-stranded-on-the-greek-
military-island-farmakonisi-travellers-stuck-on-the-island/> accessed 17 October 2017.  
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though at times they were given none, not even for the care of infants.903 Under 
these appalling conditions, as if things were not bad enough, the situation only 
gets worse considering that military units are entrusted with the main 
responsibility for these new arrivals on the ground.904 In an attempt to flee from 
persecution, ill-treatment and human smugglers, the first contact irregular 
migrants have is with military units entirely untrained for the circumstances and 
responding to an emergency situation. 
 
On the mainland, in Athens, new arrivals encountered further difficulties of 
reception, being accommodated in parks and the city squares, and sometimes 
temporarily in stadiums.905 On 10 August 2015, more than 2,000 Syrians were 
contained in a local stadium under the summer heat without adequate supplies of 
water and food.906 The agitated crowd protested against these conditions; as a 
result of in-fighting, the Greek authorities responded with tear gas, fire hydrants 
and grenades, resorting to violence to subdue the crowd.907 There were allegations 
of excessive use of force by the police in attempts to disperse rioters by directing 
fire extinguishers and tear gas at them.908 Comparable allegations were made 
regarding the Moria immigration detention centre.909 Based on the above, it is 
concluded that Greece cannot be considered a safe country of disembarkation. As 
long as Greece does not offer adequate basic humanitarian provisions such as 
food, shelter and adequate medical care, Frontex violates the international search 
and rescue framework when disembarking irregular migrants to Greece.910  
 
 






 Amnesty International Report 2015/2016 (n 625) 169.  
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5.4.1 Asylum Seekers Subjected to Arbitrary Deprivation of Liberty 
This section argues that in disembarking an irregular migrant to Greece, Frontex 
violates Article 4 of the EU Charter and Article 3 ECHR by µNQRZLQJO\H[SRVLQJ
KLPWRFRQGLWLRQVRIGHWHQWLRQDQGOLYLQJFRQGLWLRQV¶VXEMHFWLQJDQLQGLYLGXDO WR
torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.911 Since 20 March 
2016, subject to the EU-Turkey statement, TCNs arriving in Greece through the 
Aegean islands have been deprived of their liberty for a minimum of 3 days and 
up to 25 days.912 Greek law 4375/2016 transposing the recast Reception 
Conditions Directive913 transformed the hotspots914 on the Greek islands from 
reception facilities for registration and screening to centres for accelerated 
readmission procedures,915 thus depriving individuals of their liberty.916 The 
ECHR and the EU asylum acquis authorise the detention of asylum seekers for 
the purpose of verification as long as it is lawful and non-arbitrary.917 This chapter 
does not question the detention of asylum seekers for identification purposes, but 
it does question their systematic detention for the duration of the entire asylum 
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916
 $,'$DQG(&5( µ:KDW¶V LQD QDPH"7KH5HDOLW\RI)LUVW5HFHSWLRQDW(YURV$,'$)DFW-
)LQGLQJ 9LVLW LQ *UHHFH¶ )HEUXDU\ 
<http://www.asylumineurope.org/sites/default/files/resources/eu-greece-ecre-evros.pdf> 
DFFHVVHG  2FWREHU 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<http://www.unhcr.org/56fe31ca9.html> accessed 14 October 2017. 
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 ECHR, article 5(1)(f); Recast Reception Conditions Directive (n 753) article 8; Asylum  
Procedures Directive (n 158) article 26(1); Saadi (n 407) paragraph 67; A and Others v the 
United Kingdom Application no 3455/05 ECHR 2009 - 301, paragraph 164; Cathryn Costello 
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procedure.918 Asylum seekers cannot be detained simply because they are 
applying for international protection.919  
 
Although the ECtHR recognises the fact that Member States are experiencing an 
emergency situation of unprecedented flow throwing new challenges in terms of 
immigration control, that does not mean that they have the unfettered right to 
deprive individuals intercepted or rescued at sea of their liberty.920 Detention must 
be used only as a measure of last resort and no one should be deprived of his/her 
liberty in an arbitrary fashion.921 Any detention carried out for the purpose of 
identification must be performed in good faith and connected closely to the 
purpose of preventing unauthorised entry. Therefore, they would offer appropriate 
reception conditions in accordance with EU and international standards and the 
length of detention must not exceed what is reasonable for the pursued purpose.922 
In addition, Member States must have in mind that these individuals have fled 
their own country out of fear of their lives; they are not to be treated as criminals.  
Furthermore, asylum seekers, as well as presumptive refugees, are protected from 
penalties and arbitrary detention imposed by States because of their illegal entry 
or presence.923 Irregular migrants are also protected by the Palermo Protocol on 
0LJUDQW 6PXJJOLQJ ZKLFK SURKLELWV WKH µFULPLQDOLVDWLRQ¶ RI PLJUDQWV924 The 
legislative guide for the implementation of the Protocol expressly provides that 
VDQFWLRQVVKRXOGQRWDSSO\WRPLJUDQWV µHYHQLQFDVHVZKHUHLW LQYROYHV entry or 
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 *UHHN /DZ  DUWLFOH  +HOHQ 2¶1LRQV µ1R 5LJKW WR /LEHUW\ 7KH 'HWHQWLRQ RI
$V\OXP6HHNHUV IRU$GPLQLVWUDWLYH&RQYHQLHQFH¶ 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(YDQJHOLD7VRXUGL
µ$V\OXP'HWHQWLRQLQ(8/DZ)DOOLQJEHWZHHQ7ZR6WRROV"¶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 Recast Reception Conditions Directive (n 753) article 8(1); Asylum Procedures Directive (n  
158) article 26(1). 
920
 Hirsi (n 57) paragraph 176. 
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 Saadi (n 407) paragraph 64-66; UNHCR, Guidelines on the Applicable Criteria and Standards  
relating to the Detention of Asylum-Seekers and Alternatives to Detention 2012, paragraph 14 
<http://www.unhcr.org/505b10ee9.html> accessed 25 October 2017. 
922
 Saadi (n 407) paragraph 74. 
923
 Refugee Convention, article 31; *UHJRU1ROOµ$UWLFOH5HIXJHHV8QODZIXOO\LQWKH&RXQWU\
RI5HIXJH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Refugees and its 1967 Protocol: A Commentary (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2011) 1243; 
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UHVLGHQFH WKDW LV LOOHJDO XQGHU WKH ODZVRI WKH6WDWHFRQFHUQHG¶925 As Goodwin-
Gill argues, detention should be considered a form of penalty imposed on asylum 
seekers restricting their freedom of movement contrary to the standards set by 
international refugee law.926 At the very least, it should be restricted whenever 
QHFHVVDU\ EDVHG RQ DQ LQGLYLGXDO DVVHVVPHQW DQG XVHG RQO\ µLI OHVV FRHUFLYH
DOWHUQDWLYHVFDQQRWEHDSSOLHG¶927  
 
Asylum seekers become vulnerable to detention due to their irregular entry, being 
FRQVLGHUHG E\ LPPLJUDWLRQ DXWKRULWLHV DV µXQDXWKRULVHG HQWUDQWV¶ 'XULQJ WKH
identification process it is reasonable for immigration authorities to detain the 
individual and limit his/her freedom of movement. However, at the moment when 
an individual submits an asylum claim and is being examined by State authorities, 
LW LV DUJXHG WKDW WKH DV\OXP VHHNHU VKRXOG QRW EH FRQVLGHUHG DQ µXQDXWKRULVHG
HQWUDQW¶928 During the period the asylum application is being considered, the 
asylum seeker is granted the right to residence, a recognition document proving 
the legality of his/her presence until a negative decision on the application is 
                                                          
925
  UNODC, Legislative Guides (n 389) 340. 
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 Guy Goodwin-*LOO ³$UWLFOH  RI WKH 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Non-penalization, Detention, and ProtHFWLRQ´ ±196 
<http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/470a33b10.pdf> accessed 22 October 2017; Refugee 
Convention, article 26; James Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees under International 
Law (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005) 173. 
927
 Recast Reception Conditions Directive (n 753) article 8(2); Return Directive (n 42) article 15;  
Witold Litwa v Poland Application no 26629/95 ECHR 2000-III, paragraph 78; Stanev v 
Bulgaria Application no 36760/06 [2012] ECHR 46, paragraph 143; Hathaway, The Rights of 
Refugees under International Law (n 926) 414, 418±419 and 423±439 on necessity; Recast 
Reception Conditions Directive (n 753) article 8(4) requires Member States to consider 
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 Philippe de Bruycker Alice Bloomfield, Evangelia 
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Assembly, Protection of migrants: resolution adopted by the General Assembly, 3 April 
2013, A/RES/67/172, paragraph 4. 
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 Violeta Moreno-Lax, %H\RQG 6DDGL Y 8.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Detention of Asylum Seekers in the EU, Reflexive Governance in the Public Interest (Working 
Paper No. REFGOV-FR-31, 2010) 8; ECRE, The Legality of Detention of Asylum Seekers 
under the Dublin III Regulation June 2015, AIDA Legal Briefing No 1, 6; Hathaway, The 
Rights of Refugees under International Law (n 926) 173. 
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granted.929 Hence, without a judicial order and an effective judicial remedy, the 
automatic de facto detention of asylum seekers during the entire duration of the 
asylum process violates the ECHR and the recast Reception Conditions 
Directive.930 The ECtHR has accepted the argument that if asylum seekers are 
authorised to stay in accordance with domestic or EU law, their detention has no 
legal basis and thus becomes unlawful under Article 5(1)(f) ECHR.931 
Considering that asylum seekers flee their homes and may not find appropriate 
accommodation in Member State territory, it is suggested that Greece instead of 
detaining asylum seekers LQFORVHGIDFLOLWLHVWRSODFHWKHPLQµRSHQIDFLOLWLHVZLWK
FDVHZRUNHUVXSSRUW¶RUHQVXUHµUHJXODUUHSRUWLQJWRWKHDXWKRULWLHV¶932 
 
Furthermore, asylum seekers are detained arbitrarily by Greek authorities. Article 
3 ECHR requires Greece to ensure adequate conditions of detention for detainees 
that respect their human dignity and not to subject them to hardship or distress 
exceeding the level of suffering that is inherent in detention.933 Poor living 
conditions in detention or detention-like premises may amount to degrading 
treatment depending on the period of time the applicant spends in detention in 
such severe conditions.934 Even before the EU-Turkey statement, the ECtHR had 
already established that reception conditions in Greece were inadequate due to 
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 Recast Reception Conditions Directive (n 753) article 7(1); Asylum Procedures Directive (n 
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materials-1_en.pdf> accessed 24 October 2017; Suggested types of alternatives to detention: 
surrender passport, open facilities, release on bail, electronic monitoring, residence restrictions, 
and regular reporting. 
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 Rahimi (n 761) paragraph 60µ)UHHGRPIURPDUELWUDULQHVV¶LQWKHFRQWH[WRIDUWLFOH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not to those who have committed criminal offences but to aliens who, often fearing for their 
lives, have fled from their own country; and the length of the detention should not exceed that 
UHDVRQDEO\UHTXLUHGIRUWKHSXUSRVHSXUVXHG¶VHHSaadi (n 407) paragraph 74; emphasis added.  
934
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overcrowding, inadequate food, sleeping arrangements, sanitation, and heating 
facilities amounting to degrading treatment.935 This chapter agrees with legal 
VFKRODUV¶ FULWLFLVP that the EU-Turkey statement has exacerbated the reception 
conditions in Greek islands by further overcrowding the facilities through the 
influx of new arrivals.936 The refugee camps on the islands of Lesvos (Moria) and 
&KLRV9,$/RIIHUµDSSDOOLQJFRQGLWLRQV¶937 ZLWKµSRRUTXDOLW\RIIRRG ODFNRI
blankets and privacy, and inadequate access WR DSSURSULDWH PHGLFDO FDUH¶938 In 
addition, they offer no access to doctors and medical staff,939 especially important 
as individuals coming from Syria (a war torn country) are often in need of 
medical attention.940 The HRW report of 13 May 2016 described a situation of 
FKDRVDQGLQVHFXULW\RQWKHLVODQGVRI6DPRV/HVERVDQG&KLRVIRUµODFNRISROLFH
SURWHFWLRQRYHUFURZGLQJDQGXQVDQLWDU\FRQGLWLRQV¶941 In addition, on the islands 
of Samos, Lesbos and Chios, HRW reported that single women were not 
separated from adult men.942 Frequent sexual harassment has been reported by 
women in all three hotspots and no action has been taken by police officers to 
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separate women from adult men in different parts of the reception facility.943 
Apart from relocating alleged offenders to other sites, legal action against them 
was infrequent.944  
 
The hotspots have been found to be overcrowded. Acting beyond their capacities, 
Moria holds 3,150 people where it was designed for 1,000; VIAL often holds 
50% more than its capacity (designed IRU  SDFNLQJ LQGLYLGXDOV µLQWR WLJKW
quarters in fenced-RIIFRQWDLQHUVRIHLWKHURUVTXDUHPHWUHV¶945 while at the 
Vathi hotspot in Samos, a 250 bed facility held 945 people.946 In situations of 
overcrowded detention centres, the ECtHR has held that any personal space of 
less than 4 square meters contravene Article 3 ECHR.947 But even in cases where 
the personal space allotted to each migrant is not known, situations of 
overcrowding are capable of infringing Article 3.948 Other factors such as whether 
it is possible to use toilets with respect for privacy, ventilation, access to natural 
air and light, quality of heating and compliance with basic hygiene requirements 
are capable of raising an issue under Article 3. Furthermore, situations of blocked 
pipes, water on the floor, smell from toilets and dirt in living areas fall short of 
international standards as required by Article 3 ECHR.949 The length of the period 
in which the irregular migrant is detained under the impugned conditions is a key 
factor. The ECtHR has already held that even in situations where an individual is 
kept in such conditions for a short period, coupled with the fact that he or she has 
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 Rahimi (n 761) paragraphs 81-85; Khlaifia (n 115) paragraph 131 and 133. 
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undergone a dangerous sea journey in a situation of vulnerability, confinement 
under substandard conditions impairs human dignity and is capable of giving rise 
WR IHHOLQJV RI DQJXLVK DQG KXPLOLDWLRQ ZKLFK EUHDN RQH¶V PRUDO DQG SK\VLFDO
resistance,950 effectively constituting degrading treatment in violation of Article 3 
ECHR.951  
 
The accuracy of NGO findings has been accepted by the ECtHR in Khlaifia 
where the Court attached significant weight to information received from them in 
establishing that conditions in detention centres amounted to violations of Article 
3 ECHR.952 Therefore, it is argued that the systematic detention of asylum seekers 
XQGHUµDSSDOOLQJDQGGLUH¶953 conditions violates the EU asylum acquis, the ECHR 
and the Refugee Convention.954 Since 20 March 2016, when disembarking 
irregular migrants to Greece, Frontex became complicit for their arbitrary 
detention in violation of the Refugee Convention, the Protocol on Migrant 
Smuggling and the ECHR.955 
 
5.4.2 Infringement of Right to an Effective Remedy 
Frontex has the obligation not to disembark irregular migrants in a country where 
LW µknew or ought to have known that the individual had no guarantee that his 
DV\OXPDSSOLFDWLRQZRXOGEHVHULRXVO\H[DPLQHGE\WKHUHFHLYLQJDXWKRULWLHV¶956 
For many years, the Greek asylum system, challenged by the massive influxes of 
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of the European Convention on Human Rights (Oxford University Press, 3rd edition, 2014) 
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 MSS (n 115) paragraphs 358, 367; ECHR, article 3; NS and ME (n 133) paragraph 88. 
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irregular migrants, has been documented as VXIIHULQJIURPµFKURQLFGHILFLHQFLHV
making it dysfunctional from the stage of arrival to the implementation of the 
ILQDO GHFLVLRQ RQ DV\OXP¶957 In 2011, the ECtHR958 and the CJEU959 both 
GHFODUHG *UHHFH WR EH DQ µXQVDIH FRXQWU\¶ RI UHWXUQ IRU DV\OXP VHHNHUV Dnd 
suspended any Dublin transfers.960 NGOs have reported that asylum seekers 
receive limited access to the Greek asylum system due to a significant backlog in 
the processing of applications which have produced the lowest refugee 
recognition rate in the EU, with only a 2.87% recognition rate in 2012, rising to 
23% in 2015.961 'HVSLWHWKH*UHHNJRYHUQPHQW¶VOHJLVODWLYHDWWHPSWVWRLPSURYH
its asylum system,962 the Greek system has become completely saturated under 
the more recent flows.963  
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Since 20 March 2016, in accordance with the EU-Turkey statement,964 new 
arrivals who do not seek international protection, or whose asylum application has 
been rejected on its merits, or is found inadmissible, have been returned to 
Turkey.965 To seek international protection these individuals must express their 
will before the police and then be registered by the Asylum Service.966 The 
burden of claiming asylum is on the applicant.967 It is then for Greece to prove 
that the risk is non-H[LVWHQW XSRQ D µSURSHU ULVN DVVHVVPHQW¶ EDVHG RQ UHOHvant 
evidence.968 It is argued that those individuals who manage to survive the sea 
voyage are not in the right physical and mental condition to claim asylum or 
declare a wish to do so at the moment of rescue or interception.969 Therefore, in 
cases of interception at sea, the Court has transferred the burden of proof from the 
applicant to a primary investigative duty on the State, establishing an outright 
prohibition of removal.970 /RJLFDOO\WKH&RXUWDSSOLHGLWVUHDVRQLQJRQWKH6WDWH¶V
investigative duty to readmission practices.971  
 
Therefore, within a reasonable time-span, Greek authorities supported by EU 
agencies such as Frontex and the European Asylum Support Office (EASO) have 
the obligation to identify and register those with protection needs for transfer to 
the mainland as well as offer legal assistance and interpretation on asylum 
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'HJUDGLQJ7UHDWPHQWRU3XQLVKPHQW¶+XPDQ5LJKWV&RXQFLOth session, 5 February 2010) 
paragraph 239 
<http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/13session/A.HRC.13.39.Add.5_en.pdf> 
accessed 16 October 2017. 
969
 Maarten den Heijer, 'Reflections on Refoulement and Collective Expulsion in the Hirsi 
FDVHµ,-5/ 25 (2) 265-290, 274. 
970
 Den Heijer, 'Reflections on Refoulement¶ Q 952) 276-277; also see NS and ME (n 133) 
paragraph 94, the protective duty imposed by CJEU on specific claims brought by applicants 
ZKHQ0HPEHU6WDWHVµFDQQRWEHXQDZDUH¶RIV\VWHPLFGHILFLHQFLHVXQGHU(8&KDUWHUDUWLFOH
4; Hirsi (n 57) paragraph 131. 
971
 Sharifi (n 115) paragraph 219. 
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procedures.972 The systematic massive inflows of irregular migrants combined 
with the Greek financial crisis have exceeded the capacity of the Greek Asylum 
Service to identify and register these individuals in a timely manner.973 
Commission vice-president, Valdis Dombrovskis, made a direct accusation on 
*UHHFHVWDWLQJWKDWµ*UHHFHVHULRXVO\QHJOHFWHGLWVREOLJDWLRQV7KHUHDUHVHULRXV
deficiencies in the carrying out of external border control that must be overcome. 
There is no effective identification and registrations of irregular 
migrants...Fingerprints are not being entered systematically into the system, travel 
documents are not being systematically checked for authenticity or against crucial 
VHFXULW\GDWDEDVHV¶974 This practice impedes individuals access to asylum, leaving 
them unprotected under an undetermined legal status.975 The number of 
individuals left without protection is alarming considering that in 2015, Greece 
received  RI DUULYDOV IURP WKH ZRUOG¶V WRS  UHIXJHH-producing countries, 
followed by 53% in 2016.976 The situation becomes worrisome when considering 
that out of 1,822,177 irregular migrants arriving in 2015 and 511,371 in 2016, 
                                                          
972
 Asylum Procedures Directive (n 158) DUWLFOH  DQG  *LQD &OD\WRQ µ³7KH 5LJKW WR KDYH
5LJKWV´ WKH (XURSHDQ &RQYHQWLRQ RQ +XPDQ 5LJKWV DQG WKH 3URFHGXUDO 5LJKWV RI $V\OXP
6HHNHUV¶ LQ $GHPROD Abass and Francesca Ippolito (eds), Regional Approaches to the 
Protection of Asylum Seekers, An International Legal Perspective (Law and Migration, 
Routledge 2016) 193. 
973
 Parliamentary Assembly, The Situation of Refugees and Migrants under the EU-Turkey 
Agreement of 18 March 2016 Resolution 2109(2016) Doc 14028, paragraph 2.1 
<http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/Xref-XML2HTML-en.asp?fileid=22738&lang=en> 
accessed 24 October 2017; ,DQ 7UD\QRU DQG +HOHQD 6PLWK µ*UHHFH +LWV %DFN DIWHU (8V
6FKHQJHQ 7KUHDW¶ 7Ke Guardian, 27 January 2016) 
<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jan/27/greece-warned-control-borders-schengen-
european-commission> accessed 14 October 2017; 2+&+5 µUN Special Rapporteur on the 
Human Rights of Migrants Concludes His Follow up Country 9LVLWWR*UHHFH¶0D\
<http://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=19972&LangID=E
> accessed 14 October 2017; Parliamentary Assembly, The Mediterranean Sea: a Front Door 
to Irregular Migration (n 963) paragraph 60 reports Greece not to register new arrivals. 
974
 Traynor and Smith (n 973). 
975
 &RQWUDU\ WR 7)(8 DUWLFOH  µ7KH 8QLRQ VKDOO GHYHORS D FRPPRQ SROLF\ RQ DV\OXP
subsidiary protection and temporary protection with a view to offering appropriate status to any 
third-country national requiring international protection and ensuring compliance with the 
principle of non-refoulement¶(8&KDUWHUDUWLFOHDQG$V\OXP3URFHGXUHV'LUHFWLYHQ
158) articles 6,8 and 12(c). 
976
 81+&5³5HIXJHHV0LJUDQWV5HVSRQVH-0HGLWHUUDQHDQ´361,712 arrivals by sea  
<http://data.unhcr.org/mediterranean/regional.php> accessed 24 October 2017; UNHCR, 
³2YHU 2QH 0LOOLRQ 6HD $UULYDOV UHDFK (XURSH LQ ´
<http://www.unhcr.org/news/latest/2015/12/5683d0b56/million-sea-arrivals-reach-europe-
2015.html> accessed 24 October 2017. 
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there were only 51,091 applicants for international protection in 2016, out of 
which there were 28,030 pending applications, 2,467 received refugee status and 
244 subsidiary protection; resulting in 26.5% refugee recognition rate.977 If Greek 
authorities would have complied with their duty to register every irregular 
migrant arriving in its territory, Germany would not be sharing the asylum burden 
by 35% of the EU-28 total in 2015 with 442,000 first time asylum applicants and 
722,000 in 2016,978 sharing 60% of the total EU asylum burden.979  
 
GrHHFH¶V PDLQ SUHRFFXSDWLRQ LV WR VKLIW LWV UHVSRQVLELOLW\ for irregular migrants 
indirectly to other Member States, even though Greece risks being expelled from 
Schengen.980 In February 2016, the Council recommended that Greece should 
                                                          
977
 $,'$ ³6WDWLVWLFV *UHHFH´ KWWSZZZDV\OXPLQHXURSHRUJUHSRUWVFRXQWU\JUHHFHVWDWLVWLFV!
accessed 20 October 2017. 
978
 Eurostat newsrelease, Asylum in the EU Member States 1.2 million First Time Asylum Seekers 
Registered in 2016 (46/2017-16 March 2017) 
<http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/2995521/7921609/3-16032017-BP-EN.pdf/e5fa98bb-
5d9d-4297-9168-d07c67d1c9e1> accessed 24 October 2017; A first time applicant for 
international protection excludes repeat applicants-  reflects the number of newly arrived 
persons applying for international protection in the reporting Member State. 
979
 (XURVWDW 6WDWLVWLFV ([SODLQHG ³$V\OXP 6WDWLVWLFV´ KWWSHFHXURSDHXHXURVWDWVWDWLVWLFV-
explained/index.php/Asylum_statistics> accessed 24 October 2017; 56% recognition rate in 
2015, Eurostat press release, Asylum Decisions in the EU, EU Member States Granted 
Protection to More than 33 000 Asylum Seekers in 2015 (75/2016 - 20 April 2016) 5 
<http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/2995521/7233417/3-20042016-AP-EN.pdf/34c4f5af-
eb93-4ecd-984c-577a5271c8c5> accessed 24 October 2017; and 65% recognition rate in 2016, 
see Eurostat newsrelease, Asylum Decisions in the EU: Member States Granted Protection to 
More than 700,000 Asylum Seekers in 2016 [2017], 70/2017-26 April 2017, 5 
<http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/2995521/8001715/3-26042017-AP-EN.pdf/05e315db-
1fe3-49d1-94ff-06f7e995580e> accessed 24 October 2017. 
980
 Traynor and Smith (n 973); The border-free Schengen Area allows citizens to cross internal 
borders without being subjected to border checks. See SBC, article 1. Since 2015, the 
Commission has identified µVHULRXV¶ deficiencies µRQ the application of the Schengen acquis in 
the field of management of the external borders by Greece as provided for in Council 
Regulation (EU) No 1053/2013 of 7 October 2013 establishing an evaluation and monitoring 
mechanism to verify the application of the Schengen acquis and repealing the Decision of the 
Executive Committee of 16 September 1998 setting up a Standing Committee on the 
evaluation and implementation of Schengen, OJ L 295, 6.11.2013, article 16(3). See 
Commission Communication, Eighth Biannual Report on the Functioning of the Schengen 
Area, 1 May ± 10 December 2015, COM (2015) 675 final, 5. These deficiencies led to the 
temporary reintroduction of controls at the German, Austrian, Slovenian, Hungarian, Swedish 
and Norwegian internal borders.   On 25 January 2016, EU leaders proposed that the 
Commission consider plans to allow internal border checks in Europe for up to two years. 
These proposals aimed to exclude Greece from the Schengen Zone. See Matthew Holehouse, 
Greece Faces being Sealed off from Europe to Stop Migrant Flow in Move that Creates 
µ&HPHWHU\ of 6RXOV¶ (The Telegraph, 25 January 2016) 
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register and ensure the µWLPHO\ FROOHFWLRQ DQG WUDQVPLVVLRQ RI PLJUDQWV¶ 
ILQJHUSULQWV¶ LQ DFFRUGDQFH ZLWK $UWLFOH  RI WKH (XURGDF 5HJXODWLRQ981 If 
irregular migrants are not registered systematically, they may move on to seek 
asylum to other Member States; hence, the observed increase in first time asylum 
applicants in Slovenia, Croatia, Germany and Italy.982 Greece is aware that 
Member States may not return irregular migrants who have first landed to Greece 
under Dublin. In accordance with the ECtHR and CJEU rulings, Dublin transfers 
to Greece are currently suspended.983 The Commission has made numerous 
attempts to resume Dublin transfers to Greece however Greece a direct protester 
against such transfers argued to postpone Dublin transfers as it was under 
enormous migratory pressure and under an exceptional situation since the MSS 
judgment delivered in 2011.984 Nonetheless, it is argued here that the 
unprecedented irregular migration crisis may not justify Greece from failure to 
fulfil its positive duty to identify, register, protect and provide access to asylum in 
accordance with the Refugee Convention, the ECHR, the EU Charter and the 
Eurodac Regulation.985  
                                                                                                                                                              
<https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/eu/12119799/Greece-threatened-with-
expulsion-from-Schengen-free-movement-zone.html> accessed 16 June 2018. 
981
 Council of the EU, Council Implementing Decision setting out a Recommendation on 
Addressing the Serious Deficiencies Identified in the 2015 Evaluation of the Application of the 
Schengen acquis in the Field of Management of the External Borders by Greece, Doc 5985/16, 




 MSS (n 115) paragraphs 338-&RPPLVVLRQµ4XHVWLRQVDQG$QVZHUV5HFRPPHQGDWLRQRQ
WKH &RQGLWLRQV IRU 5HVXPLQJ 'XEOLQ 7UDQVIHUV RI $V\OXP 6HHNHUV WR *UHHFH¶  'HFHPEHU
2016 <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-16-4253_en.htm> accessed 28 October 
(&5(µ*HUPDQ\6XVSHQVLRQRI'XEOLQ3URFHGXUHVWR*UHHFH6HWWRHQGRQ0DUFK
¶  -DQXDU\  KWWSVZZZHFUHRUJJHUPDQ\-suspension-of-dublin-procedures-to-
greece-set-to-end-on-15-march-2017/> accessed 28 October 2017. 
984
 Recommendation (EU) 2016/2256 addressed to the Member States on the resumption of  
transfers to Greece under Regulation (EU) No 604/2013, C(2016) 8525 final, 15 December 
2016, OJ L340, 11-12. 
985
 Regulation (EU) No 603/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 
on the establishment of 'Eurodac' for the comparison of fingerprints for the effective 
application of Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for 
determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for international 
protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person 
and on requests for the comparison with Eurodac data by Member States' law enforcement 
authorities and Europol for law enforcement purposes, and amending Regulation (EU) 




In addition, Greece fails to offer an effective remedy for those individuals who 
manage to make an application for international protection, to which a fast track 
asylum procedure is applied,986 lasting no more than 14 days, including a one day 
deadline for interview preparations and three days to lodge an appeal.987 The 
Appeals Authority has the discretion to accept requests for appeal. However, even 
if the request is accepted, due to budget constraints the interview is conducted at a 
distance, while the Committee and the interpreter are situated in Athens.988 It is 
argued that this fast-track procedure raises grave concerns with regard to the right 
to an effective remedy.989 Article 13 ECHR requires the competent body, i.e. a 
court or tribunal, to examine the substance of the complaint and ensure proper 
reparation.990 Confronted with practical obstacles, such as the inability to appear 
in person, an individual is prevented from establishing an arguable claim of 
his/her complaint.991 
 
The Greek asylum and immigration appeals system is contrary to the overall 
objective of the EU Charter and the ECHR to offer an effective remedy. To offer 
a broader protection and an effective implementation of the right to an effective 
remedy, the EU Charter requires asylum applications to be reviewed by a court or 
tribunal,992 whereas the ECHR requires asylum applications to be reviewed by a 
national authority providing objectivity and independence in the decision-making 
                                                                                                                                                              
IT systems in the area of freedom, security and justice (Eurodac Regulation) [2013] OJ L180/1, 
see recital 16 and article 1. 
986
 Greek Law 4375/2016, article 60; except for vulnerable individuals undergoing the 
admissibility assessment see Greek Law 4375/2016, article 14(8) and article 50(2) namely 
victims of torture or serious physical or sexual violence. 
987
 Greek Law 4375/2016, article 60(4)(c)-(e). 
988
 (&5(DQGRWKHUVµ7KH,PSOHPHQWDWLRQRIWKH+RWVSRWVLQ,WDO\DQG*UHHFH¶Q938) 39. 
989
 ECHR, article 13; EU Charter, article 47; see MSS (n 115) paragraph 372.  
990
 MSS (n 115) paragraph 387. 
991
 MSS (n 115) paragraph 389. 
992
 EU Charter, article 47; C-175/11 H.I.D., B.A. v Refugee Applications Commissioner, Refugee 
Appeals Tribunal, Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform, Ireland, Attorney General 
(31 January 2013) paragraphs 11-12, on independence. 
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process.993 Greece has the discretion to develop its domestic asylum system in a 
way that is compatible with EU law and the ECHR and ensure no outside pressure 
FRPSURPLVHVWKHQDWLRQDODXWKRULW\¶VLPSDUWiality.994 These legal safeguards have 
QRW EHHQ PHW E\ *UHHFH 6LQFH  DV D UHVXOW RI WKH (&W+5¶V GHFLVLRQ LQ
MSS,995 Greece changed the appeals structure from that of the Council of State 
(the highest administrative court) to newly established special Appeals 
Committees.996 After the entry into force of the EU-Turkey statement, at the time 
the refugee recognition rate in Greece was increasing, Greece amended its 
Appeals system once more. This time Greece had to amend its Appeals system 
not because it was ineffective, but because it was taking decisions contrary to the 
EU-Turkey statement. In more than 330 cases, the Appeals Committees raised 
serious doubts as to the safety of Turkey.997 At first, these decisions were viewed 
as a victory of international law principles against the pressure brought by the 
irregular migration crisis to national and EU institutions.998 However, at the same 
time, politicians feared that these decisions would re-open the gate in which more 
irregular migrants would depart from Turkey.999 Instead of viewing these 
decisions with serious concerns about the safety of Turkey, the Commission urged 
Greece to adopt a new structure of Appeals Committees that would purportedly 
HQVXUH µIXOO UHVSHFW RI (8 DQG ,QWHUQDWLRQDO ODZ¶1000 Hence, the Council of the 
EU urged the Greek government to convince its judges that Turkey is safe for 
Syrians.1001  
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 ECHR, article 13; H.I.D (n 992) paragraph 10, not necessarily a tribunal; also see Asylum 
Procedures Directive (n 158) article 10(3)(a). 
994
 H.I.D (n 992) paragraph 12(a); Gautrin and Others v France Application nos 21257/93, 
21258/93 [1998] ECHR 39 VHH ,QIRUPDWLRQ 1RWH RQ WKH &RXUW¶V &Dse Law 
<file:///C:/Users/User/Downloads/002-7784.pdf> accessed 15 October 2017. 
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 MSS (n 115). 
996
 Greek Law 4375/2016, article 5(2). 
997
 $PQHVW\,QWHUQDWLRQDO³$%OXHSULQWIRU'HVSDLU´Q936) 14. 
998
 $PQHVW\,QWHUQDWLRQDO³$%OXHSULQWIRU'HVSDLU´Q936) 14. 
999
 $PQHVW\ ,QWHUQDWLRQDO ³$ %OXHSULQW IRU'HVSDLU´ Q 936) 14; Fotiadis, Smith and Kingsley, 
µ6\ULDQ5HIXJHH:LQV$SSHDO$JDLQVW)RUFHG5HWXUQWR7XUNH\¶Q550). 
1000
 $PQHVW\,QWHUQDWLRQDO³$%OXHSULQWIRU'HVSDLU´Q936) 14; Commission, Second Report on 
WKH3URJUHVV«(n 550) 4; emphasis added. 
1001
 ,UHQH.RVWDNLµ(8&RXQFLO:K\*UHHFH6KRXOG&RQVLGHU7XUNH\6DIHIRU6\ULDQ5HIXJHHV¶
(New Europe, 9 June 2016) <https://www.neweurope.eu/article/eu-council-greece-consider-




A change in the composition of the Appeals Committees would guarantee an 
expedited process facilitating returns from Greece to Turkey. The composition of 
the Appeals Committee was modified from one representative of the UNHCR, 
one human rights expert and one representative of the Ministry of the Interior, to 
two judges of the Administrative Courts and one representative of the 
UNHCR.1002 This new composition is very similar to the prior administrative 
court structure in 2012, which the ECtHR had identified as a key cause of the 
deficiency in the Greek asylum system,1003 raising questions of constitutionality 
with regard to the involvement of judicial officials in administrative bodies.1004 
Amongst its first decided cases, the newly composed Greek appeals committee 
upheld a deportation decision to return a 20-year-old Syrian man to Turkey.1005 It 
LV DUJXHG KHUH WKDW WKLV QHZ FRPSRVLWLRQ GRHV QRW IXOILO WKH µREMHFWLYLW\ DQG
indepenGHQFH¶ FULWHULD VHW RXW E\ WKH (&+5 DQG WKH (8 &KDUWHU HVSHFLDOO\
considering the outside pressure on Greece by the Commission and the Council of 
the EU to bring the Appeals Committee in line with the EU-Turkey statement.1006 
The Head of the Greek Asylum Services has declared that µinsufferable pressure 
is being put on us to reduce our standards and minimize the guarantees of the 
DV\OXP SURFHVVHV¶1007 This new structure does not guarantee irregular migrants 
arriving by sea a right to an effective remedy, a violation of EU and international 
human rights law.1008  
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 *UHHN/DZDUWLFOH$PQHVW\,QWHUQDWLRQDOµ$%OXHSULQWIRU'LVSDLU¶Q936)  
15; Commission, 6HFRQG5HSRUWRQWKH3URJUHVV«(n 550) 5. 
1003
 MSS (n 115) paragraph 117. 
1004
 (&5( µ*UHHFH$PHQGV LWV$V\OXP/DZ$IWHU0XOWLSOH Appeals Board Decisions Overturn 
WKH3UHVXPSWLRQRI7XUNH\DVD µ6DIH7KLUG&RXQWU\¶-XQHZZZHFUHRUJJUHHFH-
amends-its-asylum-law-after-multiple-appeals-board-decisions-overturn-the-presumption-of-
turkey-asa-safe-third-country/> accessed 25 October 2017. 
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 3DWULFN.LQJVOH\5HIRUPHG*UHHN$SSHDOV3DQHO8SKROGV6\ULDQ5HIXJHH¶V'HSRUWDWLRQ7KH
Guardian, 12 September 2016) <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/sep/12/reformed-
greek-appeals-panel-upholds-syrian-refugee-deportation> accessed 24 October 2017. 
1006
 Kostaki (n 1001). 
1007
 6HUJLR&DUUHUUDDQG$LNDWHULQL'UDNRSRXORXµ8QVDIH7XUNH\8QVDIH(XURSH¶2SHQ 
Democracy, 29 September 2016) <https://www.opendemocracy.net/sergio-carrera-aikaterini-
drakopolou/unsafe-turkey-unsafe-europe> accessed 24 October 2017; Asylum Procedures 
Directive (n 158) article 10(3). 
1008




5.5 Italy ± Unlawful and Arbitrary Detention 
To tackle migratory pressure the Commission proposed that Italy in collaboration 
ZLWK )URQWH[ ($62 DQG (XURSRO WR µVZLIWO\ LGHQWLI\ UHJLVWHU DQG ILQJHUSULQW
iQFRPLQJPLJUDQWV¶XQGHUWKHQHZO\VHWXSµ+RWVSRW¶DSSURDFKHVWDEOLVKHGXSRQ
existing reception facilities.1009 These hotspots would turn into locations where 
disembarkation takes place and where irregular migrants would be identified for 
asylum, relocation and return purposes. Hence, irregular arrivals by sea were 
accommodated in First Aid and Reception Centres (CPSA), First Accommodation 
Centres (CPA), and Temporary Centres for Emergency Reception (CAS) where 
they received basic needs such as food and accommodation up to a maximum of 
30 days. Once they were identified and registered they would then be transferred 
on to the System for the Protection of Asylum Seekers and Refugees (SPRAR) or 
expulsions centres.1010 No specific change in Italian legislation addressed the 
procedure and legal safeguards offered during the three fundamental stages of the 
hotspots such as: fingerprinting, early screening separating asylum seekers from 
other irregular migrants, and onward transfer.1011 Irregular migrants in Italy are 
disembarked and detained in Italian hotspots based on 1) an EU Council 
Decision,1012  ,WDOLDQ µ5RDGPDS¶1013 on 28 September 2015 indicating the 
DSSURDFK IRU LPSOHPHQWDWLRQ RI WKH KRWVSRWV VXFK DV µPHGLFDO VFUHHQLQJ SUH-
identification, registration, photographing anGILQJHUSULQWLQJRIIRUHLJQHUV¶DQG
                                                                                                                                                              
General Comment No 31 (n 657) paragraph 4 and 15-16.  
1009
 Commission, A European Agenda on Migration (n 377) 6. 
1010
 See established hotspots in Lampedusa, Pozzallo, Trapani and Taranto; Italy: Legislative  
Decree No. 142 of 2015 (reception), 19 August 2016, available at: 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/57b6d6cd4.html [accessed 27 October 2017] article 11; ECRE 
DQGRWKHUVµ7KH,PSOHPHQWDWLRQRIWKH+RWVSRWVLQ,WDO\DQG*UHHFH¶Q938) 31. 
1011
 Amnesty International 2016, 12  
<file:///C:/Users/User/Downloads/EUR3050042016ENGLISH%20(5).PDF> accessed 24 
October 2017. 
1012
 Council Decision establishing provisional measures in the area of international protection for  
the benefit of Italy and Greece 3 September 2015, Doc 11161/15, paragraph 14; legal basis 
TFEU, article 78(3). 
1013
 Ministry of Interior, Italian Roadmap, 28 September 2016,  
<http://www.immigrazione.biz/upload/Roadmap_2015.pdf> accessed 24 October 2017. 
 195 
 
Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs)1014 in March 2016 on the details and tasks 
to be pursued upon disembarkation.  
 
This chapter argues that irregular migrants disembarked to Italian hotspots are 
unlawfully and arbitrarily detained.1015 In the absence of legislation regulating 
detention in hotspots, any deprivation of liberty must be conducted in accordance 
with Italian pre-existing legislation adopted for the purpose of identification and 
expulsion for individuals crossing irregularly EU territory and are issued an 
expulsion order.1016 Italian legislation does not provide a legal basis for automatic 
detention of individuals who are disembarked in Italy as a result of rescue 
operations. Only if the rescued individual refuses to give his/her identity or 
provides false documents may Italian authorities detain not more than 24 hours 
for the purpose of identification.1017 To remand the unauthorised entrant for a 
maximum of 48 hours, the detention must be authorised by judicial authorities 
RQO\XQGHUµH[FHSWLRQDOFLUFXPVWDQFHVRIQHFHVVLW\DQGXUJHQF\strictly defined by 
ODZ¶.1018 Italian authorities have detained intercepted and rescued irregular 
migrants for prolonged periods even before the hotspots were adopted for the 
purpose of identification.1019 Furthermore, the detention of those individuals that 
                                                          
1014
 Ministry of Interior, Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) applicable to Italian hotspots, 
March 2016, 
<http://www.libertaciviliimmigrazione.dlci.interno.gov.it/sites/default/files/allegati/hotspots_s
ops_-_english_version.pdf> accesed 24 October 2017. 
1015
 ECHR, article 5(1)(f); see Khlaifia (n 115) paragraphs 105-108, 120-122, 131-135 in which  
the ECtHR found detention in Italy unlawful contrary to Article 5(1), (2) and (4) ± detention 
had no legal basis in domestic law. 
1016
 Italian Constitution Deliberation of the Constituent Assembly of 22 December 
1947, promulgation of the Provisional Head of State of 27 December 1947, Official Gazette 
extraordinary issue no 298 of December 27, 1947 (which entered into force on 1 January 
1948) article 13; Italian Legislative Decree no 286 of 1998, Consolidated text of provisions 
concerning immigration regulations and rules on the status of aliens, OJ 18 August 1998, as 
amended by Laws no 271 of 2004 and no 155 of 2005, and by Legislative Decree no 150 of 
2011, article 14; Del Rio Prada v Spain Application no 42750/09 (21 October 2013) 
paragraph 125; Medvedyev (n 159) paragraph 79. 
1017
 Italian Constitution (n 1016) article 13. 
1018
 Italian Constitution (n 1016) article 13; emphasis added. 
1019
 (OLVD0DLPRQHµ7KH(8³KRWVSRWDSSURDFK´DQGWKHUHORFDWLRQSURFHGXUHVWRWKH,WDOLDQWHVW
LPSOHPHQWDWLRQ VKRUWFRPLQJV DQG FULWLFDO UHPDUNV¶  6HSWHPEHU 
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refused to provide their fingerprints were extended to days or even weeks.1020 
These individuals were deprived of their liberty without a legal basis, or formal 
detention order and without a judicial review to challenge the lawfulness of such 
detention contrary to domestic, regional and international human rights law.1021 
To date, no new legislation has been adopted to fill the legal gap of uncertainty as 
WRWKHOHJDOEDVLVRILUUHJXODUPLJUDQWV¶GHWention in hotspots, but nonetheless, this 
chapter argues that new law may not retroactively justify unlawful detentions 
occurring before it. 
 
Furthermore, although Italy has an obligation under the Reception Conditions 
Directive to offer material reception to individuals seeking international 
protection before disembarking irregular migrants,1022 Frontex has the primary 
obligation to assess the reception situation in Italy.1023 Frontex must ensure that 
those rescued are accommodated at an adequate standard of living offered 
effective protection to physical and psychological health, paying particular 
attention to vulnerable1024 individuals.1025 Such protection consists of adequate 
food, clothing, housing and financial allowance.1026 Intercepted or rescued 
irregular migrants are accommodated in CAS centres. However, these have been 
reported to be unfit for accommodation, being overcrowded with very poor 
standards of hygiene.1027 It must be borne in mind that in 2015, Italy received 
                                                                                                                                                              
<http://immigrazione.jus.unipi.it/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/Maimone-Hotspots-and-
relocationWorking-Paper-3-2016.pdf> accessed 24 October 2017. 
1020
 Amnesty International 2016 (n 1011) 28. 
1021
 Italian Constitution (n 1016DUWLFOH(&+5DUWLFOH6HHDOVR2+&+5µ,WDO\¶V0LJUDQW 
+RWVSRW &HQWUHV 5DLVH /HJDO 4XHVWLRQV¶  $XJXVW 
<http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/LegalQuestionsOverHotspots.aspx> accessed 
26 October 2017. 
1022
 Reception Conditions Directive (n 753) article 17. 
1023
 Sea Borders Regulation (n 7) article 4. 
1024
 Minors, unaccompanied minors, elderly, pregnant women, disabled people and individuals 
subjected to ill-treatment, see Reception Conditions Directive (n 753) article 21; MSS (n 115) 
SDUDJUDSKµEHLQJDQDV\OXPVHHNHUZDVSDUWLFXODUO\YXOQHUDEOHEHFDXVHRIHYHU\WKLQJKH
had been through during his migration and the traumatic experiences he was likely to have 
HQGXUHGSUHYLRXVO\¶ 
1025
 Reception Conditions Directive (n 753) article 17 and Article 21. 
1026
 Reception Conditions Directive (n 753) article 2(g). 
1027
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153,842 arrivals by sea and in 2016 received 170,973; this is at a time when its 
first and second stage reception capacities offered only 120,000 places.1028 Given 
the high numbers of irregular migrants, Italy does not provide adequate 
accommodation for vulnerable persons, a practice which is in breach of Reception 
Conditions Directive obligations.  
 
Far worst, Italy is not complying with its duty to provide accommodation to 
asylum seekers due to a lack of reception capacity. NGOs have reported that 
many asylum seekers in Rome are homeless, sleeping on streets, railway stations, 
parks or abandoned construction sites.1029 The municipality of Milan has also 
confirmed that due to limited reception capacity they have turned away people 
who have presumably ended up homeless on the streets.1030 Leaving asylum 
seekers on the streets is not compatible with respect for human dignity.1031 
Furthermore, unable to provide for their basic needs, asylum seekers in Italy risk 
ill-treatment amounting to a violation of Article 3 ECHR.1032 Reports from the 
Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe reveal that Italy offers 
inadequate reception conditions to asylum seekers which on a case by case basis 
raise doubts as to the efficiency of its asylum and immigration system.1033  
Despite various reports from NGOs, civil society groups and international bodies, 
the ECtHR has not yet declared the Italian asylum and immigration system 
dysfunctional or deficient.1034 However, this chapter argues that Frontex, when 
considering the place of disembarkation, should follow the legal reasoning of the 
ECtHR and national courts by analogy with the Dublin transfers. Recent practice 
                                                                                                                                                              
0HQWDO+HDOWK'LVWUHVVDQG$FFHVVWR+HDOWKFDUH¶-XO\ 
1028







 EU Charter, article 1. 
1032
 MSS (n 115) paragraphs 249 and paragraphs 263-264. 
1033
 5HSRUWE\1LOV0XLåQLHNV&RPPLVVLRQHUIRU+XPDQ5LJKWVRIWKH&RXQFLORI(XURSH 
published on 18 September 2012, following his visit to Italy from 3 to 6 July 2012, 
CommDH(2012)26, 2. 
1034
 Tarakhel v Switzerland Application no 29217/12 ECHR 2014, paragraph 115; EM (Eritrea)  




shows that Belgian national courts are reluctant to transfer individuals to Italy 
holding that they could face inhuman and degrading treatment.1035 Furthermore, in 
Tarakhel the ECtHR held that µV\VWHPLF GHILFLHQFLHV¶ ZHUH not the only 
grounds for stopping Dublin transfers and that Dublin transfers can be stopped 
HYHQLQWKRVHFDVHVZKHUHWKH0HPEHU6WDWHV¶DV\OXPV\VWHPLVQRWLQµFRPSOHWH
EUHDNGRZQ¶1036  Thus it may be argued in this chapter that Dublin transfers or 
disembarkation practices to Italy should be temporarily suspended on the grounds 
of an overburdened asylum system violating the right to asylum and prohibition of 
collective expulsions and the non-refoulement principle. 
 
5.5.1 Irregular Migrants Subjected to Ill-Treatment upon Disembarkation 
Irregular migrants who wish to move to other Member States have refused to 
provide their fingerprints. Since 2014, the Commission put immense pressure on 
Italian authorities to target a 100% fingerprinting rate and take every effort at 
OHJLVODWLYHOHYHOWRµDOORZXVHRIIRUFHIRUILQJHUSULQWLQJDQGWRLQFOXGHSURYLVLRQV
RQORQJHUWHUPUHWHQWLRQIRUWKRVHPLJUDQWVWKDWUHVLVWILQJHUSULQWLQJ¶1037 obliging 
,WDO\ WR FRPSO\ ZLWK WKH µ%HVW Practices for upholding the Obligation in the 
(XURGDF 5HJXODWLRQ WR WDNH ILQJHUSULQWV¶1038 It was only after the Commission 
opened infringement proceedings against Italy for breaking the Eurodac 
Regulation that Italy succeeded in achieving an almost 100% fingerprinting 
                                                          
1035
 (&5(µ%HOJLDQ$GPLQLVWUDWLYH&RXUW6XVSHQGVWKH5HWXUQWR,WDO\RI7ZR$V\OXP6HHNHUV¶ 
30 April 2015 
<http://us1.campaignarchive2.com/?u=8e3ebd297b1510becc6d6d690&id=e42964d592&e=1d
c2474466#Belgian Court> accessed 25 October 2017. 
1036
 Tarakhel (n 1034SDUDJUDSK6WHYH3HHUVµTarakhel v Switerland: Another Nail in the  
CRIILQ RI WKH 'XEOLQ 6\VWHP" (8 /DZ $QDO\VLV¶  1RYHPEHU 
<http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.al/2014/11/tarakhel-v-switzerland-another-nail-in.html> 
accessed 24 October 2017. 
1037
 European Commission, Progress Report on the Implementation of the hotspots in Italy 15  




fingerprintting-migrants-ds-1491-14.pdf> accessed 24 October 2017. 
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rate.1039 This success was attributed to the use of coercive measures against 
irregular migrants that refused to provide their fingerprints.1040  
 
,UUHJXODU PLJUDQWV KDYH DOOHJHG WR EHLQJ VXEMHFWHG WR µEHDWLQJV FDXVLQJ VHYHUH
pain; the infliction of electric shocks by means of electrical batons; and sexual 
KXPLOLDWLRQDQGLQIOLFWLRQRISDLQWRWKHJHQLWDOV¶1041 This chapter argues that the 
SUDFWLFH RI ,WDOLDQ ODZ HQIRUFHPHQW DXWKRULWLHV WR XVH µHOHFWULFDO EDWRQV WR
DGPLQLVWHU HOHFWULF VKRFNV¶ ZKLFK DUH µSRUWDEOH HOHFWURVKRFN ZHDSRQV GHOLYHU D
painful electric shock aimed at causing compliance by directly touching 
HOHFWURGHV RQWR WKH VNLQ GLVUXSWLQJ PXVFOH IXQFWLRQV DQGRU FDXVLQJ SDLQ¶
amounts to ill treatment.1042 In assessing whether the applicant runs a real risk of 
ill treatment contrary to Article 3 ECHR, the Court applies a rigorous test and 
makes an assessment based on all the information obtained at the material 
time.1043 In assessing whether Article 3 ECHR is engaged, the Court has re-
LWHUDWHG WKDW µill-treatment must attain a minimum level of severity; that the 
DVVHVVPHQW RI WKLV µPLQLPXP¶ LV UHODWLYH1044 and that it depends on all the 
circumstances of the case,1045 such as the duration of the treatment, its physical or 
mental effects and, in some instances, the sex, age and state of health1046 of the 
YLFWLP¶1047  
 
                                                          
1039
 European Commission, Implementing the Common European Asylum System: Commission 
escalates 8 infringement proceedings, 10 December 2015 <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_IP-15-6276_en.htm> accessed 24 October 2017; Eurodac Regulation (n 985) article 9 
DQG  µHDFK 0HPEHU 6WDWH PXVW SURPSWO\ WDNH WKH ILQJHUSULQWV RI DOO ILQJHUV RI HYHU\
foreigner of at least 14 years of age who seeks asylum in the country or is apprehended while 
irregularly entering the cRXQWU\¶ 5HJXODWLRQ GRHV QRW PHQWLRQ FRHUFLYH PHDVXUHV WDNHQ IRU
ILQJHUSULQWV,WUHIHUVWRµQDWLRQDOSUDFWLFHRIWKH0HPEHU6WDWHFRQFHUQHGDQGLQDFFRUGDQFH
ZLWKKXPDQULJKWVVDIHJXDUGV¶VHH(XURGDF5HJXODWLRQQ985) article 3(5). 
1040
 Amnesty International 2016 (n 1011) 15. 
1041
 Amnesty International 2016 (n 1011) 17.  
1042
 See Chapter 4, section 4.4 for a detailed analysis of inhuman treatment. 
1043
 Chahal (n 59) paragraph 60. 
1044
 Hilal v The United Kingdom Application no 45276/99 ECHR 2001-II, paragraph 60. 
1045
 Vilvarajah and others v The United Kingdom, Application Nos. 13163/87, 13164/87,  
13165/87, 13447/87, 13448/87, 30 October 1991, paragraph 108. 
1046
 D v United Kingdom Application no 30240/96 [1997] ECHR 25, paragraph 50. 
1047
 Moghaddas (n 967) paragraph 34; also see Labita (n 690) paragraphs 120 and 121. 
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Law enforcement officials must not use force unless it is strictly necessary and to 
the extent required to perform their duties.1048 If there is no alternative to the use 
of force then law enforcement officials may adhere to use of force subject to the 
principles of strict necessity and the use of force should be to a minimum as not to 
outweigh the law enforcement objective.1049 Trained police officers cannot be 
justified to use physical or psychological force during the taking of fingerprints 
against irregular migrants for the purpose of Eurodac, at a time they could 
proactively persuade him/her as to the benefits of fingerprinting.1050 Such 
persuasion may be ensured through effective information and counselling in a 
language the individual understands with due account to cultural and gender 
considerations.1051 Furthermore, in conducting use of force for the purpose of 
coercing fingerprinting, Italian authorities violate Italian Constitution which 
clearly states tKDW µDQ\ SK\VLFDO RU PRUDO YLROHQFH DJDLQVW SHRSOH VXEMHFWHG WR
UHVWULFWLRQVRIWKHLUOLEHUW\RIZKLFKHYHUQDWXUHPXVWEHSXQLVKHG¶1052 Hence, by 
disembarking irregular migrants to Italy, Frontex subjects them to ill-treatment 
contrary to Article 4 of the EU Charter and Article 3 ECHR. 
 
5.5.2 Right to Seek Asylum - Infringed by Italy 
This chapter further argues that by disembarking irregular migrations to Italy, 
Frontex becomes complicit in violations of the right to seek asylum contrary to 
the Refugee Convention, the ECHR and the EU Charter.1053 The screening 
procedure adopted in the Italian hotspots arguably violates the right to seek 
                                                          
1048
 General Assembly Resolution 34/169 of 17 December 1979, Code of Conduct for Law  





October 2015, 1 <http://fra.europa.eu/en/publication/2015/fundamental-rights-implications-
obligation-provide-fingerprints-eurodac#main-conclusions> accessed 24 October 2017. 
1051
 )5$µ)XQGDPHQWDOULJKWVLPSOLFDWLRQV¶Q1050) 1.  
1052
 Italian Constitution (n 1016DUWLFOHFRHUFLYHIRUFHFDQEHXVHGWRWDNHµKDLURUVDOLYD¶IURP 
a person subject to criminal investigation following the authorisation of the Public Prosecutor; 
see Italian Code of Criminal Procedure, DPR 22 September 1988, No 447, article 349(2) 
<http://www.normattiva.it/static/codici_proc_penale.html> accessed 25 October 2017. 
1053
 Refugee Convention, article 1A(2); ECHR, article 3; TFEU, article 78; EU Charter, article 18;  
Recast Qualification Directive (n 720) article 1. 
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asylum.1054 During the identification procedure, Italy requires individuals to 
specify the reason for entry, dividing individuals as potential asylum seekers or 
economic migrants.1055 In Italian hotspots, access to asylum is largely based on 
whether this intention has been clearly and accurately expressed to the police, or 
to Frontex officers. Immediately upon disembarkation, after irregular migrants are 
given water and a snack, they are handed a piece of paper on which to write down 
their name, age and nationality,1056 in the absence of adequate information, an 
interpreter or legal assistance.1057 Police officers then ask question as to the reason 
for leaving their country of origin, whilst another officer ticks the relevant box in 
WKHTXHVWLRQQDLUHQDPHGµIRJOLR-QRWL]LH¶1058 If these individuals do not expressly 
VWDWH µDV\OXP¶ DV WKHLU LQWHQWLRQ IRU DUULYLQJ LQ ,WDO\ WKH\ DUH JLYHQ D IRUPDO
standardised removal order and receive no access to the reception system.1059 In 
WKHDEVHQFHRIDPRQLWRULQJPHFKDQLVP WKH LQGLYLGXDO¶V IDWH LV VHDOHGRQFH WKH
IRUPµIRJOLR-QRWL]LH¶ LVFRPSOHWHG ,W LVDUJXHG WKDWDVNLQJ LQGLYLGXDOVZK\ WKH\
left their country of origin violates international refugee law. Through this 
specific question, the Italian screening procedure is effectively adopting its 
domestic criterion for refugee determination status instead of applying the 
international refugee law factor determining the status of a refugee, which is 
based on the situation he/she would face if returned to their country of origin not 





$V\OXP 6HHNHUV DQG EHQHILFLDULHV RI SURWHFWLRQ LQ SDUWLFXODU 'XEOLQ 5HWXUQHHV LQ ,WDO\¶
August 2016, 17, <https://www.refugeecouncil.ch/assets/news/2016/161031-final-englisch-
sfh-bericht-italien-aufnahmebedingungen.pdf> accessed 24 October 2017. 
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 $PQHVW\,QWHUQDWLRQDOµ+RWVSRW,WDO\¶Q1028) 33. 
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 $,'$µ&RXQWU\5HSRUW,WDO\¶'HFHPEHU 
<http://www.asylumineurope.org/reports/country/italy> accessed 24 October 2017; ECRE 
DQGRWKHUVµ7KH,PSOHPHQWDWLRQRIWKH+RWVSRWVLQ,WDO\DQG*UHHFH¶Q938) 15; Amnesty 
,QWHUQDWLRQDOµ+RWVSRW,WDO\¶ (n 1028) 37. 
1058
 Italian Constitution (n 1016DUWLFOH0LQLVWU\RI,QWHULRUµ,WDOLDQ5RDGPDS¶6HSWHPEHU 
2016) <http://www.immigrazione.biz/upload/Roadmap_2015.pdf> accessed 24 October 2017; 
Based on Council Decision (EU) 2015/1523 of 14 September 2015 establishing provisional 
measures in the area of international protection for the benefit of Italy and of Greece [2015] 
OJ L239, article 8 six hotspots were planned, in Lampedusa, Trapani, Pozzallo, Taranto and 
Augusta. 
1059
 $PQHVW\,QWHUQDWLRQDOµ+RWVSRW,WDO\¶Q1028) 34; also see Médecins sans FrontièUHVµ2XWRI 
6LJKW¶0DUFK6 <https://www.aerzte-ohne-
grenzen.de/sites/germany/files/attachments/aerzte_ohne_grenzen_out_of_sight_report.pdf> 
accessed 26 October 2017. 
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on the reason why they left their country.1060 Both practically and legally, this 
form constitutes a major obstacle to irregular arrivals by sea having access to 
asylum.  
 
Furthermore, at the time this form is completed, individuals are given no adequate 
information on the legal consequences for incorrect completion by police 
officers.1061 The situation is aggravated when considering that these police 
officers are not properly trained to identify those in need of protection and those 
with vulnerabilities.1062 Although specialised agencies such as IOM, UNHCR and 
Save the Children assist at disembarkation hotspots, it is not possible for them to 
be present in all circumstances.1063 The deficiencies of this particular 
identification procedure were addressed in January 2016 by the Italian Prefect 
Mario Morcone who, through a circular, reminded the police to offer a genuine 
opportunity for those disembarked to seek asylum through providing adequate 
information.1064 After this circular was issued, the number of expulsion orders 
significantly reduced.1065 The circular demonstrated that the actual problem is not 
WKHDEVHQFHRIµNQRZ-KRZ¶E\WKHSROLFHRQKRZWRSURYLde adequate safeguards 
to potential asylum seekers, but the immense pressure by the Italian government 





                                                          
1060
 Refugee Convention, article 33(1); emphasis added. 
1061
 $PQHVW\,QWHUQDWLRQDOµ+RWVSRW,WDO\¶Q1028) 35. 
1062
 2+&+5µ6HFXULW\DW)RUHIURQWDV,WDOLDQ,VODQG5HFHLYHV0LJUDQWV¶-XO\ 
<http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/SecurityatforefrontasItalian.aspx> accessed 24 
October 2017.  
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accessed 24 October 2017. 
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 $PQHVW\,QWHUQDWLRQDOµ+RWVSRW,WDO\¶Q1028) 39. 
1066
 $PQHVW\,QWHUQDWLRQDOµ+RWVSRW,WDO\¶Q 1028) 39. 
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5.5.3 Risk of Arbitrary Repatriation? 
Furthermore, this flawed identification procedure arguably violates the non-
refoulement principle.  Once the individual is confirmed to be from Egypt, 
Tunisia, Morocco, Nigeria or Sudan, third countries with which Italy has entered 
into readmission agreements, expulsion proceedings are commenced to return the 
individual within 48 hours.1067 Considering that these third countries are 
systematic human rights violators, these readmission agreements raise grave 
concerns about the adequacy of legal safeguards during expulsion proceedings.1068 
This chapter argues that these readmission agreements, particularly the 
UHDGPLVVLRQDJUHHPHQWZLWK6XGDQLQIULQJHDQLQGLYLGXDO¶VULJKWWRVHHNDV\OXP
and violate the principle of non-refoulement and the prohibition of collective 
expulsions.1069  
 
Immediately upon disembarkation, Sudanese nationals are detained in the 
KRWVSRWV WR EH UHSDWULDWHG XQGHU WKH µ KRXUV UHWXUQ SURFHGXUH¶ LQ DFFRUGDQFH
with the MoU signed by Italian and Sudanese police authorities.1070 On 24 August 
2016, under Frontex supervision and financial assistance,1071 Italian authorities 
accepted that they had repatriated at least 40 Sudanese nationals in accordance 
with the MoU.1072 The Italian-Sudanese MoU provides that the detailed 
                                                          
1067
 Amnesty InteUQDWLRQDOµ+RWVSRW,WDO\¶Q1028) 42-43. 
1068
 See HRW on the Middle East/North Africa < https://www.hrw.org/middle-east/n-africa>  
accessed 22 October 2017. 
1069
 Refugee Convention, article 33; ECHR, article 3; Protocol No 4 to the ECHR, article 4; EU  
Charter, article 18 and 19. 
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 Sudan, Italy sign MoU to stem crime and irregular migration, 4 August 2016 (Signed in Rome 
3 August 2016) <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article59832> accessed 24 October 
2017 (Firmato memorandum di intesa tra Italia e Sudan su migrazione, 5 August 2016, 
<http://www.stranieriinitalia.it/attualita/attualita/attualita-sp-754/firmato-memorandum-di-
intesa-tra-italia-e-sudan-su-migrazione.html> accessed 14 October 2017); Memorandum 
G¶LQWHVD WUD LO'LSDUWLPHQWRGHOODSXEEOLFD VLFXUH]]DGHO0LQLVWHURGHOO¶,QWHUQR ,WDOOLDQRH OD
3ROL]LD QD]LRQDOH GHO 0LQLVWHUR GHOO¶,QWHUQR 6XGDQHVH SHU OD ORWWD DOOD FULPLQDOLWj JHVWLRQH




 $PQHVW\,QWHUQDWLRQDOµ+RWVSRW,WDO\¶Q1028) 44. 
1072
 $QJHOLQR$OIDQRµ9LGHR,QWHUYLHZZLWKWKH0LQLVWHURI,QWHULRU¶Il Fatto Quotidiano, 3  
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investigation for identification purposes should take place once the individual is 
returned in Khartoum, Sudan; hence, no adequate assessment of individual 
circumstances is performed by Italian authorities.1073 ,Q DFFRUGDQFH ZLWK ,WDO\¶V
EU and international obligations, the Italian authorities must not return an 
individual who claims to be or is suspected of being a Sudanese national to Sudan 
with knowledge that Sudan subjects individuals to human rights violations. But 
how may Italian authorities assess the risk the individual would face upon 
repatriation to Sudan if they are unable to confirm the identity of the individual 
prior to return?  
 
Since 2003, Italian authorities have had knowledge of the Sudanese armed 
conflict causing massive displacement, civilian casualties and human rights 
abuses.1074 The Sudanese President, Omar al-Bashir, has been charged by the 
Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court with war crimes, genocide and 
crimes against humanity for atrocities committed in Darfur from 2003 to 2008.1075 
Despite knowledge on the on-going situation in Sudan, Italian authorities have 
entered into the repatriation agreement with Sudan to return individuals without 
performing any form of identification procedure, let alone carefully examining 
whether upon return the individual would face ill-treatment. The ECtHR has 
already made it clear that compliance with bilateral agreements cannot act as 
justification for non-compliance with international law.1076 In light of the on-
going human rights violations taking place in Sudan, it is argued that Italy in 
collaboration with Frontex has violated the principle of non-refoulement when 
returning the 40 Sudanese nationals to Sudan. 
                                                                                                                                                              
September 2016) <http://tv.ilfattoquotidiano.it/2016/09/03/migranti-alfano-riabilita-i-
rimpatri-collettivi-tutto-regolare-anzi-calchero-la-mano/556944> accessed 24 October 2017; 
See also a relevant interview with the Head of the Italian Police, Franco Gabrielli, 
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It is thus also arguable that the Italian expulsion orders to Sudan violate the 
prohibition of collective expulsions.1077 According to the reports produced by 
Amnesty International, the expulsion orders given to Sudanese and other nationals 
LQFOXGHGJHQHULFVHQWHQFHVVXFKDVµLWZDVHVWDEOLVKHGWKDWWKHSHUVRQZDVQRWLQ
QHHGRI LQWHUQDWLRQDOSURWHFWLRQDV IRUHVHHQE\DUWF'/¶1078 The 
orders do not refer to an individual assessment of personal circumstances but only 
include general wording of standardised forms to be filled by police officers. 
Similar decisions do not necessarily mean a collective expulsion has taken place 
as long as the individual was given the opportunity to challenge his expulsion to 
competent authorities on an individual basis.1079 However, Amnesty International 
reports that the Sudanese nationals were given no opportunity to challenge their 
expulsion by competent independent and objective authorities.1080 These 
individuals were handed over to Sudanese authorities within the timeframe of 48 
hours without given access to an interpreter or legal advice to provide them with 
the necessary information on the right to asylum or to have access to other 
national procedures.1081 Neither were these individuals given the opportunity to 
raise arguments against their expulsion and subsequently examined by State 
authorities.1082 The repatriated individuals were expelled as a group only because 
they belonged to the same nationality. On these grounds it is argued that the 
expulsion as a group of Sudanese nationals amounts to a collective expulsion.1083 
Italy has been found by the ECtHR on two occasions to have violated the 
prohibition of collective expulsions and to date it continues to violate the ECHR 
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 See section 5.2 on collective expulsions. 
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 $PQHVW\,QWHUQDWLRQDOµ+RWVSRW,WDO\¶Q1028) 48. 
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 Sultani v France Application no 45223/05 ECHR 2007 IV, paragraph 81; Andric (n 620)  
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and international law despite the judgments against it.1084 Thus, it is argued that 
by disembarking irregular migrants to Italy, Frontex risks exposing would-be 
asylum seekers to arbitrary repatriation to Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco, Nigeria or 
Sudan in violation of the principle of non-refoulement. 
 
5.6 Conclusion 
In the context of border control, the permissive coercive rules to be conducted in 
the territorial sea of the host Member State under Article 6(2)(b), or on the high 
seas Article 7 (2)(b) under the Sea Borders Regulation as they now stand violate 
the right to seek asylum, the principle of non-refoulement and the prohibition of 
collective expulsions. Furthermore, the rules provided by the Sea Borders 
Regulation on disembarkation to the host State or coastal State (often being Italy 
and Greece) are vulnerable to future litigation outcomes by the CJEU and the 
ECtHR. This chapter disputes the safety of Italy and Greece for the 
disembarkation of intercepted and rescued irregular migrants. As a consequence 
of the recent migration flows, the overburdened reception systems of Italy and 
Greece resulted in significant shortcomings in the processing and reception of 
irregular migrants by sea. As a result, basic needs such as food, water, shelter, 
sanitation, medical care and access to the immigration and asylum systems were 
lacking. Italy and Greece were under-prepared to receive new arrivals, to register 
and accommodate them in reception facilities offering adequate living standards. 
These two countries cannot guarantee basic reception needs upon disembarkation, 
and for this reason this chapter has argued that Italy and Greece cannot be 
considered safe places for disembarkation. The ECtHR and national courts had 
already found the Greek asylum and immigration system to be dysfunctional. 
Although the Italian asylum system is not yet suffering a complete breakdown, it 
has led to violations of the Refugee Convention, the ECHR and the EU Charter. It 
is argued that the Sea Borders Regulation contravenes CJEU and ECtHR case law 
prohibiting returns to unsafe countries. In addition, by disembarking irregular 
                                                          
1084
 Hirsi (n 57) paragraph 186; Sharifi (n 115) paragraph 225. 
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migrants to Italy and Greece, Frontex is alleged in this chapter to have 
participated in a series of internationally wrongful acts such as violation of the 
µright to seek asylum¶, the prohibition of collective expulsion, and the principle of 
non-refoulement. 
 
This chapter suggests that the Regulation should be amended to provide 
alternative places of disembarkation if the host Member State is not considered 
safe. Frontex may follow the UNHCR guidelines on disembarkation on the 
FRQFHSW RI µQH[W SRUW RI FDOO¶ PHDQLQJ WKH QHDUHVW SRUW RI JHRJUDSKLF
proximity.1085 To Frontex, this would mean disembarkation in the nearest Member 
State ports such as France or Spain. The UNHCR has already proposed in 2011, a 
µ0RGHO )UDPHZRUN IRU &RRSHUDWLRQ IROORZLQJ 5HVFXH DW 6HD 2SHUDWLRQV
LQYROYLQJ5HIXJHHVDQG$V\OXP6HHNHUV¶DGGUHVVLQJGLVHPEDUNDWLRQVLWXDWLRQVE\
the State other than the flag State.1086  
 
Irregular migrants should not be penalised for crossing borders irregularly. State 
authorities are urged to gather information on apprehended individuals before 
they are returned to or disembarked at a place of safety for two reasons: 1) 
assessing individual needs for international protection, and 2) for use as a defence 
in domestic courts by showing that State operations are not being conducted 
discriminately. These individuals must be given the right to an effective remedy 
against any removal order. A case by case assessment of individual circumstances 
must be conducted by border guards before returning any irregular migrant to 
their country of departure.  
 
Chapter Six addresses the attribution of international responsibility to the EU for 
international wrongful acts committed during Frontex joint operations and 
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  EXCOM Conclusion No 23 (n 310) paragraph 3. 
1086
  UNHCR, The Model Framework (n 31381+&5µ5HIXJHH3URWHFWLRQDQG0L[HG 




through its decisions authorising Italy and Greece to commit acts which are 
internationally wrongful. The actual purpose behind Frontex deployment is 
argued not merely to assist Member States in managing their external borders but 
to constitute a crucial strategic tool to circumvent the international responsibility 
of Member States and the EU for violations of international obligations. 
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Chapter 6: 7KH(8¶V,QWHUQDWLRQDO5HVSRQVLELOLW\ 
6.1 Introduction 
In Chapter Four of this thesis it was argued that the EU-Turkey statement had the 
effect of subjecting irregular migrants to arbitrary detention, ill-treatment and an 
increased risk of refoulement to Turkey which does not offer adequate legal 
safeguards in accordance with EU and international refugee law. In Chapter Five 
it was argued that the interception1087 and disembarkation1088 rules under the Sea 
Borders Regulation violate the prohibition of torture or inhuman or degrading 
treatment, the non-refoulement principle and the prohibition of collective 
expulsions.1089 Furthermore, it was argued that by not offering an alternative 
course of action in circumstances when the host/coastal Member State does not 
guarantee an effective asylum system, the provisions of the Sea Borders 
Regulation violate EU and international obligations and the established 
international search and rescue framework. These violations have been committed 
XQGHUWKH(8¶VQRUPDWLYHFRQWUROGXULQJ)URQWH[¶VGHSOR\PHQWLQMRLQWRSHUDWLRQV
at sea and through its decisions authorising Italy and Greece to commit acts which 
are internationally wrongful. In accordance with general principles of 
international law, the EU is responsible for providing reparation for these 
violations as laid down by ARIO. Against that background and, given its status as 
an international organization1090 with international legal personality,1091 this 
                                                          
1087
 Sea Borders Regulation (n 7) article 6(2)(b) governing interception on the territorial sea and  
article 7(2)(b) on the high seas. 
1088
 Sea Borders Regulation (n 7) article 10. 
1089
 See Chapter 5. 
1090
 $5,2DUWLFOHDµLQWHUQDWLRQDORUJDQL]DWLRQ¶PHDQVDQµRUJDQL]DWLRQHVWDEOLVKHGE\DWUHDW\ 
or other instrument governed by international law and possessing its own international legal 
SHUVRQDOLW\¶ 
1091
 TEU, article 47 endows the EU with legal personality under international law; C 22-70,  
Commission v Council (European Agreement on Road Transport) (31 March 1971) 
ECLI:EU:C:1971:32, paragraphs 13-14; in support of international legal personality see TEU, 
articles 3(5) and 21 for EU to respect international law when acting on the international scene; 
0DULVH&UHPRQDµ'HILQLQJ&RPSHWHQFHLQ(8([WHUQDO5HODWLRQV/HVVRQVIURPWKH7UHDW\
Reform Process in Alan Dashwood and Marc Maresceau (eds), Law and Practice of EU 
External Relations: Salient Features of a Changing Landscape (CUP, 2008) 34 and 38; also 
see Sari and Wessel (n 93) 4. 
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chapter seeks to impute the EU with attributed international responsibility1092 for 
µHYHU\LQWHUQDWLRQDOO\ZURQJIXODFW¶1093  
 
In accordance with the general rules on international responsibility, it is possible 
for the same wrongful conduct to be attributed to more than one actor at the same 
time. Thus, when States or international organizations act together they may incur 
shared responsibility. Although both the ASR and ARIO provide determinations 
of attributed shared responsibility, the limited numbers of cases in which multiple 
attributions have been recognised in practice have created assumptions amongst 
the EU and its Member States that their international responsibility can be 
diluted.1094 In the context of Frontex joint operations at sea, the EU and its 
0HPEHU6WDWHVVHHPWREHQHILWIURPWKH8QLRQ¶VVXSUDQDWLRQDOV\VWHPHVSHFLDOO\
in relation to the EU-Agency-Member State relationship when applying Union 
law. It is argued that the EU uses the Frontex regulatory framework not only to 
assist the Member States to best manage their borders but to also create confusion 
as to the responsible entity in control of the acts of these border guards which 
purportedly act under host Member State instructions but are placed at the 
disposal and the de facto control of Frontex. This chapter rebuts such an 
                                                          
1092
 ASR and ARIO incorporated elements of progressive development and a codification of  
existing rules of customary international law and thus become legally binding; R (Al-Jedda) v 
Secretary of State for Defence [2007] UKHL 58; Mustafic et al v the Netherlands, LJN: 
BR0132, 5 July 2011; Behrami and Behrami and Saramati v France, Germany and Norway 
Application nos 71412/01 and 78166/01 (2007) 45 EHRR (2 May 2007); Al-Jedda v the 
United Kingdom Application no 27021/08 (7 July 2011); also Crawford, %URZQOLH¶V
Principles of Public International Law 2012 (n 803) 539.  
1093
 ARIO, article 3 and 5; DUWLFOHG$JHQWRIDQLQWHUQDWLRQDORUJDQL]DWLRQDQµRIILFLDORURWKHU 
person or entity, other than an organ, who is charged by the organization with carrying out, or 
helping to carry out, one of its functions, and thus through whom the organization DFWV¶,/&
Report on the Work of Its Sixty-Third Session (UN General Assembly, A/66/10, 2011) 74, 
SDUDJUDSK  &HGULF 5\QJDHUW µ7KH (XURSHDQ &RXUW RI +XPDQ 5LJKWV $SSURDFK WR WKH
Responsibility of Member States in Connection with Acts of International OrJDQL]DWLRQV¶
(2011) ICLQ 4, 997. 
1094
 Behrami and Behrami (n 1092); Kasumaj v Greece Application no 6974/05 (5 July 2007);  
Beric and Others v Bosnia and Herzegovina Application no 36357/04 (16 October 2007); Al-
Jedda (n 1092); Mustafic et al (n 1092); Nuhanovic (n 527); Nollkaemper and Jacobs (n 90) 
383; Moritz Moelle, The International Responsibility of International Organizations: 
Cooperation in Peacekeeping Operations (Cambridge University Press, 2017) 177; Ömer 




assumption arguing that in light of the law of international responsibility the 
Member States and the EU cannot use the complexity of the EU legal order to 
circumvent their international responsibility. 
 
It is concluded that as long as it can be proved that the wrongful conduct is 
attributed to the EU via Frontex, it becomes possible for the EU to incur 
international responsibility in light of Article 4 and 7 ARIO.1095 In addition, it is 
argued that the Sea Borders Regulation and the EU-Turkey statement constitute 
decisions authorising Italy and Greece to commit internationally wrongful acts, 
designed to FLUFXPYHQW WKH (8¶V UHVSRQVLELOLW\ IRU YLRODWLRQV RI LQWHUQDWLRQDO
obligations such as the non-refoulement principle.  It is concluded, however, that 
GHVSLWH WKH (8¶V DWWHPSWV WR FLUFXPYHQW WKHLU LQWHUQDWLRQDO REOLJDWLRQV ZKHQ
FRPPLWWHG XQGHU WKH (8¶V QRUPative control, in light of Article 17 ARIO it is 
possible that they incur international responsibility for internationally wrongful 
acts. These provisions of ARIO will be considered in more detail in section 6.3 
and 6.4 of this thesis. 
 
6.2 Frontex ± an EU Tool to Dilute International Responsibility? 
7R HQJDJH WKH (8¶V RU D 0HPEHU 6WDWH¶V international responsibility for the 
wrongful acts occurring in Joint Operation Triton1096 and Poseidon Sea (replaced 
by Poseidon Rapid Intervention from 28 December 2016)1097 as governed by the 
Frontex and Sea Border Regulations, the conduct in question must be attributable 
to a specific organ or agent of the EU or to a Member State.1098 The Frontex 
                                                          
1095





(17 December 2015) <http://frontex.europa.eu/news/frontex-and-greece-agree-on-operational-
plan-for-poseidon-rapid-intervention-yiSxga> accessed 15 October 2017. 
1098
 ARIO, article 3; Luigi Condorelli and Claus .UHVVµ7KH5XOHVRI$WWULEXWLRQ*HQHUDO 
&RQVLGHUDWLRQV¶ LQ -DPHV &UDZIRUG $ODLQ 3HOOHW DQG 6LPRQ 2OOHVRQ HGV The Law of 
International Responsibility (Open University Press 2010) 221; Aust (n 514) 97-98; see 
Bosnia and Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro (n 521) paragraph 420 confirming the 
customary nature of the principle within ASR, article 16, see ARIO, article 14; ARIO, 
&KDSWHU ,9 µ5HVSRQVLELOLW\ RI DQ LQWHUQDWLRQDO RUJDQL]DWLRQ LQ FRQQHFWLRQ ZLWK WKH DFW RI D
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European Border and Coast Guard Teams (EBGT) for deployment in joint 
operations Triton1099 and Poseidon Rapid Intervention are composed of border 
guards from the EU Member States seconded to Frontex. Although international 
law recognises the possibility of two or more actors sharing responsibility for the 
same wrongful act,1100 by way of exception, Article 7 ARIO excludes shared 
responsibility in those circumstances when an organ of a State is placed at the 
disposal of another State/international organization.1101 Hence, any assessment of 
WKH (8¶V LQWHUQDWLRQDO UHVSRQVLELOLW\ PXVW EH FRQGXFWHG IURm an exclusive 
DWWULEXWLRQSHUVSHFWLYHGHULYHGIURP)URQWH[¶VFRQGXFW 
 
In Frontex joint interception operations, when multi-actors are involved it is 
sometimes difficult to establish accountability and pinpoint blame on a specific 
actor. Member States argue that Frontex has considerable control over the 
operational planning stage and that of implementation; hence, it is the responsible 
entity for conduct occurring within the operational area.1102 It is argued here that 
*UHHFH DQG ,WDO\ WKH WZR 0HPEHU 6WDWHV¶ UHVSRQVLEOH IRU UHTXHVWLQJ )URQWH[¶V
assistance with regard to the control of their external borders, take advantage of 
)URQWH[¶V VHSDUDWH OHJDO SHUVRQDOLW\ WR DYRLG LQWHUQDWLRQDO UHVSRQVLELOLW\ IRU D
series of violated international obligations conducted during interception and 
                                                                                                                                                              
State or another international orgaQL]DWLRQ¶$XUHO6DUL µ,QWHUQDWLRQDO5HVSRQVLELOLW\ IRU(8
0LOLWDU\2SHUDWLRQV)LQGLQJ WKH(8¶V3ODFH LQ WKH*OREDO$FFRXQWDELOLW\ 5HJLPH¶ LQ %DUG
Van Vooren, Steven Blockmans, and Jan Wouters (eds), 7KH (8¶V 5ROH LQ *OREDO
Governance: the Legal Dimension (Oxford Scholarship, 2013) 126. 
1099
 Frontex, Joint Operation Triton (Italy) <http://frontex.europa.eu/pressroom/hot-topics/joint- 
operation-triton-italy--ekKaes> accessed 27 October 2017.  
1100
 ASR, article 47; ARIO, article 48(1); Al-Jedda (n 1092) paragraph 80; Ilascu (n 481)  
paragraphs 352, 385, 393; André Nollkaemper and Dov Jacobs, Shared Responsibility in 
International Law: A Concept Paper ASIL Research Paper No 2011-07, SHARES Series, 69-
70; the following categorisation is derived from Messineo (n 96) 10±23; see also Giorgio 
Gaja, The Relations Between the European Union and its Member States from the Perspective 
of the ILC Articles on Responsibility of International Organizations SHARES Research Paper 
25, 2013, 2. 
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 $5,2DUWLFOHµ7KHFRQGXFWRIDQorgan of a State or an organ or agent of an international  
organization that is placed at the disposal of another international organization shall be 
considered under international law an act of the latter organization if the organization 





GLVHPEDUNDWLRQ SUDFWLFHV ZLWKLQ )URQWH[¶V RSHUDWLRQDO DUHD1103 Frontex shares 
characteristics of endowed legal personality through its right to initiate and carry 
out joint operations, conduct risk analysis, deploy EBGT and enter into 
cooperation agreements.1104 Within this context, Frontex coordinates joint border 
control operations in which participating Member States provide financial and 
technical means and deploy personnel to support the host Member State control 
its external borders.1105 On this basis, its legal personality permits accountability 
and responsibility under international law, capable of bearing rights and 
obligations separate from those of its members.1106 
 
Frontex, on the other hand, contests claims of responsibility on the basis of its 
coordinating role.1107 In accordance with Article 4(2)(j) TFEU,1108 de jure Frontex 
                                                          
1103
 ARIO commentary (n 98) article 61, paragraph 1; see Chapters 4 and 5 on violations of  
international obligations. 
1104
 Frontex Regulation, article 3(1) ± as repealed by EBCG Regulation (n 1) article 14; )LQNµ$
³%OLQG6SRW´¶Q 486) 1. 
1105
 Frontex Regulation, articles 3(c) ± as repealed by EBCG Regulation (n 1) article 14(3); See 
Joint Poseidon Operation/Poseidon Rapid Intervention in the Eastern Mediterranean route; 
)URQWH[µ)URQWH[DQG*UHHFH$JUHHRQ2SHUDWLRQDO3ODQIRU3RVHLGRQ5DSLG,QWHUYHQWLRQ¶
October 2017 <http://frontex.europa.eu/news/frontex-and-greece-agree-on-operational-plan-
for-poseidon-rapid-intervention-yiSxga> accessed 22 October 2017; and Triton/EUNAVFOR 
MED Operation Sophia in the Central Mediterranean route <https://eeas.europa.eu/csdp-
missions-operations/eunavfor-med/36/about-eunavfor-med-operation-sophia_en> accessed 22 
October 2017.  
1106
 Frontex Regulation, article 21 ± as repealed by EBCG Regulation (n 1) article 56 (legal status)  
and article 62 (management board); and on Frontex Executive Director see articles 26 and 25 
respectively ± as repealed by EBCG Regulation (n 1DUWLFOH ,]DEHOOD0DMFKHU µ+XPDQ
Rights Violations during E8 %RUGHU 6XUYHLOODQFH DQG 5HWXUQ 2SHUDWLRQV )URQWH[¶V 6KDUHG
5HVSRQVLELOLW\ RU &RPSOLFLW\"¶  6-/6 ,VVXH  -78, 52; Nina Perkowski, A 
Normative Assessment of the Aims and Practices of the European Border Management 
Agency Frontex (Refugee Studies Centre Working Paper Series No 81, 2012) 18; ARIO, 
article 2(a); International Law Association, Accountability of International Organizations 
(Final Report, Berlin Conference, 2004) 5; Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of 
the United Nations, Advisory Opinion (ICJ Reports 174, 11 April 1949) 178±179; See by 
analogy discussion of the NATO legal personality according to the functionalist theory, 
1LFKRODV 7VDJRXULDV µ7KH 5HVSRQVLELOLW\ RI ,QWHUQDWLRQDO 2UJDQL]DWLRQV IRU 0LOLWDU\
0LVVLRQV¶LQ0Drco Odello and Ryszard Piotrowicz (eds), International Military Missions and 
International Law (Volume 31, Martinus Nijhoff, Leiden 2011) 257±260; Marten 
Zwanenburg, Accountability of Peace Support Operations (Volume 9, Martinus Nijhoff, 
Leiden 2005) 64±68. 
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 Goodwin-*LOOµ7KH5LJKWWR6HHN$V\OXP¶Q487) 453VHH6ND.HOOHUHWDOµFrontex  
$JHQF\:KLFK *XDUDQWHHV IRU+XPDQ5LJKWV"¶ (A Study Conducted by Migreurop on the 
European External Borders Agency in View of the Revision of Its Mandate, March 2011) 22, 
TXRWLQJ ,ONND /DLWLQHQ µ7KH ,QWHUSDUOLDPHQWDU\ &RPPLWWHH 0HHWLQJ ³'HPRFUDWLF
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cannot take the leading role in joint operations at EU external borders; such a task 
belongs to the Member States.1109 Being a coordinator instead of an initiator 
allows Frontex to shield itself behind Member State responsibility in an attempt to 
evade its accountability and the possible attribution of its conduct to the EU for 
human rights violations committed during the course of its operations.1110 In 
reality, the aim of Member States is not to blame Frontex; on the contrary, 
Frontex is their partner and supporter. However, the chain of causation becomes 
difficult to prove in practice given the action of several actors involved in the 
Frontex operational plan.1111 Sometimes the lack of transparency, accountability 
DQG GHPRFUDWLF OHJLWLPDF\ DOORZV WKH YDULRXV DFWRUV LQYROYHG µWR DFW DV VLQJOH
FRJV LQ WKH ZKROH RSHUDWLRQ¶ ZKLOVW UHVSRQVLELOLW\ LV VKLIWHG WR RWKHUV1112 The 
thinking behind this strategy is that if no one can be blamed, the act remains 
lawful although they are acting in violation of human rights law and other 
international obligations.1113 7KXV WKURXJK )URQWH[¶V de jure coordinating 
mandate, the EU purports to create a gap in attribution of international 
responsibility for human rights violations under the auspices of multi-party 
involvement.1114 This chapter argues, however, that despite the assumptions 
FUHDWHG EHKLQG )URQWH[¶V de jure coordinating mandate, it is still possible to 
attribute the EU with international responsibility for the internationally wrongful 
DFWVFRPPLWWHGXQGHU)URQWH[¶VHIIHFWLYHFRQWURORYHULWVRSHUDWLRQDODUHD 
                                                                                                                                                              
Accountability in the area of Freedom, Security and Justice: Evaluating Europol, Eurojust, 
)URQWH[ DQG 6FKHQJHQ´ RUJDQLVHG E\ WKH (XURSHDQ 3DUOLDPHQW¶V &RPPLWWHH RQ &LYLl 
Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, 4±5 October 2010) 
<http://www.migreurop.org/IMG/pdf/Frontex-PE-Mig-ENG.pdf> accessed 22 October 2017; 
On Frontex coordinative role see its mandate - Frontex Regulation, article 1(2) and preamble 
recitals 2, 3, 5 - repealed by EBCG Regulation (n 1) article 5(3) and article 8. 
1108
 Union shares competence with the Member States in the area of freedom, security and justice;  
Member States cannot adopt legislation on the same matter as adopted by EU legislation, see 
TFEU, article 2(2). 
1109
 TFEU, article 72 and article 77(4); EBCG Regulation (n 1) article 5(1). 
1110
 Ska Keller et al., (n 1107) 8; Carrera, den Hertog, and Parkin (n 78) 341±342. 
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 Sarah Wolff, Migration and Refugee Governance in the Mediterranean: Europe and  
International Organizations at a Crossroads (IAI, 2015) 3. 
1114
 See EBCG Regulation (n 1) preamble recitals 2, 3, 5 and article 1(3) and 2; Pascouau and   




6.3 Attribution of Wrongful Conduct to the EU through Frontex 
7KH(8¶VFRPPRQSROLF\RQH[WHUQDOERUGHUFRQWUROLVDGRSWHGXQGHUWKHDXspices 
of Frontex in the form of operational cooperation. As the EU does not have at its 
GLVSRVDOPLOLWDU\SHUVRQQHOWRGHSOR\DWWKH(8¶VH[WHUQDOERUGHUVLWPXVWUHO\RQ
the seconded Member State personnel. This situation raises the legal question as 
to whether the conduct of a Member State border guard during Frontex joint 
operations is attributable to the EU and/or to its Member States.1115 To incur 
responsibility, the second element of Article 4 ARIO requires that the conduct in 
question, attributable to WKH RUJDQLVDWLRQ XQGHU LQWHUQDWLRQDO ODZ µFRQVWLWXWHV D
EUHDFK RI DQ LQWHUQDWLRQDO REOLJDWLRQ RI WKDW RUJDQLVDWLRQ¶1116 In relation to the 
first element of Article 4 ARIO, the difficulty arises as to the possibility of 
Frontex committing wrongful conduct iQYLHZRI)URQWH[¶VIRUPDOPDQGDWHZKLFK
provides that its agents do not exercise executive powers;1117 their role is that of a 
coordinator.1118 The EBCG Regulation SURYLGHV WKDW )URQWH[¶V WDVN LQFOXGHV
µPRQLWRU>LQJ@ PLJUDWRU\ IORZV DQG FDUU\>LQJ@ RXW ULVN DQDO\sis as regards all 
DVSHFWV RI LQWHJUDWHG ERUGHU PDQDJHPHQW¶ µFDUU\>LQJ@ RXW D YXOQHUDELOLW\
assessment including the assessment of the capacity and readiness of Member 
6WDWHVWRIDFHWKUHDWVDQGFKDOOHQJHVDWWKHH[WHUQDOERUGHUV¶µDVVLVW>LQJ@0HPEHU
States in circumstances requiring increased technical and operational assistance at 
WKH H[WHUQDO ERUGHUV¶ DQG µVHW>WLQJ@ XS DQG GHSOR\>LQJ@ (XURSHDQ %RUGHU DQG
&RDVW*XDUG7HDPV¶1119 Frontex is entrusted with coordination, a task which it 
must achieve without standing staff of its own.1120 In addition, it is entrusted with 
                                                          
1115




 ARIO, article 4 and 7; Behrami and Behrami (n 1092) paragraph 133 and 141; Al-Jedda (n  
1092) paragraph 80. 
1118
 Frontex Regulation, article 1(2) as replaced by the EBCG Regulation (n 1) article 5; Jorrit 
5LMSPDµHybrid Agencification in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice and Its Inherent 
Tensions: The Case of Frontex¶ LQ0DGDOLQD%XVXLRF0DUWLMQ*URHQOHHUDQG-DUOH7URQGDO
The Agency Phenomenon in the European Union: Emergence, Institutionalisation and 
Everyday Decision-Making (Manchester University Press, Manchester 2012) 84±102. 
1119
 EBCG Regulation (n 1) article 8(1) (a-u). 
1120
 EBCG Regulation (n 1) article 5(3) (coordination), article 8 (tasks) and article 20 (composition  
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tasks and powers that require it to coordinate external borders of sovereign States 
without actually taking over national prerogatives.1121 Furthermore, the EBCG 
Regulation emphasises that the primary responsibility for the management of 
external borders is retained by Member States.1122  
 
In reality, however, Frontex conducts various activities akin to decision-making 
SRZHUVVXFKDVµpursuing or stopping anyone trying to cross the border, patrolling 
the area between border crossing points, screening anyone crossing the border, 
asking for travel documents, interviewing people about their identity (screening) 
and itinerary (debriefing), deciding on entry or exit, and accompanying 
inadmissible persons to GHWHQWLRQ FHQWUHV RU IRU UHPRYDO¶1123 These activities 
have often been conducted by seconded Frontex border guards1124 without host 
6WDWHRIILFHUV¶VXSHUYLVLRQ1125 7KHOHJDOFRPSOH[LW\RI)URQWH[¶VVWDQGLQJFUHDWHV
confusion as to who then becomes accountable for violations occurring within its 
RSHUDWLRQDO DUHD 1RWZLWKVWDQGLQJ ZKHWKHU WKH (8 FRQVLGHUV DV YDOLG )URQWH[¶V
                                                                                                                                                              
and deployment). 
1121
 EBCG Regulation (n 1) article 5(3) (coordination) and article 5(2) Member States manage  
their own borders. 
1122
 EBCG Regulation (n 1) article 5(1). 
1123
 Majcher (n 1106) 53; UNISYS, Study on Conferring Executive Powers on Border Officers 
Operating at the External Borders of the EU (April 2006)  35±45 <https://ec.europa.eu/home-
affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/e-library/documents/policies/borders-and-
visas/schengen/docs/study_on_conferring_of_executive_powers_04_2006_en.pdf> accessed 
24 October 2017; µ2IILFHUVGHSOR\HGE\ WKH DJHQF\ DOVR DVVLVW WKH ,WDOLDQ DXWKRULWLHV LQ WKH
registration of the arriving migrants. They also collect intelligence about people smuggling 
networks operating in Libya and other African countries on the smuggling routes. The agency 
VKDUHVWKLVLQIRUPDWLRQZLWKWKH,WDOLDQDXWKRULWLHVDQG(XURSRO¶VHH)URQWH[-RLQW2SHUDWLRQ
Triton (Italy) (n 1099). 
1124
 EBCG Regulation (n 1) article 2(3); SBC (n 158) article 2(14). 
1125
 Ska Keller et al., (n 1107) 12; Amnesty International (European Institutions Office) and  
(&5(µBriefing on the Commission Proposal for a Regulation Amending Council Regulation 
(EC) 2007/2004 Establishing a European Agency for the Management of Operational 
Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union (Frontex)  
September 2010, 11±12  <http://www.ecre.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/ECRE-and-
Amnesty-Briefing-on-the-Commission-Proposal-amending-the-Frontex-
Regulation_September-2010.pdf> accessed 24 October 2017;  UN General Assembly, Report 
by the Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants, François Crépeau, on His 




conduct on the ground,1126 this chapter argues that HYHQLI)URQWH[DJHQWV¶de facto 
conduct exceeds their formal authority or contravenes instructions, Member State 
and/or EU responsibility under international law cannot be avoided or 
excluded.1127  
 
Thus, the legal issue is whether the conduct of the seconded organ is attributable 
to the receiving organization or to the seconding State. Article 7 ARIO provides 
the only exception to multiple attribution of conduct on the transfer of State 
organs to international organizations µ7KHFRQGXFWRIDQRUJDQRID6WDWHRUDQ
organ or agent of an international organization that is placed at the disposal of 
another international organization shall be considered under international law an 
act of the latter organization if the organization has effective control over that 
FRQGXFW¶1128  In the context of joint operations at EU external borders, the border 
guards of sending States are put at the disposal of Frontex,1129 an EU agency with 
distinct legal personality.1130 What constitutes an organ or agent of the State or 
international organization is determined in accordance with its internal law.1131 
The seconded border guards of Member States usually exercise law-enforcement 
authority,1132 WKXVDFTXLULQJWKHVWDWXVRIDQµRUJDQ¶1133 The home Member State 
retains the authority to exercise disciplinary powers over the seconded border 
                                                          
1126
 ARIO Commentary (n 98) articlHSDUDJUDSK(OHQD2UWHJDµ7KH$WWULEXWLRQRI 
International Responsibility to a State for Conduct of Private Individuals within the Territory 
RI$QRWKHU6WDWH¶,Q'UHW 
1127
 ARIO, article 8; Majcher (n 1106) 54. 
1128
 Emphasis added. 
1129
 EBCG Regulation (n 1) article 17 (7-9). 
1130
 EBCG Regulation (n 1DUWLFOH)URQWH[¶VOHJDOSHUVRQDOLW\SHUPLWVLWWRDFWLQIXOO 
DXWRQRP\DQGLQGHSHQGHQFHIURPWKH(8+RZHYHU)URQWH[¶VLQWHUQDWLRQDOOHJDOSHUVRQDOLW\
is disputed, it has no treaty-making powers, nor does Frontex have international rights and 
duties enforceable by law, see Mungianu (n 84) 34; Shaw (n 204) 195, nor has the EU 
delegated its international legal personality to Frontex, as the EU has the exclusive right to 
bind the EU in international DJUHHPHQWV7)(8DUWLFOHDQG0HODQLH)LQNµ)URQWH[
Working Arrangements: Legitimacy and Human Rights Concerns Regarding Technical 
5HODWLRQVKLSV¶8-,(/ 
1131
 ARIO Commentary (n 98) DUWLFOHSDUDJUDSKµWKHWHUP³RUJDQ´ZLWKUHIHUHQFe to a State,  
has to be understood in a wide sense, as comprising those entities and persons whose conduct 
is attributable to a State according to articles 5 and 8 on the responsibility of States for 
LQWHUQDWLRQDOO\ZURQJIXODFWV¶DOVRVHH$65DUWLFOH4(2). 
1132
 ASR, article 4; Mungianu (n 84) 61. 
1133
 ARIO, article 7; ASR, article 4. 
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guards,1134 whereas the host Member State exercises civil and criminal 
jurisdiction.1135 Nonetheless, Article 7 ARIO covers precisely situations where the 
seconded organ continues to act to a certain extent as an organ of the seconding 
State.1136 Therefore, in cases of multi-party involvement, it is necessary to assess 
whether Frontex or the seconding Member State has effective control over the 
conduct of the border guards within the operational area.1137 
 
The structure of Frontex joint operations raises similar legal issues to those dealt 
with by the ECtHR when assessing UN peacekeeping operations in light of the 
ODZ RQ LQWHUQDWLRQDO UHVSRQVLELOLW\ 7KH (&W+5 DGGUHVVHG µHIIHFWLYH FRQWURO¶ LQ
Behrami concerning the UN Mission in Kosovo under Security Council 
Resolution 1244 (1999), in which NATO led the Kosovo Force (KFOR) to 
maintain security and manage the Kosovo civil administration; whereas the 
Saramati case concerned the internment of Mr Saramati by order of KFOR 
officials of French and Norwegian military forces.1138 The applicants in these two 
cases claimed violations of Article 2 ECHR and Articles 5 and 13 ECHR, 
respectively. The ECtHR observed that the complex nature of security missions 
required the Security Council to rely on States to provide military personnel and 
means, as well as delegate command. The key question considered by the ECtHR 
was whether despite a delegated operational command, the Security Council 
UHWDLQHG µXOWLPDWH DXWKRULW\ DQG FRQWURO¶1139 In recognition of UN Mission in 
Kosovo (UNMIK) as a subsidiary organ of the UN, the ECtHR held that the 
Security CRXQFLO UHWDLQHG µXOWLPDWH DXWKRULW\ DQG FRQWURO¶ DQG RQO\ GHOHJDWHG
                                                          
1134
 EBCG Regulation (n 1) article 21(5); ARIO Commentary (n 98) article 7, paragraph 7. 
1135
 EBCG Regulation (n 1) articles 42 and 43. 
1136
 ARIO Commentary (n 98) article 7, paragraph 1; in Behrami and Behrami (n 1092) paragraph  
139, the ECtHR held that exclusive jurisdiction in disciplinary and criminal matters did not 
undermine the effective operation control by NATO; see ARIO Commentary (n 98) article 7, 
paragraph 10. 
1137
 6DULµ,QWHUQDWLRQDO5HVSRQVLELOLW\IRU(80LOLWDU\2SHUDWLRQV¶Q1098) 133; UN,  
Responsibility of International Organizations, Second Report on Responsibility of 
International Organizations by Giorgio Gaja, Special Rapporteur, 2 April 2004, UN doc 
A/CN.4/541, 2. 
1138
 Behrami and Behrami (n 1092) paragraphs 64-65. 
1139
 Behrami and Behrami (n 1092) paragraphs 132-133; this test was also applied in Kasumaj (n  
1094); Beric (n 1094). 
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lawful operational powers to KFOR and UNMIK. Thus, the conduct of KFOR 
and UNMIK were attributable to the UN.1140 The test adopted by the ECtHR was 
whether the UN Security Council retained ultimate authority and control so that 
only operational command was delegated, and whether it had lawfully delegated 
its powers to another entity,1141 not on the basis of ad hoc factual analysis on who 
retains command and control over the actual operation.1142 
 
ThH(&W+5KDGWKHRSSRUWXQLW\WRDGGUHVVWKHIDFWXDOHOHPHQWRIWKHµRSHUDWLRQDO
FRPPDQG¶ SDUW RI WKH µHIIHFWLYH FRQWURO¶ FRQFHSW LQ Al-Jedda.1143 In this case, 
Security Council Resolution 1546 (2004) authorised the presence of a 
Multinational Force in Iraq.1144 The ECtHR addressed the legal question of 
ZKHWKHU WKH 81 RU WKH PHPEHUV RI WKH 0XOWLQDWLRQDO )RUFH KDG µHIIHFWLYH
FRPPDQG DQG FRQWURO¶ RYHU WKH RSHUDWLRQ1145 The ECtHR held that the UN 
6HFXULW\&RXQFLOµKDGQHLWKHUHIIHFWLYHFRQWUROQRUXOWLPDWHDXWKRULW\DQG control 
over the acts and omissions of troops within the Multinational Force and that the 
DSSOLFDQW¶VGHWHQWLRQZDVQRWWKHUHIRUHDWWULEXWDEOHWRWKH8QLWHG1DWLRQV¶1146 In 
OLQHZLWKWKH,/&¶V&RPPHQWDU\WRZKDW LVQRZ$UWLFOH$5,2WKHQ$UWLFOH
ARIO) WKH (&W+5 FRQVLGHUHG WKH µHIIHFWLYH FRQWURO¶ HOHPHQW LQ WHUPV RI µWKH
factual control that is exercised over the specific conduct taken by the organ or 
DJHQWSODFHGDW WKH UHFHLYLQJRUJDQL]DWLRQ¶VGLVSRVDO¶1147 As argued in Behrami 
                                                          
1140
 Behrami and Behrami (n 1092) paragraphs 133-141. 
1141
 Behrami and Behrami (n 1092) paragraphs 133-141. 
1142
 .MHWLO /DUVHQ µ$WWULEXWLRQ RI &RQGXFW LQ 3HDFH 2SHUDWLRQV 7KH 8OWLPDWH $XWKRULW\ DQG
CoQWURO7HVW¶EJIL 509, 516-0DUNR0LODQRYLFDQG7DWMDQD3DSLFµ$V%DGDV
,W*HWV7KH(XURSHDQ&RXUWRI+XPDQ5LJKWV¶Behrami and Behrami Decision and General 
,QWHUQDWLRQDO /DZ¶   ,&/4   &KULVWLDQ 7RPXVFKDW µ$WWULEXWLRQ RI
,QWHUQDWLRQDO5HVSRQVLELOLW\'LUHFWLRQDQG&RQWURO¶LQ0DOFROP(YDQVDQG3DQRV.RXWUDNRV
(eds), The International Responsibility of the European Union: European and International 
Perspectives (Hart Publishing, 2013) 30. 
1143
 Al-Jedda (n 1092) paragraph 84. 
1144
 Al-Jedda (n 1092) paragraph 81. 
1145
 Al-Jedda (n 1092) paragraph 84; This test was applied in Mustafic et al (n 1092); Nuhanovic  
(n 527). 
1146
 Al-Jedda (n 1092) paragraph 84. 
1147
 Al-Jedda (n 1092) paragraph 84 and 56 respectively; Court referred to what was then ARIO  
Commentary (n 98) article 5, paragraphs 1, 6 and 7, what is now ARIO Commentary (n 98)  
article 7, paragraphs 4, 7 and 8; Messineo (n 96) 41. 
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and Saramati and supported by the ILC Commentary, the effective control 
element exercised by the receiving international organization is not excluded on 
the basis that the sending Member State retains exclusive jurisdiction in 
disciplinary and criminal matters. Article 7 ARIO covers precisely the situation 
when there is not a full secondment of personnel.1148 Although it is recognised 
that the sending State retains elements of governmental authority over disciplinary 
and criminal matters, for the conduct to be attributed to the receiving State or 
LQWHUQDWLRQDO RUJDQL]DWLRQ WKH RUJDQ PXVW EH µXQGHU LWV H[FOXVLYH GLUHFWLRQ DQG
FRQWURO UDWKHU WKDQ RQ LQVWUXFWLRQV IURP WKH VHQGLQJ 6WDWH¶1149 Thus, the ILC 
emphasises that the entity which gives the order retains effective control over the 
organ placed at its disposal.  
 
7KHµHIIHFWLYHFRQWURO¶HOHPHQWRI$UWLFOH$5,2VHHPVWRUHTXLUHWKDW)URQWH[LV
the only entity that gives instructions to the seconded border guards. Such a 
situation is largely based on the arrangements made by the sending State and 
receiving international organization over the organ placed under disposal.1150 The 
conditions of cooperation between Frontex and the participating Member States 
are drawn up and dictated by the Frontex Executive Director setting out the 
operatioQ¶V REMHFWLYH GXUDWLRQ DQG JHRJUDSKLFDO DUHD SURYLVLRQV RQ command, 
team compositions and equipment involved, which Greece agrees to and 
implements.1151 The operational plan is implemented through the host Member 
State giving instructions to the seconded border guards. However, as joint 
operations are based on risk analysis, the operational plan is kept secret from the 
                                                          
1148
 Behrami and Behrami (n 1092) paragraph 139; ARIO Commentary (n 98) article 7, paragraph  
1 and 10. 
1149
 ARIO Commentary (n 98) article 7, paragraph 4 and 7. 
1150
 ARIO Commentary (n 98)  article 7, paragraph 9; emphasis added. 
1151
 Frontex Regulation, article 3a(1) - as repealed by EBCG Regulation (n 1) article 15(2-3); also 
see EBCG Regulation (n 1) article 16; Carrera, The EU Border Management Strategy (n 86) 
14; emphasis added. 
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public.1152 Apart from the specifics of the joint operation, it is not possible to 
VFUXWLQLVHWKHRSHUDWLRQDOSODQLQWKHFRQWH[WRIWKHµHIIHFWLYHFRQWURO¶HOHPHQW 
 
Even without a disclosed operational plan, it can still be argued here that Frontex 
is a de facto controller in command of the activities taking place within an 
operational area. Frontex decides which joint operation proposals to approve and 
to initiate.1153 It has the power to decide on the deployment of technical 
equipment under the established Technical Equipment Pool (TEP).1154Although 
de jure the host State gives instructions to the EBGT command in performing its 
functions;1155 de facto )URQWH[ H[HUFLVHV µHIIHFWLYH FRQWURO¶1156 over the EBGT, 
being responsible for taking the decisions on its deployment and maintaining 
responsibility for its conduct throughout the operational plan.1157 During 
deployment, for the purposes of identification vis-à-vis national authorities and 
citizens, Frontex officers must wear a blue armband bearing the insignia of the 
                                                          
1152
 Decision of the Management Board of 21 September 2006 laying down practical arrangement 
regarding public access to the documents of the European Agency for the Management of 
Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union 
(Frontex), Doc 3402, 22 September 2006, see <http://www.statewatch.org/ombudsman-
cases/frontex/x-frontex-decision-of-the-mb-of-21-september-2006-public-access-to-the-
documents-of-frontex.pdf> accessed 25 October 2017. 
1153
 Frontex Regulation, article 3(1) and (1b) for joint operations and article 8(a) for rapid  
interventions - as repealed by EBCG Regulation (n 1) article 15(2-4). 
1154
 Frontex Regulation, articles 2, 3 and 7 for EBGT and TEP being operational resources ± as 
repealed by EBCG Regulation (n 1) article 8(1)(g-i); On the establishment of TEP see Frontex 
Management Board Decision No 6/2014 of 26 March 2014 reported in )URQWH[ µAnnual 
Information on the Commitments of the Member States to the European Border Guard Teams 
and the Technical Equipment Pool¶ (2015) 5 
<http://frontex.europa.eu/assets/About_Frontex/Governance_documents/EBGT_TEP_Report/
20150401_Frontex_Annual_Report_to_the_EP_on_the_commitments_of_the_MS_to_the_E
BGT_and_the_TEP.pdf> accessed 24 October 2017; Also see EBCG Regulation (n 1) article 
39. 
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 Frontex Regulation, article 3(c )(1) - as repealed by EBCG Regulation (n 1) article 5; EBCG 
Regulation (n 1 DUWLFOH  &KULV 'HOLVR ³6DIHJXDUGLQJ (XURSH¶V 6RXWKHUQ %RUGHUV
Interview with .UDXV 5RHVOHU 'LUHFWRU RI 2SHUDWLRQV 'LYLVLRQ )URQWH[´
(Balkananalysis.com, 23 September 2011) < 
<http://www.balkanalysis.com/greece/2011/09/23/safeguarding-europe%E2%80%99s-
southern-borders-interview-with-klaus-roesler-director-of-operationsdivision-frontex/> 
accessed 24 October 2017. 
1156
 Behrami and Behrami (n 1092) paragraph 30-31, 138-140. 
1157
 Frontex Regulation, article 3b - as repealed by EBCG Regulation (n 1) article 16(3); ARIO, 




EU and Frontex and carry an accreditation document provided by Frontex.1158 
Furthermore, the prominent role of the Frontex Coordinating Officer (FCO) 
implies shared instructions on operational decisions between the host State and 
Frontex.1159 Frontex secures whether the host Member State has issued 
instructions in accordance with the operational plan through its FCO who has full 
access to EBGTs at all timHV7KH)&2¶VYLHZVPXVWEHWDNHQLQWRFRQVLGHUDWLRQ
by the host State (Greece).1160 Legal scholars have been divided as to whether 
WKHVHµYLHZV¶VKRXOGEHLQWHUSUHWHGWRFRQVWLWXWHRSLQLRQVVRIWODZRULQVWUXFWLRQV
implying legally binding decisions.1161 Roberta Mungianu and Christian 
7RPXVFKDWFRQVLGHUWKDWWKHVHµYLHZV¶GRQRWFRQVWLWXWHLQVWUXFWLRQV1162 However, 
it is argued here that the mandatory language used by the EBCG Regulation, 
FOHDUO\VWDWLQJµPXVWEHWDNHQLQWRFRQVLGHUDWLRQ¶DQGWKDW*UHHFHµVKDOODJUHH¶WR
DQ\ LQVWUXFWLRQV LVVXHG µLQ DFFRUGDQFH ZLWK WKH RSHUDWLRQDO SODQ¶ GHQRWH DQ
apparent obligation upon Greece to agree on general and/or special instructions 
drawn up by Frontex.1163 Therefore, it is argued that the obligation on Greece to 
issue instructions to border guards in accordance with the operational plan 
amounts to the reproduction of a decision taken at EU level. 
 
Furthermore, in accordance with the operational plan, seconded border guards are 
at the disposal of Frontex which has the competence to dispatch or dismiss 
                                                          
1158
 EBCG Regulation (n 1) article 40(4) and article 41 respectively; Frontex, Roles and  
Responsibilities, <http://frontex.europa.eu/operations/roles-and-responsibilities/> accessed 22 
October 2017. 
1159
 Frontex Regulation, article 3b(5) ± as repealed by EBCG Regulation (n 1) article 22(3);  
Carrera, The EU Border Management Strategy (n 86) 6. 
1160
 Frontex Regulation, article 3c (2-3) and article 8 (g) ± as repealed by EBCG Regulation (n 1) 
article 21(3). 
1161
 Mungianu (n 84&KULVWLDQ7RPXVFKDWµ7KH,QWHUQDWLRQDO5HVSRQVLELOLW\RIWKH(XURSHDQ 
8QLRQ¶LQ(Q]R&DQQL]]DURHGThe European Union as an Actor in International Relations 




 Frontex Regulation, article 3c (2) and Regulation No 863/2007 establishing a mechanism for 
the creation of Rapid Border Intervention Teams and amending Council Regulation No 
2007/2004 as regards that mechanism and regulating the tasks and powers of guest officers 
[2007] L199/30 (Rabit Regulation), article 5 (1) ± as repealed by EBCG Regulation (n 1) 
article 16(2); emphasis added. 
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them.1164 Once the Executive Director of Frontex decides to deploy a rapid 
reaction pool upon the request of a Member State experiencing immigration 
SUHVVXUHDWLWVH[WHUQDOERUGHUVERUGHUJXDUGVPXVWEHPDGHDYDLODEOHµXQOHVVWKHy 
are faced with an exceptional situation substantially affecting the discharge of 
QDWLRQDOWDVNV¶1165 The possibility of withdrawing border guards is given only to 
the home Member States, not the host Member State.1166 7KXV*UHHFH¶VUHTXHVW
for Frontex deployment on its external borders implies a transfer of its autonomy 
over its border guards, giving Frontex full command and effective control during 
joint operations.1167 0RUHRYHU WKHREOLJDWLRQRI)URQWH[¶V([HFXWLYH'LUHFWRUWR
µVXVSHQG RU WHUPLQDWH RSHUDWLRQV¶ FRQILUPV WKDW )URQWH[ UHWDLQV FRPPDQG DQG
effective control over the joint operations at all times.1168 Thus, the combination 
of mandatory language in the implementation of the operational plan coupled with 
)URQWH[¶V UROH DV D VWUDWHJLF FRRUGLQDWRU GDWD JDtherer, designer of operational 
plans, and deployer of officers and resources, makes it apparent that Frontex, not 
Greece, is the decision-making body and the de facto regulator in command and 
control of the operational plan.1169 On this basis, the conduct of border guards 
SODFHGXQGHU)URQWH[¶VGLVSRVDO1170 is attributed to the EU and considered to be an 
act of the EU under international law.1171  
                                                          
1164
 Papastavridis (n 1157) 78. 
1165
 Rabit Regulation (n ) article 4(3) ± as repealed by EBCG Regulation (n 1) article 17(9) and  
article 20(5-8). 
1166
 Rabit Regulation, article 4(3) ± as repealed by EBCG Regulation (n 1) article 20(5-8). 
1167
 $QMXP 6KDEELU µ7KH $FFRXQWDELOLW\ RI )URQWH[ IRU +XPDQ 5LJKWV 9LRODWLRQV DW (XURSH¶V
%RUGHUV¶  <https://ssrn.com/abstract=2280707> accessed 22 October 2017; Al-Jedda (n 
1092 SDUDJUDSK  µVWUXFWXUDO LQYROYHPHQW RI WKH 8QLWHG .LQJGRP LQ UHWDLQLQJ VRPH
authority over its troops, as did all troop-contributing nations, was compatible with the 
HIIHFWLYHQHVVRIWKHXQLILHGFRPPDQGDQGFRQWURO¶ 
1168
  EBCG Regulation (n 1) article 15(2-3). 
1169
  Al-Jedda (n 1092) paragraph 67; Helene Jorry, Construction of a European Institutional  
Model for Managing Operational CoRSHUDWLRQ DW WKH (8¶V ([WHUQDO %RUGHUV ,V WKH





EU secondary legislation; see TFEU, article 16; TFEU articles 340(2) and 263; ARIO, article 
DQGFUXOHVRIWKHRUJDQL]DWLRQGHILQHµRUJDQ¶7KXVIRULQWHUQDWLRQDOODZSXUSRses, they 
are considered as organs of the EU. The CJEU attributed the 8QLRQ¶V OLDELOLW\ WR LWV
µLQVWLWXWLRQV RU bodies¶ &DVH &-234/02 P European Ombudsman v Frank Lamberts [2004] 




To incur responsibility, the second element of Article 4 ARIO requires that the 
conduct is an internationally wrongful act1172 which constitutes a breach of the 
(8¶V LQWHUQDWLRQDO REOLJDWLRQV ,Q &KDSWHUV )RXU DQG )LYH RI WKLV WKHVLV LW ZDV
argued that the principle of non-refoulement and the prohibition of torture or 
inhuman and degrading treatment have been violated in FroQWH[¶V RSHUDWLRQDO
area, constituting internationally wrongful acts.1173 The principle of non-
refoulement, a peremptory norm of general international law (jus cogens),1174 is 
embodied in Article 19(2) of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. In addition, 
Article 78(1) TFEU obliges the EU to act in accordance with the Refugee 
Convention and other treaties such as CAT, the ICCPR and the ECHR.1175 On this 
EDVLV LW LV DUJXHG WKDW WKH (8 DFTXLUHV LQWHUQDWLRQDO UHVSRQVLELOLW\ IRU )URQWH[¶V
violations of international obligations during its joint operations at sea.1176  
 
)URQWH[¶V([HFXWLYH'LUHFWRUFXUUHQWO\)DEULFH/HJJHUL1177 has a positive duty to 
terminate or suspend in full or in part joint operations producing violations of 
                                                                                                                                                              
LWV0HPEHU6WDWHV¶(-,/:HVVHOQ93) 36. On the relationship with the EU 
&KDUWHUVHH(XURSHDQ3DUOLDPHQWµ7KH,PSOHPHQWDWLRQRIWKH&KDUWHURI)XQGDPHQWDO5LJKWV
LQ WKH (8 LQVWLWXWLRQDO )UDPHZRUN¶ 6WXG\ IRU WKH $)&2 &RPPLWWee, 2016, 49 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2016/571397/IPOL_STU(2016)5713
97_EN.pdf> accessed 19 June 2018. 
1171
 ARIO, article 6. 
1172
 See (n 1131) at p 217. 
1173
 See sections 4.5 and 5.5.2. 
1174
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Peter Michael Poulse and Diva Navigation Corp [1992] ECR I-6019, paragraph 9; C-410/11 
Espada Sanchez and Others [2013] 1 CMLR 55, paragraph 21; Alessandra Giannelli, 
µ&XVWRPDU\ ,QWHUQDWLRQDO /DZ LQ WKH(XURSHDQ8QLRQ¶ Ln Enzo Cannizzaro, Paolo Palchetti 
and Ramses Wessel (eds), International Law as Law of the European Union (Brill Nijhoff, 
2011) 93; Allain (n 722). 
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 On Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment see CAT, article  
1 and 16; ICCPR, article 7; ECHR, article 3; ARIO, article 10, the EU must respect an 
LQWHUQDWLRQDO REOLJDWLRQ µUHJDUGOHVV RI LWV RULJLQ¶ $5,2 &RPPHQWDU\ (n 98) article 10, 
SDUDJUDSK  WKH LQWHUQDWLRQDO REOLJDWLRQ µPD\ EH HVWDEOLVKHG E\ D FXVWRPDU\ UXOH RI
international law, by a treaty or by a general principle applicable within the international legal 
RUGHU¶ 
1176
 See Chapter 5 on interception and disembarkation. 
1177
 Frontex, Executive Profiles <http://frontex.europa.eu/about-frontex/organization/executive- 
profiles/> accessed 19 October 2017. 
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human rights.1178 Since 2014, Amnesty International has been calling upon the 
Frontex Executive Director to suspend in full or in part Operation Poseidon Land 
and Sea in the Evros region and the Aegean Sea.1179 To date, Frontex has not 
suspended or terminated any of its joint operations despite EU and international 
institutions, NGOs and legal scholars stating that human rights violations are 
taking place in its operational area.1180 Hence, the EU is the most appropriate 
entity with the legal power to prevent wrongdoings in the course of Frontex joint 
operations.1181  Thus it has an obligation to stop the joint operation and a duty to 
DFWDVVRRQDVLWEHFRPHVµDZDUHRUVKRXOGQRUPDOO\KDYHEHHQDZDUH¶1182 of the 
existence of the serious risk that the violation would be committed.1183 Upon 
having reason to believe that during Frontex joint operations international refugee 
and human rights laws are being violated, the EU through Frontex may not 
continue to support the operation but must suspend it fully or in part.1184 The EP 
and the Council may invite the Frontex Executive Director Fabrice Leggeri to 
report on joint operations Triton and Poseidon and hold him accountable for any 
wrongful acts committed.1185 Furthermore, the Member States participating in 
                                                          
1178
 Frontex Regulation, article 3(1)(a) - as repealed by EBCG Regulation (n 1) article 27. 
1179
 $PQHVW\,QWHUQDWLRQDO³7KH+XPDQ&RVWRI)RUWUHVV(XURSH´Q112) 17. 
1180
 +5:µ7KH(8¶V'LUW\+DQGV¶Q843)URQWH[LWµ$5HLQIRUFHG)URQWHx Agency EU Turns  
D 'HDI (DU WR 1*2¶V :DUQLQJV¶  6HSWHPEHU 
<https://www.frontexit.org/en/news/item/829-a-reinforced-frontex-agency-eu-turns-a-deaf-
ear-to-ngo-s-warnings-22-september-2016> accessed 25 October 2017; Parliamentary 
Assembly, Frontex: Human Rights Responsibilities Resolution 1932(2013), Doc 13161, 
SDUDJUDSK$QQHOLHVH%DOGDFFLQLµ([WUDWHUULWRULDO%RUGHU&RQWUROVLQWKH(87KH5ROHRI
)URQWH[LQ2SHUDWLRQVDW6HD¶LQ%HUQDUG5\DQDQG9DOVDPLV0LWVLOHJDVHGVExtraterritorial 
immigration control: Legal challenges (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2010) 233±236; Elspeth 
Guild et al., Implementation of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and its Impact on EU 
Home Affairs Agencies: Frontex, Europol and the European Asylum Support Office 
(European Parliament's LIBE Committee, 2011) 19, 83-87. 
1181
 ARIO, article 41 and 42(1); 7RP'DQQHQEDXPµTranslating the Standard of Effective Control  
into a System of Effective Accountability: How Liability Should Be Apportioned for 
Violations of Human Rights by Member State Troop Contingents Serving as United Nations 
3HDFHNHHSHUV¶ (2010) HILJ 51(1) 113±192, 158. 
1182
 Bosnia and Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro (n 521) paragraph 432. 
1183
 Bosnia and Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro (n 521) paragraph 431; El-Masri v the  
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia Application no 39630/09 ECHR 2012, paragraph 
µWKH\ZHUHDZDUHRURXJKWWRKDYHEHHQDZDUHRIWKHULVNRIWKDWWUDQVIHU¶ 
1184
 ARIO Commentary (n 98) article 14, paragraph 6; on cessation see ARIO, article 30(a). 
1185




joint operation Triton and Poseidon µPD\ UHTXHVW WKDW WKH H[HFXWLYH GLUHFWRU 
WHUPLQDWH WKDW MRLQW RSHUDWLRQ RU UDSLG ERUGHU LQWHUYHQWLRQ¶1186 In addition, the 
Frontex Executive Director may be forced, upon a recommendation of the FRO, 
WRWHUPLQDWHRUVXVSHQGDOORUSDUWRIMRLQWRSHUDWLRQVLIµYLRODWLRQVRIIXQGDPHQWDO





This chapter argues that the Sea Borders Regulation and the EU-Turkey statement 
ZHUHGHVLJQHGWRFLUFXPYHQWWKH(8¶VLQWHUQDWLRQDOREOLJDWLRQVDQGWKXVWRHYDGH
its responsibility.1188 Being a supranational entity with the power to develop an 
autonomous normative capacity, it is possible for the EU to use its legal order to 
LQIOXHQFH LWV 0HPEHU 6WDWHV µWR DFKLHYH WKURXJK WKHP D UHVXOW WKDW WKH
organization could not lawfully achieve directly, and thus circumvent one of its 
LQWHUQDWLRQDOREOLJDWLRQV¶1189 The question arises as to whether the EU acquires 
international responsibility in cases of decentralized implementation of EU law by 
Member States when they result in the commission of internationally wrongful 
acts. This particular situation is accommodated by special rules of attribution of 
responsibility undHU $UWLFOH  $5,2 $UWLFOH  $5,2 SURYLGHV µ$Q
international organization incurs international responsibility if it circumvents one 
                                                          
1186
 EBCG Regulation (n 1) article 25(2). 
1187
 Frontex Regulation, article 3(1)(a) and article 26 (a) - as repealed by EBCG Regulation (n 1)  
article 25(4); Frontex operations are monitored by the FCO reporting to the Frontex 
Management Board and Consultative Forum on general fundamental rights issues. 
1188
 6HH7)(8DUWLFOHµAgreements concluded by the Union are binding upon the  
institutions oIWKH8QLRQDQGRQLWV0HPEHU6WDWHV¶7KH&RXQFLOFRQFOXGHVDOOLQWHUQDWLRQDO
agreements, see TFEU, article 218; The EU-Turkey statement (n 99); Sea Borders Regulation 
(n 7).  
1189
 ARIO Commentary (n 98) article 17, paragraph 1; Jose Manuel and Cortes Martin, Does the  
EU Require Special Treatment in the Articles on the Responsibility of International 
Organizations? In Maurizio Ragazzi (ed), Responsibility of International Organizations: 
Essays in Memory of Sir Ian Brownlie (Brill Nijhoff, 2013) 192; Frank Hoffmeister, 
µ/LWLJDWLQJ DJDLQVW WKH (XURSHDQ 8QLRQ DQG LWV 0HPEHU 6WDWHV ± Who Responds under the 
,/&¶V 'UDIW $UWLFOHV RQ ,QWHUQDWLRQDO 5HVSRQVLELOLW\ RI ,QWHUQDWLRQDO 2UJDQL]DWLRQV" (2010) 
EJIL 21, 723-47. 
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of its international obligations by adopting a decision binding member States or 
international organizations to commit an act that would be internationally 
ZURQJIXO LI FRPPLWWHG E\ WKH IRUPHU RUJDQL]DWLRQ¶1190 The main objective of 
Article 17(1) is to attribute international responsibility to an international 
RUJDQL]DWLRQ ZKLFK WULHV WR LQIOXHQFH LWV PHPEHUV µLQ RUGHU WR DFhieve through 
WKHPD UHVXOW WKDW WKHRUJDQL]DWLRQFRXOGQRW ODZIXOO\ DFKLHYHGLUHFWO\¶1191 It is 
designed to prevent the international organization from escaping its responsibility 
E\µRXWVRXUFLQJ¶ LWVDFWRUV1192 For such circumvention to arise there must be an 
intention on the part of the international organization to benefit from the distinct 
legal personality of its members so as to avoid its own international 
obligations.1193  
 
Article 17(1) ARIO does not stipulate as a precondition that the Member States 
actually implement the required act.1194 As it is expected that Member States will 
comply1195 with binding decisions,1196 the likelihood that a third party is injured is 
high.1197 7RLPSO\FLUFXPYHQWLRQWKH0HPEHU6WDWHPXVWEHVDLGWRKDYHµVROLWWOH
room for manoeuvre that it would seem unreasonable to make it solely 
                                                          
1190
 Emphasis added. 
1191
 ARIO Commentary (n 98) article 17, paragraph 1. 
1192
 ARIO Commentary (n 98) article 17, paragraph 1; UN General Assembly, Agenda item 144:  
Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Fifty-Sixth Session 
(continued) 16 November 2004 A/C.6/59/SR.22, paragraph 24; Niels BlRNNHUµ$EXVHRIWKH
Members: Questions concerning Draft Article 16 of the Draft Articles on Responsibility of 
,QWHUQDWLRQDO2UJDQL]DWLRQV¶,2/5 
1193
 ARIO Commentary (n 98) article 17, paragraph 4. 
1194




Commentary (n 98)  article 17, paragraph 7; on the application of article 64, lex specialis the 
ILC has rejected the sui generis nature of the EU as an international organization thus arguing 
that a lex specialis is excluded, see ILC, Report of the Fifty-Seventh Session (2005) A/60/10, 
95, paragraph 7; According to the ILC, Article 64 was modeled on the basis of ARIO, article 
µRQWKHUHVSRQVLELOLW\RI6WDWHVIRULQWHUQDWLRQDOO\ZURQJIXODFWV¶VHH$5,2&RPPHQWDU\ (n 
98)  DUWLFOH  SDUDJUDSK  -HDQ G¶$VSUHPRQW A European Law of International 
Responsibility? The Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations and the 
European Union (SHARES Research Paper 22 (2013), ACIL 2013-04, 8. 
1196
 TFEU, article 291(1); TFEU, article 288; also see TFEU, article 216(2). 
1197
 ARIO Commentary (n 98)  article 17, paragraph 1DWDãD1HGHVNLDQG$QGUp1ROONDHPSHU 
µ5HVSRQVLELOLW\ RI ,QWHUQDWLRQDO 2UJDQL]DWLRQV¶ LQ &RQQHFWLRQ ZLWK $FWV RI 6WDWHV¶ 
ACIL 2012-05, 13. 
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UHVSRQVLEOHIRUFHUWDLQFRQGXFW¶1198 For this reason, Article 17(1) ARIO assumes 
µWKDW FRPSOLDQFH ZLWK WKH ELQGLQJ GHFLVLRQ RI WKH LQWHUQDWLRQDO RUJDQL]DWLRQ
necessarily entails circumvention of one of its inWHUQDWLRQDOREOLJDWLRQV¶1199  
 
There is no dispute that the Sea Borders Regulation constitutes a binding act of 
the EU.1200 However, the legal status of the EU-Turkey statement was questioned 
in the recent case of T-192/16 NF, NG and NM v European Council.1201 The EU 
Court has jurisdiction to review the legality of any measure intended to have legal 
effects provided that it emanates from an institution, body, office or agency of the 
EU.1202 On 28 February 2017, the General Court (GCEU) came close to deciding 
on the merits of an action for the annulment of the EU-Turkey statement but 
dismissed it for lack of jurisdiction. The GCEU concluded that the EU-Turkey 
statement had been agreed by the Heads of State or Government of the Member 
States of the EU so was not a measure adopted by the European Council.1203 The 
court referred to the first and second meetings of the Heads of State or 
Government on 29 November 2015 and 7 March 2016 which invariably used the 
WHUPµ(8¶DQGµ(XURSHDQOHDGHUV¶WRGHVLJQDWHWKHUHSUHVHQWDWLYHVRIthe Member 
States of the EU in a similar way to the 18 March 2016 meeting.1204  The press 
UHOHDVHVRIWKHILUVWWZRPHHWLQJVZHUHFOHDUO\HQWLWOHGµ0HHWLQJRIWKH(XURSHDQ
Union Heads of State or Government with the Republic of Turkey ± EU ±Turkey 
Statement, 1RYHPEHU¶DQGµ6WDWHPHQWRI WKH(XURSHDQ8QLRQ+HDGVRI
6WDWHRU*RYHUQPHQW¶1205 The GCEU considered the meeting of 18 March 2016 
as a continuation of the political dialogue with the Republic of Turkey initiated by 
                                                          
1198
 ARIO Commentary (n 98) article 17, paragraph 7. 
1199
 ARIO Commentary (n 98) article 17, paragraph 7. 
1200
 TFEU, article 288(2); TFEU, article 291(1); Wessel (n 93)UDQFHVFD0DUWLQHV³'LUHFW 
(IIHFW RI ,QWHUQDWLRQDO $JUHHPHQWV RI WKH (XURSHDQ 8QLRQ´  (-,/  -147 
<https://academic.oup.com/ejil/article/25/1/129/497390/Direct-Effect-of-International-
Agreements-of-the> accessed 17 October 2017.   
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 NF, NG and NM (n 107). 
1202
 TFEU, article 263. 
1203
 NF, NG and NM (n 107) paragraphs 70-71. The case is now on appeal to the CJEU (Case C- 
208/17). 
1204
 The EU-Turkey statement (n 99). 
1205
 NF, NG and NM (n 107) paragraphs 50-51. 
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the Commission in October 2015 upon the invitation of the Heads of State or 
Government of the EU on 23 September 2015.1206 It noted that the meeting of the 
European Council on 17 March 2016 and the international summit on 18 March 
 ZHUH RUJDQLVHG µLQ SDUDOOHO LQ GLVWLQFW ZD\V IURP D OHJDO formal and 
organizational perspective, confirming the distinct legal nature of those two 
HYHQWV¶1207  
 
Instead of taking into consideration Article 31 VCLT and interpreting the 
VWDWHPHQWµLQDFFRUGDQFHZLWKWKHRUGLQDU\PHDQLQJWREHJLYHQWRWKHWHUPVRIWhe 
WUHDW\ LQ WKHLU FRQWH[W DQG LQ WKH OLJKW RI LWVREMHFW DQGSXUSRVH¶ WKH FRXUW SDLG
close attention to the formal and organizational perspectives of the meetings.1208 It 
held that the fact that the President of the European Council and the President of 
the Commission, though not formally invited, had also been present during the 
PHHWLQJ µFDQQRW DOORZ WKH FRQFOXVLRQ WKDW EHFDXVH RI WKH SUHVHQFH RI DOO WKRVH
Members of the European Council, the meeting of 18 March 2016 took place 
between the European Council DQGWKH7XUNLVK3ULPH0LQLVWHU¶1209 By informally 
engaging the President of the European Council and the President of the European 
Commission, the European Council negotiated an agreement with Turkey on the 
basis of the intergovernmental framework.1210 This way it avoided the 
cumbersome negotiating procedures involving the Commission and consultation 
of the EP.1211 7KH *&(8¶V MXGJPHQW KDV EHHQ KHDYLO\ FULWLFLVHG E\ 1*2V DQG
legal scholars arguing that the only reason why the EU would have nothing to do 
with an agreement that it strongly supports, publicises and provides EU resources 
IRU LWV LPSOHPHQWDWLRQ ZRXOG EH WR µVLGHVWHS DFFRXQWDELOLW\¶1212 The decision 
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 NF, NG and NM (n 107) paragraph 68. 
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 NF, NG and NM (n 107) paragraph 62. 
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 The Court took a similar approach in C-104/16 P Council v Frente Polisario (21 December  
2016) 86. 
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part-1-of-2/> accessed 17 October 2017. 
1211
 TFEU, article 218. 
1212
 $PQHVW\,QWHUQDWLRQDOµ(8&RXUW'HFLVLRn Exposes Deliberate Attempt to Sidestep  
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UHYHDOHG D JDS LQ (8 DQG 0HPEHU 6WDWH DFFRXQWDELOLW\ GHPRQVWUDWLQJ D µVDIH
KDYHQ¶IRU(8LQVWLWXWLRQVDQGWKe Heads of State or Government to exploit when 
conducting negotiations with third countries in the name of the EU, but when it 
comes to international responsibility it is the Member States and not the EU that 
retain responsibility. In short, the European Council took advantage of the status 
of the Heads of States or Government to reach an agreement with Turkey based 
RQ 7XUNH\¶V H[LVWLQJ FRPPLWPHQWV ZLWK WKH 8QLRQ LQ WKH ILHOG RI PLJUDWLRQ
/DEHOOLQJ WKH DJUHHPHQW DV D µVWDWHPHQW¶ DQG UHIHUULQJ WR WKH µ0HPEHrs of the 
(XURSHDQ&RXQFLO¶DV WKHµ(8¶7XUNH\ZRXOGKRQRXUWKLVDJUHHPHQW LQ OLJKWRI
its existing commitments with the EU, and in the same time, if challenged by the 
EP before the CJEU, this agreement would be disguised as a non-binding 
instrument.1213 Thus, the Members of the European Council found a way to 
commit Turkey to cooperate with Greece in the field of migration, and in the 
same time, circumvent the procedures imposed by Article 218 TFEU for the 
negotiation and conclusion of international agreements.  
 
$OWKRXJKDWILUVWVLJKWWKHSDUWLFXODUXVHRIWKHWHUPµVWDWHPHQW¶VHHPVWRVXJJHVWD
non-binding international instrument,1214 there is no doubt that the 18 March 2016 
statement transformed the general political compromises of the EU-Turkey joint 
action plan of October 2015 and the 7 March 2016 statement into legally binding 
FRPPLWPHQWVWDNLQJWKHIRUPRIDQµLQWHUQDWLRQDODJUHHPHQW¶ELQGLQJXSRQ8QLRQ
                                                                                                                                                              
$FFRXQWDELOLW\¶  0DUFK  KWWSZZZDPQHVW\HXHQQHZVSUHVV-releases/all/eu-court-
decision-exposes-deliberate-attempt-to-sidestep-accountability-1025/#.WT0mFfmGPcu> 
accessed 25 October 2017; Carmelo Danisi, ³7DNLQJWKHµ8QLRQ¶RXWRIµ(8¶7KH(8-Turkey 
Statement on the Syrian Refugee Crisis as an Agreement Between States under International 
/DZ´  $SULO   KWWSVZZZHMLOWDONRUJWDNLQJ-the-union-out-of-eu-the-eu-turkey-
statement-on-the-syrian-refugee-crisis-as-an-agreement-between-states-under-international-
law/> accessed 22 October 2017; Steve Peers, The Final EU/Turkey Refugee Deal: A Legal 
Assessment (18 March 2016, EU Law Analysis) <http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.al/2016/03/the-
final-euturkey-refugee-deal-legal.html> accessed 22 October 2017; Sergio Carrera, Leonhard 
GHQ +HUWRJ DQG 0DUFR 6WHIDQ µ,W :DVQ¶W 0H 7KH /X[HPERXUJ &RXUW 2UGHUV RQ WKH (8-
7XUNH\5HIXJHH'HDO¶&(361R-15/April 2017, 7. 
1213




$QDO\VLV´  0DUFK  KWWS://eulawanalysis.blogspot.al/2016/03/the-draft-euturkey-
deal-on-migration.html> accessed 22 October 2017. 
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institutions.1215 This argument is supported by the fact that in its fifth report on the 
Progress made in the Implementation of the EU-Turkey Statement, the 
&RPPLVVLRQUHSRUWHGWKDWµ7KH(XURSHDQ&RXQFLORI'HFHPEHUUHLWHUDWHG
its commitment to the EU-Turkey Statement, underlined the importance of a full 
and non-discriminatory implementation of all aspects and endorsed the Joint 
Action Plan on the implementation of the EU-Turkey Statement, elaborated 
EHWZHHQ *UHHFH DQG WKH &RPPLVVLRQ¶1216 Otherwise, why would the European 
&RPPLVVLRQ UHSRUW UHJXODUO\ RQ WKH VWDWHPHQW¶V LPSOHPHQWDWLRQ" 7KH +HDGV RI
State or Government in their capacity as Members of the EU and within the 
framework of the European Council created binding obligations for the Union 
outside the established procedures laid down by the Treaties. Under the auspices 
of the EU-Turkey statement it was necessary for the Member States to act 
collectively in the framework of the European Council because readmissions and 
returns cannot be implemented without their decisions. If the Union did not intend 
to create an international agreement with Turkey via the European Council, then 
why was there a need for all Member States to meet with their Turkish 
counterparts? It would have sufficed if interested Member States had set up 
obligations in the field of migration as necessary. On this basis, the statement is 
argued to have produced legal effects for the Union, constituting a binding 
decision of the EU in light of Article 17(1) ARIO. 
 
7KHNH\ WR UDLVLQJ WKH(8¶VUHVSRQVLELOLW\XQGHU$UWLFOH$5,2LVZKHWKHU
the act is in breach of an international obligation for the EU. The law on the 
responsibility of international organizations does not permit that the EU adopts a 
binding decision on its Member States to commit an act that if committed by the 
EU would constitute an internationally wrongful act. An internationally wrongful 
                                                          
1215
 Qatar and Bahrein (n 328) paragraphs 23-25; Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (n 219)  
paragraphs 96; VCLT, article 2(1)(a) ± international agreements may take a number of forms. 
1216
 European Commission, Fifth Report on the Progress made in the Implementation of the EU- 
Turkey Statement COM(2017) 204 final, 2; European Council, Conclusions 15 December 
2016 EUCO 34/16 <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/12/15-
euco-conclusions-final/> accessed 22 October 2017. 
 232 
 
act may occur either as a result of the implementation of EU legislation or in 
connection with the operationalization of its provisions.1217 This chapter argues 
WKDW WKH (8¶V SULPDU\ DQG VHFRQGDU\ OHJLVODWLRQ GR QRW FRQVWLWXWH D SUREOHP LQ
OLJKWRI WKH µIRUPDO UHFRJQLWLRQRISURWHFWLRQSULQFLSOHV¶1218 rather, the problem 
lies in making that protection a reality, i.e. in its operationalization rules.1219 The 
8QLRQ LWV 0HPEHU 6WDWHV DQG )URQWH[ DUH ERXQG WR UHFRJQLVH WKH µULJKW WR
DV\OXP¶DQGUHVSect the principle of non-refoulement in accordance with Articles 
18 and 19 of the EU Charter which have become part of its primary law.1220 In 
addition, the Union recognises the fundamental rights as guaranteed by the ECHR 
as general principles of EU law.1221 Thus, there is an absolute duty not to expel or 
UHWXUQµrefouler¶DQLQGLYLGXDOWRD6WDWHLIµsubstantial grounds have been shown 
for believing that the person in question, if expelled, would face a real risk of 
being subjected to treatment contrary to ArWLFOH¶1222 Moreover, the prohibition 
of refoulement in border control activities is clearly laid out in the SBC and the 
EBCG Regulation.1223  
 
Through the Sea Borders Regulation, from 15 May 2014, the EP and the Council 
of the EU compelled Italy and Greece to implement Articles 6(2)(b) and 7(2)(b) 
authorising participating units WRDOWHUWKHLUUHJXODUPLJUDQWYHVVHO¶VFRXUVHRXWVLGH
of or towards a destination other than the territorial sea or the contiguous zone of 
the host/coastal Member State. It was argued in this thesis that the diversion of 
irregular migrant vessels on to the high seas or possibly to third countries of 
departure constitutes a push-back practice and a collective expulsion measure in 
violation of the Refugee Convention, the EU Charter, the recast Asylum 
                                                          
1217
 Mungianu (n 84) 55. 
1218
 Goodwin-*LOOµNon-Refoulement¶Q55) 448-449. 
1219
 Goodwin-*LOOµNon-Refoulement¶Q55)  448-449. 
1220
 TEU, article 6(1). 
1221
 TEU, article 6(3) 
1222
 ECHR, article 3; Soering (n 59) paragraph 90-91; Salah Sheekh (n 715) 135; Jabari (n 197)  
paragraph 38; Hirsi (n 57) paragraph 114. 
1223
 SBC (n 158) article 4; EBCG Regulation (n 1) article 14(2). 
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Procedures Directive and the principle of non-refoulement.1224 In addition, 
WKURXJK WKHLU LPSOHPHQWDWLRQ ,WDO\ DQG *UHHFH DFW FRQWUDU\ WR WKH (&W+5¶V
judgment in Hirsi which prohibits the practice of push-back without first 
conducting an adequate assessment of individual circumstances and to assess 
whether the individual would be at risk of ill-treatment upon return, contrary to 
the ECHR and the Refugee Convention.1225 Although EU law provides formal 
protection against refoulement, it is the border JXDUGVRI0HPEHU6WDWHV¶ LQ WKH
exercise of law-enforcement functions who violate international obligations at the 
operational level. It was accepted by the CJEU in European Parliament v Council 
of the European Union that the conferring powers on the border guards such as 
DSSUHKHQVLRQ VHL]LQJ YHVVHOV DQG GLVHPEDUNDWLRQ LH µFRQGXFWLQJ SHUVRQV
DSSUHKHQGHG WR D VSHFLILF ORFDWLRQ¶ LQWHUIHUH ZLWK WKH IXQGDPHQWDO ULJKWV RI WKH
persons concerned.1226  
 
Furthermore, in light of the EU-Turkey statement and upon the &RPPLVVLRQ¶V
request,1227 Greece was obliged to amend its immigration and asylum legislation 
through Law No 4375/2016 to transform the hotspots1228 on the Greek islands 
from reception facilities for registration and screening to centres for accelerated 
readmission procedures.1229 Such decisions led to the automatic detention of all 
new irregular entrants from 20 March 2016 for the entire duration of their stay in 
Greece.1230 The automatic de facto detention of asylum seekers during the entire 
                                                          
1224
 Refugee Convention, article 33(1); EU Charter, articles 18 and 19, non-refoulement enshrined  
in EU law see TFEU, article 78(1); also see Sea Borders Regulation (n 7) article 4. 
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 Hirsi (n 57) paragraphs 125 and 185. 
1226
 C-355/10, European Parliament v Council of the European Union (ECLI:EU:C:2012:516)  
paragraph 77. 
1227
 Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the  
Council on the State of Play of Implementation of the Priority Actions under the European 
Agenda on Migration COM (2016) 85 final, 3. 
1228
 5HQDPHGµ5HFHSWLRQDQG,GHQWLILFDWLRQ&HQWHUV¶ Greek Law 4375/2016, article 46. 
1229
 Greek Law 4375/2016, article 60; European Commission, Next Operational Steps (n 915) 4;  
EU-Turkey readmission agreement (n 99VHH7)(8DUWLFOHµAgreements concluded 
by the Union are binding upon the institutioQV RI WKH 8QLRQ DQG RQ LWV 0HPEHU 6WDWHV¶






duration of the asylum process was argued in Chapter Five to violate Article 
5(1)(f) ECHR and the Reception Conditions Directive.1231  
 
It was only on the basis of the EU-Turkey statement that Greece was obliged to 
UHFRJQLVH7XUNH\DVDµVDIHWKLUGFRXQWU\¶1232 and GHWHUPLQHDVµLQDGPLVVLEOH¶1233 
asylum applications from individuals arriving from Turkey.1234 Without assessing 
the safety of Turkey in practice, decisions by Greek first-instance courts were 
based on 1) the text of Turkish law, 2) Commission correspondence with Greek 
authorities and 3) Commission correspondence with Turkish authorities declaring 
that the situation in Turkey was safe.1235 In its letter on 29 July 2016, addressed to 
Greek authorities, the Commission seems to consider Turkey as a µsafe third 
country¶ based on the Turkish legal framework and the diplomatic assurances 
provided by Turkish authorities.1236 In relation to assurances provided by a third 
country that the applicant will not be subjected to ill-treatement, the ECtHR has 
already held that such assurances are unreliable; given the absence of an effective 
system of ill-treatment prevention it would be difficult to ensure that they would 
be respected.1237 Furthermore, in Chapter Three it was argued that the Turkish 
                                                          
1231
 Musa (n 931) paragraph 97; Recast Reception Conditions Directive (n 753) article 9; ECHR, 
article 5(1). 
1232
 (XURSHDQ&RPPLVVLRQ µ$Q (8 µ6DIH &RXQWULHVRI2ULJLQ¶ /LVW¶ Q 530); This concept was 
applied as part of the Fast Track Procedure in accordance with law no 4375/2016, article 60(4). 
1233
 Asylum Procedures Directive (n 158) article 35: A Member State may reject an application as 
µLQDGPLVVLEOH¶ZLWKRXWH[DPLQLQJLWVVXEVWDQFHZKHQWKHLQGLYLGXDOVKRXOGKDYHUHTXHVWHG
asylum in the first country of arrival Asylum Procedures Directive or see article 38: the 
applicant has been recognised as a refugee in another country (first country of asylum) 
guaranteeing effective access of protection (safe third country).  
1234
 EU-Turkey statement (n 99) point 1; Greek Law 4375/2016, article 54; Greek Presidential 
Decree 113/2013, article 54 transposing Asylum Procedures Directive; EU Charter, article 18; 
Asylum Procedures Directive (n 158) articles 3 and 6; Refugee Convention, article 1 and 33; 
see Chapter 4, section 4 for further analysis. 
1235
 See documents available on <http://asylo.gov.gr/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/scan-file-
PPHSGI! DFFHVVHG  -XO\  $,'$ ³6DIH 7KLUG &RXQWU\ *UHHFH´
<http://www.asylumineurope.org/reports/country/greece/asylum-procedure/safe-country-
concepts/safe-third-country#footnoteref1_rcakwfy> accessed 17 October 2017. 
1236
 See documents available on <http://asylo.gov.gr/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/scan-file-
mme.pdf> accessed 17 October 2017. 
1237
 Baysakov and Others v Ukraine Application no 54131/08 (18 February 2010) paragraph 51; 
Klein v Russia Application no 24268/08 (01 April 2010) paragraph 55; Othman (Abu Qatada) 
v the United Kingdom ± Application no 8139/09 (17 January 2012) paragraphs 187-189, Court 
will consider the general human rights situation in the receiving country and its general 
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asylum system does not provide access to international protection as ensured by 
the Refugee Convention to individuals coming from non-CoE countries, which 
are the source of refugee producing countries.1238 The Commission should have 
been mindful to the risk of arbitrary repatriation to countries of origin in light of 
the concluded Turkish readmission agreements with Kyrgyzstan, Romania, 
Ukraine, Belarus and 22 other third countries.1239 
 
Greece itself does not have a list of safe third countries.1240 On 10 February 2016, 
in its Communication of implementation of the priority actions under the 
European Agenda on Migration, the Commission encouraged Greece to 
incorporate in its national legislation the notion of safe third countries provided 
the conditions were met.1241 7R GHWHUPLQH 7XUNH\ DV D µVDIH WKLUG FRXQWU\¶ WKH
Commission went a step further by providing a controversial interpretation of 
Article 38 of the recast $V\OXP3URFHGXUHV'LUHFWLYHVWDWLQJWKDWµWKHFRQFHSWRI
safe third country as defined in the Asylum Procedures Directive requires that the 
possibility exists to receive protection in accordance with the Geneva Convention, 
but does not require that the safe third country has ratified that Convention 
ZLWKRXWJHRJUDSKLFDOUHVHUYDWLRQ¶1242 Whereas according to the UNHCR, access 
to refugee status and the rights guaranteed by the Refugee Convention and its 
Protocol must be ensured by law and in practice.1243  
 
                                                                                                                                                              
reputation for respect of Convention rights, the quality of the assurance and its given weight 
ZLOOGHSHQGLQHDFKFDVHµRQWKHFLUFXPVWDQFHVSUHYDLOLQJDWWKHPDWHULDOWLPH¶ 
1238
 See Chapter 3, section 4.2. 
1239
 Algeria, Bulgaria, Bangladesh, China, Egypt, Ethiopia, Georgia, India, Iraq, Iran, Israel, 
Jordan, Lebanon, Mongolia, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Russian Federation, Sri Lanka, 
Sudan, Tunisia, Uzbekistan; Kart (n ). 
1240
 AIDA, Country Report Greece (2016) 77, 
<http://www.asylumineurope.org/sites/default/files/report-download/aida_gr_2016update.pdf> 
accessed 7 October 2017. 
1241
 Commission, Communication on the State of Play of Implementation (n ) 18; Asylum 
Procedures Directive (n 158) article 38. 
1242
 Asylum Procedures Directive (n 158) article 38(1)(e); Commission, Communication on the 
State of Play of Implementation (n ) 18. 
1243
 81+&5³/HJDO&RQVLGHUDWLRQV´Q104) 1, 6; emphasis added. 
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If it were not for the EU-Turkey statement the accelerated readmission procedure 
would not have been adopted, nor would DV\OXPVHHNHUV¶OLEHUW\EHWDNHQDZD\or 
would they be deprived of their µright to an effective remedy¶.1244 Nor would 
irregular migrants be subjected to inhuman and degrading treatment in Greek 
hotspots reported to be µseverely overcrowded, with significant shortages of basic 
shelter along with filthy, unhygienic conditions. Long lines for poor quality food, 
mismanagement, and lack of information contribute to the chaotic and volatile 
DWPRVSKHUH LQ WKH WKUHH KRWVSRWV¶1245 The conclusion must be that Greece has 
taken legislative action to commit acts which are internationally wrongful based 
on its obligations deriving from the EU-Turkey statement. Thus, when carrying 
out internationally wrongful acts, Member States are said to be under the 
normative control of the EU; hence, giving rise to attributed responsibility for the 
EU.1246 
 
Furthermore, in Chapter Five it was argued that Italy has conducted acts of 
LQKXPDQ WUHDWPHQWZKLOVW WDNLQJ LUUHJXODUPLJUDQWV¶ ILQJHUSULQWV1247 It is argued 
that these acts of inhuman treatment were committed by Italy because of EU 
authorization contrary to Article 17(2) ARIO.1248 For EU international 
UHVSRQVLELOLW\ WR DULVH $UWLFOH  $5,2 UHTXLUHV WKDW  µWKH LQWHUQDWLRQDO
organization authorizes an act that would be wrongful for that organization and 
moreover would allow it to circumvent one of LWVLQWHUQDWLRQDOREOLJDWLRQV¶ 2) the 
µDXWKRUL]HGDFWLVDFWXDOO\FRPPLWWHG¶DQGWKHDFWZDVFRPPLWWHGµEHFDXVHRI
WKDW DXWKRUL]DWLRQ¶1249 Through the Eurodac Regulation, the EU has imposed 
upon Italy the obligation to take the fingerprints of everyone arriving irregularly 
                                                          
1244
 ECHR, article 5(1); Reception Conditions Directive (n 753) article 9; Musa (n 931) paragraph  
97. 
1245




 See Chapter 5, section 3.1. 
1248
 $5,2DUWLFOHµ$QLQWHUQDWLRQDORUJDQL]DWLRQLQFXUVLQWHUQDWLRQDOUHVSRQVLELOLW\LILW 
circumvents one of its international obligations by authorizing member States or international 
organizations to commit an act that would be internationally wrongful if committed by the 
former organization and the act in question is committed because of that authorL]DWLRQ¶ 
1249
 ARIO Commentary (n 98) article 17, paragraph 10 and 11. 
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DW WKH (8¶V H[WHUQDO ERUGHUV1250 Due to the large scale arrivals, the Italian 
immigration and asylum system became overwhelmed and unable to take the 
fingerprints of all new arrivals. However, there were also situations when 
irregular migrants refused to provide their fingerprints, having the intention to 
move on to another Member State.1251 Therefore, to achieve the target of 100% 
fingerprinting the Commission and Frontex recommended that Italian authorities 
use force and adopt legislation on longer term retention for those migrants that 
resist fingerprinting.1252  
 
,WDO\ZDVWRDGRSWWKHµ%HVW3UDFWLFHVIRU8SKROGLQJWKH2EOLJDWLRQLQWKH(XURGDF
5HJXODWLRQ WR 7DNH )LQJHUSULQWV¶ HVWDEOLVKHG E\ WKH Council of the EU and the 
Commission VHWWLQJ RXW WKH µSURSRUWLRQDWH XVH RI FRHUFLRQ¶ SXUSRUWHGO\
accompanied with legal guarantees.1253 To oblige Italy to meet the 100% 
fingerprinting target and implement the Best Practices, the Commission opened 
infringement proceedings against Italy for violation of the Eurodac Regulation.1254 
It was only under EU pressure that Italy used force against those persons refusing 
to give their fingerprints. The EU is bound by the prohibition of torture and 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment under Article 4 of the EU Charter. 
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idUSKBN0U02H720151217> accessed 28 October 2017. 
1252
 Frontex recommends use of force see - Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry on Reception  
and Identification, (Hearing of Frontex Coordinating Officer, Miguel Angelo Nunes Nicolau, 
13 January 2016) 
<http://www.camera.it/leg17/1058?idLegislatura=17&tipologia=audiz2&sottotipologia=audiz
ione&anno=2016&mese=01&giorno=13&idCom 
missione=69&numero=0036&file=indice_stenografico> accessed 22 October 2017. 
1253
 Commission, Non-Paper for SCIFA on Best Practices for Upholding the Obligation in the  
Eurodac Regulation to take Fingerprints 13 October 2014, Annex to DS 1491/14, 2; see 
Council of the EU, Best Practices for upholding the Obligation in the Eurodac Regulation to 
take fingerprints DS 1491/14, 30 October 2014, 2; ARIO Commentary (n 98) article 17, 
SDUDJUDSKµ7KHSULQFLSOHH[SUHVVHGLQSDUDJUDSKDOVRDSSOLHVWRDFWVRIDQLQWHUQDWLRQDO
organization which may be defined by different terms but present a similar character to an 
DXWKRUL]DWLRQ«¶ 
1254
 (XURSHDQ&RPPLVVLRQ³,PSOHPHQWLQJWKH&RPPRQ(XURSHDQ$V\OXP6\VWHP´Q1039);  
European Commission, Progress Report on the Implementation of the hotspots in Italy (n 
1037) 4, paragraph 11. 
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Although the EU has not actually committed the wrongful act itself, it has 
authorised it. The Italian authorities committed an internationally wrongful act 
because of the Council of the EU and the &RPPLVVLRQ¶V FRQWULEXWLRQ WR µ%HVW
PractiFHV¶RQµSURSRUWLRQDWHXVHRIIRUFH¶1255 Therefore, it is argued that the acts 
of inhuman treatment committed by Italian authorities for the purpose of taking 
fingerprints were committed under EU authorization through rules of 
operationalization.1256 Thus, in those circumstances when an internationally 
wrongful act results from the implementation of an EU decision by the Member 
States or its authorisation to engage in certain conduct, the EU incurs primary 
responsibility.1257 On this basis, it is argued that the EU incurs international 
responsibility through circumventing one of its international obligations under 
Article 17(1) and (2) ARIO.  
 
On this basis, it is argued that the EU has a positive obligation to amend Article 
6(2)(b), Article 7(2)(b) and Article 10 of the Sea Borders Regulation to conform 
with international human rights law and other international obligations. In the 
meantime, it is suggested that Frontex joint operations at sea, Poseidon and 
Triton, must be suspended in full.1258 In relation to the EU-Turkey statement, in 
accordance with the law of international responsibility, an international agreement 
ZKLFKµFRQIOLFWVZLWKDSHUHPSWRU\QRUPRIJHQHUDOLQWHUQDWLRQDOODZLVYRLG¶1259 
7KH (8¶V pretences that the EU-Turkey statement is necessary to manage the 
European refugee crisis do not and cannot justify or excuse the EU from any 
derogation from a peremptory norm of general international law.1260 According to 
$UWLFOH$5,2DQG$65 UHVSHFWLYHO\ µQRWKLQJ LQ FKDSWHU9FDQSUHFOXGH WKH
wrongfulness of any act of a State which is not in conformity with an obligation 
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 ARIO Commentary (n 98) article 17, paragraph 10 and 11; Nedeski and Nollkaemper (n 1197) 
12. 
1256
 ARIO, article 17(2). 
1257
 ARIO, article 17. 
1258
 ARIO, article 30; Wall (n 201) paragraph 145-146. 
1259
 ARIO, article 26; ASR, article 26; ASR Commentary, article 26, paragraph 1. 
1260
 ASR Commentary (n 489) article 26, paragraph 4; ARIO Commentary (n 98) article 26,  
paragraph 3; see *DEßFtNRYR-Nagymaros Project (n 402) paragraph 48. 
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DULVLQJXQGHUDSHUHPSWRU\QRUPRIJHQHUDO LQWHUQDWLRQDO ODZ¶1261 Thus, the EU 
must ensure that Greece suspends returns to Turkey on the basis of the EU-
Turkey statement. Any returns to Turkey must be conducted upon an examination 
RILQGLYLGXDOFLUFXPVWDQFHVZLWKGXHUHJDUGWRWKHµULJKWWRDV\OXP¶DQGWKHnon-
refoulement principle. It is suggested that the Commission commences 
infringement proceedings against Italy and Greece for violations of the non-
refoulement principle and prohibition of torture and inhuman and degrading 




The law of international responsibility becomes increasingly important at a time 
when the EU and the Member States are increasing their activities beyond their 
borders. To date, practical and legal difficulties are encountered in ascertaining 
WKH(8¶VDWWULEXWLRQRIUHVSRQVLELOLW\LQDPXOWL-actor involvement strategy.  The 
law of attribution requires the establishment of a single actor to have committed 
the wrongful act before responsibility is attributed. In multi-party involvement 
this concept of singularity does not adequately address the ever-increasing State 
cooperation, nor do they respond to the activities of the EU, which acts as a global 
actor in the field of foreign security.  
 
The articles on the responsibility of international organizations as they stand do 
not adequately address the EU-Agency-Member State relationship. The regulatory 
character of Frontex allows its participating Member States and the EU to hide 
behind Frontex acts in an attempt to circumvent their responsibility. The Frontex 
operational plan, once drawn, cannot be legally scrutinised. On this basis, as long 
as Member States use the services of Frontex, they may go ahead and undermine 
their international obligations without concern that their actions will be subject to 
                                                          
1261
 ASR Commentary (n 489) article 26, paragraph 4; also see ARIO Commentary (n 98) article 
26, paragraph 3. 
1262
 TFEU, article 258. 
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judicial scrutiny. Moreover, the complex supranational framework of the EU has 
created not only gaps in shared responsibility between the EU and its Member 
6WDWHVEXWDOVRDµVDIHKDYHQ¶IURPDFFRXQWDELOLW\ 
 
It is argued here that although the articles on international responsibility have 
revealed weaknesses when addressing the EU-Agency-Member State relationship, 
nonetheless, international responsibility cannot be circumvented by the Member 
6WDWHV DQG WKH (8 $OWKRXJK )URQWH[¶V de jure mandate provides for a 
coordinating role during joint operations, it is argued that its role of a de facto 
regulator makes it responsible for violations of international obligations within its 
operational area. Thus, the EU through Frontex acquires attributed international 
responsibility for the same wrongful act committed by Frontex and the 
participating Member States. Nor can the EU take advantage of its complex 
supranational framework to circumvent its international obligations. Article 17 
ARIO has been designed specifically to attribute international responsibility to an 
international organization which tULHV WR LQIOXHQFH LWV PHPEHUV µLQ RUGHU WR
achieve through them a result that the organization could not lawfully achieve 
GLUHFWO\¶1263 Unfortunately, however, the jurisprudence of the ECtHR involving 
multi-party actors has placed obstacles for irregular migrants to hold the EU 
accountable. Thus, the present system of international adjudication for questions 
on international responsibility for international organizations and/or States is not 
well designed to deal with the unprecedented level of international co-operation 
involving several actors (States/international organizations) responsible for 
human rights violations.1264 
  
                                                          
1263
 ARIO Commentary (n 98) article 17, paragraph 1. 
1264
 $QGUp1ROONDHPSHUµ,QWURduction: Procedural Aspects of Shared Responsibility in  
,QWHUQDWLRQDO$GMXGLFDWLRQ¶  -,'6-294; Nollkaemper and Jacobs (n 90) 423; 
Lori Fisler-'DPURVFKµ0XOWLODWHUDO'LVSXWHV¶LQ/RUL)LVOHU-Damrosch (ed), The International 
Court of Justice at a Crossroads (Transnational Publishers 1987) 376. 
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Chapter 7: Conclusion 
7.1 Original Contribution to Literature and Key Findings of the Research 
Whilst irregular migration is not a new phenomenon, it has gained the most 
attention on the south-HDVWHUQERUGHUVRI(XURSHPDLQO\GXH WR WKH(8¶V ,WDOLDQ
and Greek extraterritorial deterrence measures against boatloads of irregular 
migrants. This has revealed practices at odds with key obligations under 
international human rights and refugee law, and the Law of the Sea. These 
extraterritorial measures in the form of interception and readmission agreements 
at EU and Member State level were projected to be a solution to the irregular 
migration crisis, a response to human smuggling and a contribution to the 
protection and saving of lives at sea. However, the original part of this thesis 
stands on the rejection of these assumptions arguing that now they have become 
the problem. This thesis has sought to address the question as to whether the EU, 
Italian and Greek extraterritorial measures in the form of interception and 
readmission agreements adopted against irregular migrants crossing the Aegean 
and Mediterranean seas are in compliance with EU and international human rights 
law and other international obligations. The thesis has investigated 1) the Greek 
extraterritorial practices of interception and push-backs to Turkey from January 
2014 to June 2016 and Italian indirect push-backs to Libya through EUBAM 
since 22 May 2013, )URQWH[¶VLQWHUFHSWLRQRSHUDWLRQVat sea in accordance with 
the Sea Borders Regulation to expose serious violations of human rights law and 
other international obligations and 3) the international responsibility of Greece, 
Italy and that of the EU in its collective role through Frontex and through its 
decisions addressed to Member States authorising them to commit acts that are 
internationally wrongful. 
 
It is argued that these extraterritorial practices, used as a migration containment 
belt at sea have exposed the regulatory shortcomings of the key conventions 
designed to afford international protection such as the Refugee Convention and 
the ECHR. This thesis provides an original contribution to current literature in 
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respect of finding the Refugee Convention and the ECHR inadequate to offer 
international protection in light of the unprecedented level of international co-
operation, particularly within the framework of transnational organized crime. 
The territorial limitation under Article 1A(2) of the Refugee Convention which 
UHFRJQLVHVDVDUHIXJHHDSHUVRQZKRLVµRXWVLGHWKHWHUULWRU\of his/her country of 
QDWLRQDOLW\RUKDELWXDOUHVLGHQFH¶1265 and the ECtHR interpretation for establishing 
D6WDWH¶VH[WUDWHUULWRULDOMXULVGLFWLRQin light of Article 3 ECHR have created legal 
loopholes for exploitation in State cooperation involving several actors 
responsible for human rights violations. In cases of indirect breaches of the µright 
to asylum¶ and the non-refoulement principle, these conventions become non-
applicable, thus, they are unable to offer their protection to injured parties against 
all forms of illicit State conduct. In essence however, it is argued that 
international law does not allow a State to avoid its international responsibilities 
by assisting third countries to breach their international obligations in the context 
of cooperation in migration control. This thesis has found that through financial 
and know-how assistance to Libya within the framework of transnational 
organised crime, the Libyan pull-back practices become in effect indirect Italian 
and EU push-back practices, prohibited by the ECtHR in Hirsi as a violation of 
the non-refoulement principle.  
 
In terms of push-back practices, this thesis has contributed to raise the legal 
responsibility of Italy, Greece and the EU (through Frontex) for violations of 
international obligations in light of ASR and ARIO, respectively. Thus, the 
international responsibility for Italy and the EU has been established in 
accordance with Article 16 ASR and Article 14 ARIO respectively, for aid or 
assistance given to Libya for the commission of internationally wrongful acts. In 
addition, the international responsibility of Greece has been established in relation 
to its push-back practices contrary to Article 1 and 12 ASR for the commission of 
internationally wrongful acts. Against this background, this thesis challenges the 
                                                          
1265
 European Roma Rights Centre and Others (n 74) paragraph 31; Also see UNHCR Handbook  
(n 74) paragraph 88. 
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assumptions in existing literature that the EU cannot be attributed with 
international responsibility for the internationally wrongful acts committed during 
Frontex joint operations. In light of Articles 4 and 7 ARIO, this thesis imputes 
upon the EU institutions responsible for producing EU legislative acts with 
international responsibility for every internationally wrongful act occurring during 
Frontex joint operations. 
 
Furthermore, this thesis contributes to literature by critically analysing the 
provisions of Article 6(2)(b), Article 7 (2)(b) and Article 10 of the Sea Borders 
Regulation purportedly adopted to establish uniform rules on interception and 
disembarkation, but argued here to amount to direct breaches of international 
obligations which entail bad faith implementation of key instruments such as the 
Refugee Convention, UNCLOS, SAR Convention, and the ECHR. Furthermore, 
this thesis challenges the effectiveness of the Italian and Greek asylum and 
immigration laws in the context of the Sea Borders Regulation arguing that 
through disembarkation in these two hosts/coastal Member States, Frontex 
violates EU and international search and rescue legal frameworks, the Law of the 
Sea, as well as, the prohibition of non-refoulement and collective expulsions. 
Moreover, through an original contribution, the rules on disembarkation have 
been found to have created a legal gap in protection in terms of not offering the 
possibility of alternative places of disembarkation when the host/coastal Member 
States are deemed unsafe.  It is argued that Italy and Greece are not considered 
safe places for disembarkation purposes in accordance with EU and international 
legal framework on search and rescue. Furthermore, it has been argued that the 
Sea Borders Regulation has had the effect of creating a new immigration regime 
offering less protection to irregular migrants travelling by sea compared to those 
travelling by land. 
 
Moreover, existing literature have not studied to date the EU-Turkey statement 
and the Sea Borders Regulation as tools of circumvention for international 
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obligations in light of Article 17 ARIO. Existing literature has created an 
assumption that due to WKHFRPSOH[LW\RIWKH(8¶VOHJDOIUDPHZRUN, the EU and 
its Member States may continue to exploit the gaps in the rule of law and in the 
OHJDO UHJLPH RI 6WDWH DQG LQWHUQDWLRQDO RUJDQLVDWLRQV¶ OHJDO UHVSRQVLELOLW\ DQG
accountability as to evade their international responsibility. However, this thesis 
UHMHFWVWKHDVVXPSWLRQWKDWWKHFRPSOH[LW\RIWKH(8¶VOHJDOIUDPHZRUNKDVWXUQHG
into a shield for the EU and its Member States against international responsibility 
for violations of international obligations when committed under Frontex 
coordination RUWKH(8¶VQRUPDWLYHFRQWURO. It is argued that Article 17 ARIO is 
designed precisely to prevent situations when an international organization 
attempts to circumvent its responsibility by µRXWVRXUFLQJ¶ LWV DFWRUV DQG WDNLQJ
advantage of its separate international legal personality.1266 Thus, by way of an 
original contribution the EU is argued to incur international responsibility in light 
of Article 17 ARIO because through its decisions it has obliged its Member States 
to commit internationally wrongful acts in an attempt to circumvent its 
international obligations.  
 
Based on the above framework, the following key arguments have been made in 
this thesis: 
1. EU, Italian and Greek extraterritorial practices as violations of 
international obligations.  
The illicit extraterritorial border control practices conducted by Italian and Greek 
authorities have been based on the assumption that the Refugee Convention, CAT 
and the ECHR do not apply in situations where massive arrivals of irregular 
migrants generate a state of emergency. This thesis rejects this assumption 
arguing that these conventions apply extraterritorially and any conduct contrary to 
human rights law and other international obligations triggers the international 
responsibility of that State and that of the international organizations which assist 
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 ARIO Commentary (n 98) article 17, paragraph 1. 
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in the commission of internationally wrongful acts. In addition, the inconsistent 
interpretations of the international legal framework on search and rescue and the 
inconsistent application of human rights law for irregular migrants crossing by sea 
are argued to have created a loophole in Member State and EU responsibility 
under international law for violations of human rights law and other international 
obligations.  
 
Chapter Two set out the legal framework on interception and search and rescue to 
FOHDUO\LGHQWLI\WKHERXQGDU\EHWZHHQWKH6WDWH¶V legitimate interests in protecting 
its external borders against irregular migration and the limitations of its sovereign 
right to regulate immigration on matters concerning asylum and refugee law, and 
the principle of non-refoulement prohibiting the return of individuals to a country 
where s/he might face a real risk of being subjected to ill treatment. As distinct 
jurisdictional rules apply to specific maritime zones, in light of UNCLOS, 
Chapter Two provided a detailed analysis of a 6WDWH¶VULJKWWRLQWHUFHSWDIRUHLJQ
vessel or a stateless vessel within its territorial sea or contiguous zone or on the 
high seas. As Greek and Italian authorities have treated interception operations as 
rescue missions, Chapter Two provided a detailed analysis of the international 
legal framework on search and rescue and the jurisprudence of the ECtHR to 
substantiate the argument that the application of multiple international law 
regimes does not diminish Convention rights. The SAR Convention was critically 
assessed in relation to the legal issues arising out of rescuing irregular migrant 
ERDWVLQGLVWUHVVDQGWKHµSODFHRIVDIHW\¶FRQFHSW 
 
The overlapping SAR regions of Italy and Malta have been analysed with regard 
WRWKHLULQFRQVLVWHQWLQWHUSUHWDWLRQVRIFRQFHSWVVXFKDVµGLVWUHVV¶DQGµVDIHSODFH¶
for disembarkation. 7KHLQFRQVLVWHQWLQWHUSUHWDWLRQRIZKDWLVPHDQWE\DµGLVWress 
SKDVH¶ KDV JLYHQ ULVH WR YDULRXV OHJDO LVVXHV RQ WKH µright to life¶. It has been 
argued that the reluctance of the Italian and Maltese authorities to initiate rescue 
operations upon a distress call has contributed to increased loss of life at sea. It is 
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argued that this practice has developed as a result of the legal vacuum created by 
the SAR Convention in not addressing the issue of who acquires responsibility for 
those rescued or offering a solution to situations of failed rescued scenarios and 
reluctance to initiate rescue.  Chapter Two refers to the jurisprudence of the 
ECtHR which has clearly asserted that as long as the jurisdiction of the State is 
triggered, the relevant coastal authorities have a positive obligation to ensure the 
legal protection and safeguards guaranteed under regional and international legal 
frameworks on asylum and other international obligations. Furthermore, coastal 
States have a positive obligation to take preventative measures to counter 
immediate risks to persons in distress under their responsibility. As part of the 
solution, Chapter Two advances the argument that at the moment a distress call is 
made to a coastal State from the high seas, a relationship is created through the 
HVWDEOLVKPHQWRIDQµH[FOXVLYHORQJGLVWDQFH de facto FRQWURO¶VXIILFLHQW WRPDNH
the ECHR applicable, leading to WKHUHFRJQLWLRQRIDµULJKW WREHUHVFXHG¶1267 If 
the distress call comes from within the SAR Zone this control becomes de jure 
JLYHQ WKHDGGLWLRQDOREOLJDWLRQRQ WKH6$56WDWH WR µpromote the establishment, 
operation and maintenance of an adequate and effective search and rescue 
VHUYLFH¶1268 Thus, failure to initiate a rescue operation upon receiving a distress 
FDOO EUHDFKHV WKH FRDVWDO 6WDWH¶V LQWHUnational obligation to protect the µright to 
OLIH¶.1269  
 
The issue of disembarkation has been analysed in light of the SAR Convention 
and the Sea Borders Regulation. The latter has contributed to the complexities in 
interpretation instead of adopting a uniform interpretation on principles of rescue, 
GLVWUHVV DQG GLVHPEDUNDWLRQ 7KH FRQFHSW RI µSODFH RI VDIHW\¶ KDV EHHQ
misinterpreted not because of unclear guidance by IMO or due to a lack of 
specific definition by the SAR Convention, but because of EU rules under the 
Dublin Regulation and CEAS imposing legal responsibility for the reception and 
                                                          
1267
 7UHYLVDQXW³,V7KHUHD5LJKWWREH5HVFXHG´(n 48). 
1268
  UNCLOS, article 98(2). 
1269
  ECHR, article 2; EU Charter, article 2; ICCPR, article 6; see Chapter 5 for more detail. 
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processing of asylum claims on the State in which the irregular migrant first 
disembarks. 
 
Chapter Three has investigated the legal background of these extraterritorial 
measures in the form of interception, readmission agreements and surveillance 
mechanisms such as EUROSUR under the developed three stage pre-emptive 
strategy. The purpose of this chapter was to show that these measures, whilst 
SXUSRUWHGO\ LQ WKH QDPH RI VDYLQJ PLJUDQWV¶ OLYHV DQG FRPEDWLQJ KXPDn 
smugglers, actually act as movable walls to an invisible fortress Europe, holding 
irregular migrants in an invisible belt within the Mediterranean and Aegean seas. 
In fact they are used as forms of deterrence to prevent irregular migrants from 
reaching EU territory in the most inhuman way. The chapter investigated the 
Italian and Greek extraterritorial strategy against irregular migration with the 
assistance of the EU in the light of the UN Convention against Transnational 
Organised Crime 2000 and its Protocols (the Palermo Protocols) in cooperation 
with Libya and Turkey.1270 Chapter Three argued that the detention measures 
taken by Libya and Turkey penalised irregular migrants contrary to Article 5 of 
the Migrant Smuggling Protocol and the good faith principle,1271 rendering the 
SURKLELWLRQ RI µQRQ-FULPLQDOLVDWLRQ¶ LQHIIHFWLYH LQ SUDFWLFH1272 These restrictive 
PHDVXUHVZHUHDOVRDQDO\VHGLQOLJKWRIWKHµULJKWWROHDYHRQH¶VRZQFRXQWU\¶DQG
WKH µULJKW WR VHHN DV\OXP¶1273 The recent report of the Special Rapporteur on 
counter-terrorism and human rights, Ben Emmerson QC, was used as evidence 
that there was no genuine or present link between irregular migration and 
increased terrorist activity.1274 Therefore, it was argued that the measures 
undertaken under the Protocols on migrant smuggling were disproportionate to 
                                                          
1270
 See (n 68).  
1271
 Free Zones (Switzerland v France) (n 392).  
1272
 Migrant Smuggling Protocol (n 135) article 5 - smuggled migrants should not be subject to  
criminal prosecution if they are the object of conduct related to migrant smuggling as set forth 
in Article 6 of that Protocol; An obligation similar to article 31 of the Refugee Convention. 
1273
 Refugee Convention, article 1; EU Charter, article 18; UDHR, article 14; Goodwin-Gill and  
McAdam, The Refugee in International Law (n 71) 370. 
1274
 81µ3URPRWLRQDQG3URWHFWLRQRI+XPDQ5LJKWV¶Q21) paragraph 11. 
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the aim of tackling human smuggling and do not meet the tests of legality and 
necessity. Thus, the overly-restrictive migration policies cannot be justified on 
grounds of State security.1275  
 
Thus, the Italian financial assistance to Libya and the Greek returns under the EU-
Turkey statement were analysed in light of the µright to asylum¶ and the non-
refoulement principle. The Italian extraterritorial measures undertaken post-Hirsi 
were analysed in relation to its financial contribution to Libya in the field of 
border security for the purposes of returning irregular migrants, under the mission 
known as EUBAM. Through EUBAM, the EU and Italy are assisting the Libyan 
authorities to perform pull-back practices, i.e. preventing would-be asylum 
seekers from reaching Europe. It was argued that such assistance is an indirect 
form of push-back in violation of international human rights and refugee law,1276 
interfering with the µULJKWWROHDYHRQH¶VRZQFRXQWU\¶ and incompatible with the 
non-refoulement principle. Thus, in light of Article 16 ASR and Article 14 ARIO 
respectively, Italy and the EU become derivatively responsible for the 
internationally wrongful acts committed by Libya in pulling-back irregular 
migrants in violation of its international obligations.1277 Chapter Three also 
DVVHVVHG WKH DSSOLFDWLRQ RI WKH µVDIH WKLUG FRXQWU\¶ FRQFHSW WR 7XUNH\ DQG the 
responsibility of Greece for returns to Turkey in accordance with the EU-Turkey 
statement. Turkey does not offer effective legal protection under the Refugee 
Convention or respect the principle of non-refoulement.1278 As recognised by 
ECtHR and the CJEU case law, Greece has an obligation to assess the efficiency 
of the Turkish asylum and immigration system before return, despite the fact that 
Turkey is also a party to the ECHR and a party to the EU-Turkey readmission 
agreement and the EU-Turkey statement.1279  
                                                          
1275
 81µ3URPRWLRQDQG3URWHFWLRQRI+XPDQ5LJKWV¶Q21) paragraph 11.  
1276
 See Chapter 4 on push-backs. 
1277
 ASR, article 16; ARIO, article 14. 
1278
 Roman, Baird, and Radcliffe (n 10481+&5³/HJDO&RQVLGHUDWLRQV´Q104) 5-6; See  
Chapter 4 on non-refoulement5HLQKDUG0DU[µ/HJDO2SLQLRQRQWKH$GPLVVLELOLW\¶Q542) 
10. 
1279




The chapter then VFUXWLQLVHG WKH (8¶V LQWHQVLILFDWLRQ RI VXUYHLOODQFH WKURXJK
EUROSUR, an extraterritorial tool purportedly established to contribute to search 
and rescue and saving lives at sea. Chapter Three concluded that instead of being 
DVWUDWHJLF OLIHVDYLQJ WRRO(852685¶VREMHFWLYHZDV WRFRQVWUXFWD µFRQWUROOHG
VSDFH¶ LQ WKH0HGLWHUUDQHDQ6HDZKLFKKDVFRQWULEXWHG WR increased loss of life. 
7KH (852685 µSUH-IURQWLHU LQWHOOLJHQFH SLFWXUH¶ DQG WKH µSUH-frontier situation 
LQ SDUWQHU WKLUG FRXQWULHV¶1280 were argued to be acting as a disguised form of 
push-back mechanism. In effect, the pre-frontier mechanism assists Libya and 
Turkey to conduct pull-back operations, preventing would-be asylum seekers 
IURP UHDFKLQJ LQWHUQDWLRQDO ZDWHUV WKXV YLRODWLQJ WKH µULJKW WR OHDYH RQH¶V RZQ
FRXQWU\¶ DQG WKH µULJKW WR DV\OXP¶ It was argued in Chapter Three that the 
combination of Greek illicit push-back practices, Frontex joint operations and 
EUROSUR have contributed to the deaths of irregular migrants, turning the 
Mediterranean Sea into a graveyard.  
 
Chapter Four scrutinised the illicit Greek push-back practices to Turkey from 
January 2014 to June 2016. Instead of offering assistance as required under the 
search and rescue legal framework,1281 the Greek coastguards have taken positive 
steps to ensure the immediate return of these individuals to Turkey without first 
examining their individual circumstances.1282 Chapter Four addressed the most 
contentious incidents occurring in Greek territorial waters on 20 January 2014, 25 
October 2014 and 14 August 2015. In these incidents it was alleged that the 
drowning of irregular migrants was caused as a result of Greek coastguards 
                                                                                                                                                              
57) paragraph 179; see full list of ratifications as of 11 September 2017 
<https://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-
/conventions/treaty/005/signatures?p_auth=VqX9Ev7W> accessed 11 September 2017. 
1280
 Emphasis added. 
1281
 See Chapter 2, section 4.2-4.3. 
1282
 Allegations of push-backs from November 2013 to 11 June 2016; see 3UR$V\O³3XVKHG-EDFN´ 





towing their boat to Turkey at high speed, causing it to capsize.1283 Other 
allegations were that the Greek coastguards boarded and punctured the vessel, and 
VXEVHTXHQWO\SXVKHGWKHERDWWR&HVPH7XUNH\DIWHUUHPRYLQJWKHHQJLQH¶s fuel 
tank.1284 Allegations of push-back practices have also been reported until 15 June 
2016, between Chios, Greece and Cesme, Turkey.1285 These incidents raised legal 
LVVXHVDVWRYLRODWLRQVRIWKHµULJKWWROLIH¶DQGµGXW\WRUHVFXH¶,1286 and were also 
assessed in light of the non-refoulement principle and the prohibition of inhuman 
and degrading treatment.  
 
Chapter Four concluded that these push-EDFNSUDFWLFHVKDYHSURGXFHGµDUHDODQG
LPPHGLDWH ULVN WR WKH OLIHRI DQ LQGLYLGXDO¶ YLRODWLQJ$UWLFOH(&+51287 In 
addition, the failure of the Greek authorities to initiate investigations to confirm or 
disprove these allegations violates the procedural aspect of Articles 2 and 3 
(&+5 7KH LQWHQWLRQDO GDPDJH FDXVHG WR LUUHJXODU PLJUDQWV¶ ERDWV E\ *UHHN
coastguards constitutes an internationally wrongful act. The allegations that 
during push-EDFNVLUUHJXODUPLJUDQWVZHUHµVODSSHGEHDWHQZLWKEDWRQVSXQFKHG
DQGNLFNHGRQWKHLUERG\RQWKHLUKHDGDQGRQWKHLUIDFH¶ZHUHDVVHVVHGLQOLJKWRI
Article 3 ECHR and it was concluded that these acts amounted to inhuman 
WUHDWPHQW ,Q DGGLWLRQ WKH DOOHJDWLRQV RI KDYLQJ WR µNQHHO GRZQ DQG NHHS WKHLU
KDQGV EHKLQG WKHLU QHFN¶ ZKLOVW EHLQJ ERGLO\ VHDUFKHG ZLWK VRPH LQGLYLGXDOV
being forced to take their clothes off, were considered to constitute degrading 
WUHDWPHQW FDSDEOH RI LQWHUIHULQJ ZLWK WKH LUUHJXODU PLJUDQWV¶ GLJQLW\ 7KH
international responsibility of Greece for conducting internationally wrongful acts 
was analysed in light of Article 1 and 12 ASR. 
 








 UNCLOS, article 98(1); SOLAS, Chapter V, Regulation 33.1; SAR Convention, Chapter 
2.1.10. 
1287
 SAR Convention, Annex, Chapter 1, point 11. 
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Chapter Four also proYLGHGDWKRURXJKDVVHVVPHQWRI*UHHFH¶VREOLJDWLRQQRW WR
µKDQGRYHUWKRVHFRQFHUQHGWRWKHFRQWURORIDVWDWHZKHUHWKH\ZRXOGEHDWULVNRI
persecution (direct refoulement),1288 or from which they would be returned to 
another country where such a risk exists (indirect refoulement¶1289 Through 
returning irregular migrants to Turkey pursuant to the EU-Turkey statement, 
Greece was found to violate the non-refoulement principle, which is an absolute, 
non-derogable1290 peremptory norm1291 of general international law (jus 
cogens).1292 Upon an assessment of decided cases by the ECtHR against Italy and 
Greece, this chapter has provided an original contribution by arguing that the 
reason why Italy and Greece have chosen to violate the non-refoulement principle 
despite its jus cogens character is because the economic costs for non-compliance 
is definitely lower than the costs of compliance.1293 
 
In the context of border control, Chapter Four explained that the complexity of the 
judiciary system has made these extraterritorial border controls even more 
dangerous for the individuals concerned. Irregular migrants must first exhaust the 
inadequate asylum and immigration systems of Italy and Greece before accessing 
                                                          
1288
 Refugee Convention, article 33(1); ECHR, article 3; EU Charter, article 19(2); TFEU, article  
78; Asylum Procedures Directive (n 158) article 9; Return Directive (n 42) articles 1 and 5. 
1289
 81+&5µ81+&5,QWHUYHQWLRQEHIRUHWKH(XURSHDQ&RXUWRI+XPDQ5LJKWV¶Q735)  
paragraph 4.3.4.  
1290
 Refugee Convention, article 42(1) and article VII(1) of the 1967 Protocol ± µQRUHVHUYDWLRQV 
DUHSHUPLWWHG¶*HQHUDO$VVHPEO\$5(6Q721)  paragraph 3. 
1291
 Allain (n 722) 534; Picone (n 722) 414. 
1292
 North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (n 723) paragraphs 71, 73 and 77. 
1293
 See Chapter 4, section 4; Hirsi (n 57) paragraphs 215-218, non-pecuniary damage: EUR  
15,000 for each applicant (24 applicants), costs and expenses: EUR 1,575.74; Sharifi (n 115) 
paragraphs 251-252 and 256,  non-pecuniary damage: with regards to Italy and Greece - 
applicants did not submit their claim for just satisfaction within time-limit, no amount was 
granted, costs and expenses: EUR 5,000 (granted jointly to the applicants); Khlaifia (n 115) 
paragraphs 285 and 288, non-pecuniary damage: EUR 2,500 for each applicant (3 applicants), 
costs and expenses: EUR 15,000 to applicants jointly; MSS (n 115) paragraphs 406, 411, 414, 
and 420: non-pecuniary damage: against Greece - EUR 1,000, against Belgium ± EUR 24,900 
costs and expenses: EUR 3,450 and EUR 6,075 respectively. See costs figures for EU 
countries, taking as example Germany - per asylum seeker (free meals plus EUR 143/month 
cash to maximum EUR 216/month and EUR 92/per child depending on age, compared to Italy 
EUR 35/day which goes to centres for meals and shelter and EUR 2.50 pocket money 
<http://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-migrants-benefits-factbox/factbox-benefits-




the ECtHR. Secondly, assuming that they manage to exhaust the domestic 
remedies, they must satisfy the stringent eligibility criteria in the context of 
individual applications to the ECtHR. Chapter Four analysed the difficulties 
irregular migrants encounter in relation to the strict legal standards of 
admissibility to the ECtHR in order to prove a violation of Article 2 ECHR on the 
µright to life¶ or Article 3 ECHR on prohibition of torture and other ill-treatment. 
As no expulsion order is given to irregular migrants pushed-back at sea, they have 
no opportunity to exhaust domestic remedies and as a consequence, their 
application is rejected by the ECtHR for want of victim status.1294 Thus, illicit 
practices in border control coupled with the strict legal standards of admissibility 
to the ECtHR leave irregular migrants without legal protection. In addition, these 
create gaps in accountability. To ensure more effective protection of Convention 
rights, Chapter Four suggested that the ECtHR should adopt a practice wherein 
1*2VKDYHOHJDOVWDQGLQJWRUHSUHVHQWWKHYLFWLPV¶LQWHUHVWV1295 Furthermore, the 
ECtHR should allow an actio popularis for specific cases, similar to the practice 
of the Inter-American and African Commission on Human Rights.1296  
 
Through an examination of reported cases and case studies by NGOs and civil 
society groups of alleged illicit practices in the context of extraterritorial border 
control, this thesis contributes towards demonstrating that Italy, Greece and the 
EU are blatantly undermining their obligations under international law, especially 
the Law of the Sea, the SAR Convention and international human rights and 
refugee law. Thus, in the framework of Frontex joint operations at sea, this thesis 
provides an original contribution to literature through finding that the launching 
of military vessels with the objective RI µVWRSSLQJ ERDWV¶ DQG µDOWHULQJ WKHLU
FRXUVH¶ WR D WKLUG FRXQWU\ RU RQWR WKH KLJK VHDV referred to in this thesis as a 
µFRPSDVVLRQDWH ERUGHU ZRUN¶ SROLF\ LV QRW µUHVFXH¶ 2Q WKH FRQWUDU\ LW LV D
misinterpretation and a violation of SAR duties, an over-stretching of interception 
                                                          
1294
 ECHR, article 34; Scordino (n 774) paragraph 179. 
1295
 ASR, article 33; Mayer (n 775) 911; Rebasti and Vierucci (n 775) 12. 
1296
 American Convention on Human Rights, article 44; Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the  
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, article 23; Kooijmans (n 779) 23. 
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powers under UNCLOS, and a violation of the non-refoulement principle. 
Moreover, these extraterritorial measures have had the effect of displacing 
PLJUDQW¶V URXWHV LQWR PRUH GDQJHURXV URXWHV YLD VHD WKHUHE\ FRQWULEXWLQJ WR
increasing the number of deaths in the Mediterranean and Aegean seas. In so 
doing, they are in violation of the µULJKWWROLIH¶The representation of interception 
DV D µFRPSDVVLRQDWH ERUGHU-ZRUN¶ SROLF\ HTXDWHG WR 6$5 FRQFHSWV EXW KDYLQJ
human rights consequences most certainly do not find support in international 
law. 
 
2. The Sea Borders Regulation and lack of compliance with the SAR 
Convention and international human rights and refugee law. 
It has been argued that the consolidation rules on interception, search and rescue 
and disembarkation constitute a formal legitimisation of Member State push-back 
SUDFWLFHV LI FRPPLWWHG XQGHU )URQWH[¶V FRRUGLQDWLRQ The provisions of the Sea 
Borders Regulation, particularly those in regard to interception, search, rescue and 
disembarkation, it is argued violate the principle of non-refoulement and 
international refugee law. These rules seem to have created a new immigration 
regime which offers less protection to those irregular migrants arriving by sea. In 
addition, it is argued that the rules on disembarkation are flawed. They do not take 
into consideration the possibility of providing an alternative place of 
GLVHPEDUNDWLRQ LI WKH KRVWFRDVWDO 0HPEHU 6WDWH¶V DV\OXP DQG LPPLJUDWLRQ
system and conditions of disembarkation are not safe. It is argued that by 
disembarking these irregular migrants to Italy and Greece, Frontex violates 
international human rights law and other international obligations. 
 
&KDSWHU )LYH TXHVWLRQHG WKH &RXQFLO RI WKH (8 DQG WKH (3¶V GHFLVLRQ WR DGRSW
rules on external border controls exclusively for Frontex joint operations, 
especially when considering that disputes and human rights violations take place 
through unilateral maritime border controls performed by Member States. Thus, 
Chapter Five argued that the objective of the Sea Borders Regulation was not to 
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provide a sustainable solution to the inconsistency in interpretation of 
interception, search and rescue and disembarkation practices, but was an attempt 
to use the EU regulatory framework to legitimise push-backs disguised as 
interception practices under the auspices of the fight against human smugglers 
and the deterrence of irregular migration. Chapter Five analysed Article 6(2)(b) 
governing interception on the territorial sea and Article 7(2)(b) on the high seas, 
two particularly controversial provisions of the Sea Borders Regulation. These 
provisions permit participating units to alter WKH LQWHUFHSWHG LUUHJXODU PLJUDQWV¶
YHVVHOV¶FRXUVHWRDGHVWLQDWLRQRWKHUWKDQWKHWHUULWRULDOVHDRUFRQWLJXRXV]RQe of 
the host/coastal Member State. Such a provision leads to a possible diversion of 
the vessel to international waters or a third country. Therefore, Chapter Five 
UDLVHGWZRNH\OHJDOLVVXHVTXHVWLRQLQJµ1) the legality of the permissive measure 
conducted in the territorial sea of the host Member State (Article 6(2)(b)), or on 
the high seas (Article 7 (2)(b)); and 2) the effectiveness of the Sea Borders 
Regulation to ensure the protection of fundamental rights and the principle of 
non-UHIRXOHPHQW¶1297 These provisions were assessed in light of the two incidents 
reported by activist networks between 5 August 2015 and 11 June 2016,1298 
argued to constitute a push-back practice and a collective expulsion measure,1299 
resulting in a violation of the Refugee Convention, the EU Charter, the recast 
Asylum Procedures Directive and the principle of non-refoulement, as well as the 
Sea Borders Regulation itself.1300 In addition, these provisions infringe the µright 
to life¶1301 and the µduty to rescue¶ at sea.1302 Furthermore, the Sea Borders 
Regulation has not stopped the rescue avoidance behaviours as analysed in 
                                                          
1297
 See Chapter 5, section 5.2. 
1298
 ,QIRPRELOHµ,QIRUPDWLRQZLWKDERXWDQGIRU5HIXJHHVLQ*UHHFH¶Q601); Watch the Med,  
³,OOHJDO3XVK-%DFN´Q601). 
1299
 Protocol No 4 to the ECHR, article 4; Hirsi (n 57) paragraphs 134, 138; see Chapter 4 on  
push-backs. 
1300
 Refugee Convention, article 33(1); EU Charter, articles 18 and 19, non-refoulement enshrined  
in EU law see TFEU, article 78(1); Sea Borders Regulation (n 7) article 4. 
1301
 ICCPR, article 6; ECHR, article 2; EU Charter, article 2; UDHR, article 3; Aas and Gundhus  
(n 79) 14. 
1302
 UNCLOS, article 98(1); SOLAS, Chapter V, Regulation 33.1; SAR, Chapter 2.1.10 ; also  
contrary WRWKH6HD%RUGHUV5HJXODWLRQ¶VREMHFWLYHµto ensure the efficient monitoring of the 




Chapter Two. On the contrary, it purports WR OHJLWLPLVH WKH SDUWLFLSDWLQJ XQLWV¶
SUDFWLFH RI DOWHULQJ WKH FRXUVH RI LUUHJXODU PLJUDQWV¶ ERDWV DQG OHDYLQJ WKH
individuals concerned stranded at sea contrary to the SAR Convention, UNCLOS 
and the ECHR. 
 
The Sea Borders Regulation was critically analysed in terms of creating a new 
immigration legal framework offering less protection to those irregular migrants 
travelling by sea. The Sea Borders Regulation seems to presume that those 
individuals who arrive by sea should be treated differently from those arriving by 
land, denying them the applicable legislative guarantees under the asylum and 
immigration legal frameworks. The creation of a new immigration legal 
framework LVQRWRQO\GLVFULPLQDWRU\EXWDOVRFRQWUDYHQHVWKH(&W+5¶VUHDVRQLQJ
in Medvedyev and more recently in Hirsi holding that the special nature of the 
maritime environment will not be allowed to fall outside the law, leaving 
LQGLYLGXDOV ZLWK µQR OHJDO V\VWHP FDSDEOH RI DIIRUGLQJ WKHP HQMR\PHQW RI WKH
rights and guarantees protected by the Convention which the States have 
XQGHUWDNHQWRVHFXUHWRHYHU\RQHZLWKLQWKHLUMXULVGLFWLRQ¶.1303   
 
In addition, Chapter Five addressed WKH6HD%RUGHUV5HJXODWLRQ¶VODFNRIVSHFLILF
rules on the possibility of providing an alternative course of action if the level of 
safety in the host Member State is questionable. On this basis Chapter Five 
analysed the local reception conditions and questioned the effectiveness of the 
asylum and immigration laws of Italy and Greece, the two main disembarking 
host/coastal Member States in Frontex joint operations at sea. For disembarkation 
purposes, it was argued that Greece and Italy no longer fulfil the µVDIHFRXQWU\¶
criteria. The Italian and Greek hotspots were shown not to guarantee basic human 
needs such as food, shelter and medical provisions, contrary to the SAR 
Convention.1304 ,QDGGLWLRQWKHLUUHJXODUPLJUDQWV¶DXWRPDWLFde facto detention in 
                                                          
1303
 Medvedyev (n 159) paragraph 81; Hirsi (n 57) paragraphs 177 and 178. 
1304
 SAR, Annex 3, Chapter I, 1.3.2. 
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Italy and Greece is unlawful in light of Article 5(1)(f) ECHR.1305 Furthermore, 
through disembarking irregular migrants to Italy and Greece, it was argued that 
Frontex violated Article 4 of the EU Charter and Article 3 ECHR by knowingly 
subjecting an individual to conditions of detention and living conditions which 
amount to torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.1306 
Moreover, the Greek asylum and immigration appeals system does not offer an 
effective remedy, contrary to the overall objective of the EU Charter and the 
ECHR, whilst the Italian identification procedures are flawed and violate the non-
refoulement principle. Chapter Five scrutinised the Italian readmission agreement 
with Sudan and found that it LQIULQJHV DQ LQGLYLGXDO¶V ULJKW WR VHHNDV\OXm and 
violates the principle of non-refoulement and the prohibition of collective 
expulsions.1307 The chapter concluded that by disembarking irregular migrants to 
Italy and Greece, Frontex through its implementation of the Sea Borders 
Regulation violates EU and international search and rescue legal frameworks on 
the grounds of the non-refoulement principle and prohibition of collective 
expulsions.  
 
Thus, the Sea Borders Regulation has failed to resolve the inconsistent search and 
rescue practices occurring in the Aegean and Mediterranean seas. Even worse, its 
adoption rather seeks to legitimise these practices when performed under Frontex 
coordination contrary to a good faith implementation of international human 
rights and other international obligations. Moreover, the Sea Borders Regulation 
is perceived in this thesis to be the means to establish a new immigration regime 
which subjects irregular migrants arriving by sea to less protection. Under this 
new immigration regime, it is argued that irregular migrants travelling by sea are 
subjected to push-back practices endangering their lives in violation of the µright 
to life¶ and µsearch and rescue duties¶, as well as forced disembarkation to Italy 
                                                          
1305
 ECHR, article 5(1); Recast Reception Conditions Directive (n 753) article 9; Musa (n 931)  
paragraph 97. 
1306
 NS and ME (n 133) paragraph 88; MSS (n 115) paragraphs 358, and 367. 
1307
 Refugee Convention, article 33; ECHR, article 3; Protocol No 4 to the ECHR, article 4; EU  
Charter, article 18 and 19. 
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and Greece, two host Member States which no longer satisfy the safe place of 
disembarkation criteria nor provide adequate asylum and immigration systems. 
 
3. The Use of WKH (8 OHJDO IUDPHZRUN DV D VKLHOG DJDLQVW (8¶V
international responsibility for violations of international obligations 
when committed under Frontex coordination. 
This thesis argues that the deployment of Frontex, the adoption of the Sea Borders 
Regulation and the conclusion of an EU-Turkey statement are strategic tools 
designed to create confusion as to the responsible actor committing human rights 
violations and at the same time as a shield against responsibility and 
accountability for violations of international obligations. Through Frontex and its 
regulatory framework, the EU seeks to circumvent its international responsibility 
for any internationally wrRQJIXODFWFRPPLWWHGXQGHUWKH(8¶VQRUPDWLYHFRQWURO
7KH )URQWH[ UHJXODWRU\ IUDPHZRUN LV XVHG QRW RQO\ WR KHOS PDQDJH WKH (8¶V
external borders but as a strategic tool to exploit the international judiciary system 
which is ill-equipped to hold international organisations accountable for the 
commission of internationally wrongful acts. The thesis contributes to 
HVWDEOLVKLQJWKH(8¶VLQWHUQDWLRQDOUHVSRQVLELOLW\WKURXJKWKDWRI)URQWH[LQOLJKW
of Articles 4 and 7 ARIO. Frontex has been found to be the de facto controller in 
command of Frontex joint operations, thus, the wrongful conduct of the seconded 
border guards are attributable to the EU through Frontex. In addition, it is argued 
that the EU has stepped in to use its competence to act in the area of freedom, 
security and justice by taking advantage of the limited case law on the 
responsibility of States and international organisations with the hidden aim of 
circumventing its international responsibility and that of its Member States for 
violations of international obligations. However, it is argued that in light of 
Article 17 ARIO, the EU incurs international responsibility precisely because it 
takes advantage of its separate international legal personality and that of its 
Member States to circumvent its international obligations. Thus, the EU is argued 
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to acquire international responsibility for obliging its Member States through its 
decisions to commit internationally wrongful acts. 
 
&KDSWHU 6L[ DQDO\VHG WKH (8¶V DWWULEXWHG UHVSRQVLELOLW\ LQ DFFRUGDQFH with the 
JHQHUDO UXOHV RQ $5,2 7KLV FKDSWHU DGGUHVVHG WKH (8¶V LQWHUQDWLRQDO
responsibility by arguing that the internationally wrongful acts committed during 
Frontex joint operations may be attributed to the EU via Frontex. The EU-
Agency-Member State relationship was explored in the context of joint operations 
at sea to address the question as to whether international responsibility can be 
diluted in cases involving various parties when applying EU law. The legal 
question raised in this chapter was whetheUWKHµFRQGXFWof a Member State border 
guard during Frontex joint operations is attributable to the EU and/or to its 
0HPEHU6WDWHV¶ in light of Articles 4 and 7 ARIO.1308 As Frontex joint operations 
raised similar legal issues as those situations involving UN peacekeeping 
operations, the jurisprudence of the ECtHR was assessed in light of the law on 
international responsibility, referring mainly to the cases of Behrami and 
Saramati and Al-Jedda.1309 2Q WKH EDVLV RI ZKR PDLQWDLQV D IDFWXDO µHIIHFWLYH
FRQWURO¶ RI WKH µRSHUDWLRQDO FRPPDQG¶ LW ZDV DUJXHG WKDW )URQWH[ ZDV WKH
decision-making body which retained de facto command and control of the 
operational plan.1310 As Frontex was found to be the only entity responsible for 
drawing up an operational plan detailing the organisational and procedural aspects 
of the joint operation, it was argued that Frontex retained control of the seconded 
ERUGHU JXDUGV DV UHTXLUHG E\ $UWLFOH  $5,2 )URQWH[¶V ZURQJIXO FRQGXFW ZDV
argued to be attributed to the EU, thus making the EU internationally responsible. 
On this basis, as Frontex is accountable to the Council of the EU and the EP it 
ZDV VXJJHVWHG WKDW WKHVH WZR LQVWLWXWLRQV LQYLWH )URQWH[¶V ([HFXWLYH 'LUHFWRU WR
report on any allegations of wrongful acts committed in joint operations Triton 
and Poseidon and underline the necessity to exercise his positive duty to terminate 
                                                          
1308
 Chapter 6, section 6.3. 
1309
 Behrami and Behrami (n 1092); Al-Jedda (n 1092). 
1310
 Al-Jedda (n 1092) paragraph 67. 
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or suspend in full or in part these joint operations which have adversely effected 
the human rights of irregular migrants.1311 
 
Chapter Six also critically analysed the Sea Borders Regulation and the EU-
Turkey statement in light of Article 17 ARIO as extraterritorial measures 
GHVLJQHG WR FLUFXPYHQW WKH (8¶V UHVSRQVLELOLW\ IRU YLRODWLRQV RI LQWHUQDWLRQDO
obligations such as the non-refoulement principle. These extraterritorial measures 
were assessed against the objective of Article 17 ARIO which attributes 
international responsibility to the EU if it influences its members to commit an 
internationally wrongful act that it cannot itself commit. However, as Article 17 
ARIO comes with limitations, the chapter assessed whether in order to avoid its 
own international obligations, the EU intended to benefit from the distinct legal 
personality of its members. As Article 17(1) ARIO applies to decisions of the EU, 
the chapter had to assess the much debated legal status of the EU-Turkey 
statement as to whether it constitutes an international agreement. The legal status 
of the EU-Turkey statement was addressed in the cases of T-192/16 NF, NG and 
NM v European Council,1312 in which the GCEU concluded that the statement did 
not emanate from an institution, body, office or agency of the EU.1313 This chapter 
challenged the GCEU decision which is currently on appeal to the CJEU. It was 
argued that the language used in the EU-Turkey statement press release purports 
to present this agreement as a non-binding instrument. The actual objective 
behind this disguise however, is to avoid the cumbersome negotiating procedures 
imposed by Article 218 TFEU involving the Commission and consultation of the 
EP.1314  
 
Concluding that the Sea Borders Regulation and the EU-Turkey statement 
constitute binding decisions of the EU, the chapter moved on to analyse the 
                                                          
1311
 EBCG Regulation (n 1) article 25 (termination/suspension); EBCG Regulation (n 1) article  
68(2) (report to Council of the EU and EP). 
1312
 (n 107). 
1313
 TFEU, article 263. 
1314
 TFEU, article 218. 
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prohibition under Article 17 ARIO against the EU adopting a decision binding its 
0HPEHUV WR µFRPPLW DQ act that if committed by the EU would constitute an 
LQWHUQDWLRQDOO\ ZURQJIXO DFW¶1315 The above-mentioned binding decisions were 
argued to raise legal issues not with regard to their formal recognition of 
protection principles but in relation to their operationalisation rules. At the 
operational level, it was argued that the border guards of Member States which 
exercise law enforcement functions in the implementation of the Frontex 
operational plan have violated human rights law and other international 
obligations, establishing the causation element necessary for the application of 
Article 17(1) ARIO. Chapter Six scrutinised the changes made by Greek law no 
4375/2016 in compliance with Greek commitments under the EU-Turkey 
statement, in terms of human rights law and other international obligations.1316 In 
addition, the chapter assessed in light of Article 17(2) ARIO the Italian acts on 
LQKXPDQWUHDWPHQWZKHQWDNLQJLUUHJXODUPLJUDQWV¶ILQJHUSULQWVDUJXLQJWKHVHDFWV
to have been committed because of EU authorization.   
 
On this basis, it is argued that the Sea Borders Regulation and the EU-Turkey 
statement have been designed as extraterritorial tools perceived to constitute 
formal legitimisation of push-back practices contrary to the non-refoulement 
principle and the prohibition of collective expulsions entailing a bad faith 
implementation of key instruments such as the Refugee Convention, UNCLOS, 
SAR, and the ECHR. But most importantly, it is argued that the EU may not use 
the complexity of its legal framework as a shield against international 
responsibility when issuing decisions and authorisations contrary to international 
human rights and other international obligations. However, in light of the law of 
international responsibility, it is possible to impute the EU with responsibility for 
every internationally wrongful act or omission attributable through Frontex or its 
decisions authorising its Member States to commit internationally wrongful acts. 
                                                          
1315
 See the analysis in Chapter 6, section 6.4. 
1316
 *UHHN/DZDUWLFOHVHH7)(8DUWLFOHµAgreements concluded by the  
8QLRQ DUH ELQGLQJ XSRQ WKH LQVWLWXWLRQV RI WKH 8QLRQ DQG RQ LWV 0HPEHU 6WDWHV¶ Council 
concludes all international agreements, see TFEU, article 218. 
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Necessarily, a EUHDFK RI WKH (8¶V LQWHUQDWLRQDO REOLJDWLRQV HQWDLOV its duty to 
declare the EU-Turkey statement void. Returns to Turkey must be conducted only 
upon an adequate assessment of individual circumstances. Furthermore, this thesis 
suggests that Article 6(2)(b), Article 7(2)(b) and Article 10 of the Sea Borders 
Regulation must be amended as to conform with international human rights law 
and other international obligations.  
 
7.2 Research Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research 
In terms of the scope of the research and the nature of the irregular migration 
phenomenon, this thesis was limited to conducting a doctrinal analysis based on 
qualitative research drawing on primary and secondary sources. The nature of the 
irregular migration phenomenon imposes limitations in terms of conducting 
quantitative research as a result of irregular migrants departing from different 
third countries and entering EU territory through irregular means with constantly 
changing routes managed by migrant smugglers. Thus, quantitative research to 
determine the number of people who come to Europe in small boats and the 
treatment they receive during interception and rescue becomes difficult; 
especially as they are immediately detained in secure facilities with no 
opportunity of access. Therefore, this thesis has used statistics and data provided 
by regional and international agencies, civil society groups and NGOs, whose 
reports have gained authority through being relied upon by the ECtHR. The data 
provided by the IMO and the UNHCR together with civil society groups have 
been very useful in creating a nuanced picture of the irregular migrant arrivals 
crossing the Mediterranean Sea.  
 
One of the main challenges encountered in terms of statistics has been the lack of 
official and accurate counting and registering of the number of irregular entries by 
sea and the number of deaths during border crossings. If the Member States had 
created a unique system for the registration of the number of deaths occurring at 
their land or sea borders, the international community would have a better picture 
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of what is truly going on in the Mediterranean Sea, especially in terms of the 
effects of any extraterritorial measure undertaken in the name of humanitarianism 
and border security. An official system of registration would not only be 
beneficial to families who report their family members as missing but would also 
be important for policy makers and international courts, in terms of quantification 
of the irregular migration phenomenon in the Mediterranean Sea. Registration is 
necessary for domestic and international courts to better analyse Member State 
practices in the light of their EU and international obligations. Although the 
quantification of irregular migration by sea is necessary, it must be noted that any 
official system of registration would not of itself reveal the actual number of 
migrants crossing the Mediterranean Sea considering that irregular migration 
occurs covertly following irregular paths and departing from unattended ports.  
 
The nature of the irregular migration crisis posed a challenge in terms of 
GLIILFXOWLHVLQSURYLQJWKHPDLQDUJXPHQWWKDWWKH0HPEHU6WDWHV¶DQG)URQWH[¶V
practices during joint operations at sea do not comply with fundamental rights. 
The Commission and Frontex are in charge of preparing official reports as to the 
implementation of Frontex joint operations and the EU-Turkey statement. These 
reports are prepared on the basis of Member States¶ self-reporting obligations, 
Frontex guest officers on the ground, EASO, and liaison officers. The Member 
States claim that officially the operational plan is fully compliant in practice with 
the applicable EU and international legal frameworks. The reports on the other 
hand describe procedural difficulties of implementation but do not refer to any 
violations occurring during these joint operations. Therefore, limited in terms of 
SURRI LQ VXSSRUW RI WKH WKHVLV¶V PDLQ DUJXPHQW WKLV UHVHDUFK KDV EDVHG LWV
assessment on the reports of FRA and non-legal sources such as NGO reports, 





The principles of international responsibility for international organizations in 
terms of Article 4, 7 and 17 ARIO have remained underdeveloped as a result of 
jurisdictional limitations by international courts and the limited scholarly 
literature. Thus, this thesis has been limited in terms of interpreting these 
particular articles to impose international responsibility on the EU through 
Frontex, or through its decisions and authorizations. The ILC commentaries on 
Article 4, 7 and 17 ARIO have been helpful in this regard. However, it must be 
noted that it was out of these limitations in case law and literature that the EU and 
LWV 0HPEHU 6WDWHV DGRSWHG WKH µ(8¶V FRPSDVVLRQDWH ERUGHU ZRUN SROLF\¶ LQ LWV
essence largely undermining the rights of irregular migrants. At the same time, 
these limitations have contributed into the establishment of Article 17 ARIO 
which has been designed to impute international organizations with international 
responsibility if they take advantage of the complexity of their legal frameworks 
to circumvent their international obligations.  
 
Of particular concern in this thesis have been the conclusion of bilateral 
readmission agreements in respect to push-backs and refoulement to third 
countries with poor asylum systems and other rule of law deficiencies. Although 
the ECtHR in Hirsi and Sharifi challenged the illicit practices of push-backs under 
the auspices of bilateral agreements, since 2012 Member States with the 
assistance of the EU have increased their cooperation in terms of concluding 
bilateral readmission agreements at domestic and/or EU level.1317 It has been 
argued in this thesis that readmission agreements involve collective expulsions of 
migrants and push-backs at sea without a proper assessment of individual 
circumstances in violation of EU and international human rights law. These 
agreements are in effect attempts by Member States to shrug off and shift their 
responsibility for irregular migrants to third countries. A future contribution to the 
field of bilateral readmission agreements could be the proposal of an expert 
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 Hirsi (n 57) paragraphs 127-129; Sharifi (n 115) paragraph 224. 
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agency1318 with the function of scrutinising and controlling negotiations on 
bilateral readmission agreements both at EU and Member State level. Apart from 
raising standards and best practice on concluding readmission agreements, it is 
important that a mechanism is put in place to check that the agreement has been 
concluded and implemented in accordance with EU and international laws. The 
challenges brought about by these bilateral readmission agreements have not been 
due to their rhetoric, which claims consistency with international human rights 
and other international obligations, but the accelerated return provisions which 
infringe the legal safeguards established by international human rights and 
refugee law. Through its early involvement in the negotiation process, such an 
expert agency would guarantee that the third country satisfies the conditions for 
the readmission of TCNs. 
 
Another important contribution to future research on the topic of extraterritorial 
interception measures at sea could be a study on the involvement of Frontex, 
NATO and Member State military vessels in jointly patrolling the Mediterranean 
6HD ,W ZDV EH\RQG WKLV WKHVLV¶V VFRSH WR DQDO\VH WKH (8¶V EUNAVFOR MED 
operation Sophia and NATO military operations deployed to disrupt the human 
VPXJJOHUV¶ DQG WUDIILFNLQJ QHWZRUNV LQ WKH &HQWUDO 0HGLWHUUDQHDQ 5RXWH1319 
Germany and Greece requested NATO to patrol Turkish and Greek territorial sea, 
as well as international waters1320  LQVXSSRUWRIµWKHEURDGHULQWHUQDWLRQDOHIIRUWV
WRVWHPWKHIORZRILOOHJDO WUDIILFNLQJDQGPLJUDWLRQLQ WKH$HJHDQ6HD¶1321 The 
                                                          
1318
 The agency could mirror the organic structure of FRA which includes legal experts,  
statisticians, political and social scientists. By way of suggestion the agency should include 
reputable NGOs as part of the structure to provide insightful information on what actually 
happens on the ground.  
1319
 Council Decision (CFSP) 2015/778 of 18 May 2015 on a European Union military operation 
in the Southern Central Mediterranean (EUNAVFOR MED), (2015) OJ L 122/31; NATO, 
Press Conference by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg following the meeting of the 
North Atlantic Council at the level of Defence Ministers, 11 February 2016 
<http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_127972.htm> accessed 25 October 2017. 
1320
 Germany leads the NATO operation, together with participating members such as Canada,  
France, Germany, Greece, Turkey and the UK. 
1321
 1$721$72¶V'HSOR\PHQWLQWKH$HJHDQ6HD(Fact Sheet, October 2016)  
<http://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2016_10/20161025_1610-factsheet-
aegean-sea-eng.pdf> accessed 25 October 2017. 
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31 ships of the 1$72¶VStanding Maritime Group 2 from eight states patrol the 
$HJHDQ6HDWREUHDNWKHVPXJJOHUV¶EXsiness model and at the same time purport 
to save lives at sea.  
 
This thesis has identified the Frontex military intervention not as a humanitarian 
tool but as a strategic warfare tool used against irregular migrants. It is suggested 
that the NATO military interventions have been deployed with similar aims. 
NATO does not have the mandate to board, search, seize and destroy boats of 
smugglers, or to interdict and turn away boats of migrants.1322 NATO has openly 
stated that it does not intend to act as a transportation company for irregular 
migrants.1323 NATO has openly stated in the media that rescued irregular migrants 
at sea would immediately be returned to Turkey.1324 The British Defence 
Secretary, Michael Fallon, has explained that the intention is to save lives in the 
Aegean and break the criminal networks from Turkey to Europe.1325 1$72¶V
deployment to the Aegean Sea is questioned in light of search and rescue 
obligations which NATO ships have under international maritime law to rescue 
people who are at risk of drowning. Not only does this practice go beyond 
1$72¶V FRPSHWHQFH EXW ZLWKRXW DQ DGHTXDWH DVVHVVPHQW RI LQGLYLGXDO
circumstances it constitutes a collective expulsion measure and also violates the 
Law of the Sea 1$72¶V LQYROYHPHQW LQ WKH $HJHDQ 6HD UDLVHV Verious legal 
                                                          
1322
 House of Lords, European Union Committee, 2SHUDWLRQ6RSKLD7KH(8¶V1DYDO0LVVLRQLQ 
the Mediterranean: an Impossible Challenge 14th Report of Session 2015-6, HL Paper 144, 
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issues in terms of violations of international human rights and refugee law and 
thus constitutes an important area of study for future research. 
 
A further contribution to future research could be the effects of opening legal 
migration channels of well-organised and coordinated resettlement and integration 
policies as a solution to prevent irregular migration. Future research should be 
focused on the means of tackling the refugee crisis from different perspectives 
including economic factors such as trade and employment as well as concerns for 
fundamental human rights.1326 The European Economic forecast demonstrates that 
since 2011, the refugee crisis has produced positive economic outcomes in the 
EU, raising the Gross Domestic Product level of the EU to 0.2-0.3% by 2020.1327 
Furthermore, irregular migrants could be seen as a long term benefit to the EU 
considering its ageing population and the problem of labour shortages.1328 Thus, 
future research could be conducted to explore the range of options towards 
finding the most effective way to open up channels to derive mutual benefit from 
irregular migration.  
 
The arrival of over a million asylum seekers within the EU does not really 
represent a crisis of capacity for the Member States but rather one of political 
leadership.1329 Politicians should change their collective mind-VHW DQGSULRULWLHV¶
bearing in mind that migration is a common part of human existence. Migration is 
not necessarily a problem as such and is definitely not a crime. On this basis, 
future research should be focused on migration governance to open secure legal 
pathways for migrants, not to close off borders by wasting billions of Euros to 
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fund an EU policy which has failed to prevent irregular migrants and refugees 
from entering EU territory. The consequence of existing policies has been the 
tragic death of thousands of people dying in an attempt to find protection or a 
better life in Europe. The root causes of these tragedies rest with the policies and 
practices of the Member States and EU agencies. Opening up legal channels is the 
only way to weaken the criminal organisations responsible for human smuggling 
and most importantly to save lives at sea.  
 
The battle against human smuggling and the irregular migration phenomenon is 
happening at the expense of persons in desperate need of international protection 
and thus in violation of international human rights and refugee law. The EU and 
its Member States have an obligation not to criminalise migrants who are the 
victims of conduct related to migrant smuggling but to protect these individuals, 
especially those entitled to special protection such as refugees and other 
vulnerable groups in accordance with international obligations.1330 Furthermore, 
the continuing migration crisis requires that strong mechanisms are established to 
ensure that search and rescue operations are best coordinated by public authorities 
and to guarantee and facilitate rapid disembarkation.1331 The political debate as to 
WKH LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ RI WHUPV OLNH µSODFH RI VDIHW\¶ DQG µGLVWUHVV¶ ZLOO FHDVH RQO\
when disembarkation is not linked to the processing of asylum applications.1332 
7KXVDPRUHFLYLOLVHGEDODQFHPXVWEHGUDZQEHWZHHQWKH0HPEHU6WDWHV¶ULJKW
to protect their borders and the µright to life¶.  
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